

STILLBORN REPUBLIC:

Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936

by George Th. Mavrogordatos

This is a revisionist work that challenges the common perception of Modern Greek history as a succession of foreign interventions, military coups, and personality conflicts. It is also the first systematic study of mass politics in Modern Greece, and of their implications for party strategy and conflict.

Focusing on the tumultuous and critical interwar period—1922-1936—the author dissects class, ethnic, and regional cleavages, and shows that the contending political forces drew the core of their mass support from distinctive coalitions of particular strata, groups, and areas. Venizelism (named after its charismatic leader Eleftherios Venizelos and identified with the short-lived interwar Republic) represented the historic alliance between the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and a potentially radical popular base. This alliance was forged around a program of modernization that had originally combined pragmatic irredentism with social reform, but was irreparably crippled by military defeat in 1922 and the Depression in 1931. In contrast, Antivenizelism (identified with the Monarchy) embodied a romantic reaction of all those affected or threatened by historical

Jacket Illustration:

Venizelos (standing on the gangplank) arrives in Chios on the eve of the senatorial by-election of 5 November 1933. (Photograph by N. Frydas, courtesy of the Benaki Museum.)

Stillborn Republic

This One



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Map 1. OLD GREECE AND NEW LANDS.

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Party Strategies in Greece,
1922–1936

George Th. Mavrogordatos

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*To my mother
For my father
and his generation*

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PREFACE

This study grew out of dissatisfaction with available interpretations of modern Greek history, and out of exasperation with the political exploitation to which they lend themselves. Despite great diversity in their ideological inspiration, theoretical foundations, scholarly pretensions, scope, and focus, these interpretations converge in one crucial respect: explanation is ultimately reduced to the elite level alone, while the impact of mass politics is ignored, denied, or else very superficially treated.

This should be expected of traditional historiography, focusing as it does on individual actors, "great men" or otherwise. It should also be expected of the innumerable studies of foreign intervention in this dependent country, since foreign policy is an elite domain par excellence. But it is also ironically true of most class analyses of Marxist inspiration. Shunning concrete and detailed historical research, they commonly prefer to take for granted an extremely rudimentary and abstract scheme, which essentially boils down to the perennial confrontation between an undifferentiated "ruling class" (usually called the "bourgeoisie," but also the "oligarchy," the "establishment," etc.) and the "popular classes" (usually meant to include an undifferentiated peasantry and working class, while the petty bourgeoisie hardly ever enters the picture). In its theoretical status and notwithstanding the terminology used, this kind of simple juxtaposition of

a “ruling class” and “the people” is more akin to a theory of elites than to a theory of classes.¹ Its implications are also similar, since it has to assign most of political conflict in modern Greece to “family disputes” within the “ruling class,” which can then only become intelligible through recourse, once again, to individual actors and foreign intervention.

Although it developed within an entirely different theoretical perspective, the more recent clientelist approach also leads to a theory of elites and has similar implications. No wonder that its fusion with this sort of “class” analysis has been smooth: it is through the patron-client system that the “ruling class” maintains its domination over “the people” in times of parliamentary rule.

Effectively reducing explanation to the elite level alone, these various interpretations explicitly or implicitly view the vast majority of the population as an amorphous mass of atomized, undifferentiated, and normally passive spectators of politics, subject to continuous manipulation or repression. Apart from being ideologically distasteful, this image readily lends itself to disturbing political exploitation, exemplified by the propaganda of the 1967–1974 military regime, under which this study was originally conceived. But it is also a highly implausible image, in view of the fact that Greece has had functioning representative institutions and universal suffrage during most of its history as an independent state, *and* that several elections were decisive turning points in that history. It is, moreover, quite unwarranted and premature, given the almost total lack of systematic research on mass politics in modern Greece, which is only beginning with this study.

The interwar years, starting in 1922 and ending in 1936 with respect to competitive politics, were chosen for several reasons, both substantive and practical. In the first place, these years constitute a clearly distinct period in Greek political development—not only because of the convenient boundaries provided by the two world wars. By 1922–1923, the modern Greek state reached or rather was confined by military defeat to its definitive territorial expansion and population,² and was confronted with the formidable task of assimilating new lands and people, including almost a million and a half destitute refugees (one-fifth of its total population). A new period was beginning in disaster and tremendous social dislocation,

1. For a classic examination of the relationship between elite and class theory, see Bottomore, pp. 18–41.

2. Only the Dodecanese Islands were to be incorporated subsequently, in 1947.

but also under a new regime, the Republic, proclaimed in 1924.³ Its short life was characterized by intense political and social conflict, the emergence of class parties, and recurrent military intervention, which eventually led to its downfall and monarchical restoration in 1935, and subsequently to the suppression of competitive politics as such in 1936. Apart from the interest that the period presents in itself, it also contains the seeds of subsequent political developments, during the war and postwar years and down to the present. Finally, the interwar period offers a wealth of data and other materials readily available for the study of mass politics, which seems to be greater relatively to both earlier and later periods.

The purpose of this research is thus to propose an explanation of the intense political conflict and of the concomitant crisis of legitimacy that destroyed the interwar Greek Republic in terms of mass politics—and more specifically in terms of *cleavages* existing at the mass level. As stated earlier, the intention is deliberately revisionist with respect to previous explanations, which have focused on “great men,” elites, and nonelectoral processes. Military intervention in particular has commonly received an inordinate amount of attention, creating an unbalanced and misleading image of the period. It has been written, for example, about the regime issue, that it “was fought out through coups and countercoups during the 20’s and 30’s.”⁴ The truth of the matter is that the regime issue was *also* fought out through several elections. A balanced picture should therefore include *both* the military coup and the electoral process as two alternative “sites” or “arenas” in interwar politics and in the strategic calculus of political elites.

Moreover, the impact of mass politics was of course by no means restricted to the electoral process and civilian rule. To take only the most obvious example, this impact can be clearly seen in the two major military confrontations of the period (1923 and 1935), which, since swift and successful action in the capital was precluded, escalated into brief civil wars involving large areas, if not the entire country. In both cases, the areas, army units, and readily mobilizable reserves on which the warring camps could rely closely corresponded to those defined by existing mass cleavages and on which they would rely in an electoral contest as well. Battlefield, actual leadership, and strategy were different, but the troops were largely the same.

3. Greek usage refers to it as the “First Republic.” Strictly speaking, it was the Second Republic, given that the first regime of the modern Greek state, under Capodistrias, was also republican. Since there is no danger of confusion, and hence no need to resolve this question of terminology, the interwar regime will be simply referred to as the Republic.

4. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, p. 127.

An attempt, such as this, to revise previous reductionist explanations naturally runs the risk of verging into the opposite reductionism. This would involve viewing mass politics as a sufficient explanation of interwar political conflict—perceived as a mere reflection of divisions in the society. Although this is an old and well-entrenched conception, it has come under attack within the context that most seemed to justify it, that is, politics in Western Europe. It has been argued in particular that conflict articulation and management “are elite and institutional activities, and their linkage with mass phenomena is problematic.”⁵ Criticism of this sort can perhaps be avoided, if mass politics are viewed not as a sufficient but as a *necessary* explanation and, furthermore, as concretely related to elite strategies. This study will therefore proceed to examine three successive questions:

1. What were the principal features of mass politics during the interwar period, and in particular what were the main cleavages on the mass level?
2. What was the effect of mass politics and especially cleavages on party strategies?
3. What were the consequences for conflict regulation?

It should be explained at the outset that the logical sequence of these three questions also involves a descending order of emphasis and elaboration, which is imposed by the original purpose and limits of this research. Otherwise, it would become necessary to expand this study into a full-fledged historical analysis of a very complex period and include several aspects which must remain outside its scope, such as military politics, economic, and foreign policy.

It is appropriate to introduce this study of interwar cleavages with a brief discussion of a central and directly pertinent modern Greek myth, which may be called “the myth of social homogeneity.” It is the claim that modern Greece has somehow been blessed with a situation quite unlike that of any other country: that of being an entirely or, at the very least, an essentially homogeneous society, lacking the cleavages which are common elsewhere. A concomitant myth claims that modern Greece has been entirely free of racism.

There is nothing particularly Greek about the myth of social homogeneity as such. What would seem to be peculiar to Greece, however, is the firm assumption that the country has been an extraordinary exception in this respect, as well as the lasting consensus and resilient respectability that

5. Giuseppe Di Palma, ed., *Mass Politics in Industrial Societies* (Chicago: Markham, 1972), p. 400.

the myth has enjoyed, in practically every quarter. It has explicitly or, more often, implicitly permeated political discourse throughout modern Greek history, including the interwar period. Although it is not possible to offer a detailed analysis of its derivation and manifestations here, suffice it to briefly note its functions within the particular interwar setting, as well as its consequences for the present study.

Given that it generally denies and shrouds from social consciousness the very existence or, at least, the real importance of social differentiation into distinct and potentially conflicting groups, the uses of such a myth are fairly obvious, and several are relevant for interwar Greece. With reference to social classes, the myth evidently protects the existing social order by blocking the emergence of class consciousness. With reference to national minorities, the myth protects the territorial integrity of the state, especially if these minorities are located in sensitive border areas—disputed or coveted by neighboring states which claim the national allegiance of local populations. Finally, with reference to ethnic groups, religious, or regional subcultures, the myth protects national identity, especially if this identity is predicated on the assumption of a common ethnic stock. This assumption has been a central tenet of Greek nationalism.

Although each of these points will be developed and clarified in the appropriate place, the general implications for this study must be emphasized at the outset. There is an almost total lack of directly relevant and useful studies on which this analysis could rely. Whatever exists on ethnic groups usually deals only with folklore, while it typically also strives to prove their Greek origin and identity. In the case of national minorities, the focus of innumerable studies is on foreign propaganda and machinations rather than on the life of these minorities themselves. As for religious divisions, the emphasis of existing writings is mostly theological. Finally, a similar vacuum continues to exist with respect to social classes and strata, despite a prolific socialist, communist, or otherwise Marxist literature. Imprecise, inconsistent, and based usually on arbitrary doctrinal constructions rather than on concrete research, it offers little reliable help for an understanding of interwar class structure—with fewer exceptions than one might expect.

Under the pervasive grip of the myth of social homogeneity, the absence of scholarly studies goes hand in hand with, reflects, and in turn perpetuates a generalized lack of public recognition. It is only in very practical and typically electoral contexts that fragmentary references or allusions to the particular condition and behavior of specific groups can be gleaned—from variegated sources, including mainly political correspondence and contemporary press reports. Consequently, this study heavily

relies on such fragments, while it cannot claim to provide the missing social history of the period.

Although this is primarily a case study, certain aspects may be of broader theoretical interest. One is the treatment of charisma, clientelism, and cleavage as complementary and interrelated explanatory models for mass politics. Another is the linkage of mass politics to elite strategies and their implications for conflict management. In both instances, the analysis of the interwar Greek experience may point to neglected or else inadequate aspects of the literature. More generally, this study may be of some theoretical significance as a deliberate attempt to bring together, for the analysis of a concrete historical situation, theoretical perspectives, concepts, and methodological instruments that are commonly developed and used in splendid isolation. Otherwise, neither the design nor the scope of this research allow for the meaningful "testing" of a particular theory.

The comparative implications of this study are more problematic. This is directly related to the general question of placing Greece in a class in terms of development, or in an area in terms of geography, history, and culture. In both respects, its position is ambiguous or, at least, distinctly intermediate.⁶ Semideveloped or transitional, it has been variously considered a part of the Balkans, Southern or Mediterranean Europe, and even the Near East. Although it is not possible to examine this problem in greater detail here, the comparative context of Mediterranean Europe, including Greece, has recently been shown to be both appropriate and fruitful by a growing body of literature, first in anthropology, then also in economics, history, and political science. Today, this context is also dictated by political developments in these countries and by their evolving relationship with the European Community.

"Maximum convergence"⁷ in the political development of the countries of Mediterranean Europe (i.e., mainly Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece) can be observed in the latter part of the 19th, and the beginning of the 20th centuries, until World War I. During the war and interwar periods, common patterns are harder to identify, and Greece in particular followed a course of its own in many respects. Nonetheless, several parallels or contrasts with other Mediterranean countries, the Balkans, and Latin America will become apparent in the course of this analysis.

My principal intellectual debts for this book, apart from those dis-

6. See, e.g., Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, pp. 1–2.

7. Kurth, p. 2.

persed among footnotes, can be nicely and meaningfully grouped in three committees of equal size.

The first was of course my dissertation committee in Berkeley. Giuseppe Di Palma, Richard Herr, and J. Merrill Shanks patiently tolerated my various meanderings and made sure that I would eventually approximate the requirements of their diverse respective fields: comparative politics, modern history, and quantitative methods. Beppe in particular proved far more than a usual committee chairman.

To my mind, there was a parallel "shadow" committee as well, although it never actually met: Reinhard Bendix as a presence, but also as a source of uniquely perceptive advice; Richard A. Webster, with his passion for Italian history, for Giolitti, but also for Venizelos; and Christopher Achen, amused but never too exasperated to help me out of a methodological quagmire.

The transformation of the dissertation into a book was guided by yet another committee of three: Edward E. Malefakis, John A. Petropulos, and Sidney G. Tarrow. Thanks to their comments and suggestions, I had one more chance to reconcile the requirements of diverse viewpoints.

In Greece itself, the first debt should be to the late Gregorios Dafnes, both for his books and for the few discussions I was privileged to have with him. My friends Elias Nicolacopoulos, Nikos Oikonomou, and Phoebus Papageorgiou provided, between them, far more than a substitute for the locally missing institutional sources of research support and scholarly debate. Constantinos Tsoucalas unfortunately came too late to add much in person to what I already owed him for his published work.

Finally, among the many persons and institutions that were essential to my protracted collection and treatment of information, I should single out Chryssa Maltezou and Voula Konti, then at the Benaki Museum, who patiently assisted my fanatical exploration of the Venizelos Archive.

To the extent that these intellectual debts are also debts of friendship, I hope to be forgiven for the poor use I may have made of precious advice.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

CALENDAR

Greece adopted the Gregorian calendar on 1 March 1923 (16 February 1923 according to the Julian calendar previously in force). The day or month of earlier events appears in this study only on rare occasions. These include dates of documents, newspapers, speeches, parliamentary debates, etc., and dates of elections or other important events, such as the November Days of 1916. Given that the identification of these sources or events, rather than their precise chronology, was of importance to this study, it seemed preferable to report them as they are originally dated or commonly referred to (according to the Julian calendar) rather than correct the date or list two dates on every occasion—an extremely burdensome procedure.

TRANSLITERATION

The continuing absence of a standard system of transliteration poses problems for the rendering of Greek names and references in English. The system adopted here, and presented below, has been guided mostly by phonetic considerations and simplicity—with some concessions to tradition, particularly in the case of the spiritus asper ('). The most doubtful case is that of “η” which is usually rendered either as “ē” or as “i.” To avoid the awkward results of both alternatives, it seemed preferable to adopt “e” as a middle course. Exceptions to the general rules were made in the case of names of places or areas which have a standard English form (e.g., Lesbos or Thessaloniki) and names of Greek authors who have been published in English with a different spelling (e.g., Tsoucalas or Pallis).

TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION OF GREEK CHARACTERS INTO
LATIN CHARACTERS

GREEK	LATIN	GREEK	LATIN
α	a	ν	n
β	v	ξ	x
γ	g	ο	o
δ	d	π	p
ε	e	ρ	r
ζ	z	σ	s
η	e	τ	t
θ	th	υ	y
ι	i	φ	f
κ	k	χ	ch
λ	l	ψ	ps
μ	m	ω	o
αυ, ευ, ηυ	av, ev, or af, ef, depending on pronunciation	μπ	b if initial mb otherwise
γκ	g if initial ng otherwise	ντ	d if initial nd or nt otherwise
γγ	ng	ου	ou
γχ	nch	spiritus asper (´)	h

FOOTNOTE CITATIONS

Full references appear in the footnotes only in the case of works which are not listed in the Bibliography. For all other works (listed in the Bibliography in single alphabetical order by author, editor, or title), footnote citations are abbreviated to include only the author's or editor's last name, and the page number(s). If more than one work by the same author appears in the Bibliography, footnote citations also include the first part of the work's title, or some other part thereof which identifies it unambiguously. Works listed in the Bibliography by title are cited in the footnotes by the title's first part.

Citations of archival material include: sender, recipient, and date; archive name (VA for Venizelos Archive); and file number (unless the document was found outside the numbered files, in which case it is designated as unclassified). Whenever the sender cannot be identified, usually because the signature is illegible, his name is replaced by X?.

References to parliamentary debates include: the name of the legislative body, whether Chamber (of Deputies), Senate, or Fourth Constituent (Assembly); the date of the session; and *Efemeris* [Gazette] or *Praktika* [Minutes], and the page number(s).

References to newspapers or magazines include the date of publication.

Finally, all translations from the Greek are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

ABBREVIATIONS

- A.P. Agrarian Party
ASO *Aftonomos Stafidikos Organismos* [Autonomous Currant Office]
ATE *Agrotike Trapeza tes Hellados* [Agricultural Bank of Greece]
BCF Balkan Communist Federation
C.P. Communist Party
EEE *Ethnike Henosis "Hellas"* [National Union "Greece"]
GSEE *Genike Synomospondia Ergaton Hellados* [General Confederation of Workers of Greece]
IMRO Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
KKE *Kommounistiko Komma Helladas* [Communist Party of Greece]
L.P. Liberal Party
P.P. People's Party
VA Venizelos Archive

INTRODUCTION

Even a cursory survey of interwar developments in Greece (such as the one presented in the following chapter) points to the relevance and importance of mass politics—if only because of several critical electoral contests (and military confrontations) in which the contending political forces depended on mass support.¹

Once the importance of mass politics is recognized, one is confronted with the choice of the theoretical approach or model which can best explain, and eventually link mass politics to party strategies. In the particular case of interwar Greece, this preliminary question is closely related to the country's intermediate or transitional level of development—taken in its most general, as well as in its specifically political sense. Three competing interpretations are suggested on both empirical and theoretical grounds, the central concept of each being *charisma*, *clientelism*, and *cleavage*, respectively. Each will be examined in turn, before their status in relation to each other, whether mutually exclusive or complementary, can be discussed.

1. The relationship between the military and the electoral arena is discussed in Chapter 7.

CHARISMA

According to the first interpretation, interwar mass politics may be explained in terms of the emergence of charismatic leaders and movements. Despite the term's widespread and often indiscriminate use, and also despite the continuing controversies it has provoked, the most elaborate and systematic formulation of a "theory of charisma" is still to be found in Weber himself, in conjunction with those interpretations which follow him most faithfully.² Weber defined charisma as

a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a "leader."³

Weber emphasized the revolutionary and emergency character of charisma, its radical opposition to everyday routine and permanent institutional structures, as well as the special characteristics of the charismatic movement, which lacks a specified hierarchy or delimitation of authority and competence. The ideal and material interests of followers and especially of disciples or lieutenants ("members of the administrative staff") require, however, the transformation of charisma into more permanent structures, that is, its "routinization," which itself presupposes its "depersonalization" into either familial or institutional charisma, particularly in view of the critical problem of succession.

Two variants or rather "transformations" of charisma seem directly applicable in the interwar Greek context: (1) the hereditary charismatic type and, specifically, hereditary monarchy, and (2) the plebiscitary leadership of the charismatic party leader, which Weber defines as a "transitional type" within the process of the transformation of charisma in an "anti-authoritarian" or "democratic" direction.⁴ In addition to these two specific types and their analysis, three relatively neglected and undeveloped aspects of the theory of charisma are of particular relevance to this study. They concern the conditions under which charismatic movements are likely to appear, the relationship between leader and followers, and the conflictual implications of charisma.

2. Especially Bendix, *Max Weber*, pp. 290–328.

3. Weber, Vol. 1, p. 241.

4. Ibid. pp. 266–271.

Eisenstadt notes that a predisposition to the charismatic appears in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress.⁵

Similarly Bendix states that

charismatic leadership occurs most frequently in emergencies, it is associated with a collective excitement through which masses of people respond to some extraordinary experience and by virtue of which they surrender themselves to a heroic leader.⁶

Finally, Parsons offers a more extensive personal interpretation on this particular point:

Any situation where an established institutional order has to a considerable extent become disorganized, where established routines, expectations, and symbols are broken up or are under attack is a favourable situation for such a movement. This creates widespread psychological insecurity which in turn is susceptible of reintegration in terms of attachment to a charismatic movement. In addition to relatively generalized and diffuse "anomie" and insecurity, there are generally specifically structured sources of strain and frustration which may have much to do with the definition of the specific content of effective charismatic appeal.⁷

On the nature of the relationship between the charismatic leader and his followers, Bendix observes:

In its "pure form" charismatic leadership involves a degree of commitment on the part of the disciples that has no parallel in the other types of domination.⁸

Weber's basic formulation is the following:

It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma. This is freely given and guaranteed by what is held to be a proof, originally always a miracle, and consists in devotion to the corresponding revelation, hero worship, or absolute trust in the leader. But where charisma is genuine, it is not this which is the basis of the claim to legitimacy. This basis lies rather in the conception that it is the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to recognize its genuineness and to act accordingly. Psychologically this recognition is a matter of complete per-

5. Eisenstadt, p. xxiii.

6. Bendix, *Max Weber*, p. 300.

7. Parsons, p. 71. Cf. Gramsci, Vol. 3, p. 1603, where the rise of "obscure forces represented by the providential or charismatic men" is linked to periods of "organic crisis."

8. Bendix, *Max Weber*, p. 300.

sonal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope. . . .

If proof and success elude the leader for long, if he appears deserted by his god or his magical or heroic powers, above all, if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear.⁹

If there is a vote,

this takes place under the pressure of feeling that there can be only *one* correct decision and it is a matter of duty to arrive at this.¹⁰

Within the context of plebiscitary democracy, this relationship may have specific implications:

The anti-authoritarian direction of the transformation of charisma normally leads into the path of rationality. If a ruler is dependent on recognition by plebiscite he will usually attempt to support his regime by an organization of officials which functions promptly and efficiently. He will attempt to consolidate the loyalty of those he governs either by winning glory and honor in war or by promoting their material welfare, or under certain circumstances, by attempting to combine both. Success in these will be regarded as proof of the charisma. His first aim will be the destruction of traditional, feudal, patrimonial, and other types of authoritarian powers and privileges. His second aim will have to be to create economic interests which are bound up with his regime as the source of their legitimacy. So far as, in pursuing these policies, he makes use of the formalization and legalization of law he may contribute greatly to the formal rationalization of economic activity.¹¹

Charisma has usually been associated with the creation of consensus and integration, especially in the context of "new nations," while, strangely enough, its implications for conflict of the most severe kind have commonly been ignored. These however can easily be deduced from the analysis of the conditions under which it arises and of the commitment it requires. Weber's relevant statements are only fragmentary, but crucial:

When such an authority comes into conflict with the competing authority of another who also claims charismatic sanction, the only recourse is to some kind of a contest, by magical means or an actual physical battle of the leaders. In principle, only one side can be right in such a conflict; the other must be guilty of a wrong which has to be expiated.¹²

9. Weber, Vol. 1, p. 242.

10. Ibid., p. 267.

11. Ibid., p. 269.

12. Ibid., p. 244.

Also, in his brief typology of parties, he distinguishes:

Charismatic parties arising from disagreement over the charismatic quality of the leader or over the question of who, in charismatic terms, is to be recognized as the correct leader. They create a schism. . . .

. . . Their conflict is essentially over questions of faith and, as such, is basically irreconcilable.¹³

CLIENTELISM

According to the second interpretation, interwar mass politics can best be explained by the formation and operation of a nationwide patron-client system. Like charisma, clientelism has recently known widespread and rather indiscriminate use. In this case, moreover, there is a plethora of more or less elaborate versions of the “theory of clientelism,” especially in political science, from which it is hard to choose, and which it is even harder to summarize and often to reconcile. Without the ambition to add one more version to the existing ones, only the central concept and its most relevant implications will be outlined.

The central phenomenon and concept which gives rise to clientelism and its theory is the *patron-client dyad*, which, in the classic anthropological formulations, has been defined as an asymmetrical dyadic contract, a many-stranded dyadic and vertical peasant coalition, or equivalently as an instrumental friendship which is (or has become) unbalanced or lopsided.¹⁴ *Clientelism*, by extension, is a particular mode of social and especially political organization, whose typical structural element and characteristic building block is the patron-client dyad. It is of course with specifically political clientelism that we will be concerned here.

The Definition and Its Implications

The essential distinguishing and differentiating elements in the definition of the patron-client relationship must be identified and emphasized, however briefly:

1. It is *dyadic* and *personal*, linking two individuals, or at most the two nuclear families that they represent.¹⁵

13. Ibid., pp. 285–287.

14. See Foster, “The Dyadic Contract,” and “The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II”; Wolf, *Peasants*, pp. 86–87, and “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations,” p. 16; and Pitt-Rivers, p. 140.

15. See Brögger, p. 121. The personal quality of the relationship has been unnecessarily confused with “face-to-face” contact and proximity. See, e.g., Powell, p. 412.

2. It is *contractual* and *achieved* (as opposed to ascribed), the result of an essentially free choice for both parties, and subject to termination by either.
3. It is *informal*, lacking legal status and sanction, and specifically distinct from the formal institutional order, even if it parallels it or spills over from it.¹⁶
4. It is fundamentally *instrumental* (as opposed to affective or emotional), even if a “minimal element of affect,” whether real or feigned, remains an “important ingredient.”¹⁷
5. It is predicated on *reciprocity*, aiming at a more or less wide-ranging and enduring exchange of goods and services, for the mutual benefit of the two parties.¹⁸
6. It is above all *asymmetrical* and *vertical*, requiring an inequality of status and resources between a superior (patron) and an inferior (client).¹⁹

Ever since the initial anthropological analyses of patron-client ties, it should have been obvious that the essential and differentiating elements of this definition must be preserved if the concept is to retain its utility. Failure to abide by this normal requirement of theory has unfortunately produced a proliferation of “redefinitions” or “refinements,” usually in the name of “adapting” the concept from anthropology to the needs of political science, and a corresponding conceptual fuzziness and confusion.²⁰

As this is clearly not the place to embark on a systematic and exhaustive critical review of the literature, the discussion will be highly selective and condensed, beginning with the most salient logical consequences flowing from the single or combined elements of the definition, and with a parallel effort to draw some dividing lines.

If the patron-client tie is dyadic and personal, it follows that it is specifically antithetical to group formation and membership. This, however, does not rule out other forms extending the relationship to involve a larger number of actors. Connected patron-client dyads may be thought of

16. The complexities raised in this respect by patron-client relations in Ancient Greece and Rome need not be examined here. See Weber, Vol. 2, pp. 1355–1356.

17. Wolf, “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations,” pp. 13 and 16.

18. Although there is considerable variation, an exchange extremely restricted in time and scope, such as a one-time bribery, or the occasional buying of votes, clearly does not require a patron-client relationship.

19. Wolf, “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations,” pp. 16–17. Some have insisted that resources must be *noncomparable*, which may be more emphatic but raises some unnecessary conceptual difficulties. See, e.g., Powell, p. 412.

20. Kaufman thus states: “There are, unfortunately, almost as many definitions of the patron-client relationship as there are writers on the subject.” Kaufman, p. 285 n. 3.

as belonging to unbounded and open-ended social *networks*, but also as forming bounded and finite *action-sets*, that is, segments of the larger network defined in terms of, and centered on a particular actor. These action-sets can be characterized as *quasi-groups* since the participants are not linked and do not (or need not) interact with each other, as in a group, but only with a specific individual, through whom membership in the action-set is established.²¹

Adding the hierarchical dimension, we may think of a patron-client network as linking individuals positioned on successive levels, each being patron to some immediately below and client to one immediately above; or of patron-client action-sets as forming a series of pyramids, each headed and defined by a patron, who may in turn be a client within the next largest pyramid, and so on. Depending on the flexibility of the situation, and on the distribution of control over strategic resources, the role of individuals on intermediate levels of such a pyramid (or of the larger network) may vary. They may no longer qualify as patrons in their own right, but rather as *middlemen* or *brokers*.

Given that the relationship is defined as dyadic and personal, it is also inappropriate to speak of patron-client ties or clientelism when the role of the client, the patron, or both is no longer occupied by an individual, but rather by a group or institution. Patron-client ties and party patronage have been commonly and indiscriminately lumped together under the label of “clientelism,” although the distinction is essential, both conceptually and empirically.²² Weingrod, for example, contrasted what he called the “anthropological” and the “political science” meaning of “patronage,” and protested that

a patronage system cannot be simply reduced to a series of “patron-client” ties; a political party is much more than a set of “dyadic contracts.” In brief, these two meanings of the term are so divergent that it is surely important to specify which type of “patronage” is being considered.²³

Speaking of party patronage, Tarrow makes a distinction along the same lines:

it is patronage channeled through an organization, rather than through a chain of individuals.²⁴

21. The discussion and terminology are taken from Mayer.

22. An example of this common practice is Powell.

23. Weingrod, p. 380.

24. Tarrow, p. 326.

Similarly, Kaufman has noted that the group/quasi-group distinction excludes

the relatively stable party machines, business organizations, and socio-economic role sets to which the clientelist model is frequently applied.²⁵

Rather than abandoning the distinction, as Kaufman seems to imply, patron-client relations and party patronage should remain separate conceptually, as they are empirically, even though they may both be seen as belonging to the same broader class or syndrome. Consequently, the term "clientelism" should be reserved for patron-client networks and sets (which *are* quasi-groups, even though they may exist *beside* or *inside* groups), whereas the situation where a group or institution acts "like a patron" may be referred to as "machine politics."²⁶ Both clientelism and machine politics may then be classified under a common heading, such as "patronage politics" or perhaps, to avert confusion (at the price of term neutrality), "political corruption."²⁷ The distinction between clientelism and machine politics can be further clarified if the latter is viewed as a transformation of the former—a point to which we shall return.

Moreover, if the patron-client relation is defined as informal, contractual, instrumental, and predicated on reciprocity, it is clearly inappropriate to use the concept whenever either coercion or legally prescribed and enforceable rights and obligations predominate in a vertical relationship.²⁸ In such cases, nevertheless, a patron-client tie may develop side-by-side with, or rather on top of the more basic relationship, usually in order to mask, modify, or even neutralize it, at least partially, to the advantage of either or both parties. A case in point is that of landowner and peasant.²⁹ To the former, the establishment of patron-client ties with "his" peasants may represent a more economic, and in the long run more effective way of preserving political control and economic exploitation; for the latter, a patron-client relationship may fulfill, or at least may seem to fulfill an even

25. Kaufman, p. 299.

26. In view of his earlier insight, it is surprising that Kaufman eventually concludes that "it seems legitimate to use the terms 'political machine' and 'clientelist party' interchangeably." Kaufman, p. 303 n. 47. His own discussion should indicate the need to distinguish between the two concepts.

27. See, e.g., Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*. One might of course adopt a different set of terms, as long as both the similarity and the dissimilarity between clientelism and machine politics are preserved. Tarrow, p. 341, speaks of *vertical* and *horizontal* clienteles. But "vertical" and "horizontal clientelism" would be both inelegant and unclear.

28. Usually in a polemical context, clientelism has often been compared to feudalism and denounced as an invidious revival of the latter. Despite the polemical merits of this association, it should not be allowed to produce conceptual confusion. Tarrow, p. 69, thus remarks:

more pressing need for survival, promising as it does to alleviate or moderate the consequences of his formal position, as well as his general vulnerability to forces he cannot control. Both sides thus appeal to a culturally sanctioned model of human interaction in order to disguise naked class relations, and remove or at least postpone the possibility of class conflict.

The same elements in the definition of the patron-client relation (i.e., its informal, contractual, instrumental, and reciprocal quality) also imply that it is inherently *unstable* and *contingent*. Its continuation remains at all times subject to unilateral utility calculation, and consequent action by either party. Competition among clients and, especially, among patrons naturally exacerbates fluidity and uncertainty. To counteract this built-in instability, a minimal element of affect is injected, as well as some pretension of egalitarianism, and the relationship is typically clothed in the language of friendship. "Political friends" seems to be the universal term for patrons and especially clients.

Its disguise as "friendship," however, only masks the instrumental and unequal quality of the relationship. Friendship remains informal. The next step against contingency is to *formalize* the relationship, and the universal form seems to be *ritual kinship*: *compadrazgo* in Spain, Latin America, and the Philippines; *comparaggio* in Italy; *koumbaria* in Greece; etc. In all these cases, a religious institution provides the means to strengthen and endow with a more explicit moral code the tie between patron (who becomes the baptismal or wedding sponsor) and client (the baptized child's father or the groom, respectively). This development may be seen as working in the opposite direction to the one discussed earlier. To pursue with the same example, the peasant who succeeds in becoming *compadre* with the landowner first seeks to cloak their basic formal relationship in an informal patron-client tie, and then proceeds to dress this tie in yet another formal relation, ritual kinship. One may speak of three superimposed layers in this case.

"Observers often confuse the clientele relationship with feudalism; in reality it is quite different. In feudal society, social relations were formalized, hierarchical, and legally sanctioned. A logical pyramid of mutual obligations was built up which was congruent with the requirements of the society for defense and solidarity. . . . Clientelismo, on the other hand, is shifting and informal, and has no institutional recognition in concrete institutions." Confusion is apt to increase when clientelism is presented as a paradigm for *all* power relationships. See especially Lemarchand and Legg, and the critique in Kaufman, pp. 290–291. For the same reasons, clientelism should not be conceptually confused with patrimonial authority, as in the paper by Kurth.

29. See, e.g., Silverman, "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships," p. 182, where patron-client ties are seen as "an extension of the landlord-peasant relationship defined by the land-tenure system."

While typically formalized as ritual (or fictive) kinship, which is also achieved, the patron-client tie is clearly distinct from actual kinship relations, which are of course ascribed. This remains true even when patron and client are kinsmen. The distinction should be made in such cases with reference to the existing family structure and recognized sphere of family obligations. If the two parties are such distant relatives that the prevailing cultural norms do not account for the degree of reciprocity and mutual assistance observed on the basis of kinship alone (and if asymmetry also exists), it is fairly obvious that a patron-client relation has been established on top of kinship.

The Emergence and Consequences of Clientelism

It has been argued that some degree of clientelism, here taken as a variable, is to be found in all societies.³⁰ This may be true, even if other kinds of interaction are *not* unnecessarily and misleadingly confused with patron-client relations. It is, however, in certain societies and under certain conditions that clientelism becomes a major, if not the dominant, mode of social and political organization. These conditions have been the object of much discussion and controversy, which need not be extensively reviewed here. They may be generally described as conditions of endemic and generalized insecurity, in which alternative ways of coping with it are lacking.

This has been shown to be primarily, though by no means exclusively, the situation of peasants, facing a hostile physical and social environment, with little or no land, inadequate technology, and generally scarce resources. Under the impact of the market and the centralized state (and although the autonomous control of local landlords may be shaken), the peasant finds himself increasingly at the mercy of not just natural and local but also distant economic and political forces, which he can neither control nor communicate with. If traditional institutions, such as the extended family, the corporate village community, or even feudal relations, do not exist, have been destroyed, or at least so weakened that they can no longer offer effective protection, modern institutions, both public and private (e.g., interest groups), are slow to develop and not yet able to replace them.³¹ During the transition, this vacuum is usually filled by patron-client networks, which not only offer a measure of security to the peasant, but also link the rural periphery to the economic and political

30. See Lemarchand and Legg, pp. 151–152. On clientelism as a variable, see also Kaufman, pp. 288–290.

31. Tarrow, p. 74, states epigrammatically that clientelism “is characteristic of fragmented systems passing from a traditional to a modern organization of social roles.”

centers. This linkage transforms local patrons into *brokers*, not only in the sense that they act as intermediaries between the local and the national level, and “stand guard over the crucial junctures or synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole,”³² but also in the sense that they no longer enjoy autonomous control over strategic resources, and are themselves subordinate to more powerful patrons.

Such structural conditions are typically related to, or rather reflected in cultural patterns of the kind made famous by Banfield’s “amoral familism” or Foster’s “image of limited good.”³³ In essence, the world is perceived as hostile, unpredictable, and wholly competitive, resources as scarce and above all *finite*, while no trust and no (practically consequential) obligations extend beyond the immediate family, outside which all social relations are fundamentally instrumental, contingent, and antagonistic. It may be observed that this is a supremely *zero-sum* perspective.

Even though clientelism may be originally an outgrowth of peasant society, it usually invades the city as well, for both cultural and structural reasons, not the least of which is the commonly overwhelming electoral weight of the countryside. Although clientelism does not require electoral politics, it develops at a tremendous pace once liberal representative and, especially, parliamentary institutions and mass suffrage are introduced into a predominantly peasant society, which is totally unprepared to adopt them in their original meaning and content, but quite prepared to *adapt* them. Clients no longer count merely for prestige or for occasional armed conflict, as before: they just *count*. Their leverage consequently increases, depending on the degree of electoral competition and fairness allowed.³⁴ On the other hand, the structural position of parliament makes it into the central node of a nationwide patron-client network, from which clientelism penetrates the centralized state bureaucracy as well.³⁵ There is no need to insist here on the detailed features of clientelist political systems, which have been characteristic of Mediterranean Europe and Latin America

32. Wolf, “Aspects of Group Relations,” p. 1072. Silverman, “Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships,” p. 188, emphasizes the element of *control*: “Mediators guarded the junctures between part and whole, at once facilitating contacts between community and nation and limiting the access of local persons to the larger society.” Although the term “mediator” is commonly used, Firth has observed in a brief note that it has connotations involving the settlement of disputes, which is misleading in this case. Terms such as “broker,” “middleman,” or “intermediary” are therefore preferable.

33. See Banfield, *The Moral Basis*; and Foster, “Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good.” The primacy of structural over cultural factors in this case has been most forcefully argued in Silverman, “Agricultural Organization, Social Structure, and Values.”

34. Portugal may be offered as a case in point; this leverage vanished after the establishment of the Salazar regime. See Cutileiro, pp. 221–222.

35. See Campbell, p. 260, who concludes that “the organization of government and the structure of patronage are parallel hierarchies.”

since the 19th century, and have become infamous under a colorful variety of loathsome names, such as *trasformismo* in Italy, *coronelismo* in Brazil, *caciquismo* in Spain and Spanish America (where it is also *gamonalismo*).

What does clientelism explain? Its immediate implications are primarily structural and organizational: it inhibits the formation, or subverts the expected operation of ostensibly modern institutions and groups. Political parties in particular, regardless of labels, programs, and other paraphernalia of modernity, merely consist of unstable coalitions of patrons at the head of their respective clienteles—coalitions put together solely for the conquest of office, which is essential (and sufficient) if protection and services to clients are to be provided. Voters in turn behave as clients, each supporting his own patron and switching parties with him. Moreover, they respond to private inducements rather than policies, issues, or group identification and interests.³⁶ The political system is thus constantly flooded with an amorphous mass of particularistic or rather specifically *personal* demands,³⁷ which it can meet only erratically, while collective or categorical demands are not made or at least are not met. Politics are fundamentally issueless and nonideological. The performance of the state bureaucracy is characterized by corruption, inefficiency, and waste. Economic development and long-term policies in general cannot be effectively undertaken, etc.

The implications of clientelism for political conflict are rather more ambiguous. On the one hand, certain kinds of conflict, such as class conflict or in general issue conflict, are effectively avoided or postponed. Moreover, if the patron-client system is stabilized and succeeds in providing a more or less steady flow of social welfare services to large numbers of strategically located clients (a performance naturally dependent on available resources and their skillful management), it may build considerable political support and legitimacy for a regime. On the other hand, the competition for spoils under zero-sum assumptions may easily escalate on both the local and the national level into violent confrontations quite comparable to class warfare, an extreme example of which would be *La Violencia* in Colombia, unless some kind of *sharing over time* is instituted, such as *rotativismo* in Portugal or *el turno* in Spain.³⁸ Moreover, clientel-

36. See, e.g., Tarrow, pp. 74–77.

37. Although personal demands are of course particularistic, not all particularistic demands are personal. They may be local, for example, and localism should by no means be confused with clientelism.

38. Kaufman, p. 286, notes that “the concept . . . allows for (and at times suggests) the possibility of intense conflict between narrowly based, shifting patron-client clusters and pyramids.” On Colombia, see, e.g., Payne.

ism may also lead to severe conflict between those who benefit from the system and those excluded from it, and, consequently, between those political forces based on patron-client relations and those created on different bases.³⁹ This is a particularly important aspect, which will be examined in greater detail subsequently.

The Transformation or Displacement of Clientelism

Several of the points made so far may be further clarified if the directions of social change which can be expected to transform or displace clientelism are briefly noted. Clientelism may be said to be *transformed* (into machine politics), when the role of individual patrons is taken over by institutions, such as political parties and interest groups. A political party is *now* "much more than a set of dyadic contracts," even though it may be, to a greater or lesser extent, a political machine, and even though its relation to voters may still involve individualized and material inducements and, in this sense, resemble a patron-client relationship. The crucial difference is that the party machine is fundamentally impersonal and its organizational core is a group, regardless of the possibility that the terminals through which it reaches individual voters may still often involve individual patrons, or rather *brokers*. Conversely, the political loyalty and identification of voters is largely transferred to the *party*. The institutionalization and expansion of state, party, and interest group activities, and the concomitant stabilization and concentration of political power that the transition from clientelism to machine politics requires,⁴⁰ originate in the national capital, the urban centers, or the developed areas in general, under the impact of economic and social change, then penetrate the countryside, where they are no longer simply taken over by local notables. Even though some kind of compromise is common, control ultimately remains at the center. A case in point would be the postwar transition from "clientelism of the notables" to "party-directed patronage" in the Mezzogiorno and in Sardinia.⁴¹

Clientelism may be said to be *displaced* when, instead of vertical and personal, *horizontal* and *categorical* interests and loyalties, particularly along class lines, become predominant. Collective interests and demands,

39. On the "exclusivism" of clientelism, see Tarrow, p. 74; and especially Graziano, p. 5.

40. Scott has perceptively remarked that the existence of a "potential machine electorate" is *not* a sufficient condition for the creation of a machine: centralization of control is also needed. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, p. 101.

41. Graziano, especially pp. 19–28. Tarrow, pp. 326 and 341, following one of his respondents, similarly speaks of the transformation of "clientelismo of the notable into clientelismo of the bureaucracy." On Sardinia, see Weingrod.

issues, policies become the main stakes of politics and the principal object of party activity, voter choice, and state action. And social cleavages, rather than patron-client networks, should be expected to provide the key for an understanding of mass politics. It is not possible to discuss here in any detail the decisive role of economic and specifically capitalist development for the transition from clientelism to machine politics to categorical politics, which may be viewed as stages in a developmental process.⁴² Suffice it to note, however, that serious doubts have been raised about the role of “peripheral” capitalist development in this respect.⁴³

CLEAVAGE

According to the third interpretation, interwar mass politics may be explained by (politically relevant) cleavages in the social structure. The linking of politics, and of political conflict in particular, to the lines along which a society is divided is as old as politics itself—or at least as old as political theory. From Plato and Aristotle to Hume and Madison, the relationship between political struggles and societal divisions has been a perennially central theoretical concern. After Marx, it has indeed dominated political thought and, eventually, political science. The study of political parties in their relation to social cleavages has certainly been the most popular field of political research for almost a century. It is clearly not possible to attempt here a survey of the long history of theory, or of the overwhelmingly voluminous modern literature on the subject.⁴⁴ Suffice it to simply indicate three points of particular relevance to this study.

1. Even if class is viewed as the ultimately single most important source of social cleavage (which is a view long antedating Marx), variation and complexity should be expected from many different directions. One is

42. The main argument of Graziano, for example, is “that the persistence and specificity of Southern clientelism is best understood if we regard it as the product of the incomplete capitalistic rationalization of the Southern economy.” Graziano, p. 4, and especially pp. 19–20, where a developmental typology in three stages is presented.

43. With reference to Greece, for example, Mouzelis has argued that, in peripheral capitalist social formations, clientelism, although weakened as the capitalist mode of production becomes dominant, is *not* displaced by “strong” and “autonomous” horizontal class organizations, presumably because they would destroy the “favorable climate” for private investment. Political participation by the lower classes is thus controlled by the dominant classes either through “dependent integration” (which involves both clientelism and “dependent” horizontal organizations) or through “dictatorial exclusion.” See Mouzelis, “Taxike Dome kai Systema Politikes Pelateias.” The most obvious weakness of this argument, however, is the vagueness of the distinction between “autonomous” and “dependent” horizontal organizations.

44. This was attempted in my unpublished paper “Party Cleavages: A Report on the Literature.” Modern classics include the works of A. Siegfried, H. Tingsten, and V. O. Key, Jr.

the widespread significance of several other sources of cleavage, such as race, religion, ethnicity, and region, which have often proved—and still prove—both remarkably persistent and irreducible to class, if not more determining than class itself.⁴⁵ Another is the Weberian perception of class and status as dialectically interrelated, but distinct and often inconsistent dimensions of social stratification and cleavage.⁴⁶ A third is the historical aspect: different class cleavages can be expected to emerge or predominate in different stages of historical development, and class cleavages in general can be expected to dominate certain stages rather than others. More specifically, they are commonly expected to become predominant in a fairly industrialized capitalist society.

2. The recognition of several dimensions of cleavage has further led to the examination of the ways in which they may be interrelated, and of the implications of various possible patterns. The most commonly emphasized aspect is whether or rather to what extent existing cleavages are *superimposed* (and mutually reinforcing) or *crosscutting* (and mutually moderating or neutralizing). A widely accepted proposition states that superimposed cleavages exacerbate political conflict and threaten democratic stability, whereas crosscutting cleavages have the opposite effect.⁴⁷

3. In a historical perspective, multiple cleavages are typically the product of successive historical crises and of “the way in which major issues dividing society have been solved or left unresolved over time.”⁴⁸ Following this thread, several efforts have been made to arrive at a general typology of historical conflicts, whose timing and outcome in each country should explain its particular pattern of cleavages, whether superimposed or crosscutting. One of the most parsimonious was the distinction of four “critical lines of cleavage” proposed by Lipset and Rokkan:

Two of these cleavages are direct products of what we might call the *National Revolution*: the conflict between *the central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries . . . ; the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing *Nation-State* and the historically established corporate privileges of the *Church*.

Among more recent sources, see, e.g., the review article by Lipset et al. and the volumes edited by Allardt and Littunen, by Lipset and Rokkan, and by Dahl.

45. See, e.g., Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 106–108.

46. Weber, Vol. 2, pp. 926–940. For an excellent presentation of this perspective, see W.G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 135–145.

47. For an extensive discussion of this proposition, see Lijphart, pp. 7–15. On the problems associated with it, and the limited empirical verification available, see Nordlinger, pp. 93–104.

48. Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 71.

Two of them are products of the *Industrial* Revolution: the conflict between the *landed interests* and the rising class of *industrial entrepreneurs*; the conflict between *owners and employers* on the one side and *tenants, laborers, and workers* on the other.⁴⁹

More abstract typologies of crises have sought to transcend the European experience by identifying, for example, *five* crises in general terms: identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution.⁵⁰ Over and above the merits of particular typologies, the most relevant aspect of this literature for the present study is the emphasis on the historical interplay between national integration, state-building, and class conflict.

MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?

The evidence to be presented in subsequent chapters suggests that important aspects of mass politics in interwar Greece come under each of the three conceptual headings of charisma, clientelism, and cleavage, and thus require the corresponding approach. Any analysis exclusively based on one, while ignoring the others, is bound to be partial and incomplete, or, worse, guilty of reductionism.

Warning against the danger of reductionism in his critique of the clientelist approach, Kaufman notes:

The larger the macro-unit, . . . the more necessary it becomes to introduce into the analysis properties and assumptions which are not implied by and cannot be derived from the patron-client concept.⁵¹

Referring in particular to “non-clientelistic opposition movements,” which sometimes “tend to be reconstituted along patron-client lines once their objectives are achieved,” he pointedly remarks:

At most, however, the interpersonal patron-client transaction is only one of the building blocks out of which such movements are built. Other equally important factors include unmediated personalistic (but not personal) identifications between national leaders and mass followers, substantial group identification, and even the relatively clear formulation of group-related goals.⁵²

49. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” in Lipset and Rokkan, p. 14.

50. Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

51. Kaufman, p. 293. (Italicized in original.)

52. Ibid., p. 295.

It may be seen that “personalistic” identification with national leaders includes (if it does not coincide with) charismatic leadership, whereas group identification and goals imply cleavages. The argument is therefore equivalent to the one presented here: that charisma, clientelism, and cleavages may *coexist* as distinct aspects of the same political situation. It remains to be seen how the implications of each modify those of the other two.

Charisma and Clientelism

An indication that charisma and clientelism are not a priori mutually exclusive may be inferred from the emphasis placed by Weber on the *material* interests of the charismatic staff and followers. Concretely, charisma and clientelism can be expected to interact in the following principal ways.

The charismatic appeal of the leader (or, after his disappearance, his charismatic legacy) becomes a *major* element in the tactical calculations of patrons. The mantle of charismatic legitimacy (of what was appropriately called the electoral *chrism* in interwar Greece) may constitute the decisive factor in electoral competition: by adding to the existing clients a complement of “charismatic” votes, it may secure victory and, consequently, insure the satisfaction of the former. In other words, a candidate may have a clientele without the *chrism* or the *chrism* without a clientele. If he has both, his chances are (typically) greatly enhanced.

Charisma, and charismatic conflict in particular, destroy much of the flexibility or freedom of movement of patrons and clients on all levels, as they are forced to take sides in inextinguishable disputes and demonstrate a degree of commitment which cannot be compared to the inherently conditional patron-client obligations.

They also destroy much of the flexibility of the charismatic leader himself, that is, the flexibility he would otherwise enjoy as a patron, because the obligation to reward and protect supporters, an obligation inherently contingent with respect to clients, now becomes coated with specific and highly emotional “sacredness” with respect to charismatic followers.

Given that charisma originally appears as a novel and revolutionary force, which disturbs or destroys traditional patterns, the emphasis has been placed so far on *its* impact on clientelism. The relationship, however, is not necessarily one-way only. The readiness of patrons and clients on all levels to exploit charisma to their advantage, although they are not really “converted” to the cause, can be expected to have a profoundly subversive effect on a charismatic movement and its cohesion, especially after it has

gained power, and the process of routinization is under way. One may speak in this case of the “transformation of charisma in a *clientelist* direction.”

Charisma and Cleavage

Even if the charisma of a political leader, like that of a prophet, “is not confined to membership in any particular class”⁵³ (or group), a charismatic movement does not emerge within a social vacuum, nor does it produce one. Charisma and cleavage should therefore be expected to interact in several ways.

To the extent that charismatic appeal is random and not confined to any particular group, it cuts across existing cleavages, and subverts or destroys any kind of group solidarity which stands in its way. Nevertheless, the appeal of charisma should rarely, if ever, be expected to be effective randomly and evenly throughout a society. Given that crisis conditions are required for its emergence, it should be most effective among those groups which are primarily (or even exclusively) experiencing these conditions—whether it is a crisis specific to them or a generalized crisis affecting them with particular intensity. Furthermore, if *competing* charismatic leaders are available, and different groups experience *different* crisis situations, each of these groups will be receptive to the charisma of *that* leader who promises to provide an answer to *its own* particular crisis, while it will deny any competing charismatic mission: not only because it does not promise to meet the group’s needs, but also because it may have been espoused by *antagonistic* groups. In all these cases, charisma not only follows the lines of preexisting social divisions, but it may also serve as a *catalyst* in bringing to the surface and in crystallizing latent or incipient social cleavages and conflicts.

On the other hand, however, when particular groups are thus converted to a charismatic cause, mass identification with the leader and his “mission” can be expected to function as a collective illusion or “false consciousness,” that is, can be expected to mask or obscure “real” group interests and the corresponding “real” cleavages, especially those to be found *within* the charismatic movement itself.

In sum, charisma may activate or exacerbate, but it may also blur or cut across cleavages. Greater clarity and insight are allowed by an equivalent formulation: charisma and charismatic conflict *create a new cleavage*,

53. Weber, Vol. 1, p. 486.

which may coincide with or cut across other cleavages, or, more precisely, may coincide with some cleavages (and be in part determined by them) and cut across others. The impact of charisma can thus ultimately be integrated into the familiar framework of superimposed or crosscutting patterns of cleavage.

Clientelism and Cleavage

Patron-client ties require an inequality of resources between the two parties, which typically corresponds to a difference in class, or at least in status. To put it more simply, clientelism *requires* inequalities which are the principal source of actual or potential cleavage. Beyond this general formulation, clientelism and cleavage can be expected to interact in the following specific ways.

The most important, and most commonly emphasized, is that patron-client ties typically mask, modify, or even neutralize class cleavages. In place of horizontal intraclass solidarities, which they dilute, destroy, or prevent, they establish solidarities, however contingent, which are vertical and interclass.⁵⁴ Clientelist parties are consequently interclass or multi-class parties—*policlasistas* in Latin American usage.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, interaction between clientelism and class cleavages should be seen as a two-way and inherently precarious balance. For instance, the periodic and occasional explosion (or, a fortiori, the definitive crystallization) of class conflict, which is typically the result of severe economic crises in peasant societies, may instantly destroy long-standing patron-client relationships.⁵⁶

Furthermore, even though clientelism typically cuts across class cleavages, it may also cut across *other* kinds of cleavage as well, such as those based on differences in race, religion, ethnicity, or status in general. Such cleavages may actually encourage the development of clientelism, as a means to bridge the discontinuities that they create.⁵⁷

Inversely, clientelism may develop and function within the *limits* or constraints set by such cleavages. This is so because

54. According to Scott, clientelism can be viewed as an alternative to “class” and “primordial” models of association. See Scott, “Patron-Client Politics,” p. 91.

55. See, e.g., Saturnino Sepúlveda Niño, *Elites Colombianas en Crises: De Partidos Policlasistas a Partidos Monoclasistas* (Bogotá, 1970). An interclass coalition may of course also be constituted on the basis of allied classes or strata rather than individuals.

56. Among many possible examples, see especially Hansen.

57. Cf. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, p. 114, who considers ethnic cleavage and/or social disorganization as one of the three conditions for the development of a political machine.

patrons and clients may well share certain social identities—such as kinship, ethnicity, religion, community, region, rural residence—which place them in the same camp along some dimensions of potential social conflict.⁵⁸

It can be seen that, in such cases, a high incidence of clientelism is clearly compatible with deep cleavages and intense conflict, along lines usually (but not necessarily) other than class. An analogous situation may be found whenever clientelism develops *within* each of warring political camps.

Finally, like charisma, clientelism itself can become the source of a *new* cleavage, which may coincide with, or cut across other cleavages. This new cleavage is primarily a consequence of the exclusivism of clientelism, and separates the beneficiaries of the patron-client system on every level from those excluded or disadvantaged. In addition, it is a cleavage between political forces consisting of well-entrenched patron-client factions and new political forces bent on replacing established patrons with new ones, or with a political machine, or even bent on destroying clientelism as a system—forces threatening to *take over*, *transform*, or *displace* clientelism, according to the distinction made earlier.

In conclusion, charisma, clientelism, and cleavage can and should be viewed and used as complementary approaches to the structure of mass politics. The specific implications of both charisma and clientelism, as sources of additional divisions in a society, can be readily integrated into the general model of multiple and interrelated cleavages, whether cumulative or crosscutting. It remains to see how the structure of mass politics may be linked to the elite level—and to party strategies in particular.

SOCIAL COALITIONS AND PARTY STRATEGIES

In Tarrow's crisp reminder, "all governments are based on social coalitions of one kind or another."⁵⁹ The truism of course also applies to political forces challenging an existing government and seeking to supplant it. The formation, maintenance, and effective steering of such coalitions provide the key link between the mass and elite levels, and the most general definition of party strategy.

Among the infinite variety of potential coalitions and strategies, sev-

58. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds," pp. 10–11. See also his distinction between "parochial" and "market" corruption, for which the test is "whether the predominant form of corruption cuts across or reinforces existing cleavages" (mainly ethnic). Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption*, pp. 88–90.

59. Sidney Tarrow, "The Italian Party System Between Crisis and Transition," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May 1977), p. 200.

eral dimensions are crucial in any case, and particularly relevant to the present study:

1. The breadth and complexity of the coalition, which may embrace one or several social classes, strata, or groups.
2. The lines along which it is constituted, implying a generic distinction between coalitions for *patronage* (covering both clientelism and machine politics) or *program*, and between corresponding strategies.
3. The choice of *arena* or site, implying, in the most generic terms, a choice between violent and nonviolent means, or, most commonly, between a *military* and an *electoral* strategy.
4. The corresponding "rules of the game," whether embodied or not in a concrete institutional framework.

Although such questions have been perennially present, in one form or another, throughout political thought and contemporary political science, there does not seem to exist a general and systematic conceptual scheme, even less a general theory, that can be readily and confidently adopted or adapted for the analysis of a particular situation. Sjöblom's observation remains true that this is "a subject area whose relevancy for political science seems obvious, but in which the literature is as yet surprisingly scanty."⁶⁰

It would be tempting to appeal to the growing family of rational-choice theories, for example. Such theories, however, have been mostly applied to conceptually and temporally restricted arenas (electoral contests and cabinet or legislative coalitions, conceived as discrete events) and remain incurably lacking in generality. This is in turn related to the insuperable limits to the quantification that such theories require. The most ambitious attempted breakthrough in this direction has proved hardly conclusive.⁶¹ Under the circumstances, invoking propositions from this literature in the present study would constitute mere illustration rather than verification, at the heavy risk of crossing the line into triviality and pedantry.

A partial exception should be made nonetheless in the case of spatial models of party competition for votes, which can be readily extended to competition for mass support in general. The exception specifically refers to the elementary dynamics derived from the distribution of the electorate

60. Sjöblom, p. 16.

61. Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).

along a given political dimension.⁶² The twin central implications for party strategy are worth restating here:

1. A *unimodal* distribution (i.e., one in which the largest number of individuals is concentrated around a *single*, more or less central, point) provides incentives for *centripetal* strategies of moderation.
2. A *bimodal* distribution (i.e., one in which the largest numbers are concentrated around *two*, more or less distant, poles) provides incentives for *centrifugal* strategies of confrontation.

Much confused controversy has grown around the problem of unidimensionality, that is, whether a single political dimension can be assumed. Among the arguments put forth to salvage this assumption (which seems so far irreplaceable in both analysis and action), unequal *salience* is particularly persuasive and useful, since the same dynamics can be expected to operate if *one* among several potential dimensions *is* or *becomes* decisive.⁶³ Hence, the question of one or several dimensions constitutes more than a mere theoretical problem. It can become *itself* an element entering the strategic calculations and initiatives of party leadership. A party may thus choose to *make* more salient by all the means at its disposal *that* particular dimension which is most favorable, through the distribution of mass support it activates, to the party's immediate goal—whether maximization of mass support or else of internal cohesion.⁶⁴ It may, for example, emphasize an issue on which the electorate is highly polarized (i.e., the distribution is bimodal) to the party's comparative advantage.

On the key distinction between coalitions (and corresponding strategies) for patronage or program, Shefter's illuminating argument can be summarized very briefly. Depending on their origin, parties are either "internally-mobilized" (founded by elites occupying positions within the existing regime) or else "externally-mobilized" (founded by "outsiders"). "Externally-mobilized" parties are likely to pursue a strategy of program. "Internally-mobilized" parties, on the other hand, are apt to pursue a strategy of patronage *unless* a constituency for "bureaucratic autonomy" (or "universalism") has emerged and consolidated its gains prior to universal suffrage, whether in the form of an "Absolutist coalition" led by the monarchy (Germany) or in that of a "Progressive coalition" led by a rationalizing middle class (Britain).⁶⁵

62. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 117–120; and Robert A. Dahl, "Some Explanations," in Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions*, pp. 372–376.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 378–381.

64. Cf. Sjöblom, p. 173.

65. Shefter, pp. 1–29. Shefter curiously proposes his "theory" in order to show that the

Otherwise, it is from Marx (especially his political writings) and, among his heirs, above all from Gramsci that one can derive still the most general and penetrating perspective on social coalitions and party strategies—however obscure and fragmentary the relevant indications may be. One has of course to recognize and be reconciled with the uncomfortable fact that no fully developed and integrated theory is to be found in these texts. On the other hand, one does not have to become involved and paralyzed in endless scholastic exegetics, nor to be carried away by the facility of a mechanical use of specific concepts.⁶⁶

Protagonist of the “New Prince,” the political party is conceived by Gramsci as “necessary expression” and therefore as “guide” of a particular social bloc.⁶⁷ In his most explicit and general formulation:

Although every party is [the] expression of a social group, and of one social group only, nevertheless in certain given conditions certain parties represent a single social group precisely in so far as they exercise a function of equilibrium and of arbitration between the interests of their own group and the other groups, and make sure that the development of the group they represent occurs with the consent and with the assistance of the allied groups—if not outright of the groups which are decidedly opposed.⁶⁸

The party is thus the agent that elaborates and carries the program or, better, the global ideological project around which a social coalition (or bloc) can be constituted, and eventual hegemony over the entire society can be established.

It is with these conceptual instruments and theoretical bearings that we can now approach the interwar Greek situation, keeping in mind that both the actual choice and the actual outcome of particular party strategies, however constrained, should be considered nonetheless ultimately indeterminate.

choice of strategy is not adequately explained by the social characteristics of a party's electorate. Yet, both the question of “external” or “internal” mobilization and the emergence and timing of a “constituency for bureaucratic autonomy” depend on the social structure and political culture of the country in question, i.e., ultimately refer back to the factors he initially intended to dismiss as inadequate.

66. See, e.g., David Abraham, “State and Classes in Weimar Germany,” *Politics and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1977), pp. 229–266.

67. Gramsci, Vol. 3, p. 1818.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 1601–1602. Translation partly taken from Hoare and Smith, p. 148.

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PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

A rapid and highly condensed survey of interwar political developments is required at the outset, to introduce the principal actors and set the stage for the analysis to follow. This chapter will therefore focus specifically on parties and elections, while neglecting other aspects of interwar history which are not directly relevant for this study.¹

Greek interwar politics were dominated by the polarization between two major political camps or blocs: Venizelism and Antivenizelism. Each was identified with a particular constitutional regime: the former with the Republic, the latter with the monarchy. Nevertheless, the correspondence was not perfect, nor free of ambiguity. Venizelism in particular should not be equated with Republicanism as a whole, which also included other groups, and especially the Left: the Agrarian Party (A.P.) and the Communist Party (C.P.).

In terms of structure, each bloc consisted of one major party, with which it was primarily identified, and several minor and often short-lived

1. The most detailed and perceptive account of interwar politics is still Dafnes, *He Hellas Metaxy Dyo Polemon*. In English, an excellent summary is to be found in Campbell and Sherrard, pp. 107–161. This chapter heavily relies on these two sources, supplemented by contemporary press reports and material in the Venizelos Archive.

parties and splinter groups. Each of the two blocs should therefore be seen as a coalition or, even more appropriately, as a “political family.” The dominant component of Venizelism was the Liberal Party (L.P.), founded and led by Eleftherios Venizelos.² Among his lieutenants, Themistokles Sofoules eventually became his successor to the party leadership. Others had left the L.P. earlier, to form several minor parties under their own leadership. Among these, greatest distinctiveness and continuity were achieved by the Republican Union, or Farmer-Labor Party, under Alexandros Papanastasiou, which constituted the Venizelist Left.³ At the opposite end, Andreas Michalakopoulos was the most consistent and articulate, if isolated, representative of the Venizelist Right, at the head of his diminutive Conservative Liberals (later Conservative Republicans). Georgios Kafandares and his Progressives occupied an intermediate, center-right position. Among the leaders of the remaining minor Venizelist groups, General Georgios Kondyles (heading the National Republicans, later National Radicals) should be singled out for his decisive extraparliamentary role and for his eventual defection to Antivenizelism. On the Antivenizelist side, the major and dominant party was the People’s Party (P.P.), founded by Demetrios Gounares, and led during the interwar period by his successor Panages Tsaldares.⁴ Out of the minor Antivenizelist parties and groups, only the Free Opinion Party of General Ioannes Metaxas remained in existence throughout the period, until his dictatorship in 1936.⁵

Antecedents: The National Schism

The interwar polarization of Greek political life between Venizelism and Antivenizelism was inherited from the preceding decade. Its first roots are to be found in the Revolution of 1909, which was inaugurated by the Goudi military revolt.⁶ Leaving the politics of his native (then autonomous) Crete, Venizelos gave a political expression and a program to the protean regenerationist movement which had been triggered by military

2. The exact title in Greek is *Komma (ton) Fileleftheron*, or “Party of (the) Liberals.”

3. In Greek, *Demokratike Henosis*, or *Agrotikon-Ergatikon Komma*. Although translated as “Republican,” the party was also fundamentally democratic, i.e., combined both meanings of *demokratikos* in modern Greek—unlike many interwar Republicans, among the military in particular.

4. In Greek, *Laïkon Komma*, i.e., literally “Popular Party.” The title is commonly translated as “Populist Party,” which lends itself to a largely unwarranted identification with populism.

5. In Greek, *Komma ton Eleftherofronon*, i.e., literally “Party of the Free-Minded” (not to be confused with freethinkers).

6. In this, as in other cases, particular historical events are mentioned as they are commonly referred to. On 1909 as a bourgeois revolution, see Chapter 3.

intervention. In the wake of the August 1910 election, he founded the L.P. and formed his first government. The resistance of the Old Parties (i.e., the parties which had governed the country until 1909) was eventually crushed: they chose to abstain from a new election in November 1910, and were soundly defeated when they ran in March 1912. Between 1910 and 1915, Venizelos and the Liberals presided over a period of internal reform and territorial expansion—the fruit of success in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.

The earlier division between the L.P. and the Old Parties was to be transformed into the National Schism (*Ethnikos Dichasmos*) in 1915–1916, over the issue of Greek participation in World War I, and over the ensuing constitutional conflict. For Venizelos and his supporters, the choice dictated by the vital interests of the Greek nation as a whole was obvious: the Greek state should enter the war on the side of the Entente in order to realize its irredentist mission, especially in Turkey, where large Greek populations were threatened with destruction. As the war proceeded, and especially after it came to Greek Macedonia, it became increasingly apparent that Greek sovereignty itself was also at stake, primarily over the New Lands (i.e., the territorial gains of the Balkan Wars) and above all Macedonia. King Constantine, however, convinced of an eventual German victory, opted for neutrality, which effectively benefited the Central Powers while increasingly exposing Greek territorial integrity and sovereignty to violations by all sides.

Constantine's refusal to accept the prime minister's policy led to the latter's resignation and to the election of May 1915, which returned an overwhelming majority for the Liberals. Refusing to submit to the electoral outcome, the king forced a second resignation of Venizelos, dissolved the Chamber once again, and called for a new election in December 1915, from which the Liberals abstained, protesting that parliamentary government had been replaced by royal absolutism. In the course of 1916, the conflict was further embittered by foreign intervention, and escalated into secession and civil war. When Constantine's regime abandoned Eastern Macedonia to the Bulgarians, Venizelos assumed the leadership of the National Defense revolt and established the Provisional Government in Thessaloniki, which entered the war against the Central Powers. Constantine's regime responded to the rebellion, and to direct Entente intervention, by unleashing a wave of persecutions and mob terror against Venizelist "traitors," culminating in the November 1916 events in Athens (November Days, or *Noemvriana*). Civil war between the "State of Athens" and the "State of Thessaloniki" continued until the summer of 1917.

The National Schism thus split state and nation into two “political worlds,” as they were characteristically called thereafter, each bent on totally subjugating, if not annihilating, the other. Venizelism was constituted by the civilian and military supporters of the Liberal leader and his policy, including more radical—republican and socialist—elements. Antivenizelism united the military and civilian supporters of Constantine (hence the alternative label “Constantinism”) and of the Old Parties, which rallied behind the king under the new leadership of Demetrios Gounares. After the first resignation of Venizelos in 1915, Gounares had been appointed prime minister by the king and had founded what was to become the People’s Party. With respect to the state, the Schism reflected a territorial division between the New Lands, acquired after 1912, and Old (pre-1912) Greece. With respect to the nation, it reflected a bitter conflict between, on the one hand, the newly liberated Greeks in the New Lands together with unredeemed Greeks elsewhere and, on the other hand, the majority of Old Greece. The national aspirations of the former were embodied in Venizelism. The war-weariness and defensive patriotism of the latter found their political expression in Antivenizelism.⁷

Eventually, in June 1917, the Entente Powers ousted Constantine and imposed Venizelos as prime minister of the reunited Greek state, still a kingdom under Constantine’s second son Alexander. Venizelos recalled the Chamber elected in May 1915 to life (hence “Lazarus Chamber”) and governed with its support until 1920. This was a period of radical reform and harsh repression at home, military and diplomatic successes abroad, culminating in the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland in Asia Minor (1919), and in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). Alexander’s untimely death, however, followed by a crushing Liberal defeat in the November 1920 election, led to Venizelos’s self-imposed exile from Greece and to Constantine’s return after a needlessly rigged plebiscite. Antivenizelism then ruled for almost two years, repressing the Liberals at home, but recklessly escalating the campaign in Asia Minor, until the collapse of the Greek army in the summer of 1922.

1922: Disaster and Revolution

The Asia Minor Disaster marks the actual beginning of the interwar period in Greece and was a turning point in more than one respect. It not only ended a decade of successive wars, but also buried a policy of irredentism and expansionism (the Great Idea), which had dominated the politics of

7. These aspects of the National Schism are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

the modern Greek state for a century since its inception.⁸ Most of the nation now gathered within the borders of the state, as more than a million refugees settled in Greece (a fifth of its total population), creating the most explosive among the domestic problems which were henceforth to have priority over foreign involvements. The exchange of populations (with Turkey and Bulgaria) drastically altered the composition of the Greek electorate. Last, but not least, the Disaster created the conditions for the overthrow of the monarchy. It might also be said to have rendered obsolete the confrontation between Venizelism and Antivenizelism, and this was in fact widely felt at the time. The Schism survived, however, thanks to subsequent developments.

In September 1922, the remnants of the Greek army evacuating Asia Minor overthrew the Antivenizelist regime, forcing Constantine to abdicate in favor of his son George and leave the country. The Revolution of 1922 established itself as a military regime, headed by Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras. Although initially a purely military reaction to the humiliation of the Disaster, and despite various subsequent efforts, the Revolution failed both to remain "above parties" and to supersede existing political alignments. Under the pressure of events and its extremist wing, its actions assumed the character of a settling of accounts with Antivenizelism, drawing it inexorably to identify itself with Venizelism. In this respect, the most fateful turning point was the summary court-martial and execution of six Antivenizelist leaders held responsible for the Disaster, including Gounares himself (November 1922). The execution of the Six would forever remain an unforgivable "monstrous crime"⁹ for Antivenizelism, even though it may have been required in order to restore discipline in the army and defuse popular unrest, especially among the arriving refugees.

The Revolution thus rapidly turned out to be no more than the military triumph and domination of Venizelism over its adversaries. It also involved, however, two critical developments within the Venizelist camp itself: the separation and growing emancipation of the military from civilian leadership, and the internal division of the bloc over the regime issue. The military, themselves split into several cliques, mostly acknowledged the authority of the absent Venizelos and entrusted him with the negotiation of the peace treaty ending the war with Turkey, signed at Lausanne in July 1923. But they were on strained relations with the L.P. and actually planned its dissolution, either into a new political party sponsored by the Revolution or under a permanent dictatorial regime. With respect to the

8. See, e.g., Dakin, who characteristically considers the Asia Minor Disaster as the end of the Greek *Risorgimento*.

9. The expression was used by Tsaldares in 1929.

second development, the left wing of the Liberals under Papanastasiou had created the Republican Union already in the spring of 1922. After the Revolution, Republicanism naturally gained political momentum and, more decisively, powerful military converts. These wished first to avert any future comeback of Antivenizelism, and especially reprisals for the Six, then also to prevent the reinstatement of the Antivenizelist officers massively purged after the Counterrevolution of October 1923. Personal safety and professional security thus determined the republicanism of Venizelist officers for the future.

Nevertheless, the L.P. was initially able to resist both military and Republican pressures. In the face of a threatening and vengeful Antivenizelist camp under reconstitution, neither the military nor the Republicans could do without the legitimacy and mass support that *only* the L.P. and its absentee leader could provide. With the P.P. in disarray after the tragic death of its leader Gounares, the reconstitution of Antivenizelism was rapidly taking place around Metaxas and his Free Opinion Party, both untainted by responsibility for the policies of 1920–1922 and the Disaster. The threat of an electoral victory by Metaxas (which would also give him the undisputed leadership of Antivenizelism) greatly preoccupied the Revolution. It inspired several abortive political plans, the postponement of elections, and finally the peculiar electoral law promulgated in October 1923, together with the calling of an election in December for a Constituent Assembly.¹⁰

Counterrevolution and Republican Triumph

Metaxas (and Antivenizelism with him) missed whatever electoral chances he might have had, by associating himself with the abortive Counterrevolution of October 1923. This military revolt, despite the heterogeneity of its participants and their motives, essentially represented an Antivenizelist counteroffensive, with the proclaimed aim of holding elections according to the pre-1922 electoral system. In the wake of its suppression, more than a thousand officers were cashiered, while Metaxas fled the country.

The disastrous Counterrevolution not only deprived Antivenizelism of its electoral prospects and its remaining military support, but also sealed the fate of the monarchy. Concretely, it upset the balance of forces within the Venizelist bloc and exacerbated the centrifugal tendencies by removing the common threat. The most “radical” military around Kondyles, Pangalos, and Othonaios, greatly strengthened by their decisive role

10. On electoral systems, see Appendix 1.

in the suppression of the revolt and by the subsequent purge, joined forces with the Republican Union and demanded the immediate abolition of the monarchy. The L.P., however, still refused to commit itself and insisted that the Constituent Assembly, once elected, should decide whether to hold a referendum on the regime. A group of Republican Liberals then also left the party in order to campaign on a republican platform.

After the decision of what remained of Antivenizelism to abstain, the election of 16 December 1923 was fought almost exclusively between the three segments of Venizelism (Liberals, Republican Liberals, and Republican Union), which even constituted common lists in some areas, including Athens. A few Antivenizelist independents, the newly founded Agrarian Party, and the Communists also participated (see Table 1).

Two days after the election, military pressure forced King George II to leave the country. In January 1924, the Revolution surrendered its authority to the (Fourth) Constituent Assembly, and Venizelos returned to Greece from abroad, yielding to the urgent appeals of friends and foes

Table 1 ELECTION FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, 16 DECEMBER 1923

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	7	1.76
Independent Antivenizelists	7	1.76
<i>Venizelism</i>	377	94.72
Liberal Party	250	62.81
Republican Liberals and Republican Union	120	30.15
Independent Republicans	7	1.76
<i>Agrarian Party</i>	3	0.75
<i>Communist Party</i>	—	—
<i>Other</i>	11	2.76
Moslems	3	0.75
Jews	3	0.75
Miscellaneous Independents	4	1.00
Socialist	1	0.25
TOTAL	398	100.00

Total Votes Cast: 694,548

SOURCES: Dafnes, *He Hellas Metaxy Dyo Polemon*, Vol. 1, p. 194; and *Eleftheron Vema*, 30 January 1924.

NOTE: Party strength in votes is not available. Party strength in seats is itself only approximate, because of the fluidity of alignments in the almost exclusively Venizelist Assembly.

alike. His purpose was to promote reconciliation with Antivenizelism and to resolve the regime issue through a fair referendum, which could secure general recognition. In it, the deposition of the dynasty and the abolition of the monarchy would be separated, presumably allowing for the retention of the latter under a new dynasty or, perhaps, under a protracted regency.

Despite the high hopes created by his return, Venizelos failed both to achieve an understanding with Antivenizelism and to check the centrifugal tendencies in his own camp. He was specifically unable to secure the unity of the L.P. under a new leader and to reestablish civilian authority over the military. His resignation and departure from Greece accelerated the tendencies he had failed to check. A successor cabinet under Kafandares resigned under military pressure, and Papanastasiou formed a government of the Republican Union. The L.P. then disintegrated into three main splinters, under Kafandares (Progressive Liberals), Michalakopoulos (Conservative Liberals), and Sofoules, the latter two providing the parliamentary support that Papanastasiou needed. On 25 March 1924, the Assembly voted unanimously (but without the Progressive Liberals) the deposition of the dynasty and the proclamation of the Republic. This accomplished fact was then ratified by a plebiscite on 13 April (see Table 2).¹¹

All Venizelist parties united to campaign for the Republic, and so did the Antivenizelists for the monarchy. Among them, however, only Me-

Table 2 PLEBISCITE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC,
13 APRIL 1924

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>% of Valid Votes</u>
Monarchy	325,322	30.01
Republic	758,742	69.99
TOTAL	1,084,064	100.00

SOURCE: Dafnes, *He Hellas Metaxy Dyo Polemon*, Vol. 1, p. 245.

NOTE: The actual choice was to vote "Yes" or "No" on the resolution of the Constituent Assembly.

11. Its outcome was undoubtedly valid, despite the somewhat inflated turnout and Republican vote, which were due to military participation and some double voting. Royalist strength surely did not exceed the reported figure (325,000), which also indicates the extent of political abstention in the December 1923 election (cf. Table 1). A similar assessment was then made by Metaxas and later by Antivenizelist historiography. See Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 1, p. 245; and Vouros, p. 74.

taxas (who had been granted an amnesty by Papanastasiou) openly recognized the outcome and the new regime, while Tsaldares, newly risen to the leadership of the P.P., refused to follow suit. He would only do so eight years later.

Within the Venizelist Assembly, the removal of the regime issue brought to the forefront deep ideological differences between Left (Republican Union) and Right (Progressive and especially Conservative Liberals), which were exacerbated by social conflicts and Communist agitation outside. Meanwhile, Venizelist generals-politicians Kondyles and Pangalos were turning to authoritarian, if not fascist, directions. Papanastasiou was soon overthrown by the Assembly, in July 1924, and replaced by an interim Sofoules cabinet. In October 1924, the Venizelist Right formed a government under Michalakopoulos, supported by Kafandares. It was overthrown by Pangalos in his long-awaited but practically unopposed coup of June 1925.

Having received a vote of confidence from a suicidal Assembly, Pangalos proceeded to dissolve it three months later and in January 1926 openly declared himself dictator. Although of Venizelist origin, he aimed at destroying the division between the two blocs and at creating for himself elite and mass political support drawn from both sides. In this, he may have achieved a measure of success, as indicated during his tours around the country and when he was "elected" president of the Republic in an uncontested but probably not entirely falsified popular vote (April 1926).¹²

The parties only gradually joined forces against an authoritarian regime which threatened them with extinction. During the three-day conference of party leaders called by Pangalos in November 1925, there was no agreement on the projected elections. Tsaldares in particular not only refused to refrain from raising the regime issue, but even threatened to hold a new plebiscite, thus making it easier for Pangalos to proceed with his own plans. Venizelism was the first to present a united front (Kafandares, Papanastasiou, Michalakopoulos) in view of the projected senatorial election, which did not take place. Facing the challenge of the presidential election, all the parties, Venizelist and Antivenizelist, eventually united

12. The results officially reported were the following:

Total valid	838,715
Pangalos	782,589 or 93.31%
Demertzes	56,126 or 6.69%

Nikos Oikonomou, personal communication.

in support of a common candidate (Demertzes, a moderate Antivenizelist) but in the end decided to abstain.

The united opposition of all political parties and the disastrous mismanagement of financial and foreign affairs eventually created the conditions for the overthrow of the dictatorship, which was carried out by Kondyles in August 1926.

The Election of 1926 and the Ecumenical Cabinet

The downfall of the dictatorship was greeted with a widespread demand, voiced by the urban middle class in particular, for an extension of all-party cooperation, and a swift return to parliamentary normalcy through a cabinet of Grand Coalition, or "Ecumenical."¹³ Renewed mutual suspicion, however, and the maneuvers of party leaders anxious to gain advantage within their own party or bloc prevented its immediate formation. Kondyles was thus allowed to form a cabinet of his own and play a decisive role in preparing the election, even though he was eventually forced to abstain himself and dissolve his party.

Within the Antivenizelist camp, Tsaldares was caught between Royalist diehards and the ostensibly Republican Metaxas. The unity of Antivenizelism, which had been threatening to abstain if proportional representation was adopted, finally collapsed when Metaxas decided to participate anyway, forcing Tsaldares to follow suit this time. On the other hand, within Venizelism, the Progressive Liberals of Kafandares and the Conservative Liberals of Michalakopoulos easily renewed their earlier collaboration, forming an electoral "Union of Liberals" which was hailed as a reconstitution of the Liberal Party freed from its "extreme elements," namely, the Republican Union of Papanastasiou.

A major menace to Venizelism on the eve of the election came from the refugees, who threatened to present their own separate lists, abstain, or even listen to the overtures of Metaxas. Thanks to a last-minute first payment of the long-delayed refugee compensations, Kondyles saved Venizelism—and secured future refugee support for himself. The two blocs and larger parties in general were further threatened by the Agrarians, the Communists, and a host of small and mostly local parties, especially in Macedonia.

The internal power struggle of Antivenizelism and the anxious effort of Venizelism to keep the loyalty of its refugee supporters in particular were the principal factors which revived the regime issue during the last

13. This discussion of developments between the fall of Pangalos and November 1926 is mostly based on contemporary press reports, particularly in *Eleftheron Vema*.

weeks of the electoral campaign, primarily at the expense of Metaxas and the smaller parties in general. The election took place on 7 November 1926 and was the first to be held in Greece under proportional representation (see Table 3).

Three weeks before the election, Venizelos from abroad had lent his authority to the popular demand for an ecumenical cabinet and had even outlined its preferred composition ("all constitutional parties"), duration (two years if possible), and program: (1) a definitive and generally recog-

Table 3 ELECTION FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 7 NOVEMBER 1926

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	403,232	41.95	127	44.41
People's Party	194,479	20.23	60	20.98
Free Opinion Party	151,660	15.78	52	18.18
Other Antivenizelists ^a	57,093	5.94	15	5.25
<i>Venizelism</i>	450,020	46.82	143	50.00
Union of Liberals	304,727	31.70	108	37.76
Farmer-Labor Party	62,260	6.48	17	5.95
Other Venizelists	83,033	8.64	18	6.29
<i>Agrarian Party</i>	28,318	2.95	4	1.40
<i>Communist Party</i>	41,982	4.37	10	3.49
<i>Other</i>	37,674	3.91	2	0.70
Jewish Political Union	5,825	0.60	2	0.70
Miscellaneous Minor Parties and Independents	31,849	3.31	—	—
TOTAL	961,226	100.00	286	100.00
Invalid ballots	3,912	(0.41% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	965,138	(61.38% of registered voters)		
Registered voters	1,572,469			

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections des députés du 7 novembre 1926* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1928).

NOTE: The returns for the three "privileged" districts of Hydra, Spetsae, and Psara (with 7 seats and 2,834 votes), where a plurality system with lead ballot was used, have been appropriately transformed and included. "Other Antivenizelists" and "Other Venizelists" include minor and mostly local parties and tickets as well as some independents.

^aIncludes two joint lists of the People's Party and the Free Opinion Party, in Lesbos and Euboea, polling 17,493 votes, and electing 3 P.P. deputies and 2 Free Opinion deputies. Hence the total number of seats for these two parties is 63 and 54, respectively.

nized settlement of the regime issue; (2) a similarly definitive and generally accepted settlement of the "military" question (arising out of the past purges of mostly Antivenizelist officers); (3) the restoration of economic stability; and (4) the normalization of foreign relations, especially with neighboring countries.¹⁴ An urgent concern of party leaders, especially in the Venizelist camp, was to reestablish civilian control over the military through such a coalition cabinet. In this respect, the election was fought to secure the best bargaining position in view of a coalition rather than to win a majority.

The Ecumenical Cabinet was finally formed one month after the election under the premiership of the "neutral" or rather colorless (but originally Antivenizelist) Zaïmes, and with the participation of the Progressive Liberals (Kafandares), Conservative Liberals (Michalakopoulos), Farmer-Labor Party (Papanastasiou), People's Party (Tsaldares), and Free Opinion Party (Metaxas). Its program was a significantly truncated version of the one outlined by Venizelos: instead of settling the regime issue once and for all, it only promised to provide the country with a constitution, as the republican constitution had remained in limbo since 1924. This was a major and fateful concession on the part of the Venizelists in order to secure the participation of the People's Party, which was allowed to restate its emphatic "reservations" concerning the legitimacy of the republican regime. It was thus able to achieve the reinstatement of a considerable number of Antivenizelist officers without any substantial concession on its part.

By June 1927, both the constitutional and the military question had been settled. In August, the People's Party quit the government, leaving its erstwhile partners with the highly unpopular task of economic stabilization. In February 1928, the Farmer-Labor Party followed suit. The efforts of Kafandares to stabilize the drachma, at the price of heavy taxation and onerous foreign loans, were finally completed on 14 May 1928. Five days later, he was pushed aside.

The Election of 1928 and the Four Years of Venizelos

Venizelos had returned to Greece in April 1927, establishing himself in Crete. Although monotonously reiterating his decision never to return to active politics again, he quickly became a parallel and competing authority for both the government and the parties. His often public interventions subverted the authority of Kafandares in particular, who rapidly realized

14. See *Eleftheron Vema*, 17 October 1926.

that his Progressive Liberals had become identified with the old Liberal Party and that he himself was considered a mere *locum tenens* for the party's real leader.

This conflict of authority came to a head immediately after the conclusion of the economic measures in May 1928. Kafandares resigned the leadership of the Progressive Liberals, the great majority of whom immediately reconstituted the Liberal Party under Venizelos. After a brief extension of the Zaïmes cabinet, Venizelos formed a government in July, dissolved the Chamber, and reestablished by decree what was essentially the plurality electoral system of 1923.

The campaign was completely dominated by Venizelos, who promised to provide the strong leadership that had lacked for so long, to secure the republican regime once and for all, and to render the country "unrecognizable" by continuing the era of good government and drastic reforms inaugurated in 1910 and interrupted in 1915. Venizelism formed an electoral coalition around the Liberal Party. Only Kafandares refused to join the coalition, and ran separately with his new Progressive Party. For its part, Antivenizelism failed to cooperate electorally in many districts where the People's Party, the Free Opinion Party, and independent Royalists ran separately, thereby increasing the magnitude of their defeat. The election was held on 19 August 1928 and gave Venizelos an unexpectedly huge and unprecedented triumph—and an even more overwhelming parliamentary majority (see Table 4).

One of the first concerns of the Venizelos government was to complete the institutions of the Republic by holding the long-delayed first election of the Senate.¹⁵ The senatorial election of 21 April 1929 confirmed the continuing popularity of the government, despite an exceptionally low turnout (see Table 5).

The Venizelos government of 1928–1932 (the Four Years) came to be regarded as the second Golden Age of Venizelism, after 1910–1915. It was not only the third longest in Greek parliamentary history until then, but also one of the few inspired by a comprehensive program. Although largely continuing policies and projects initiated previously, especially in

15. This second legislative body was to be composed of 92 senators elected by universal suffrage, 18 elected by the "professional organizations" (interest groups), and 10 elected by Senate and Chamber in joint session. Although its confidence was not required for the constitution of a government, unlike that of the Chamber, the Senate was endowed with important powers: its approval was required for the Chamber's dissolution, and it could oppose legislation passed by the Chamber. Such bills could be ultimately submitted to a joint session of Senate and Chamber. Joint sessions were also required for the election of the president of the Republic and for the process of constitutional revision.

Table 4 ELECTION FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 19 AUGUST 1928

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	336,057	33.03	24	9.60
People's Party	243,543	23.94	19	7.60
Free Opinion Party	53,958	5.30	1	0.40
Independent Royalists	38,556	3.79	4	1.60
<i>Venizelism</i>	646,485	63.55	226	90.40
Liberal Party	477,502	46.94	178	71.20
Farmer-Labor Party	68,278	6.71	20	8.00
National Republican Party	27,603	2.71	9	3.60
Progressive Party	25,729	2.53	3	1.20
Conservative Republican Party	15,852	1.56	5	2.00
Progressive Union	13,452	1.32	5	2.00
Independent Republicans	18,069	1.78	6	2.40
<i>Agrarian Party</i>	17,042	1.68	—	—
<i>Communist Party</i>	14,325	1.41	—	—
<i>Other</i>	3,372	0.33	—	—
National Union (Pangalos)	1,958	0.19	—	—
Miscellaneous Independents	1,414	0.14	—	—
TOTAL	1,017,281	100.00	250	100.00
Invalid ballots	4,153	(0.41% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	1,021,434			

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections des députés du 19 août 1928* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1931).

NOTE: These officially compiled party votes should be considered rough estimates in view of the electoral system, mixed tickets, unofficial candidates, split-ticket voting, and the questionable computation used. A more reliable estimate of C.P. strength, for example, is 23,899 or 2.35%. See Georgantides and Nicolacopoulos, pp. 453–468.

1926–1928, it placed them in the context of a forceful conception of modernization of state, economy, and society. Economic development received first priority, which was no longer challenged by irredentist plans, as in the past. The main emphasis was placed on the rapid growth of agricultural production, with a shift from export crops to cereals for the domestic market, in order to reduce the chronic deficit in wheat. The growth of agriculture and peasant income would in turn expand the market for trade and especially for domestic industry, which was also expected to take advantage of protective measures and, above all, of the large and cheap labor force supplied by the refugees and the rural migrants. These

Table 5 ELECTION FOR THE SENATE, 21 APRIL 1929

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	215,166	26.06	12	13.04
People's Party	157,304	19.05	10	10.87
Free Opinion Party	22,518	2.73	2	2.17
Independent Royalists	35,344	4.28	—	—
<i>Venizelism</i>	582,535	70.56	78	84.79
Liberal Party	450,624	54.58	64	69.57
Farmer-Labor Party	54,337	6.58	4	4.35
Progressive Party	34,712	4.20	3	3.26
Conservative Republican Party	23,171	2.81	5	5.44
Progressive Union	9,807	1.19	2	2.17
Independent Republicans	9,884	1.20	—	—
<i>Agrarian Party</i>	13,720	1.66	2	2.17
<i>Communist Party</i>	14,069	1.70	—	—
<i>Other</i>	165	0.02	—	—
TOTAL	825,655	100.00	92	100.00
Invalid ballots	11,262	(1.35% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	836,917			

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections sénatoriales du 21 avril 1929* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1931).

NOTE: These officially compiled party votes should be considered rough estimates. The votes received by mixed tickets in multimember districts were apportioned to the parties according to the strength of their candidates.

policies involved huge investments in reclamation projects, agricultural credit, and communications (roads, ports, etc.), mostly financed through foreign loans. In sum, the overall political project inspiring the Four Years involved a rapidly growing capitalist economy and a modern bourgeois democracy (which was otherwise ready and willing to suppress communism).¹⁶

The major and eventually fatal weakness of this program was that it was predicated on an extended period of economic and political stability and social peace. It was first plagued by a succession of bad years in

16. In foreign policy, the twin guiding principles were peaceful cooperation with neighboring countries and increased independence from Great Powers. Any involvement in Great Power rivalries was to be avoided. The first policy led to a rapprochement with Turkey and Yugoslavia, the second to a rapprochement with Italy.

agriculture and then also by the catastrophic impact of the Great Depression. Ultimately, however, it was crippled by changing political conditions.

The “arrogance of power” produced by an overwhelming personal vote of confidence in Venizelos led to continuous tactical miscalculations. The prime minister’s isolation was largely responsible for the inability of both party and government to function effectively, and for a highly personalized and arbitrary style of decision making. Furthermore, the advantages of a huge and stable parliamentary majority were largely offset by frequent changes of ministers and other top executive officials, while opposition to the government mounted.

Beginning in 1929, relations with the Antivenizelist opposition, now represented by Tsaldares alone, were embittered by the insistence of Venizelos on appointing leaders of the 1922 Revolution and others associated with the execution of the Six to prominent political posts. Relations with the Venizelist opposition became even more embittered, especially after Venizelos refused to propose Kafandares as president of the Republic in December 1929, despite the unanimous approval of other party leaders, including Tsaldares himself. Venizelos imposed the colorless and spineless Zaïmes instead—a fateful decision. In 1930, Kafandares, Papanastasiou, and Kondyles began a series of savage attacks on the Liberal government, which lasted until the election two years later. Among the electoral allies of the L.P. in 1928, only Michalakopoulos remained in the cabinet. Opposition was further exacerbated by a sensationalist press, which exploited a series of scandals, real or contrived. The government’s reaction to such attacks and to social unrest (among the peasants, workers, and public servants in particular) showed a growing sense of political insecurity.

The government’s insecurity and loss of grip became apparent after Great Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931. The impact was catastrophic on the Greek economy, which had until then largely withstood the consequences of the Great Depression. Hoping to save its ambitious development projects, the Venizelos government was reluctant to take the measures immediately indicated, which would imply the abandonment of monetary stabilization and of foreign sources of credit. The situation thus dragged on for several months, while in February 1932 the Liberals suffered ominous reverses in the municipal elections (especially in Piraeus).

Eventually, in March 1932, Venizelos proposed the formation of a new ecumenical cabinet, which Tsaldares flatly refused. In the ensuing parliamentary debate, Venizelos inaugurated a new strategy of polarization by focusing on the historical responsibility of Antivenizelism for the 1922 Disaster. Refusing immediate elections, he then proceeded to rees-

establish proportional representation (for the coming election only) and started taking the economic measures imposed by his failure to secure foreign aid, which became final in June. His tactical resignation in May failed to bring about an ecumenical cabinet or a coalition cabinet of the small Republican (Venizelist) parties, as hoped. A brief Papanastasiou cabinet, which would rely solely on Liberal parliamentary support, was forced to resign by the hostility of the Liberal majority. Two weeks after his resignation, Venizelos was thus forced to form an all-Liberal cabinet again.

The Election of 1932: Stalemate

As the country was approaching elections, Venizelos abruptly raised the Republican standard and largely succeeded in turning the regime into the sole issue of the campaign, thus diverting attention from the failures of his government. He categorically insisted that an electoral victory of the People's Party would immediately lead to the overthrow of the Republic, and warned that such a development would not be permitted by the Republican officers—newly organized in a Military League tolerated, if not sponsored, by the government. Going even further, he declared three weeks before election day that the civil war *continuing* since 1915 could only be terminated through an understanding between the two sides *or* through total victory by one side, which he was intent on pursuing unless Tsaldares changed his ways.

Tsaldares, nevertheless, still refused to withdraw his reservations and recognize the Republic, fearing for the unity of his party. He only insisted that nothing threatened the republican regime—and was backed in this assertion by the smaller Venizelist parties, which feared that they would be crushed between the People's Party and the Liberals if the electorate became polarized over the regime. This was in fact what happened in the election of 25 September 1932 (see Table 6). Elections to renew one-third of the popularly elected senators took place on the same day, with similar results (see Table 7).

Following the election, Tsaldares at last proceeded to remove the principal obstacle to his party's rise to power by solemnly and unreservedly recognizing the Republic, in a document drafted by Kafandares and Papanastasiou and approved by Venizelos. All at once the explosive issue was defused, and the Military League publicly dissolved itself.

Protracted negotiations followed for the formation of a government, in the absence of a clear parliamentary majority. Tsaldares once again refused the ecumenical coalition that Venizelos proposed, while Venizelos

Table 6 ELECTION FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 25 SEPTEMBER 1932

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	415,786	35.49	98	39.20
People's Party	395,974	33.80	95	38.00
Free Opinion Party	18,591	1.59	3	1.20
Independent Antivenizelist ^a	1,221	0.10	—	—
<i>Venizelism</i>	617,911	52.74	131	52.40
Liberal Party	398,779	34.04	98	39.20
Progressive Party	97,836	8.35	15	6.00
Farmer-Labor Party	69,057	5.89	8	3.20
National Radical Party ^b	44,789	3.82	6	2.40
Conservative Republican Party ^c	7,145	0.61	2	0.80
Independent Venizelists ^d	305	0.03	2	0.80
<i>Agrarian Party</i>	72,311	6.17	11	4.40
<i>Communist Party</i>	58,223	4.97	10	4.00
<i>Other</i>	7,406	0.63	—	—
Minor Parties	1,511	0.13	—	—
Miscellaneous Independents	5,895	0.50	—	—
TOTAL	1,171,637	100.00	250	100.00
Invalid ballots	4,346	(0.37% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	1,175,983			

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections des députés du 25 septembre 1932* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1933).

^aA. Schliemann (district of Larisa).

^bAlso received 2,909 preference votes on L.P. tickets.

^cAlso received 4,349 preference votes on L.P. tickets.

^dTicket headed by A. Chatzkyriakos ("privileged" district of Psara).

successfully maneuvered to prevent a coalition of Tsaldares-Kafandares-Papanastasiou, which would confirm the defeat of the Liberals and their political isolation. Tsaldares was able to draw only Kondyles (and Chatzkyriakos) from the Venizelist camp, and formed a cabinet which also included Metaxas and depended on the parliamentary support of the Liberals. The first Tsaldares government only lasted two months, with the Chamber in recess. As soon as the Chamber reconvened in January 1933, Tsaldares was overthrown: the Venizelists feared the erosion of their strongholds in the state and especially in the armed forces through the action of Kondyles and Metaxas.

Table 7 ELECTION FOR THE SENATE (PARTIAL), 25 SEPTEMBER 1932

				Same districts on 21 April 1929		
<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	117,452	32.51	13	65,948	24.78	4
People's Party	117,452	32.51	13	56,511 ^a	21.23	4
Independent Royalists	—	—	—	9,437	3.55	—
<i>Venizelism</i>	198,182	54.85	17	194,134	72.91	26
Liberal Party	142,575	39.46	16	165,990 ^b	62.35	25
Progressive Party	32,822	9.08	1	16,226	6.09	1
Farmer-Labor Party	12,376	3.43	—	10,661	4.00	—
National Radical Party	10,409	2.88	—	—	—	—
Independent Republicans	—	—	—	1,257	0.47	—
<i>Agrarian Party</i>	29,000	8.03	—	1	0.00	—
<i>Communist Party</i>	14,143	3.91	—	6,162	2.31	—
<i>Other</i>	2,534	0.70	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	361,311	100.000	30	266,245	100.00	30
Invalid ballots	13,158	(3.51% of votes cast)		5,428	(2% of votes cast)	
Total votes cast	374,469			271,673		

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections sénatoriales du 25 septembre 1932 et de celles supplémentaires jusqu'à la fin de 1933* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1934).

^aIncludes Free Opinion Party.

^bIncludes Conservative Republican Party.

The Election of 1933 and the Transfer of Power

Venizelism had rapidly reconstituted itself around its founder and the Liberals in the aftermath of the 1932 election. The seventh and last Venizelos cabinet was formed in January 1933 (after Tsaldares refused to reform his own or participate in an ecumenical coalition). It included the L.P., the Progressive Party (Kafandares), the Farmer-Labor Party (Papanastasiou), the Conservative Republican Party (Michalakopoulos), and a segment of the Agrarian Party under Mylonas, while another segment under Sofianopoulos promised its parliamentary support. Refusing to rely on a

tenuous parliamentary majority of 131 and expecting a landslide under the plurality electoral system by simply adding up the votes of September, Venizelos dissolved the Chamber and headed the "National Coalition," an alliance of all the parties in his last cabinet (which was preserved until March 1935).

Antivenizelism also formed an electoral alliance, the "United Opposition," which included the People's Party (Tsaldares), the Free Opinion Party (Metaxas), a segment of the Agrarians, and the National Radical Party of Kondyles (who had previously sought to participate in the National Coalition but was refused at the insistence of his old enemy Plasteras). Within the United Opposition, Kondyles and Chatzokyriakos, two of the principal military founders of the Republic, appeared to vouch for the security of the regime.

It was the *first* election since 1920 that saw such a polarization between the two blocs. Only the Communists, a third segment of the Agrarians under Sofianopoulos, and various independents remained outside. Yet it was also the *first* electoral campaign since 1922 in which the Republic was not at issue. The campaign was mostly about the economic crisis and the ability of each bloc to cope with it. The United Opposition attacked Venizelos for his wasteful government and his failure to take effective measures against the crisis. It also attacked his partners for being inconsistent with their fierce criticisms of the Venizelos administration. The National Coalition, on the other hand, proclaimed the economic ineptitude of Tsaldares, shown during his brief term, and of two ex-generals, Metaxas and Kondyles. The most explosive campaign development, however, was the promise of the United Opposition to the refugees that, once in power, it would proceed with a further payment of compensations (25 percent), a promise made credible by Kondyles's performance in 1926. Venizelos denounced it as one more proof of financial irresponsibility, reiterating that the refugees could expect no more payments. The election was held on 5 March 1933. The two blocs received almost equal votes, but the working of the plurality system, as in 1920, produced a clear Antivenizelist majority in seats (see Table 8).

However, Plasteras, the prestigious leader of the 1922 Revolution, would not accept the potential consequences of electoral defeat. During the night after the election, he improvised a military coup—apparently without the explicit consent of Prime Minister Venizelos, but also without meeting with any resistance on the part of the government. Lacking the support of both the military and the civilian Venizelist leadership, Plasteras was eventually forced to hand over to an interim cabinet of generals, who in turn handed over to the victor of the election. Tsaldares formed his second and last cabinet on 10 March; it included, beside the P.P., the

Table 8 ELECTION FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 5 MARCH 1933

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i> (United Opposition)	527,200	46.19	136	54.84
People's Party	434,550	38.07	118	47.58
Free Opinion Party	25,758	2.26	6	2.42
National Radical Party	46,692	4.09	11	4.44
Agrarians	20,200	1.77	1	0.40
<i>Venizelism</i> (National Coalition)	528,656	46.32	110	44.36
Liberal Party	379,968	33.29	80	32.26
Progressive Party	77,254	6.77	10	4.03
Farmer-Labor Party	47,460	4.16	13	5.24
Agrarians (Mylonas)	14,302	1.25	5	2.02
Conservative Republican Party	9,672	0.85	2	0.81
<i>Agrarian Party</i> (Sofianopoulos)	22,985	2.01	2	0.81
<i>Communist Party</i>	51,656	4.53	—	—
<i>Other</i>	10,834	0.95	—	—
TOTAL	1,141,331	100.00	248	100.00
Invalid ballots	5,612	(0.49% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	1,146,943			

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections des députés du 5 mars 1933* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1933).

NOTE: On the basis of official candidates alone, the United Opposition received 488,545 votes, or 42.81%, and the National Coalition 483,231 votes, or 42.34%. All these officially compiled party votes should be considered rough estimates in view of the electoral system, mixed tickets, split-ticket voting, and the questionable computation used. A more reliable estimate of C.P. strength, for example, is 68,647, or 6.01%. See Georgantides and Nicolacopoulos, pp. 453–468.

parties of Kondyles and Metaxas, which were required for its parliamentary majority.

The Plasteras coup was to provide the first major source of tension following the transfer of power from the Venizelists to the Antivenizelists after more than a decade. While Plasteras fled the country, the most extreme elements of Antivenizelism, headed by Metaxas but unchecked by Tsaldares, demanded the indictment of Venizelos as instigator of the coup. Defending himself before a menacing Chamber, Venizelos provoked an explosion by insisting on the “great services” of Plasteras. Considering

that his freedom of speech was being curtailed, he refused to continue and left the Chamber. He was never to return.

Three weeks later, on 6 June, a savage attempt was made on the life of Venizelos and his wife. It was immediately proved to have been organized by the Security Police chief appointed by Tsaldares (whereas the identity of its political and financial sponsors was never fully established). The assassination attempt, and the subsequent obstacles to the criminal investigation, deeply poisoned the relations between the government and the opposition and immediately revived extreme fanaticism on both sides.

The by-election of Thessaloniki on 2 July thus became a critical confrontation. Twenty seats were at stake, which could overturn the continuing Venizelist majority in the joint sessions of Chamber and Senate. The assassination attempt and the danger of monarchical restoration under the Tsaldares government dominated the by-election campaign, together with a local anti-Semitic crusade. The electoral outcome showed a sizable swing to Venizelism since March (see Table 9).¹⁷

On the next day, the party leaders of the National Coalition secretly decided to start preparing for the eventuality of violent struggle. This decision materialized with the creation of Republican Defense mass organizations staffed by retired Republican officers, and with a Venizelist conspiracy in the armed forces, whose ultimate outcome was the coup of 1 March 1935.

During the twenty months until March 1935, the confrontation between the government and the opposition remained near breaking point and was continuously fed by additional causes of tension. These included in particular: (1) what appeared to be a systematic governmental coverup of the assassination attempt; (2) the policy of Kondyles as minister of war, aimed at altering the composition and power structure of the armed forces and thus terminating Republican control; (3) a governmental bill drastically changing the electoral system, in conjunction with gerrymandering measures; (4) the government's refusal to accept joint sessions of Chamber and Senate on such disputed bills (especially the electoral), in violation of the constitution, and its related threats to abolish the Senate; (5) the attitude of the government and its supporters in the Chamber, which repeatedly provoked violent incidents and protracted opposition walkouts (September 1933 and June 1934); and (6) the continuous rumors of preparations for a dictatorship and monarchical restoration on the part of Antivenizelist extremists around Metaxas and Kondyles.¹⁸

17. The by-election is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

18. In the spring of 1934, foreign policy itself became subject to partisan dispute, after more than a decade of consensus, when Venizelos and Venizelists bitterly attacked the Balkan Pact as it was negotiated and interpreted by the Tsaldares government.

Table 9 THESSALONIKI BY-ELECTION, 2 JULY 1933

				Results on 5 March 1933 ^a		
<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i> (Government Parties)	42,652	45.60	—	38,171	43.66	2
<i>Venizelism</i> (National Coalition)	47,182	50.44	20	38,311	43.82	18
<i>Agrarian Party</i> (Sofianopoulos)	—	—	—	1,846	2.11	—
<i>Communist Party</i>	3,421	3.66	—	8,769	10.03	—
<i>Other</i>	280	0.30	—	327	0.38	—
TOTAL	93,535	100.00	20	87,424	100.00	20
Invalid ballots	957	(1.01% of votes cast)		221	(0.25% of votes cast)	
Total votes cast	94,492			87,645		

SOURCE: République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections des députés du 5 mars 1933* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1933).

NOTE: Because of the peculiarities of the electoral system, party figures are only approximate, based on crude averages.

^aCombined results of the Thessaloniki district and the then separate electoral college for the city's Jews.

Several attempts were made by moderates in both camps to achieve a political compromise and a return to parliamentary normalcy (the most important being in September 1933, March 1934, and September 1934). All failed, for reasons which included primarily: (1) the obsession of Venizelos with his personal safety and vindication, which required humiliating amends on the part of Tsaldares; (2) the lack of credibility of Tsaldares, who perennially appeared unable to check, even less impose his will on, extremist supporters and allies; and (3) the intransigence of those interested in preventing a compromise, especially Kondyles—a key actor both for his pivotal parliamentary strength and for his grip on the armed forces.

After the failure of the last attempt in October 1934, the government proceeded with its controversial electoral legislation, and Venizelos began a series of articles from Crete with the emphatic warning that the country

was on the eve of an explosion, which could take the form of a most savage civil war.¹⁹ This series developed into a full historical exposition of the Schism of 1915, with Metaxas presenting the opposite view in a series of his own. This elaborate revival of old feuds appeared aimed at preparing the supporters of both camps for renewed conflict, after the failure of conciliation.

Meanwhile, however, the deputy leaders of the Liberal Party, Gonas and Sofoules, squandered the opposition's principal parliamentary weapon—the threat to block the reelection of Zaïmes as president of the Republic and to elect Venizelos instead. They encouraged a compromise initiative by the senators of the professional organizations, which resulted in the reelection of Zaïmes—in exchange for which the government conceded only a fraction of the original Venizelist demands by revoking part of the disputed electoral law.

Venizelos had to accept the *fait accompli*, but this last disastrous misuse of parliamentary resources may have been a critical turning point in his eventual choice of extraparliamentary means. The last straw was the repeated and scandalous postponement of the trial for the assassination attempt, in November and December 1934. In January 1935, Venizelos finally gave the green light for the coup which was being prepared since July 1933. It was timed before the approaching election to renew one-third of the Senate, which threatened to deal the final blow to the parliamentary balance of forces. By this decision, he not only abandoned parliamentary means, but also implicitly abdicated civilian control over the military, since the coup was to establish a military dictatorship under Plasteras, which Venizelos hoped would be brief.

The Coup of 1 March 1935 and the Restoration

The disastrous last Venizelist uprising of 1 March 1935 bears striking similarities with the Antivenizelist Counterrevolution of 1923. Heterogeneous in purpose and composition, lacking leadership, an effective plan, and a compelling political justification, it actually destroyed the regime it was supposed to save—in this case the Republic. The massive purge in its aftermath of over a thousand Republican officers deprived the regime and Venizelism of their military power base, while it completed the predominance of those military cliques, especially around Kondyles, which were instrumental in crushing the coup and now sought to preserve personal and professional security through the establishment of a new constitu-

19. See the text in VA File 308.

tional regime. In the political field, the government's emergency measures (including the abolition of the Senate and the suspension of constitutional guarantees for judges, public servants, and local government officials, followed by massive dismissals), together with wholesale repression, created a situation which led to Venizelist abstention from the subsequent election of a Constituent Assembly. In sum, both in the military and in the parliamentary arena, the power vacuum created by the defeat and abstention of Venizelism drastically upset the balance of forces in favor of extremism, in which Metaxas and Kondyles maneuvered to outbid each other, forcing the moderate Tsaldares to retreat step by step.

Already in March, Metaxas had left the government after a clash with Kondyles and had demanded the immediate restoration of the monarchy as a logical consequence of the rebellion and its defeat. During the electoral campaign for the Constituent Assembly, he formed a "Union of Royalists" together with dissidents from the People's Party and ran on a Royalist platform, promising to accomplish the restoration by a vote of the Assembly. Tsaldares began by denying that the regime was at issue, but in the last days of the campaign conceded that a referendum would be held. The election was held on 9 June 1935. The electoral system, combined with governmental pressure and large-scale falsification, gave an overwhelming victory to the government coalition of the People's Party and the National Radical Party (see Table 10).

Despite his absolute numerical control of the Assembly, Tsaldares was immediately undermined by his partner Kondyles, who publicly came out for the monarchy towards the end of June. Under pressure both from Kondyles and from diehard Royalists in the military and in his own party, Tsaldares retreated once again. On 10 July, the Assembly passed a resolution providing for a referendum to be held before 15 November, and then recessed until 10 October. During this critical session, 42 diehard Royalists of the People's Party openly rebelled against the party line.

In the course of the summer, the position of Tsaldares was further weakened when Kondyles convinced the ex-king and the Royalists that the referendum would be lost (or postponed indefinitely) if Tsaldares remained in power, and especially if the Republicans were allowed to participate. Despite his belated royalist statements, which forced 15 Republican deputies to leave the People's Party, Tsaldares was eventually overthrown on 10 October by the Royalist military. They established a dictatorship under Kondyles and forced a rump Assembly (only 82 members remaining after the walkout of Tsaldares and the majority of his party) to proclaim the abolition of the Republic and the restoration of the monarchy, a decision to be ratified by referendum on 3 November. As dictator, Kondyles

Table 10 ELECTION FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, 9 JUNE 1935

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	892,068	86.68	300	100.00
Government Coalition ^a	669,434	65.04	281	93.67
Union of Royalists ^b	152,285	14.80	4	1.33
Macedonian Union	29,664	2.88	—	—
Mixed ticket ^c	25,349	2.46	9	3.00
Other Antivenizelists ^d	15,336	1.49	6	2.00
<i>Venizelism</i>	—	—	—	—
<i>Agrarian Party</i> (Sofianopoulos)	—	—	—	—
<i>Communist Party</i>	98,699	9.59	—	—
<i>Other</i>	38,429	3.73	—	—
National Party (Pangalos)	5,636	0.55	—	—
National Union	2,590	0.25	—	—
Miscellaneous Independents	30,203	2.93	—	—
TOTAL	<u>1,029,196</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>100.00</u>
Invalid ballots	61,166	(5.61% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	1,090,362			

SOURCE: Royaume de Grèce, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections de l'Assemblée Nationale du 9 juin 1935* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1935).

^aIncludes the People's Party and the National Radical Party. Out of the 281 seats, they won 249 and 32, respectively.

^bIncludes the Free Opinion Party and dissidents from the People's Party led by I. Ralles and G. Stratos.

^cA mixed ticket ran in the district of Arcadia; of the 9 seats, 5 went to the People's Party, 3 to the Union of Royalists, and 1 to the National Radical Party.

^dInclude two local tickets, in the districts of Florina and Arta.

hoped to remain in power after the king's return. Denouncing the "collusion" between Venizelism and Communism in defense of the Republic, he proceeded with large-scale repression of unprecedented ferocity, to make sure that the Republican opposition abstained, and staged an absolutely and grotesquely falsified plebiscite (see Table 11).

All Republican party leaders categorically refused to recognize the new regime. They included Sofoules, leading the Liberal Party, Kafandares, Papanastasiou, Mylonas, and G. Papandreou (who had left the Liberals after the March coup and had founded a Republican Party of his own). Their united front was breached, however, when, following the

Table 11 PLEBISCITE ON THE RESTORATION OF THE MONARCHY,
3 NOVEMBER 1935

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>% of Valid Votes</u>
Monarchy	1,491,992	97.87
Republic	32,454	2.13
TOTAL	<u>1,524,446</u>	<u>100.00</u>
Invalid ballots	3,268	(0.21% of votes cast)
Total votes cast	1,527,714	

SOURCE: Dafnes, *He Hellas Metaxy Dyo Polemon*, Vol. 2, p. 390.

publication of a letter by Venizelos, the Liberal Party expressed willingness to grant the monarchy a “trial period” if the king was to swiftly restore parliamentary rule and grant a general amnesty. Separating itself further from its erstwhile allies, the Liberal Party also concluded an agreement with the People’s Party, involving the rapid adoption of a new constitution by the Assembly, elections under proportional representation, and a post-electoral coalition government of the two parties.

The Election of 1936: Stalemate and Dictatorship

King George II returned to Greece on 25 November 1935. He rapidly pushed aside both the authoritarian Kondyles and the parliamentarian Tsaldares, appointed a “neutral” cabinet under K. Demertzes, and granted an amnesty to the civilian leaders of the March coup and a pardon to the military participants (thus preventing their automatic reinstatement). The Assembly, dominated as it was by the People’s Party, was dissolved in December, and elections were called for a Chamber with powers of constitutional revision, under proportional representation.

Both major blocs entered the electoral contest badly split, but Anti-venizelism much more so than its opponents. The supremacy of the mainstream People’s Party under Tsaldares was seriously challenged by the “General People’s Radical Union,” a coalition including the National Radical Party of Kondyles, the National People’s Party of I. Theotokes (hard-core Royalists who had left the P.P. in the summer), and other dissidents from the P.P. or the Free Opinion Party. The latter ran on its own. For its part, Venizelism was split between the Liberal Party and the “Republican Coalition,” which included the Progressive Party (Kafandares), the

Farmer-Labor Party (Papanastasiou), the Republican Party (Papandreou), and the Agrarian Republican Party (Mylonas). The L.P., however, easily retained its dominant position within the bloc. Outside the two blocs, the C.P. and the A.P. (under Sofianopoulos) also participated in the election, as well as the new National Unity Party of P. Kanellopoulos, a young Republican academic. The campaign was marred by violent incidents and widespread intimidation of Republican voters. It was dominated by mutual recriminations about the recent past and by the theme of national reconciliation, most forcefully advocated by the Liberals. The last election of the interwar period was held on 26 January 1936 (see Table 12). Once again,

Table 12 ELECTION FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 26 JANUARY 1936

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>% of Valid Votes</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
<i>Antivenizelism</i>	606,297	47.59	143	47.67
People's Party	281,597	22.10	72	24.00
General People's Radical Union	253,384	19.89	60	20.00
Free Opinion Party	50,137	3.94	7	2.33
Reformist National Party	17,822	1.40	4	1.33
Other Antivenizelists ^a	3,357	0.26	—	—
<i>Venizelism</i>	562,698	44.17	141	47.00
Liberal Party	474,651	37.26	126	42.00
Republican Coalition	66,026	5.18	11	3.67
Other Venizelists ^b	22,021	1.73	4	1.33
<i>Agrarian Party</i> (Sofianopoulos)	13,006	1.02	1	0.33
<i>Communist Party</i>	73,411	5.76	15	5.00
<i>Other</i>	18,590	1.46	—	—
National Unity Party ^c	12,429	0.98	—	—
Minor Parties	1,949	0.15	—	—
Miscellaneous Independents	4,212	0.33	—	—
TOTAL	1,274,002	100.00	300	100.00
Invalid ballots	4,083	(0.32% of votes cast)		
Total votes cast	1,278,085			

SOURCE: Royaume de Grèce, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Statistique des élections des députés du 26 janvier 1936* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale, 1938).

^aLocal ticket headed by P. Ralles in Messenia.

^bInclude the Old Republicans of Crete, the New Liberals of Jannina, and the independent Glavanes of Larisa.

^cIncludes the local ticket of F. Dragoumes in Florina.

the result was a stalemate between the two blocs, Venizelism totaling 141 seats, and Antivenizelism 143.²⁰ For the *first* time, however, the C.P. held the parliamentary balance, with 15 seats.

After Sofoules categorically stated, in the aftermath of the election, that the regime was no longer at issue, a coalition government of the two major bourgeois parties (L.P. and P.P.) became a generally recognized possibility, or even necessity. The critical stumbling block, however, was the Antivenizelist state erected since March, especially in the armed forces, where the new military establishment refused to tolerate the reinstatement of purged Republicans. Negotiations between the Liberal Party and the People's Party thus twice reached an impasse, first in February over the control of the Ministry of Interior (with jurisdiction over local government, the prefects, and police forces), then again in April when an agreement of the two parties providing for a partial return of the Republican officers was frustrated by Kafandares. He was at the time perceived as a potential challenger by Sofoules, insecure in his leadership of the L.P. since the death of Venizelos on 18 March.

The Demertzis government was thus allowed to continue even after Sofoules was elected president of the Chamber in March with Communist support. A few days previously, Metaxas had been appointed minister of war by the king, supposedly to control the armed forces, which threatened to intervene in case the Venizelists formed a government with Communist support. Upon the death of Demertzis on 13 April, the king appointed Metaxas prime minister.

When the Chamber reconvened on 22 April, it first discussed a motion of censure against its president Sofoules, based on the revelation that he had signed an agreement with the C.P. to get its parliamentary support for a Venizelist cabinet. Despite the uproar drummed up by the Antivenizelists, and a revolt within the L.P. itself, the issue was largely defused when it was revealed that there had been negotiations between the C.P. and the P.P. as well. The final vote, in support of Sofoules by 165 to 88, suggested that a Sofoules cabinet was possible with the support or toleration of smaller groups, even without the P.P. Sofoules, however, failed to follow this lead.

The second failure of the two major parties to form a coalition government, as well as the failure of Sofoules to pursue another formula, led to the fateful parliamentary session of 25 April. Metaxas, appearing to be an acceptable transition until the issues separating the two major parties could be removed (by him) or compromised (by them), received an

20. A few days after the election, Kondyles died, and the General People's Radical Union split into its three components: 12 National Radical Party, 38 National People's Party, and 10 around I. Ralles and G. Stratos. See Linardatos, p. 165.

overwhelming vote of confidence. Only Papandreou and the C.P. voted against, whereas Papanastasiou and Mylonas abstained in protest against the failure of the two major parties to cooperate. Five days later, the Chamber recessed until 30 September, delegating legislative powers to the government and a parliamentary committee of forty.

Meanwhile, labor and social unrest intensified, culminating in the revolt of Thessaloniki in May. These events provided a pretext and precipitated preparations for a dictatorship. Yet, the parties failed to perceive the urgency of the situation. The death of Tsaldares, on 17 May, deprived the People's Party of its leader. Sofoules, while pressing the government for the reinstatement of Venizelist officers and other dismissed officials, proceeded leisurely with negotiations with both the People's Party and the National People's Party (Theotokes), ultimately reaching a coalition agreement with the latter. This agreement he announced to the king on 22 July, adding that it would take effect in October, after the Chamber reconvened. Two weeks later, on 4 August 1936, supposedly to prevent a twenty-four-hour general strike, the king and Metaxas established the dictatorship which was named after its date of birth ("Fourth of August") and lasted until well into World War II. Political parties were soon suppressed, and no elections were held in Greece until ten years later.

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CHARISMA, CLIENTELISM, AND CLEAVAGES IN INTERWAR GREECE

VENIZELOS AND CONSTANTINE

In Weber's previously quoted words, charismatic parties "create a schism." It was precisely through a "National Schism" that Venizelism and Antivenizelism became consolidated in 1915–1916. To the extent that this was a conflict over charisma, they can be viewed as "charismatic parties" in Weber's sense.

Bendix has warned that the distinction between charismatic leadership and leadership *sans phrase* "is difficult to make in practice, though not in theory," adding that genuine charisma is a rare event in any case.¹ There can be no doubt, however, that Venizelos was a genuinely charismatic leader. The evidence that one can invoke is overwhelming, but it would be senseless to attempt a systematic anthology from contemporary and subsequent press and personal accounts, chronicles, speeches, letters, poems, songs, etc., in which Venizelos is hailed as hero, revolutionary, father of the nation, savior, liberator, protector, prophet, messiah, wizard, creator, great governor and chief in peace and war—"if you are Christians, a national vessel of Divine Providence," as a prominent newspaper

1. Bendix, "Reflections on Charismatic Leadership," p. 629.

editor once wrote.² Only a few random fragments (by no means the most extreme) can be presented here, mainly to convey the unique flavor of the Venizelist cult.

The first is an appeal sent by a rally in the town of Edessa (Macedonia), on 14 November 1923, when similar meetings all over Greece implored Venizelos to return and “save the country” once again:

Our Father,
Away from us for so long, you haven't seen with your own eyes the people's longing. You haven't heard their deep repentance for the bitter cup of ingratitude that they gave you to drink on that cursed day. . . . Come, father. And if the eternal mob later votes you down again, and ingratitude shouts “Crucify, crucify Him!”, don't forget that this is the fate of the great. . . .³

Several years later, in May 1930, the mayor of Soufli (Thrace) welcomed Prime Minister Venizelos with the following words:

In the past, your adversaries have only too often used the term “Messiah” ironically, referring to your great personality, but if any of them was among us today, and could be perceptive enough to feel the vibrations of the soul of the People of Thrace, and particularly of Soufli, he could not deny that your arrival in the land of Evros is equivalent to the descent of the awaited Messiah.⁴

Antivenizelists did not deny the “specifically exceptional” character of the leader they loathed. An example is the obituary published by their most authoritative newspaper, *Kathemerine*, and signed by its editor G. Vlachos:

Because Eleftherios Venizelos was not a man like all, a common organism, good or bad, small or great, coward or brave, upright or perverted. He was something in addition to all this, and all this together. . . .

Eleftherios Venizelos was, lived, died, and will remain a problem, a mystery, a myth, a nightmare, a terrible blend of a small and a great man, who willed, acted, moved, and did not feel, did not believe, did not rest. . . .⁵

Even a Marxist, albeit an exceptionally perceptive one, could not fail to remark, upon the return of Venizelos in 1928:

2. *Akropolis*, 19 November 1919, reprinted in Gavrielides, p. 1. On the continuing “adoration” of Venizelos by his followers in 1935–1936, see Birtles, pp. 213–215.

3. VA File 324. The “cursed day” is of course election day (1 November) 1920.

4. Quoted in *He Historike Periodeia*, p. 50.

5. “Ho Eleftherios Venizelos” [Eleftherios Venizelos], *Kathemerine*, 19 March 1936, reprinted in Vlachos, pp. 68–70. Georgios Vlachos was the most articulate and authoritative ideologue of Antivenizelism and will be extensively quoted in this study.

Only an exceptionally demagogic personality could make it simultaneously credible, to workers and bourgeois, to capitalists and peasants, to republicans and monarchists, that he is in a position to satisfy all, to please all, to better the condition of all. Only a wizard could play such a role with success, and this under certain conditions, objective and subjective.

Since the situation was unavoidably leading to a generalized crisis of Parliament, and since this crisis carried with it all parliamentary parties, the only solution for both party and Parliament to be saved was Venizelos, as model, as leader, fist for the bourgeois, honest administration for the people, pro-labor for the working masses, a "*father*" to the refugees, conservative for the conservatives, leftist for the leftists, conciliator for the conciliators, intransigent for the intransigents. . . .

This turn to messianism is the most characteristic feature of the bankruptcy of bourgeois democracy in Greece, the ideological preparation of the new dictatorship.⁶

Finally, one of the most important writers of the interwar generation, G. Theotokas, describes in his novel *Argo* the political excitement aroused by Venizelos's comeback in 1928 in a highly condensed and effective form:

Chief, savior, symbol of half of Greece, Satan to the other half, he was certainly for all the President of Greek affairs, the axis around which the Nation was starting to whirl again. Nobody understood what exactly he had in mind, but his presence was enough to upset everything, as if this presence emitted some mysterious current, which shook all at once all the forces of the national organism, the forces of faith and heroism, of adventure and plunder, of creation and dissolution, of malice and envy. All the vital instincts which slept unused, awoke again and boiled forcefully on the rosy coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Venizelos! Venizelos!⁷

A few pages later, Theotokas puts in the mouth of a contemporary old-Socrates, inebriated tavern owner, a paradigmatic reconstruction of the popular mythology around Venizelos:

The President is a great adventurer, he was saying with reverence, a great pirate. Consider how he began. He started by himself, unprotected, alone, a kid in breeches, a little poor boy from Crete. From the first day he knew the world, his mind is all set on rebellion and revolution. And he does whatever he wants! I will drive the Turks out of Crete, he says. He drives them out. They bring him a Greek prince. He drives him out too. I will govern Greece, he says. He governs it. I will break apart the Sultan's Empire, he says. He

6. Maximos, p. 147. "Fist" (*pygme*) is a metaphor for strong willpower.

7. Theotokas, Vol. 2, pp. 100–101. This part of the novel was first published in 1936.

breaks it apart. I will make armies and fleets, I will make wars and win, I will go to Macedonia, to Thrace, to the Black Sea. He goes. To Smyrna, he says. He goes. I will impose myself on all Europes, he says, all will step aside when I pass. He said it and he did it. He "plays slaps" [is familiar] with the great of the world, eats and drinks and jokes with the kings, sleeps with the princesses, and inside mocks them all, and schemes something every moment, prepares something, exploits everything, gets juice out of stone. The Great Powers, he has them in his pocket. Sign treaties, he says, and all the time they sign. He writes and they sign, without understanding. He has impressed the world. How he did it, that's his business. Let Greece go ahead, and nothing else matters to us. He does whatever he wants, I tell you. He would have taken even Constantinople, he would have taken us even to Persia, if we had not voted him down. . . .

He found the secret, he mumbled. That's it, the wretch found the secret and doesn't give a damn about anybody anymore. Do I know which secret? If I knew, I wouldn't be here. And if you ask him, he will tell you there is no secret. Is he a fool to tell it?⁸

The circumstances under which Venizelos emerged as a charismatic leader clearly correspond to the crisis conditions postulated previously. He was first called to Greece to provide political leadership and direction amidst the chaotic revolutionary situation created by the Goudi military revolt in 1909. Subsequent manifold successes firmly established his charismatic claim. It was in 1915–1916 however that his charismatic "mission" was defined with greater clarity and urgency, when he was "called" to save the Greek nation, and particularly those parts in immediate danger of extinction within the context of World War I. It was then that, as a true charismatic leader, he broke completely with legality and created *new* obligations by demanding of the "faithful" that they follow him on the road to revolution and secession. In 1924 briefly, and then again in 1928, he reappeared as the providential *deus ex machina* in times of trouble, uncertainty, and insecurity. Finally, the disastrous coup of 1935 itself was in a certain sense an attempt to repeat the charismatic "mission" of 1916.

The Weberian analysis of the relationship between the charismatic leader and his followers also fits well the case of Venizelism. A prime example is reaction to the shock of electoral defeat in 1920—a traumatic experience which remained present and salient in Venizelist minds throughout the interwar years. Among Venizelists, the prevailing perception was that the Greek people had then failed in their duty to recognize the "correct" leader (or reach the "correct" decision). The language of the rally in Edessa quoted earlier is highly instructive in this respect: if the

8. Ibid., pp. 109–111.

voters fail in their charismatic duty, they become the ungrateful "eternal mob."⁹

Moreover, Venizelos's domestic and foreign policies, as well as his reforms of state and party organization, provide a striking illustration of the rationalization which is possible, according to Weber, under the charismatic ruler who is dependent on recognition by plebiscite. Economic policies will be discussed subsequently in conjunction with social cleavages; it should be noted here, however, that it was precisely in this area that proof of Venizelos's charisma clearly appeared to fail him for the first time in 1931–1932, with far-reaching consequences.

On the other hand, the routinization of Venizelos's charisma—its institutionalization in the state and the party—met with insuperable difficulties during his lifetime, precisely because of his towering presence and restless activity. Both the Liberal Party and the Republic, having derived at birth most, if not all, of their legitimacy from Venizelos, ultimately failed to cut the umbilical cord. Taking pretext from the debate on the Republic's Senate, Vlachos characteristically argued in 1931 that Greece was under personal rule and not under a constitutional form of government:

now there exists Eleftherios Venizelos, nerves of Eleftherios Venizelos, moods of Eleftherios Venizelos, angers of Eleftherios Venizelos, frivolities of Eleftherios Venizelos, fist of Eleftherios Venizelos, and above this the Azure-and-White. But this and the Azure-and-White are they a form of government?¹⁰

It would be natural to inquire whether the charismatic leadership of Venizelos performed any of the functions widely expected of such leaders in "new nations." To the extent that post-1912 Greece *was* a "new nation," Venizelism may be said to have been the principal agent for the integration of new territories and populations (the New Lands and the refugees), as well as for the legitimation of the Republic, *but* only insofar as this integrative and legitimizing role was not simultaneously *negated* by the conflictual potential of charisma, to which we shall now turn.

The founding principle of Antivenizelism, as its chosen name pro-

9. An extension of this attitude was the conviction of many Venizelists, among the military in particular, that state power should not be surrendered under these circumstances. Venizelos himself was often forced to combat this conviction and justify the Greek people for "failing" him.

10. "Politevma? . . ." [Form of Government? . . .], *Kathemerine*, 8 March 1931, reprinted in Vlachos, p. 45. The "Azure-and-White" (*galanolefke*) is the Greek flag. Note the recurrent image of Venizelos as "fist."

claims, was the total negation of Venizelos. Vlachos put the essence of his political camp in a nutshell when he wrote in 1920:

Whatever happens to this country, we don't want Mr. E. Venizelos.¹¹

It was not however simply a matter of denying the man's "specifically extraordinary" qualities and "mission," but rather a matter of perceiving them as fundamentally dangerous, harmful, evil, even diabolical. For Anti-venizelists, Venizelos was a "false prophet," a "so-called messiah," not so much in the sense of being a fraud, a common mortal, but rather in the sense of being Satan, an evil force. Charisma is bound to give rise to its antithesis. Yet, this particular development in popular perceptions and beliefs would have probably been impossible, or at least would have never reached such extreme fanaticism, if a *competing* charismatic authority had not been available: King Constantine.

In his case, it may be futile to attempt to separate personal from institutional charisma and assign to each a weight of its own. What may be stated with greater confidence is that, under particular historical conditions, the latent charismatic potential of the monarchy was activated by a king who could also claim *personal* charisma as a victorious military leader. If strict correspondence between the beliefs of the leader and those of his followers is required, Constantine's case may be doubtful, since he usually expressed himself in the conventional language of an absolute monarch, responsible only to God.¹² Nevertheless, in the particular Greek context, Constantine's monarchical beliefs had no indigenous mass appeal by themselves and cannot explain the extraordinary devotion he inspired *as a person*, unlike any other king before or since. What is even more central to this analysis is that he effectively functioned *as* a rival charismatic party leader in opposition to Venizelos.

In the absence of a strong indigenous tradition, modern royal absolutism on the Prussian model, with which both Constantine and his closest advisors were imbued, could only capture the popular imagination by being translated into existing religious and nationalist mythology. The most obvious combination was readily provided by the Byzantine romanticism contained in modern Greek irredentism (the Great Idea). Constantine I was thus numbered XII, as next in line to the last emperor, Constantine XI Paleologue, frozen in marble according to legend, but ready to rise when the "City" (Constantinople) would become the Greek capital again. A warrior-king by the grace of God was the Greek-Orthodox and Byzantine tradition, which was revived to provide Constantine and his sup-

11. "Choris Pathos" [Without Passion], *Kathemerine*, 27 December 1920, reprinted in Vlachos, pp. 11–13.

12. Reinhard Bendix, personal communication.

porters with the charismatic legitimation that could challenge the plebiscitary charisma of Venizelos. Antivenizelist politicians, old and new, despite their mostly parliamentary and often modern outlook, were thus caught in a movement which was profoundly and fundamentally antiparliamentary, obscurantist, reactionary, and, through its populist dimension, prefascist.

Constantine's claim to charisma was first established during the Balkan Wars (which he waged as commander-in-chief) with the calculated, if short-sighted, contribution of Venizelos himself. King and prime minister emerged from the wars as the twin providential agents of national destiny. It could then be expected that their subsequent dispute, although couched in constitutional terms, would involve an explosive and irreconcilable conflict about the "correct" leader in a charismatic rather than a legal sense. Ironically, it was the warrior-king who then assumed the "mission" of preserving peace and protecting his kingdom from the hardships and hazards of war.

As in the case of the Venizelist cult, only a few expressive examples can be offered here:

He was beautiful and had a truly royal bearing. The soldiers became heroes by his glance alone. His presence exerted magical influence on the troops. The name Constantine made the heart of Greece start.¹³

Unspoken mystery lights your name and most holy hopes are incarnated in your person. They are comforted by hearing a divine voice, which tells them: In a little while he'll be with you.¹⁴

In 1916, Reservists of Peloponnesus:

express to their god-sent King and sweet Father limitless devotion, and declare that they are ready to sacrifice themselves to the last for the realization of the national ideals, and the defense of His laurel-growing Throne. To You the living image of the Nation, to you the Ruler agent and executor of the will of the state, to you the King of Kings, in whom we firmly believe the national ideals and the majesty of the Fatherland are concentrated. . . .¹⁵

Reservists of Roumeli (Sterea Hellas) sent a similar cable in August 1916:

We entrust in you alone, Your Majesty, our fate and the fate of the Fatherland, as genuine successor to the Paleologues and through divine providence entrusted fulfiller and sleepless guardian of the sacred ideals of our race.¹⁶

13. Quoted in Venteres, Vol. 2, p. 352.

14. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 355.

15. Quoted in Paparregopoulos, Vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 234. On the Reservists, see Chapter 2.

16. Quoted in Venteres, Vol. 2, p. 147.

In charismatic conflict, as Weber pointed out, the “other” side “must be guilty of a wrong which has to be expiated.” Venizelos and Venizelists were thus portrayed as guilty of lese majesty, as diabolical traitors, and as foreign agents. To cite only the most extreme examples, the king’s sickness in May 1915 (for which the miraculous intervention of Our Virgin of Tenos was officially organized) was attributed to the evil influence of Venizelos. A forest fire which endangered the royal country house and the king in June 1916 was also attributed to Venizelist arson. In October 1916, the king characteristically addressed the crews of the Fleet in the following terms:

With you, my faithful sailors, I am ready to face all the forces of Hell!¹⁷

Soon thereafter, during the November Days, a true mass witch hunt was launched by the Royalists against Liberals in Athens. The exorcism of the “Cretan Minotaur” (Venizelos) reached its paroxysm when the metropolitan of Athens, head of the Church of Greece, presided over a truly medieval ceremony of anathema.¹⁸

After 1917, and again after 1922, Venizelos and Venizelists were of course primarily guilty of expelling the “Martyr King,” who died in exile but remained symbolically unburied in Italy until his body was returned in 1936. In 1935, for example, the president of the rabidly Royalist “Constitutional Youth” was writing of:

His people, the people who still mourn for Him, dead in a foreign land, weep for Him, always remember Him, always imagine Him alive, see Him in their dreams, honor Him, respect Him as Saint, as Martyr, as immortal . . . [and as a victim of a “three-times cursed”] . . . real rascal, a true traitor, a real Cagliostro of politics, a Cretan liar who, unfortunately for Greece, is still alive.¹⁹

The last phrase is only a pale reflection of the murderous hatred which developed against Venizelists and Venizelos personally—a logical consequence of the “wrong” which had to be “expiated” and which implied a license or even a sacred duty to kill. Plotting against Venizelos’s life seems to have begun as early as 1915–1916 and continued on and off for the next two decades, with two actual assassination attempts, one in 1920 and one in 1933.²⁰ In 1933–1935, rabid Antivenizelists once again pub-

17. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 225.

18. Similar ceremonies were held in the provinces as well.

19. Chatzesarantos, p. 25.

20. The attempt in 1920 was immediately “expiated” through the apparently spontaneous assassination of a prominent Antivenizelist, Ion Dragoumes, by the praetorian guard of the Venizelos regime.

licly called for the murder of Venizelos, which, together with the actual attempt, exacerbated his feeling of physical insecurity, as well as the fanaticism of his followers. This is hardly the place to undertake a detailed account, even less a comparison, of violence, reprisals, and counterreprisals on both sides over two decades.²¹ What must be emphasized is that their ferocity and persistence can largely be attributed to the specifically “sacred” and inflexible demands of charisma.

In other respects, Constantinism, as the charismatic component of Antivenizelism, had very different implications from those of Venizelism. Although it was to some degree transformed in an “anti-authoritarian” and plebiscitary direction, especially in 1920, it was in no way leading to rationalization of any kind. Its institutionalization, on the other hand, poses a complex problem. In a sense, it was greatly simplified by Constantine’s early death (1923) and by the inherently hereditary quality of royal charisma. Constantine’s charisma may thus be said to have been *reabsorbed* by the monarchy and the dynasty as such, with its established order of succession. To the extent, however, that it was not familial but personal, to the extent that Constantine had been a charismatic party leader rather than a mere king, in a uniquely personal fusion, George II was no successor. In this sense, succession was hardly possible, both because Constantinism had never been identified with any one particular party, organization, or group but with several, and because any *political* heir would unavoidably constitute a challenge to the *royal* heir and explode the original fusion. The charismatic legacy of Constantine thus remained essentially “up for grabs” throughout the interwar period, with several political “disciples” or “apostles” in the Antivenizelist camp constantly competing for it among themselves and, implicitly, with the dynastic heir apparent. Republican Antivenizelism briefly appeared to offer a possible resolution, through a total break with the royalist part and with hereditary monarchy. The forced Restoration in 1935, however, ultimately resolved the contradiction in favor of George II and the monarchy.

A final note with respect to charisma in interwar Greece is in order here. Apart from the obvious case of Venizelos, it is fairly evident that no other civilian leader of the period can qualify as charismatic. Among the military, however, one might think of several possibilities. Plastiras in particular seems to have attained a charismatic appeal of his own—largely *independent* from that of Venizelos—which can be detected especially in 1933–1935. During those years, he openly disagreed with Venizelos about the dictatorship that he, Plastiras, was advocating, on what seemed to be an equal footing. Nevertheless, given that Venizelos eventually concurred

21. On repression and its impact on regional and local political loyalties, see Chapter 6.

and that *both* were recognized as nominal leaders of the (practically leaderless) disastrous coup of 1935, this incipient charismatic conflict never fully emerged.

PARTY STRUCTURE

There can be little doubt that clientelism has been a major characteristic of modern Greek politics, antedating Independence itself. Following Campbell's classic anthropological investigation of patron-client relations, both historical research and contemporary political science analysis have emphasized the importance and impact of such relations in Greek society and politics.²² It has even been argued that "the most significant aspect of Greek society, at least in connection with the political system, has been clientage relationships."²³ Such systematic and scholarly descriptions of clientelism and its consequences in Greece, even if couched in general terms, have mostly been drawn from research on the early 19th century or the contemporary, postwar period.²⁴ Moreover, they do not differ substantially from the general discussion of clientelism, which they have in fact influenced. Rather than examining them in any detail, it therefore seems preferable to focus directly on the interwar period, which has not been adequately studied in this respect, and specifically on the structure of political parties, which is the principal area where political clientelism should manifest itself and where its limits should become apparent.

The Quest for "Parties of Principle"

The character of political parties in modern Greece has been the object of an almost uninterrupted and often confusing public debate, which started in the very first years of Independence and continues to the present day. Set implicitly or explicitly against the background of the westernization of the

22. Campbell, especially pp. 213–262. Although it is the study (in 1954–1955) of a marginal mountain community (which should have indicated caution as to the general applicability of its findings) and although it remains the *only* systematic and empirical investigation of patron-client ties in contemporary Greece, it is such an integrated and powerful analysis of Greek values and institutions that it has enjoyed widespread influence and has served as the basis for subsequent discussions, especially in political science. In history, Petropulos has provided an excellent analysis of patron-client networks before, during, and after the War of Independence, and has retrieved very perceptive contemporary accounts, among which a classic description of clientage from Friedrich Thiersch, *De l'état actuel de la Grèce* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1833), Vol. 1, pp. 181–182, quoted in Petropulos, p. 54. In political science, see especially Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*.

23. Legg, "Political Change in a Clientelistic Polity," p. 233.

24. Modern Greek political discourse as well as traditional historiography are of course

country, this debate has measured Greek parties against the presumed requirements of democracy and modernity and has consistently found them lacking.

In the 1830s, the very existence of parties in Greece was disputed. Arguing that parties can only arise out of differences in principle, many observers refused to recognize as parties the groups then so called, dismissing them as merely "resting upon the personality of an influential leader and the personal relations among the members" and exclusively concerned with the acquisition and distribution of spoils.²⁵

Following the virtual extinction of parties during the latter part of Otho's reign, the debate resumed soon after the establishment of parliamentary institutions in the 1860s. No longer concerned with the very existence of groups qualifying as parties, it was by then, and has since remained, based on the contrast between "personal parties" and "parties of principle."²⁶ Parties in Greece were no longer denied the name itself, but were diagnosed as being purely "personal," that is, loose and unstable alliances of deputies around a leader, bound together solely for the conquest of power and the distribution of patronage. The foremost polemicist of that period, Emmanuel Roïdes, acidly observed:

Elsewhere, the parties are born because there exist people disagreeing, each wanting different things. In Greece, the exact opposite occurs; the cause of party genesis and struggle is the admirable accord with which all want the same thing: to be fed at public expense.²⁷

Such parties were held responsible for widespread corruption, unstable and inefficient government, and generally for making a sinister farce out of elections and the parliamentary system.²⁸ The remedy was to be the emergence of "parties of principle," and this was to be achieved through "social engineering," involving reforms of the parliamentary and particularly of the electoral system.

The debate continued intermittently through the 1900s, reaching unprecedented proportions and intensity on the eve of the Revolution of

replete with (usually polemical) references to political phenomena which are clearly clientelist. Such materials have been extensively used in this study.

25. Petropulos, pp. 10–16.

26. The distinction closely resembles the one made by David Hume between *personal* and *real* parties, parties "from principle" being a species of the latter. See David Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, Essay VIII. The terms *personal* and *real* were in fact sometimes used in Greece, although it is not possible to trace their intellectual history here. See, e.g., Charilaos Trikoupes, untitled article in *Hora*, 10 November 1875.

27. *Asmodaios*, 8 June 1875, reprinted in Papakonstantinou, p. 188.

28. One need hardly emphasize the parallels with contemporary Italy, Spain, or Portugal, where one can find largely similar conditions, criticisms, and reform proposals.

1909. Their “personal” character was a central part of the indictment against the Old Parties and the “system” they represented.²⁹ Among the regenerationist demands unleashed by the military revolt, the creation of “parties of principle” was seen as an urgent need. The Liberal Party as well as several small and short-lived parties were founded at that time ostensibly to meet this need.³⁰

Nevertheless, the creation of “parties of principle” remained on the political agenda throughout the interwar years (and, one may add, down to the present), cropping up in every discussion of the electoral system in particular. One of the principal arguments in favor of proportional representation was that it would precipitate the emergence of such parties, whereas its opponents retorted that it *presupposed* such parties, which were not yet there.³¹

That the quest for “parties of principle” has continued, like a Sisyphian task, for over a century, despite many promises and some promising beginnings, should *not* lead to the conclusion that political parties in Greece have been lacking any distinguishing ideas, ideologies, policies, or programs, and that such terms, with which Greek political discourse is replete, are a priori entirely deceptive.³²

This kind of literal interpretation of the term “party of principle” has always produced much confusion and sterile debate. A striking example was offered in 1910, when a newspaper friendly to the Old Parties proclaimed that the newly founded L.P. was no “party of principle” but the supremely “personal” party, since its leader had not previously announced any kind of program, whereas the first true “party of principle” was the one founded by Ch. Trikoupes forty years earlier!³³

Confusion is avoided only if the contrast between “personal party” and “party of principle” is understood to be based mostly on the *structure*

29. Ever since then, this “system” has been designated by the derogatory term *palaikommatismos* (from *palaio*, “old,” and *komma*, “party”), which is the closest (and least polemical) Greek equivalent of *caciquismo*, *trasformismo*, etc.

30. See, e.g., the pamphlet *Kommata Archon*, published by the short-lived Radical Party, founded in 1910.

31. On proportional representation as a means for the creation of “parties of principle,” see, e.g., Papanastasiou, p. 93; Charitakes, pp. 131 and 142; and esp. the first parliamentary speech of Papanastasiou on the subject (2 April 1911) in Lefkoparides, Vol. 1, p. 103.

32. This is the view of Legg and many other observers, both Greek and foreign. Petropoulos has shown that it is unwarranted even for the very first parties of independent Greece. See especially his conclusion, pp. 504–511. On the fundamental opposition between an anti-European and a pro-European orientation underlying party conflict towards the end of the 19th century, see Charles Seignobos, *A Political History of Europe since 1814*, trans. and ed. S. M. Macvane (New York: Henry Holt, 1900), p. 656.

33. “Komma Archon Anef Archon” [Party of Principle Without Principles], *Neon Asty*, 24 August 1910.

of parties rather than on the “principles” they stand for. Although this conceptual clarification is explicit or implicit in many discussions of the matter, the unfortunate choice of terms has been retained, and confusion has continued. In light of what has been said so far, it should be obvious that “personal” refers to clientelist parties, whereas “party of principle” refers to impersonal party organization.

This brief historical review may serve as an introduction to the analysis of interwar party structure, beginning with the local level.³⁴

Local Politics: Personal Factions and Partisan Associations

Local politics during the interwar period continued to be primarily structured around competing local “parties,” that is, factions consisting of the clienteles of each area’s most prominent politicians.³⁵ Insofar as they constitute a fairly typical case of patron-client politics, these personal factions need not be described in great detail here. On the other hand, a systematic and exhaustive account of the identity and history of local factions throughout Greece has not been possible within the scope of this research.³⁶ Only some general observations will be noted.

As elsewhere, the organizational core of such a local faction consisted of a pyramidal action-set of patron-client dyads, with individual voters (typically peasants) at the base and the top patron-politician at the peak, through a varying number of intermediate levels, occupied by lesser patrons or middlemen.³⁷ Although identified with and named after an individual politician or a political family,³⁸ a faction was often an alliance between patron families (related by kinship or friendship) with their respective clienteles, and was sometimes governed by a correspondingly composite and collegial internal oligarchy around its nominal leader. An example would be the Roufos faction in Patras, about which it was once

34. This analysis has been based on innumerable press reports, materials in the Venizelos Archive, and other contemporary sources, which it is impossible to list individually. Particular sources will therefore only be cited for specific details, examples, and, of course, quotations.

35. It is worth noting that the Greek word for “party” (*komma*) still retains this double meaning: depending on the context, it may designate a national political organization or the local and personal clientele of a politician.

36. See, e.g., Gerakares, Vol. 1, pp. 116ff., for a short history of the two local factions of Zante, dating back to 1840–1850. They persisted into the interwar period, as indicated by the reports of the island’s prefect (E. Athanasiades), dated 29 March, 4 April, 9 April, and 10 May 1932, VA File 110.

37. The term for local political patrons or middlemen is *kommatares* (“party chief” or “party boss”), which is the Greek equivalent of *cacique*.

38. Established political families were collectively referred to as *ta tzakia* (“the fireplaces”; by extension, “the great houses”).

said that it constituted a sort of “many-headed mandarinat.”³⁹ Likewise, although a faction was commonly transmitted as inheritance or even as dowry, succession was not restricted by the rules of civil law, nor was it confined to the actual relatives of the previous head, but often would pass on to a more qualified political heir chosen by him or, after his death, by his cronies. This was the case, for example, of K. Zavitzianos in Corfu, who took over the “orphaned” Polylas faction in 1910.

Initial resources upon which a faction could be founded included mainly wealth, whether landed or commercial, the provincial practice of law or medicine, as well as public office by itself. Such resources were of course not only subject to uncertainty of various sorts and degrees, but also potentially accessible to “outsiders.” The system of factions in each area—rarely a monopoly, usually a duopoly or an oligopoly—was therefore more or less constantly open to challenges, both from “inside” (through defections of lesser patrons or clients from one faction to the other) and from “outside” (through the entry of new competitors), depending on economic, social, and political conditions.⁴⁰ What appears to have been an unprecedented massive challenge to established factions occurred in 1910, beginning with the August election and then completed with the November election, from which the Old Parties abstained. Out of the 362 members of the Chamber elected in November: 243 or 67 percent had never been elected to Parliament before, 74 or 20 percent had been elected in August for the first time, and only 45 or 13 percent had been members of Parliament before 1910. It was mostly out of these “new men” that the L. P. was formed.⁴¹

The importance and institutionalization of local factions varied considerably with the social structure and the very diverse historical experiences specific to each area. Although clearly an institution of rural society, as elsewhere, local factions were by no means absent from provincial towns and even the major cities, whether as an extension of the political organization of the surrounding countryside or of the rural migrants to the city (resembling in this respect urban machines elsewhere). It was in Old Greece that local factions were most dominant, conspicuous, and well entrenched, after several decades of fairly stable parliamentary politics and despite the post-1909 challenge, whereas political influence in the New Lands remained in a much more fluid state by comparison, especially

39. K. Spyrides to Venizelos, 7 June 1912, VA File 310.

40. Cf. Sir Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 135–138, on the inherent insecurity of control over even the safest electoral boroughs in 18th-century England.

41. Dafnes, *Kommata*, p. 122.

in the regions (Macedonia and Thrace) most affected by war and population movements.⁴²

Local factions were fairly restricted in geographical scope, as a result of physical or political boundaries. In Old Greece and in Crete, they were mostly confined to the area of the *eparchy* (rather than the *nome*), which had a long history as an administrative and specifically electoral district.⁴³ Insularity was a special case in the sense that factions would be usually specific to each island, even if it was considerably smaller than the eparchy to which it belonged (as in the Cyclades). On the other hand, in the case of exceptionally influential politicians, the effective area of a faction could be considerably larger than an eparchy, covering an entire nome or more.

Although erected upon fundamentally instrumental and personal ties, factions were sometimes related to local cleavages—between town and country, plain and mountain, ethnic groups or even classes—or else became identified with a particular ideological position, political tradition, or national party on a more or less permanent basis.⁴⁴ After 1910, and in particular after the National Schism of 1915, factions were largely forced to take sides locally and become identified as Venizelist or Antivenizelist. Their “freedom of movement” was thereby considerably constrained, even though by no means totally lost. A parallel development was that the instrumental quality of the relationship between followers and leaders was overlaid not only with the language of friendship, as before, but with much more emotional bonds of solidarity forged in intense civil strife.

Created under the “image of limited good” and engaged in strictly zero-sum politics, factions existed in, and reproduced a permanent state of extreme competitiveness and polarization in local politics, with important repercussions on the national level. Clearly, the zero-sum assumption applies well to the stakes of factional competition: votes, parliamentary and cabinet seats, and preferential access to government resources.⁴⁵

Competition would commonly be polarized between rival factions in pairs (or two-person games) even if more than two factions existed in the area. Competition would also seem to be most ferocious among rival factions belonging to the *same* national party, at least in normal times. In

42. See, e.g., *Eleftheron Vema*, 16 November 1926. In Old Greece, many successful “new men” of 1910 actually consolidated their local support by building their own factions on the old model.

43. On the administrative division into nomes and eparchies, see Appendix 1.

44. On factions and local class cleavages in Volos, for example, see Kordatos, *Eparchia Volou kai Agias*, pp. 988–995.

45. It may be noted that growing resources do not by themselves invalidate the zero-sum assumption, which continues to hold for *preferential* access.

such cases, each would be intent on excluding the other from the party and on monopolizing official party representation in the area. Typically, the national party leadership would be constantly flooded with mutual denunciations of incompetence, scandals, or disloyalty. All of this intraparty local squabbling was in preparation of, and would escalate around two crucial decisions: the constitution of the official party ticket for a coming election, and the constitution of the cabinet, if the party was in power.

For the designation of the official party ticket, or the granting of the *chrism* as it was characteristically called, one can identify three principal procedures:

1. The politician recognized as the single most powerful faction leader, and consequently as the official party representative in his area, would be authorized by the national leadership to form the local ticket and select his running mates.
2. Rival local factions would be left to work out an agreement among themselves.
3. The national leadership would intervene to arbitrate or impose a solution, if local agreement proved to be impossible or under special circumstances (for example, to prevent a particularly undesirable outcome).

Local agreement was typically very hard to achieve, except when one faction enjoyed unchallenged dominance. Even in multimember districts, proportionality was seldom recognized as the obvious formula for the allocation of places on the ticket: each faction would be normally intent on taking them all! Furthermore, in the election itself, whether under the plurality system or under proportional representation (with preference votes), factions would commonly seem to be more interested in securing the election of their own candidates *and* the defeat of running mates from rival factions than in promoting the victory of the party ticket as a whole. Sub rosa bargains with candidates of other parties to this effect were not unknown under the plurality system, which allowed split-ticket voting. Finally, if the official ticket failed to satisfy other aspirants, they might still run on their own, for example, as "Independent Liberals." In such cases, it was also by no means uncommon for a faction to request of the national leadership that no *chrism* be granted at all, and that local rivals be thus authorized to fight it out openly in the election and thereby prove who was contributing more votes to the party.

Needless to say, such local "problems" were a constant source of concern, if not despair, for national party leaders, as they would often lead to unnecessary party losses through defections of dissatisfied clients, *kom-matarches*, or entire factions. The constitution of a government was a

similar headache, given that factions, once again, would not just seek a cabinet post for themselves, but would also try to veto any appointment from their local rivals.

Combined with the structural insecurity of a patron's position and with traditional culture related to honor, these patterns of local factionalism were reflected in personality traits common among politicians (such as extreme and even paranoid suspicion and susceptibility to real or imagined encroachments upon their "exclusive" sphere of influence) and in corresponding norms to which they would constantly refer. Political correspondence is replete with such matters and quite extravagant but common expressions of the perennial insecurity and anxiety of the average deputy: rivals within the party are out to "decapitate" or "exterminate" him; if this or the other road is not built, he is "finished," will "lose face," etc.

To conclude this brief discussion, a small and rather moderate example may illustrate several of the points made so far and convey the flavor of local factionalism. It is a fragment from a long letter of Deputy Prime Minister A. Michalakopoulos to Prime Minister Venizelos, after the surprise appointment of a local rival, F. Zaïmes, to the cabinet:

You came to Greece in 1910. The old parties of the nome, namely, those of Zaïmes, Roufos, Gounares, Gotses, etc., had joined hands in the election of 8 August 1910, in order to secure total victory for themselves, and exclude any new situation under your leadership. A few new men, we had then the courage to confront them in some nomes, and managed with our struggles to allow an expression of the popular current, which helped the course of events that followed, fortunately. In the election of 1912, the Zaïmes party in Kalavryta sided again against you. I struggled, made and kept good friends there, who—following the breach with Constantine, when the Zaïmes party again sided against you—were dreadfully persecuted and martyred in 1915–1917 and 1920–1922. My friends—your friends—saw the party against which they locally struggled approach you in days of victory, only to go away and side with the persecutors of my friends—your friends—in difficult days. Upon the announcement of the appointment of Mr. Z., I received numerous visits of faithful friends, old fellow fighters (you too know the feelings of affection one feels towards those who followed him in hard vicissitudes) wretched, complaining, lamenting, despairing, because they see once again those who fought against them and against you prevail, through the same game of instability. I understood their grief. I wish that local (in particular), but also general party affairs were differently organized, so that one would not witness such manifestations. As things now stand, such are the conditions under which party struggles are waged, in the provinces at least. The friends and fighters consider their abandonment by the chief unpardonable. I quieted, admonished, exhorted, comforted, as much as I could, those old and tried friends and fellow fighters. But I also

perceived the absence of any confidence in me, an absence which oppressed me doubly: in itself, and because it was not the result of distrust in my political ability, but of reproach for the lack of the attention that I should show for my friends, as they see it. And they were not few. The last senatorial election proved, through the preference votes of the candidates, that they were approximately as many as the friends of Mr. Zaïmes.⁴⁶

Political associations—the second kind of structure on the local level—had existed in Greece before 1909, for the most part in Athens, other urban centers, and the Ionian Islands, the only region with a legacy of modern European rule. They mushroomed, however, on the eve and in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1909, which may be considered a first turning point in this respect. The associations created at that time, within the wider context of intense group activity, were mostly an urban, middle-class, and elite phenomenon,⁴⁷ inspired by a regenerationist program, and radically opposed to the Old Parties and *palaiokommatismos*. They fielded “new men” as candidates in 1910 and subsequently aligned themselves with the Liberal Party. A prime example would be the Political Association (*Politikos Syllogos*) of Athens.

A second turning point was in 1916. Associations were founded in that year which were no longer restricted to the urban areas and the middle class, but became popular and mass organizations in town and country. Moreover, the initiative had mostly passed to Antivenizelism. In June 1916, the Entente Powers imposed on Constantine's government the demobilization of the Greek army. Upon their return to their towns and villages in Old Greece, discharged soldiers founded Associations or Leagues of Reservists (*Epistratoi*). Far from being the product of spontaneity, this unprecedented massive organizational effort seems to have been masterfully planned by the General Staff (and in particular by its Deputy Chief I. Metaxas) and directed by Royalist officers, in conjunction with the local *kommatares* of the Old Parties. Nevertheless, the Reservists developed into a genuine mass movement, which exerted “colossal influence” on the politics of 1916–1920, terrorized Venizelists, usurped legal authority, and put pressure on Antivenizelist party leaders, who were largely unable to control it.⁴⁸ Shortly before the election of 1920, the “Cooperat-

46. A. Michalakopoulos to Venizelos, “Friday” (4 December 1931), VA File 336.

47. Except in Thessaly, where there was considerable organizational activity among landless peasants, spurred by the agrarian question.

48. The expression is from Venteres, Vol. 2, p. 147. On the Reservists, see also Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers*, pp. 331 and 374–376, where they are characterized as a “formidable anti-Venizelist weapon terrorizing town and countryside” and intended to serve in the election scheduled for August 1916 (which was eventually postponed as a result of Entente pressure). A rival “National Reservists’ League” organized by the Venizelists was not allowed to grow because of Antivenizelist intimidation. The term “Reservists” therefore

ing" (Antivenizelist) opposition reconstituted the former Leagues of Reservists as People's Political Associations, which were to play the same role as extremist pressure groups and instruments of repression in 1920–1922.⁴⁹

On the Venizelist side, a less spectacular organizational drive, primarily in Macedonia, had begun a little earlier, in January 1916, when the Liberal Association of Macedonia was founded (which was later to become the Liberal Club of Thessaloniki). Similar efforts continued in 1917–1920; of particular significance was the creation of the Liberal Club of Athens (1917) and of the Liberal League (1920).

These then were the antecedents of the numerous partisan associations which continued to exist, were reconstituted, or created during the interwar years—especially among the refugees, whose arrival was a third turning point in the development of such political structures. Rather than enumerating and describing interwar partisan associations in detail, it is only possible here to simply note that there was considerable variation along several dimensions.

The first and most fundamental, which underlies several others, is whether they were conceived as *elite* or as *mass* organizations. The prime example of the former conception was the distinctly bourgeois and exclusive Liberal Club of Athens, whose membership was originally restricted to 200, and which was modeled on the British Liberal and Conservative clubs. At the other extreme, one could find exclusively lower-class associations in the refugee settlements on the periphery of Athens. Other associations, such as the Liberal Club of Thessaloniki, would seem to fall somewhere in the middle.

Another important dimension is their institutionalization as formal organizations, indicated by such aspects as their duration and their impersonal character. Here again one can mention, on the one hand, the two most important Liberal Clubs, in Athens and Thessaloniki, which continued well into the post-World War II period and, on the other hand, various so-called associations which were thinly disguised clienteles, and/or whose existence was extremely fleeting or erratic. Associations would often begin at one end of the spectrum and degenerate into the other. The Liberal League, for example, was originally conceived as the official mass organi-

commonly designates the Royalist organizations only. Antivenizelist sources naturally insist that these were the product of grass roots spontaneity. See Gerakares, Vol. 1, pp. 457–459; and Metaxas, pp. 251–253, who merely claims to have "placed himself at their service." Gerakares, however, reports: "Within a month, 180,000 Reservists were organized and moved like machines [*sic*] as soon as they received an order from the Center." This is hardly consistent with the myth of popular spontaneity. The similarity of the Reservists with proto-fascist movements elsewhere (especially in Italy and Germany) cannot be examined here.

49. See *Hypodeigma Katastatikou Laïkou Politikou Syllogou*.

zation of the party. By 1926, however, its then president was candidly boasting to Venizelos that he had run in the election of that year on a separate ticket "*of his own*," with seven running mates who were "absolutely his own friends," and thus had proven how much support he had which was "*absolutely his own*."⁵⁰

Partisan associations were generally conceived as a means to preserve, expand, and mobilize party support, primarily in elections, but also in rallies, demonstrations, and even in armed conflict, if necessary. Voter registration was a crucial function they would perform, chiefly in the urban centers. With respect to party resources, and depending on their elite or mass composition, they would either *collect* funds or, much more commonly, serve as channels for the *distribution* of party patronage, or both. To take two extremes, affluent members of the Liberal Club of Athens would be periodically asked to contribute heavily to the party treasury, whereas the Liberal Association of Metamorfosis Kallitheas (a suburb of Athens) implored "His Excellency" Venizelos in 1933:

to support and assist its suffering members during the holy days of Easter. And who are dreadfully suffering because of the crisis and unemployment, numbering 160, are always working with zeal for the dissemination of the Liberal idea, and who have not received any aid from the Party.⁵¹

Only rarely did partisan associations manage to become the true center of party life and the sole bearer of party legitimacy locally. The most successful example in this respect was probably the Liberal Club of Thessaloniki. In most areas, associations would seem to be only one of several structural components of local party life, and often a secondary one, compared with personal factions.

The relationship between local factions and partisan associations was in general extremely antagonistic. As a rule, the development of the latter was inversely related to the strength and resilience of the former. Established politicians would normally view associations as a Trojan Horse of ambitious aspiring competitors (which was often an accurate perception) and would strenuously oppose or boycott them accordingly. (This would seem to be the prevalent attitude in Old Greece.) In other instances, a faction would create or capture an association in order to promote its claim to the monopoly of local party legitimacy against its rivals, who might in turn do the same, with competing associations as the result.⁵² In yet other cases, as already noted, an association would succeed

50. V. Kyrellos to Venizelos, 14 December 1926, VA File 372.

51. Liberal Association of Metamorfosis Kallitheas to Venizelos, 13 April 1933, VA File 395.

52. Among several examples, see Liberal Club of Serres to Liberal Party Central Office,

in becoming accepted by all local party supporters as the legitimate arena within which factional disputes would be contained and resolved. (These latter situations would seem to be more common in the New Lands and some urban centers.)

In conclusion, it may be said about interwar party structure on the local level that, even though partisan associations generally failed to dislodge personal factions and *displace* clientelism (with which they were themselves largely permeated), they at least partly succeeded in establishing alternative forms of political organization and in beginning the *transformation* of clientelism into machine politics—in some areas more than in others.

National Politics: "Leaders," "Friends," and "Members"

On the national level, Greek parties during the interwar period continued to be primarily, if not exclusively, informal parliamentary parties of notables. As before, a party was essentially conceived as a group of deputies "recognizing" the same leader or, more exactly, "chief" (*archegos*). These were the two basic elements of national party structure and the two and only sources of authoritative decisions. In the absence of formal constitutions, it is actual party operation which reveals the patterns, norms, and conceptions governing party life.⁵³ The language used is itself instructive in its diversity and often in its ambivalence.

The group in session (i.e., the party caucus), for example, was sometimes described as "the party chief in conference with his political friends," which reflects a traditional and informal conception. A more modern and formal intention is conveyed by the alternative expression: "the general meeting (or general assembly) of the members of the party."⁵⁴ There seems to have been no explicit and rigid rule for the composition of the party caucus. It was normally composed of all actual members of Parliament (occasionally distinguished as "the parliamentary members" or "the parliamentary group") or those of the *last* Parliament until a new one was elected. In addition, former deputies, unsuccessful or prospective candidates, and professional politicians in general might be invited also.⁵⁵

30 October 1933, VA File 399; Liberal Association of Alexandroupolis to Venizelos, 19 December 1933, VA File 399; and A. A. Sitras to Venizelos, 15 December 1934, VA File 404, on party organization in Larisa.

53. The discussion therefore mostly relies on a multitude of press reports, from which actual party operation can be reconstructed.

54. An intermediate and distinctly transitional form was "the (political) friends of the party," meaning *members*, not sympathizers. To avoid unnecessary awkwardness and confusion, the terms "leader" (rather than "chief") and "caucus" will be used throughout this analysis.

55. *Politeftes* is the standard Greek term for a professional politician of the parliamentary

The conception of the leader's role was very much like the one contained in Captain Pretyman's striking 1921 description of the process by which British Conservatives chose their leaders:

great leaders of parties are not elected, they are evolved. . . . I think it will be a bad day for this or any party to have solemnly to meet to elect a leader. The leader is there, and we all know it when he is there.⁵⁶

This conception seems inspired by a model of *charismatic* leadership (although of course most party leaders were not, and were not really considered or required to be charismatic). It is clearly reflected in the procedures typically followed for the emergence and for the succession of a party leader.

The first leader was always the official *founder* of the party as well. Typically, a prominent politician would announce his intention to create a party of his own, and then a variable number of deputies or other politicians would "recognize" him as leader. The public announcement of this "recognition" can be considered as the only formal act by which a party was born and its membership established. The process was not fundamentally different if the sequence was reversed, that is, when a group of deputies first got together and then requested another to become their leader. In March 1910, for example, ten deputies conferred in order to found a new party, but had to postpone it, lacking a leader.⁵⁷ The Liberal Party was to be created by a slightly different and larger group of deputies five months later, when a leader had been found at last.

This standard process, in which the recognition of the first leader and the birth of the party are actually inseparable, has given rise to the widespread myth that Greek parties do not survive their leaders. This is however not always true and may actually serve as a crucial test of the *institutionalization* of a party. The test of succession was first successfully passed by a Greek party in 1898, when the "orphaned" party of Ch. Trikoupes met and elected G. Theotokes to direct it. Subsequently, as will be seen, the

and notable variety. Although its flavor is impossible to convey exactly, *politico* may be close. It should be added that newspaper publishers, although rarely, if ever, present at official party meetings, exercised a powerful and often decisive influence on party affairs. On the national level, this was especially true of two individuals during the interwar period: Georgios A. Vlachos and Demetrios Lambrakes. Vlachos published *Kathemerine* [Daily], which appeared in September 1919 and became the authoritative daily newspaper of the P.P. Lambrakes, on the other hand, published *Eleftheron Vema* [Free Tribune], which first appeared in February 1922 and rapidly became the authoritative daily of the L.P.

56. Quoted in McKenzie, p. 34. It may be seen that this is not the only similarity of Greek parties with the British Conservatives.

57. *Akropolis*, 20 March 1910.

same problem was confronted and resolved by both major parties (P.P. and L.P.) in the interwar period.

An interpretation of these limited “precedents” indicates that succession involved two different stages, which suggest once again an essentially charismatic conception of the role of party leader. After the disappearance of the previous leader, the party caucus would meet and elect a person or a committee for the *direction* or *management* of party affairs. The authority of the (single or collective) party *manager*, in contrast to that of the leader, was explicitly or implicitly viewed as restricted in time and scope—and specifically as revocable, temporary, and transitional.⁵⁸ The transitional and elective authority of the party manager(s) would end when a new leader would be “recognized.” Even if he had earlier been formally elected as manager, or had been designated by the previous leader, or had served as deputy leader, it was this completely separate and essentially informal, gradual, and intangible “recognition” which was decisive for the establishment of the authority of the new leader.

The difference between party management and leadership was also reflected in the actual and, even more clearly, in the ostensible distribution of authority, and in the apparent decision-making procedure. Party managers would be expected to convoke the party caucus frequently and submit to it all important decisions, which would be freely debated and often put to a formal vote. Party leaders, on the other hand, would convoke the caucus at their discretion, more often merely to inform and sound off reactions than to introduce a formal resolution. Moreover, party leaders would normally elicit or receive a unanimous confirmation of the confidence of the party and a blanket authorization to make the final decision. These differences are, nevertheless, largely blurred by the general tendency of the parties to avoid any open and formalized expression of disagreement. Typically, the procedure followed—and the image projected—was one of open if unstructured discussion, from which consensus and unanimity (“the sense of the meeting”) would emerge without the need to actually count votes.

Moreover, a constitutional rule may be clearly inferred: that the party leader ostensibly enjoyed supreme and unlimited authority. This was thought to be incompatible with any arrangements that might even seem to encroach upon it, such as a formal division or a mandatory resolution in the party caucus, a formal delimitation of competence, the creation of other statutory and collegial bodies, etc., *unless* such arrangements were ordained by him, who was always free to freely delegate authority.

58. More precisely, the standard expression was “direction of the work of the party” (*diefthynsis ton ergasion tou kommatos*).

Between the leader and the party caucus, there usually was an "inner circle" of the most prominent or powerful party members, often informally designated as the party "staff," who might occasionally even substitute themselves for the entire caucus. When the party was in power, these "staff members" (*steleche*) would more or less coincide with the cabinet, and the presidents of the Chamber and Senate. Otherwise and depending on the security of the leader's position, the "staff" could be formalized to some degree: one (or more) deputy leaders or even a collegial directorate would be usually designated or nominated by him, with the consent or approval of the caucus. It always remained true, however, that leadership was conceived as indivisible, whereas only management or administration could be entrusted in a committee.

This kind of national party structure can be clearly seen to be consistent with, and well adapted to the structure found on the local level. Nevertheless, it would be a Procrustean oversimplification to also conclude, as some have, that national party structure merely *reproduced* the local structure on a larger scale, that is, only consisted of a patron as leader and his clients as members. To begin with, this aspect was of distinctly secondary importance on the national level. Not that patron-client sets could not exist within a parliamentary party: both the leader and prominent party figures might have a number of client deputies. However, insofar as a party could be characterized as simply clientelistic on the national level, it would principally consist of a *horizontal* alliance of patrons (around a leader whom they expected to be most effective in promoting their interests and those of their clients) rather than a *vertical* patron-client set.

Insofar as its leader had emerged as a merely skillful clientelist strategist, a party would still remain within the exclusive realm of clientelism. Not so, however, if other elements were also present. These were in particular: (1) the emergence of a significant mass following identified with the leader and/or the party; (2) the development of a distinctive party image, set of principles and policies, or even ideology; and (3) the institutionalization of the party *as a group* on the national level, as indicated especially by its successful passage of the test of succession and by its progress in the implementation of certain structural changes. Ever since 1910, it was widely understood that the desired transition from "personal parties" to "parties of principle" basically required *four* specific and interrelated structural changes: (1) the adoption of a written party constitution, (2) the establishment of intraparty democracy, (3) the transformation of a parliamentary party of notables into a mass party, and (4) the creation of a party bureaucracy.

It is the element of institutionalization that we will now briefly review, as it varied considerably among interwar parties, whereas party identification and ideology will be discussed subsequently.

The People's Party (P.P.)

The party of notables model and clientelism in particular were part of the very essence of Antivenizelism ever since its emergence as a defensive alliance of the Old Parties.⁵⁹ Early in his career, the founder and first leader of the P.P., D. Gounares, although then considered a promising politician with new ideas, had even formulated what amounts to a classic ideological statement in defense of clientelism:

Gentlemen, all over the world, and particularly in Greece, parliamentary government has produced and could not but produce results too which are unpleasant in many respects. But let us be careful lest these unpleasant results are so intertwined with the pleasant results, by the very nature of things, that, by attempting to cut off the source and cause of the unpleasant results, we also cut off the source and cause of the pleasant ones.

[They say that the close bond between elector and elected is detrimental to the country.] But when we say country, we say people. And when we say people, Gentlemen, let us depart from idealisms. Let us bear in mind that the people is nothing else than the individuals who compose it. And when we speak of needs of the people, we mean the needs of the individuals who compose it. Let us not imagine the people as some person standing above and outside the individuals. Let us not imagine the interests of the people as interests placed above and outside the interests of the individuals. The sum, the union, the harmonious connection of the interests of all the individuals, whose *individual* promotion, development, and betterment is and should be the object of the occupation of us all, constitute the interest of the people. Beyond this, there are only empty phrases, useful for the deception of the simple-minded.⁶⁰

Even after the 1909 Revolution, and going against the regenerationist spirit of the times, Gounares would insist that "parties of ideas, or rather of interests" were premature in Greece.⁶¹ Consequently, the party he

59. Nevertheless, various Antivenizelist minor groups and politicians did advocate the creation of "parties of principle," especially after the electoral triumph of their camp in November 1920. See, e.g., *Programmatika Arthra*, and the pamphlets by Strategos and by Bousios.

60. Chamber, 22 May 1906, reprinted in Malloses, p. 93. Emphasis added. In a very real sense, this is the true meaning of the "dogma of popular sovereignty" with which the P.P. was identified.

61. *Akropolis*, 17 March 1912.

founded in 1915 merely signified a rallying and a partial renewal of the political personnel of the Old Parties, rather than of their structure or methodology.⁶²

Party tradition has it that the People's Party was conceived in December 1911, at a meeting of D. Gounares, P. Tsaldares, and three others on a friend's estate near the small town of Gastoune in Western Peloponnesus.⁶³ It was however King Constantine who actually promoted Gounares to party leadership and to the political leadership of Antivenizelism as a whole, when he appointed him, a mere independent deputy at the time, prime minister in February 1915. Soon thereafter, politicians hastening to "recognize" Gounares as leader founded the Nationalist Party.⁶⁴ It rapidly absorbed most of the forces (i.e., the local factions) of the disintegrating Old Parties, and became the major Antivenizelist party. During 1917–1920 when Gounares was exiled abroad, the representation and management of the party (which refused to sit in the revived Venizelist Chamber) seems to have been de facto assumed by his closest collaborators. Upon his return in October 1920, it was renamed the People's Party.

After the execution of Gounares in November 1922, the party was in disarray. Eventually, P. Tsaldares emerged as "temporary manager" in January 1924 after protracted deliberations within the party "inner circle." In May, he was unanimously elected (simply or definitively) "manager" by a broad party caucus and was soon recognized as actual leader. The P.P. only acquired a central office (a "Center") and a constitution in April 1936, after it had been greatly shaken and weakened by a series of massive walkouts in the previous year and consequently in the election of January 1936.

The constitution is of particular interest because, for the most part, it merely spells out and codifies the implicit and informal structure of a party of notables outlined above.⁶⁵ The leader is the supreme authority (part of which he can delegate at his discretion) and determines the party program after receiving "the views and wishes" of the General Meeting. This is to meet at least annually and is composed of all "full members," that is, all present and former ministers, deputies, and senators of the P.P. Under the leader, an Administrative Council composed of all former ministers is confined to party administration. Provision is also made for specialized

62. On the history of the P.P., see Efstratiou, Kambanes, Malloses, Svolopoulos, and especially Vouros. All represent the party's own view of its history.

63. See, e.g., Kambanes, p. 51. Subsequent chapters may show why the "Meeting of Gastoune," an area typical of Old Greece and its traditional agrarian economy, is a very appropriate founding myth for the P.P.

64. Literally, "Party of the National-Minded" (*Komma ton Ethnikofronon*).

65. "Katastatikon Kendrou tou Laïkou Kommatos" [Constitution of the People's Party Center]. A copy was kindly provided by A. Tsaldares.

committees, local annexes, finances, and other categories of affiliation, beside "full members."⁶⁶

Tsaldares died soon thereafter, and the P.P. faced the test of succession for a second time in its history. An extraordinary parliamentary caucus immediately charged the Administrative Council with the temporary management of party affairs. The council then convoked the first General Meeting under the new party constitution. It met for three days, at the end of June 1936, and elected a five-member Executive Committee, to which the acting president of the Administrative Council was added as chairman. This was the last party meeting before the dictatorship.⁶⁷

A series of apparent paradoxes concerning the P.P. should be noted here. As will be seen, it appears that certain aspects of institutionalization, such as succession to the leadership, the adoption of a constitution, and relations with partisan mass organizations, posed less of a problem and were handled more smoothly by this party than by the L.P. Apart from the early death of its first leader and the absence of the problems associated with charismatic leadership (for the party as such, not for Antivenizelism as a whole), this difference can largely be explained by the fundamentally conservative, traditionalist, and even deferential orientation of the P.P. and its supporters. The P.P. was unquestionably and uncontestedly conceived and preserved as a parliamentary party of notables, based on local factions. Its structural transformation was never seriously considered or threatened, and the party constitution of 1936 merely sanctioned an existing state of affairs. Similarly, the extensive web of partisan associations on which the party relied was conceived "rather as a handmaid to the party, than to usurp the functions of party leadership," as was said on a different occasion.⁶⁸ Consequently, their integration into the formal party structure as local party branches was never envisaged, nor did they threaten to usurp the nomination of party candidates. In exchange, they seem to have exerted, as extremist pressure groups, greater influence on party leadership than their Liberal counterparts.

The Liberal Party (L.P.)

Unlike its principal adversary, the Liberal Party was originally supposed to become a *modern mass party*. Yet, it was in fact created more or less like a

66. These include: (1) "extraordinary members" (open to professional politicians of the party), (2) "honorary members" (rewarded for their services to the party), and (3) "contributors" (open to party voters). All of these have only financial obligations and no rights.

67. On the meeting, see especially *Kathemerine*, 29, 30, and 31 June and 2 July 1936.

68. Said by one of the founders of the National Union, the mass organization of British Conservatives, and quoted in McKenzie, p. 146.

party of notables, as seen previously, and essentially remained one throughout the interwar period, despite repeated attempts to transform it, and despite the fact that it was “the first party with an effective party organization.”⁶⁹

Already in the spring of 1910, several months before the August election and the subsequent creation of the L.P., Venizelos had been asked how “new men” were to enter the Chamber. He replied:

Through the founding of political associations, which will seek to educate the people in the use of its political rights.⁷⁰

Even after the founding and naming of the party, he insisted in his first public speech in Greece (in Athens), on 5 September 1910:

I do not come here as the leader of a new and already formed party. I come simply as a standard-bearer of new political ideas, and I call under this standard all who share these ideas, are inspired by the sacred desire to dedicate all their forces, soul and body, to contribute to the success of these ideas

Recognizing the need for the education of the Greek people and for its emancipation from personal parties, I will work with those with whom . . . my ideas coincide for the organization of a political association branching out throughout the land, which is going to become the organization of the new political party of regeneration.⁷¹

This unfulfilled promise was remembered by Venizelos and some of his closest or most faithful supporters on several occasions.⁷²

The nomination of Liberal candidates in the November 1910 election may be seen as a first experiment in party organization; many candidates were then officially nominated by occupational interest groups, including Merchant Associations in particular.⁷³ This procedure, however, which would directly link the party to occupational interest groups and would effectively turn them into party annexes, was rapidly abandoned.⁷⁴

Several years later, the creation of the Liberal Club of Athens was

69. Dafnes, *Kommata*, p. 121. It may be noted that an impersonal party name was adopted at the insistence of Venizelos. According to a half-serious version, however, *Fileleftheroi* (“Liberals,” from *filos*, “friend,” and *eleftheria*, “liberty”) could also be interpreted as “the friends of *Eleftherios*” (Venizelos)! The choice of a party emblem, the anchor, was also astute.

70. *Akropolis*, 20 March 1910.

71. *Patris*, 6 September 1910. Note the charismatic overtones of the first paragraph.

72. On the history of the L.P., the Venizelos Archive is an inexhaustible source. Among published works, those by Dafnes, Venteres, and Stefanou are the most pertinent.

73. See the list in VA File 97.

74. See A. Kassavetes, “He Organosis ton Fileleftheron” [The Organization of the Liberals], *Eleftheron Vema*, 16 February 1930.

hailed by Venizelos as the beginning of a long-overdue effort to organize the party—an effort which “known circumstances” (i.e., the National Schism) had until then prevented.⁷⁵ A new effort began in May 1920 with the creation of the Liberal League, which was to become the single, official, nationwide, and democratically constituted mass organization of the party.⁷⁶ The crushing electoral defeat in November and the departure of Venizelos intervened before this plan could materialize. The league was later reactivated, but merely as one of the two nationwide rival mass organizations of party supporters. During the absence of Venizelos, in 1920–1924, the party itself not only functioned as a party of notables, but was also distinctly hostile to mass organization. The only noteworthy institutional development was the creation of a rudimentary central office in 1921.

Almost immediately after his return to the leadership of the L.P. in 1928, Venizelos sponsored one more effort to provide the party with a written constitution and with a formal organizational structure. The only outcome of this renewed but equally abortive attempt consisted of three successive drafts, none of which was ever definitively adopted. The first such draft modified the existing state of affairs only slightly, and essentially provided the formal structure of a party of notables. It was rejected by Venizelos in the fall of 1929, when he demanded one more in accordance with a democratic model. His wish was clearly fulfilled by the second draft: it was the constitution of a mass party, based on local sections or branches. The most democratic constitution ever presented to a Greek bourgeois party was introduced by Venizelos himself to the party caucus in February 1930, when he even spoke of a target membership of more than 600,000, that is, all party voters.⁷⁷ Opposition among established party politicians proved so automatic and vociferous, however, that this second draft was immediately abandoned. Venizelos conceded in April that “the idea of our organization has not matured within the party.”⁷⁸ A third draft was prepared in 1934. Explicitly based on the existing state of affairs, it provided once again the structure of a party of notables, with limited participation by representatives of “recognized” mass organizations. It was never adopted and was the last attempt at constitution making.⁷⁹

75. *Patris*, 26 March 1918.

76. See *Katastatikon Syndesmou Fileleftheron* [Constitution of the Liberal League] (Athens, 1920), and the League's printed circular to Liberal Associations all over Greece, dated 21 August 1920.

77. *Eleftheron Vema*, 14 February 1930.

78. Minutes of the caucus meeting on 16 April 1930, Athens Liberal Club.

79. It has been impossible to determine the exact dates and history of this third draft constitution. On the story of the first two drafts, see A. Kassavetes to Venizelos, 7 October 1930, VA File 384.

Party structure thus remained in the following mixed state. On the proposal of Venizelos, a party caucus in January 1933 had unanimously decided the formation of a committee for the management of party affairs; it was constituted by Venizelos (as leader), Sofoules (deputy leader since 1928), and Gonatas (newly elected president of the Senate). This committee (which lasted until March 1935) proceeded to appoint official local party committees in each nome. Otherwise, party organization consisted of the central office, the Liberal Clubs of Athens and Thessaloniki, a party office in Piraeus, various associations in the Athens area, and approximately one hundred provincial associations, more or less authorized to represent the party locally.⁸⁰

One of the principal and declared aims of Venizelos's repeated organizational initiatives was the resolution of the problem of *succession*—of which he was acutely, if somewhat coquettishly, conscious. Not counting his death, Venizelos abandoned Greek politics or the L.P. no less than *five* times: in 1915, for a brief period, upon his first resignation as prime minister; in 1916, when he left for Thessaloniki as a rebel; in 1920, after the November electoral disaster; in 1924, after his brief stay in power; and in 1935, after the disastrous March coup.

It was, however, the precipitated departure of Venizelos from Greece in November 1920 and his subsequent statements that the L.P. was definitively without a leader that posed the problem of succession in all its complexity for the first time. Until 1924, continuity was assured by General P. Dangles as party manager (and parliamentary spokesman) either alone, or at the head of several short-lived committees. Meanwhile, Venizelos monotonously insisted that his decision was irrevocable and that the L.P. would have to choose a new leader. The party, however, adamantly refused to acknowledge the fact and insisted that there could be *no* other leader.

The peculiar deadlock continued after the return of Venizelos to Greece in January 1924. In a written message to the party caucus convened at his request, he immediately demanded the election of a new leader without delay. The caucus unanimously responded that this was impossible as long as Venizelos was alive. After three frustrating months, Venizelos left Greece once again, one day after the untimely death of Dangles. Within the following week, the leaderless caucus twice failed to reach a consensus on the L.P.'s course of action. When it eventually split, most of the members rallying one of the three main pretenders (Kafandares, So-

80. Central Office undated memorandum (probably 1934), VA, unclassified. Athens-based party organizations included the Panhellenic Liberal Youth, founded in 1929 and claiming 19,000 members.

foules, and Michalakopoulos), the problem of succession seemed finally liquidated, if not resolved. Not so, as Kafandares was to learn at his expense. Once his Progressive Liberals had become identified with the old party, and Venizelos had returned to Greece, Kafandares realized that he had been surreptitiously demoted from leader to mere manager.⁸¹ The party had found its only true leader again, and this reunion was formalized in May 1928.

The problem of succession was posed once again, and apparently resolved, in the wake of the disastrous March 1935 coup. With Venizelos a fugitive abroad and Gonatas in jail, only Sofoules remained of the L.P.'s managing committee. In the course of the summer of 1935, he gradually emerged as party leader, apparently with the consent of Venizelos, who had again formally resigned. The first party caucus to meet after the March storm was simply presented with the fait accompli, which it is reported to have ratified by mere acclamation.⁸² Yet, despite his smooth accession to nominal party leadership, the actual authority of Sofoules as leader was not securely established. The formation of a three-man party committee (under his chairmanship) was forced upon him after the January 1936 election. On the other hand, the absent Venizelos clearly remained the ultimate source of authority for the L.P., as he proved in November 1935 by dictating the recognition of the Restoration. Upon his sudden death, on 18 March 1936, it seemed that the L.P., emancipated from its founder at last, might turn to Kafandares and offer him the leadership. To regain the protection of charismatic legitimacy, Sofoules swiftly invited Sofokles Venizelos, the deceased statesman's son, to participate in the party committee (with himself and Gonatas).⁸³

Although protected from an external threat, Sofoules soon faced internal challenges, as S. Venizelos began taking initiatives on his own, while Gonatas sought to establish the tutelage of the committee over the leader. Things came to a head at the last party caucus to be held before the dictatorship, on 2 July 1936. The resolution finally adopted clearly registers the failure to resolve a conflict of authority (and personality) which was to plague the party for years to come:

The meeting of the Liberal Party, approving the Leader's policy to date, expresses its confidence in him and in the members of the managing commit-

81. G. Kafandares to Venizelos, 18 August 1927, VA File 329.

82. *Eleftheron Vema*, 17 September 1935. This newspaper seems to have played a critical role in the promotion of Sofoules to party leadership.

83. This decision, which was to have far-reaching consequences for the party, was ratified a month later by the parliamentary caucus, before which S. Venizelos emphatically proclaimed himself guardian of his father's political legacy. See *Eleftheron Vema*, 23 April 1936.

tee, trusting that, in close cooperation, the principles formulated by the great founder of the party will be continued.⁸⁴

In conclusion, it may be said that the institutionalization of the L.P. was arrested under the combined, if contradictory, impact of charisma, clientelism, and, indirectly, cleavage. Succession proved impossible, as long as Venizelos was alive and remained the ultimate source of authority for the party. Even his death, however, did not remove the instability associated with charisma. This was so because *competing* principles of charismatic succession became involved as soon as Sofoules conjured the irrepressible force of *familial* charisma by inviting S. Venizelos to participate in party management. As long as the problem of succession could not be resolved, it had a paralyzing effect on the party, forcing some of its best minds and several aspiring leaders to break with it. As Michalakopoulos put it in 1922:

It is a misfortune for the country that no organization which is not expressly recognized by him has any authority, either domestically or internationally. His great personality has exerted and exerts absorbing power. But no one is to blame for this.⁸⁵

With respect to party organization, it may seem paradoxical that the charismatic leader repeatedly failed to impose the institutional order ostensibly ordained by him. Yet, the organizational activism of Venizelos always had an erratic, superficial, and short-lived quality. As a true charismatic leader, he could never quite submit himself to the routine of party administration (as he openly admitted) nor to the straitjacket of fixed constitutional rules (as he himself implied with reference to his possible election as president of the Republic). Both were required, however, if his charisma was to be effectively harnessed to the erection of a modern mass party.

Nevertheless, the principal obstacle was probably the staunch resistance of the clientelist component of the party. The prospect of a democratic and open nominating process, which a mass party was expected to lead to, was of course anathema to the leaders of local factions. It was clearly perceived at the time that resistance to party organization was concentrated among the Liberal bosses in provincial Old Greece, whereas party members and supporters in the New Lands and the major urban centers—the refugees in particular—would welcome, or at the very least accept, the transformation into a mass party. Structural reform could

84. *Kathemerine*, 3 July 1936.

85. A. Michalakopoulos to P. Dangles, 6 September 1922, Dangles Archive.

therefore only be imposed on the clientelist component of the party at the risk of exacerbating existing cleavages and upsetting the fairly close balance of forces with Antivenizelism, if dissatisfied local factions were to walk out en masse. Such a risk was evidently unacceptable to Venizelos, whose fundamental pragmatism had led him to welcome several supposedly reform-minded local bosses in 1910 and later.

The Minor Parties

In general, the minor Antivenizelist and Venizelist parties never reached the level of organizational articulation and the degree of institutionalization, however relative, of the two major parties. By comparison, they remained to a much greater extent, or even exclusively, parties of notables assembled around a leader and clientelist quasi-groups, adequately described by the traditional expression "Mr. X (the leader) and his political friends."

Their leaders were more or less identified with distinctive ideological and policy stands, but their stable electoral support was normally concentrated in their home areas, consisting in effect of a local faction on which they could always fall back. Otherwise, electoral support was either thinly scattered throughout the country or else was overwhelmingly contributed by the local factions of politicians joining the party.

Moreover, party composition (or "membership") was for the most part unstable, fluid, and shifting, given that it consisted normally of politicians dissatisfied with the major parties and, typically, excluded from their tickets through the machinations of local rivals. Partisan associations, if not entirely absent, were fewer, smaller, and less influential than those attached to the major parties. Finally, none of these parties survived its leader.

This is avowedly a gross picture, but variation within it is of secondary importance here. What must be noted, however, is that the picture would change significantly whenever one of these minor parties managed temporarily to profit from the disarray or even the disintegration of the major party in its own camp. The former was the case of the Free Opinion Party (Metaxas) between 1922 and 1927, which came close to displacing the P.P. from its central position within Antivenizelism. The latter was the case of the Progressive Liberals (Kafandares) between 1924 and 1928, when they were in fact the main beneficiaries of the L.P.'s legacy, including its numerous partisan associations.⁸⁶

86. Actually, it may be more accurate to consider the Progressive Liberals as the *mainstream* Liberals during those years rather than the party of Kafandares. In this sense, only his post-1928 Progressive Party was a minor Venizelist party, properly speaking.

Beside these temporary deviations from the general picture presented above, a major exception is the Republican Union, or Farmer-Labor Party, which is entitled to separate treatment.

The Republican Union or Farmer-Labor Party

The Sociological Society, founded in 1908 by A. Papanastasiou and six other radical young intellectuals fresh from German universities, included among its distinctly reformist and gradualist socialist goals "the organization of the working people into a political party of their own." This they first attempted to provide in 1910, calling it the People's Party (*Laïkon Komma*)⁸⁷ and getting a few but vocal spokesmen elected to the Chamber (in both elections of that year), where they functioned as the most articulate and radical, but basically friendly opposition to the Liberals, and became simply known as "the Sociologists." After the outbreak of the National Schism in 1915, the Sociologists were absorbed into the L.P.

The same core group under Papanastasiou, increased by several new associates, reemerged with a distinct identity in April 1921, when a document was signed, outlining a democratic and socialist program which specifically included:

the organization of the political parties in a way promoting within them free discussion and criticism and the taking of decisions on the political program according to the views of the majority, while preventing as much as possible the personal imposition of the party leaders on the basis of personal ties and services, and the arbitrary determination of the party course by them.⁸⁸

One year later, in March 1922, the original and subsequent signatories of the 1921 program founded the Republican Union (*Demokratike Henosis*), elected an executive committee, and adopted a provisional party constitution, as well as a model constitution for Republican Associations which were rapidly created as local party organizations. The provisional party constitution defined the Republican Union as a political group including, on the one hand, the "left wing" of the L.P., organized separately, and, on the other hand, members of "the agrarian or labor movement or independents" subscribing to the 1921 program.⁸⁹ In August 1923, how-

87. Not to be confused with the Antivenizelist party of Gounares, which adopted the same name in 1920. Yet another short-lived "People's Party" was the one founded in 1914 by the Thessaloniki guilds. See Gotzamanes, *Koinonikai Taxeis*.

88. Text enclosed in N. Apostolopoulos to Venizelos, 5 April 1922, VA File 316.

89. See Lefkoparides, Vol. 1, pp. 306–309, and the text in VA File 354. In February 1922, a "Republican Manifesto" had been published, for which Papanastasiou and six others were imprisoned.

ever, the split with the mainstream Liberals was consummated, and members of the Republican Union were no longer allowed to participate in the Liberal caucus.

A change of the party name to "Farmer-Labor Party" (*Agrotikon-Ergatikon Komma*) seems to have been first considered in 1926, but the party remained commonly known under both names, in conjunction or interchangeably, throughout the interwar period. The party was originally conceived as and remained a loose confederation of individuals (mostly professional politicians) *and* associations subscribing to its program, which by 1932 were often referred to as party "sections" (or branches).⁹⁰

Supreme authority within the party was originally to be held by an annual conference, but only three were in fact held, at irregular intervals (1924, 1929, and 1931). Otherwise, national party structure apparently consisted of the leader (Papanastasiou), an executive committee, and the party caucus—much like any other Venizelist or Antivenizelist party. In fact, the party became increasingly identified with Papanastasiou personally, whose position as leader was never challenged.

In sum, the Farmer-Labor Party certainly traveled farther in the direction of becoming a modern mass party than any other party within the two dominant interwar blocs. Yet its structure remained forever incomplete,⁹¹ hence heterogeneous, and actually seems to have gradually regressed in later years. Especially after 1933, when the party was reintegrated into the Venizelist bloc (the National Coalition), it seems to have functioned more or less as a party of notables around Papanastasiou, despite its surviving mass organizations.⁹²

With respect to clientelism, the structure of this party reflected the regional and rural/urban cleavages much more clearly than that of any other party, precisely because of the more advanced organizational model on which it was explicitly erected. Party members in Old Greece, including Papanastasiou himself, largely depended on local factions or personal recognition in their home areas, whereas the core of party support in the cities and the New Lands was mostly organized in local party associations. This contrast emerges with exceptional consistency from the extensive reporting of party activity published in *Demokratia* during the summer of

90. See a draft constitution for second-degree party organizations (by nome or electoral district), dated February 1934, Papanastasiou Archive, File 18; and a 1935 party circular addressed to "party organizations, sections, and politicians (*politeftes*)," *Eleftheron Vema*, 30 September 1935.

91. See the anonymous article by a "peasant social-democrat" in the party newspaper *Demokratia*, 4 December 1932.

92. Among them, the Republican Youth included a significant portion of the postwar political and academic elite.

1932: while party sections are actively being organized in the New Lands, what is reported from Old Greece consists almost exclusively of the declarations of allegiance by local caciques (*kommataarches*) and the campaign tours of individual politicians.

Apart from the regional and rural/urban cleavages, however, the arrested institutionalization of the Farmer-Labor Party should be attributed to several other factors as well, including the competition it faced on its left, by the Agrarian Party in particular.

The Agrarian Party (A.P.)

There had been many self-proclaimed Agrarians before 1923, but no agrarian party.⁹³ The Agrarian Party of Greece was ostensibly born in March 1923, out of a Panhellenic Agrarian Congress organized by the agricultural cooperatives (those of Peloponnesus in particular), which recognized the need for a party representing the peasants. A committee was formed, a program and constitution adopted, and official party candidates ran for the first time in the election of that year. For several years, however, party organization was practically nonexistent, the original founders split, and the party label merely covered several localized agrarian groups, which would only come together to participate in an election (1926, 1928, and 1929).

It was in May 1929 that another Panhellenic Agrarian Congress, which met in Thessaloniki to unify all Agrarian groups, actually created the A.P., providing it with a new constitution. It was to be organized as a mass party, based on local sections, which would be represented in its conference (or congress), the highest party authority. Party management was to be entrusted in a secretary-general, a seven-member Executive Committee, and a General Council of twenty, all elected by the party conference, as was done in Thessaloniki for the first time.

This newly found organizational unity proved fragile, however. Two intraparty factions emerged and confronted each other on a series of political and personal issues, including the plan of one side to promote Ioannes Sofianopoulos, an Agrarian neophyte, as leader of the party.⁹⁴ At the end of the next conference (December 1930), one of the two factions walked out, and for more than a year thereafter both claimed to represent the A.P.

93. This brief account of A.P. history is based mostly on Pournaras, *Historia tou Agrotikou Kinematos*, and his *Eleftherios Venizelos*, Vol. 4, pp. 68–97.

94. It was felt by this faction that the party needed a prestigious leader, much like other Greek parties. Before Sofianopoulos, two other prominent politicians had been approached.

Painstaking negotiations eventually led to the reunification of the party in March 1932.

The unified party participated in the election of September 1932, only to split again in its aftermath, when the Executive Committee, in violation of the party constitution, appointed Sofianopoulos as parliamentary leader. Eventually, three splinters of the A.P. participated in the March 1933 election: one as part of the Antivenizelist United Opposition; another, under A. Mylonas, as part of the Venizelist National Coalition; and a third, under Sofianopoulos, retained the party label and ran separately.

Of these three, the first subsequently cooperated with the C.P. and actually ran on its "Popular Front" tickets in January 1936; but it refused to join the "Unified A.P." which was being formed in the summer of 1936. The Mylonas group, renamed Agrarian Republican Party, remained an integral part of the Venizelist bloc and joined the Republican Coalition of minor Venizelist parties in January 1936.

It was Sofianopoulos who mostly represented what was left of the A.P. and its legacy, and it was around him that the "Unified A.P." was being formed in the summer of 1936. Following an earlier decision, the C.P. officially dissolved its rural organizations, which were instructed to join the A.P. By the middle of July, the A.P. had grown spectacularly and reportedly numbered 20,000 members. Finally, on the very eve of the dictatorship, an agreement was signed between the A.P. and the C.P., constituting a Popular Front.⁹⁵

The dictatorship abruptly interrupted this new and dynamic phase in party development before its results could crystallize. In its earlier career, and even though it was established as a mass party, the A.P. seems to have actually functioned like one only in certain areas, mainly in Thessaly and Macedonia, while party sections elsewhere were probably more nominal than real. This geographical variation, combined with intense localism, seems to have been responsible for the extreme initial heterogeneity of the party, both structural and ideological, which is one of the keys to the dismal failure of its institutionalization.

Although its evolution was consequently dominated by factional disputes between prominent individuals and cliques, most of them based in their respective local strongholds, clientelism is only partially relevant in this case. A clientelist model would only seem to be applicable to those already established politicians who merely adopted the Agrarian label at one time or another, in Old Greece but also elsewhere (A. Mylonas in

95. See Sarles, pp. 222, 356–359, and 400–404.

Epirus, F. Dragoumes in Florina, etc.). The most common type among Agrarian notables, however, was that of the local activist and *agitator* rather than that of the patron. In this respect, which it shared with the Farmer-Labor Party, personal and factional politics within the A.P. should not be equated with clientelism.

The Communist Party (C.P.)

Given that the principal purpose of this discussion of interwar party structure has been to determine the presence and extent of clientelism, there is no need to become involved with the extremely convoluted early organizational history of the C.P. of Greece (*Kommounistiko Komma Helladas*, or *KKE*): clientelism had obviously no part in it.⁹⁶

What should be briefly sketched, nonetheless, is the dramatic structural transformation of the party between 1918 and 1931, from the original model of a social-democratic mass party to a Bolshevik model and eventually to a Stalinist monolithic model. The Socialist Labor Party (*Socialistikon Ergatikon Komma*) was founded in November 1918 by a few delegates representing about 1,000 organized socialists in seven urban centers as a democratic mass party based on local sections and groups, which would be represented in its supreme body, the annual congress. A Central Committee elected by the congress was to lead the party. The party's Second Congress (April 1920) decided to join the Third International, added the qualification "Communist" in parentheses at the end of the party title, and adopted a new constitution increasing centralization and the concentration of power in the Central Committee. What was called the Third Extraordinary Congress (November–December 1924) completed the party's integration into the Third International, approved its Twenty-One Conditions of admission, changed the name to "Communist Party of Greece (Greek Section of the Communist International)," and inaugurated the "Bolshevization" of the party, a process which implied its reorganization on the basis of cells rather than sections. The process continued for several years, during which the party was incessantly shaken by a series of ferocious factional struggles and concomitant purges. (The Politbureau, a new body, was established by the Third Congress in March 1927.) Eventually, intraparty democracy received its death blow, and a new period of monolithic stability began in December 1931 when the Communist International openly intervened and appointed the party's

96. On the history of the party, see Elefantēs, Kousoulas, and Sarles (who may be considered an authorized party source). See also the collected party documents in *KKE* and in *Saranda Chronia*.

“New Leadership” under Nikos Zachariades. He was officially “elected” secretary only in 1934, and secretary-general and “Leader of the Party” in 1935 by the Sixth Congress.⁹⁷

It should also be noted that the C.P., despite its widespread influence in the labor movement and even in some rural areas as well, remained a small cadre organization throughout the interwar period. Between 1918 and 1932, total membership hovered around the 2,000 mark, and increased rapidly only after 1932, possibly exceeding 10,000 on the eve of the dictatorship.⁹⁸

Conclusion

Approached from the angle of party structure and institutionalization, clientelism in interwar Greece emerges as a distinctly *variable* rather than uniformly distributed phenomenon. Its importance varied considerably along several interrelated dimensions which illustrate the limits imposed on its operation by other factors, such as cleavages and charisma.

The most obvious dimension is related to ideology and class. If interwar political parties are placed on a Left/Right spectrum—with all the arbitrariness and simplification that such an exercise normally involves—the importance of clientelism may be seen to *increase* continuously *from left to right*: from the C.P., which is an actual zero point, to the A.P., to the Farmer-Labor Party, to the rest of Venizelism, and eventually to Antivenizelism—its foremost exponent and expression. This is hardly a surprising finding, since it agrees with most theories of party structure and with Duverger in particular.⁹⁹

Another nationwide dimension of variation is spatial, linked to both regional and rural/urban cleavages. Clientelism was generally more dominant and deeply rooted in Old Greece than in the New Lands, and in rural than in urban areas. These differences not only corresponded to spatial differences in party strength, but were also reflected in the heterogeneous structure of particular parties—above all the L.P. and the Farmer-Labor Party.

A third dimension of variation, more directly related to charisma, can be identified *within* each of the two dominant political camps. The

97. See Elefantas, p. 121. The office of “leader” was not to be found in the new party constitution that the *same* congress adopted. This elevation of a “leader” is in fact the only structural similarity between the C.P. and other Greek parties. It may be seen that a charismatic conception of leadership underlies both the Stalinist model and the traditional party model presented earlier.

98. On membership figures, see, e.g., Sarles, pp. 26, 30, and 408.

99. Maurice Duverger, *Les partis politiques* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951).

importance of clientelism was relatively smaller for the major party of each camp, compared with the minor parties. Conversely, the degree of institutionalization achieved by the two major parties cannot be compared to that of the minor parties, which was practically nil (with the noted exception of the Farmer-Labor Party). This is obviously related to the central position of the P.P. and the L.P., which were normally considered to embody the very essence of their respective camps and, thereby, monopolized legitimacy, mass identification, and mass organization within them. To the extent that charisma shaped mass loyalties, it destroyed much of the flexibility and fluidity inherent in clientelism, to the benefit of the two major parties, and especially the L.P.—undisputed font of charismatic legitimacy within its camp.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND IDEOLOGY

Party identification was strong and widespread in interwar Greece, where almost everyone was bound to be either a Venizelist or an Antivenizelist, and usually a Liberal or a P.P. identifier, respectively. Such strong and widespread party identification effectively created additional constraints on the operation of clientelism. This is perhaps best condensed in the tension between the traditional term “political friend” and the novel term “fellow fighter,” each implying a different conception of loyalty and obligation.¹⁰⁰

It was certainly true that particularly effective, enterprising, or securely established political patrons commonly acquired clients (and voters) identified with the *opposite* bloc. This was the case of I. Tsirimokos in Fthiotis, for example, as described by his son:

Venizelism never was more than a section—big perhaps, but a section nonetheless—of “tsirimokism” in Fthiotis. Those who voted for my father were many more than those who had understood or believed in Venizelos. Some in fact would prefer, deep inside, that it might not coincide that they support Venizelos by voting for my father. In any event, when asked about their convictions, they would simply answer: “I am with Master John.”¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, such voters did *not* ipso facto change their party or bloc identification and basic political loyalty, which could be expected to prevail over their obligations as clients whenever the conflict between the two

100. See the Michalakopoulos letter quoted previously, where both terms are used in juxtaposition.

101. Elias Tsirimokos, *Mneme: Skiagrafia Ioannou Tsirimokou* [Memory: Sketch of Ioannes Tsirimokos] (Athens: Alfa, 1953), p. 49.

blocs was revived or exacerbated, reaching the *local* level. This is why political patrons in areas where basic political loyalties were known to be mostly favorable to the opposite camp—typically Venizelist politicians in heavily Royalist areas of Old Greece—would strenuously attempt to keep divisive national issues out of their areas and preserve a strictly personal rapport with actual or prospective clients. In 1923, for example, the group of Republican Liberals who seceded from the L.P. offered the following explanation for the party's reluctance to take a preelectoral stand on the regime issue:

There certainly are those among Liberal politicians who are compelled by local conditions to cooperate with Royalists and fear that they are in danger of not being elected if they present themselves as Republicans in the coming election.¹⁰²

Similarly, in 1933 Republicans in Aegina complained that the island's Venizelist politician was blocking the creation of a local Republican organization, claiming, among other things, that it would drive away those among his regular supporters who were in fact Royalists.¹⁰³ Conversely, a local politician very rarely could expect to carry all of his regular supporters over to the opposite political camp. Strong party (or bloc) identifiers would not follow him.¹⁰⁴

In conclusion, strong mass identifications may be said to have had in interwar Greece, particularly with respect to Venizelism and Antivenizelism as blocs, consequences similar to those observed in some Latin American countries, such as Colombia, where strong mass identification with the two major parties has constrained the shifting coalitions among politicians and has resulted in the emergence of intraparty factions rather than new political parties.¹⁰⁵ The equivalent of internal factions in the Greek case was the emergence of minor parties within each bloc, as well as the various independent Venizelist or Antivenizelist tickets at election time.

Party (or bloc) identification was also the most common and everyday meaning of the term "ideology" in interwar Greece. But did this imply ideology, properly speaking? It has often been asserted, especially as part of the perennial debate on "personal parties" and "parties of principle," that *no* ideological or programmatic differences have separated Greek (bourgeois) parties. Similarly, Legg claims: "Other attributes of parties

102. Proclamation "The Party of Republican Liberals to the Greek People," VA File 357.

103. Panhellenic Republican Defense to Venizelos, 5 December 1933, VA File 399.

104. This generalization, which goes against a widespread myth, is based on many reports of local political developments in the Venizelos Archive, and especially on the reports sent by the prefects in the spring of 1932, VA File 110.

105. Payne, pp. 185–203.

such as ideology or program are also largely missing in the Greek context."¹⁰⁶ It has already been noted that this is a myth, or a misleading half-truth at best.

What is certainly true, also for the interwar period, and may be partly responsible for this myth, is that political ideology generally remained in a diffuse and uncoded state, except for the parties on the left of the political spectrum (Farmer-Labor Party, A.P., C.P.), and these in varying degrees as well. It can be said that ideology was all over the place, but must be gleaned and reconstructed from innumerable fragments of parliamentary and other public speeches, press articles and interviews, private letters, etc.

It is also true that interwar Greek usage of terms such as party "principles," "program," and "ideology" may be confusing. The term "program," for example, was commonly reserved for the electoral platform put together for a specific election and often announced only a few days in advance.¹⁰⁷ What should primarily qualify as party ideology was commonly referred to as "the principles" of a party. These were understood to have been formulated mainly, if not exclusively, by the founder and first (or only) leader of the party and possibly adapted by his successor; they were to be found in speeches, statements, and letters, or generally deduced from the policies pursued while in power or advocated in opposition.¹⁰⁸

This situation is by no means unique to interwar Greek parties, but has been common among European bourgeois parties until well into the 20th century, if not until today. The same may be said about the problem of reconciling the countless contradictions in what were mostly ad hoc statements by practical politicians, or about the more vexing problem of filling the gaps created ex post facto by the hagiographic censorship exercised by editors of selected (rather than collected) speeches and papers.¹⁰⁹

A systematic and exhaustive analysis of ideology as such falls outside

106. Legg, "Political Change in a Clientelistic Polity," p. 238.

107. Two weeks before the 1926 election, it was thus reported that Tsaldares had not yet prepared the "program" of the P.P. and had decided to give a "programmatic speech" instead. See *Eleftheron Vema*, 20 October 1926.

108. On what was considered the original and authoritative formulation of party "principles," see, e.g., the 1936 resolution of the L.P. quoted previously. Similarly, the 1936 constitution of the P.P. stated that its purpose was "the pursuit by all legal means of the victory of the principles of the P.P., as they were formulated by the party's founder, the unforgettable D. Gounares, and were developed according to the evolution of the country's political life, and the present-day conceptions about the state's mission, by the party's leader, P. Tsaldares." It further added that an elaboration of these principles would allow the formulation of "the political program appropriate each time."

109. See, for example, the selection of Venizelos speeches edited by Stefanou.

the scope of this study. Nevertheless, specifically relevant and critical party differences in ideology and program have already been and will be further examined. The general question that may be raised at this point is whether such differences can be extended to the mass level, where the articulation, elaboration, and consistency of "belief systems" has been shown to be minimal, if not entirely missing.¹¹⁰

Several ideological influences may be said to have actually affected mass politics, such as conflicting beliefs and attitudes related to clientelism, charisma, class or group identification, variations or even conflicting versions of Greek nationalism, and popular versions of diverse constitutional theories. But the two most pervasive and salient ideological cleavages related to party choice were certainly those concerning *the political regime* and *the existing social order*.

On the regime issue, the division between Republicanism and Royalism truly permeated the entire society, even if articulated in only a rudimentary and perhaps superficial way. Apart from party identification, another common meaning of "ideology" in interwar Greece was precisely one's position on the regime issue. This division was largely the product of charismatic conflict and civil strife, but did not entirely coincide with the split between Venizelism and Antivenizelism, if only because the Left was also Republican.

On the other hand, attitudes towards the existing social order were commonly and crudely differentiated with reference to what was perceived as its essential foundation: private property. The overriding ideological division was thus defined as one between its supporters and its (actual or suspected) foes, and sharply separated all "bourgeois" parties from the "subversive" Left, and most unambiguously from the Communists.¹¹¹

The lack of congruence between these two ideological divisions had critical implications for political alignments and party strategies, which became increasingly obvious towards the end of the interwar period. The two cleavages were clearly *crosscutting*: Republicans were divided on the social order, whereas its supporters were divided on the regime. Moreover, the two dimensions invoked drastically different *spatial* distributions of mass support (which can be roughly derived from the electoral results in the absence of other data). On the regime issue, the distribution was

110. The classic study is, of course, Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1965).

111. "Bourgeois" will be used generically, as it was used at the time, to designate all political forces subscribing to private property and the existing social order.

evidently *bimodal*, with a majority concentrated around the Republican pole, a large minority around the Royalist pole, and few, if any, indifferents in between. In sharp contrast, the social order called forth a *unimodal* concentration of supporters (and actual or aspiring beneficiaries) of private property, fading off towards the Left where its few determined foes were to be found.

However simplistic this rough sketch may be, it makes sufficiently apparent that whether the one or the other dimension became more salient radically altered the space of party competition. Consequently, manipulation of these two basic ideological dimensions was bound to become a *central* element of party strategy.

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGE

Ideological divisions were of course not unrelated to underlying cleavages in the country's social structure. The most official and emphatic confirmation of this fact is offered by various legislative measures, whose explicit or transparent purpose was to control and suppress the political exploitation of existing social divisions.

The famous decree of 23 April 1924 "on the safeguard of the republican regime," known as *Katochyrotikon*, represents in this respect the most general statement on existing ethnic and religious cleavages. It was not only directed against various forms of contesting the legitimacy of the Republic and of reviving the political passions of the recent past, but also punished whoever:

By means of the press, and for political purposes, systematically and invidiously distinguishes the inhabitants of the Country into natives and immigrants, into those of the same and those of a different religion, into those of the same and those of a different language, and the like, or attributes contemptible qualities or customs to them.

Uses religion, or the religious institutions, or the religious dogmas, for the defamation of the republican form of government, or for whatever political exploitation¹¹²

Public approval of such acts was also made a criminal offense, and their perpetration with the express purpose of overthrowing the republican regime carried heavier penalties.¹¹³

112. Article 2, Paragraph 1.

113. For the heated discussion of the *Katochyrotikon* decree by the Assembly, see Fourth Constituent, 25, 29, and 30 May 1924, *Praktika*, Vol. 2, pp. 80–109, 147–154, and 157–167. Rarely invoked and repeatedly amended, the decree seems to have actually lapsed by 1927, i.e., before the expiration of the ten-year period for which it was originally intended.

With respect to class cleavages, a similar function was performed by the various anticommunist measures and above all by Law 4229 of 1929, which became known as *Idionymon* and punished:

Whoever seeks the implementation of ideas whose manifest purpose is the overthrow of the established social order by violent means or the detachment of part from the whole of the State's territory, or proselytizes in favor of these ideas¹¹⁴

The reference to the state's territorial integrity also points to the existence of national minorities in sensitive areas.

Finally, with respect to regional cleavages, a host of legislative and administrative measures acknowledged the basic territorial division between Old Greece and the New Lands. The most telling and pertinent example is an electoral system which was tailored to make the most out of the profound political differences separating the two parts of the country.¹¹⁵

For analytical purposes, a conceptual distinction will be made between *four* principal dimensions of social cleavage, along which interwar Greek society was divided into: (1) different classes and strata; (2) natives and refugees; (3) an Orthodox Greek majority and various national, ethnic, and religious minorities; and (4) various regions and, above all, into two halves—Old Greece and the New Lands. Each of these four principal dimensions will be examined in turn, in the four subsequent chapters. Eventually, it will be seen that, although conceptually distinct, these were concretely interrelated and overlapping dimensions of political conflict, and that the overall territorial division between Old Greece and the New Lands largely subsumed and reflected other social cleavages.

It will also become apparent that social cleavages interacted with charisma and clientelism along the directions previously outlined (in the Introduction). To the extent that the appeal of charisma *was* random, it certainly subverted all kinds of group solidarity. The aspect of the National Schism which most impressed and traumatized contemporaries in this respect was the widespread severance of family ties and frequent destruction of family solidarity—to an extent unprecedented in Greek society. Weber, who quotes the proposition "It has been written, . . . but I

114. "*Idionymon*" is derived from the fact that the law created a "special" crime. For the long and heated parliamentary debate on the measure, see Chamber, 3 April, 30 May, and 18 June 1929, *Efemeris*, pp. 729–751, 977–1001, and 1184–1197. For a general discussion, see Katefores, pp. 64–76; and Alivizatos, pp. 270–279. A more detailed analysis is to be found in Koundouros.

115. See Appendix 1 on the "narrow-wide" plurality system, and also Chapter 7.

say unto you . . .” as typical of every charismatic authority,¹¹⁶ would perhaps invoke here another statement from the Gospel:

I have come to set a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a son's wife against her mother-in-law; and a man will find his enemies under his own roof.¹¹⁷

Nevertheless, the geographic and social space in which the charisma of Venizelos proved most effective was clearly different from (if not the exact opposite of) that in which Constantine's appeal prevailed. Each promised “salvation” to *different* groups in crisis: Constantine, to the natives of Old Greece; Venizelos, to the newly liberated Greeks of the New Lands and unredeemed Greeks elsewhere—the future refugees. Finally, interwar Greek politics also illustrate the role of charismatic identification as “false consciousness” masking “real” group interests and conflicts. Charismatic conflict and its legacy probably provided the most effective and enduring cement for the cohesion of the otherwise quite heterogeneous interwar blocs, especially on the mass level.

On the interaction that one should expect between clientelism and social cleavages, suffice it to note here that the general fluidity of class lines and the remarkable degree of social mobility characteristic of Greek society are to be linked to the lasting operation of a widespread patron-client network. Yet, this network has already been shown to have been mostly concentrated in the rural areas and in Old Greece, thus following the lines of existing cleavages. In addition, it largely excluded and disadvantaged the newly arrived refugees, as opposed to the natives.¹¹⁸ Related to existing social cleavages and a source of cleavage itself, clientelism has also been shown to underly the division between Antivenizelism and Venizelism. Despite the countless compromises made, the latter largely retained its image of a political force directed against established patrons and traditional political families (*ta tzakia*). In a hyperbolic but significant statement, one of these wrote to Venizelos in 1932, infuriated by the appointment of a young local rival to the cabinet:

Measuring the past, I have formed the conviction that the disappearance of all the families of Old Greece was also part of your program.¹¹⁹

If Antivenizelism was the foremost exponent and expression of clientelism, Venizelism should be expected to represent areas and groups less

116. Weber, Vol. 2, p. 1115.

117. Matthew 10: 35–36.

118. This point is also made in Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, pp. 114ff.

119. P. Flessas to Venizelos, 7 July 1932, VA File 346. “Families” obviously refers to established political families, i.e., *ta tzakia*.

involved in, disadvantaged by, or even hostile to the traditional patron-client system.

THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT

The preceding discussion of charisma, clientelism, party identification, ideology, and social cleavages as interrelated factors jointly shaping inter-war mass politics might be simply summarized in an equation of the familiar form $Y = b_1X_1 + \dots + b_iX_i + e$, where Y represents mass support for a particular party (or bloc) and each X one of the factors in question, while the residual error term e takes care of other potential but unspecified influences. Ideally, such a model would make it possible to separate, estimate, and compare the impact (b) of each of these factors. This must remain a purely theoretical possibility, however, because available data do not allow the operationalization and measurement of each of the terms involved, except two: *mass support* and *social cleavages*.¹²⁰ The only available and in any case most meaningful measure of mass support for a particular party (or bloc) is electoral support, which will serve as the dependent variable. On the other hand, social cleavages can be operationalized in terms of census and other aggregate data, from which independent variables will be derived. Both sets of data are only available by geographical-administrative subdivisions, which will serve as the units of *ecological* analysis. Appendix 2 describes in detail both the units of analysis and the variables used.

As far as the quantitative analysis is concerned, the theoretical model is thus inevitably amputated, and reduced to one where only cleavages can be represented by X , while other factors, such as charisma and clientelism, may be confounded with both X and e . Under these conditions, it becomes impossible to separate, estimate, and compare the impact of each of the factors previously discussed. It also becomes superfluous to consider interaction terms which might have to be included or more elaborate models, whether recursive or otherwise.

Accordingly, the intention of the quantitative analysis which follows is more modest: it is only to establish whether social cleavages had *any*

120. Although theoretically conceivable, meaningful indicators of charisma and clientelism cannot be constructed with the particular data at hand. Similarly, the strength of party identification and ideological commitment cannot be quantified independently of the electoral results themselves: the only usable measure of mass Republicanism or Royalism, for example, is precisely the electoral support for parties generally counted as Republican or Royalist—the former including Venizelism and the Left (A.P. and C.P.), the latter coinciding with Antivenizelism. Results of the 1924 plebiscite on the regime are unfortunately not available in sufficient detail (by area).

discernible impact on interwar mass politics, *even if* this also reflects the impact of other factors, such as charisma and clientelism, which have been shown to have contradictory implications for cleavages, that is, to reinforce them in some respects and weaken (or cut across) them in others. Depending on the unknown balance in either direction and on the unknown degree to which other factors are confounded with X and *not* contained in e , the “true” impact of cleavages as such may be under- or overestimated. But what is of primary importance here is rather the sum total of effects, of whatever origin, which are eventually channeled *through* social cleavages, and effectively assume the form of such cleavages.

Formally, the null hypothesis tested is that $b = 0$, which would mean that electoral support for any given party or bloc is *randomly* distributed with respect to the social cleavage represented by X (and conceptualized as a division of the population into two or more categories). A politically relevant cleavage may be said to exist if (and to the extent that) electoral support for any given party or bloc is *disproportionately* concentrated in one of the categories into which the population may be divided, that is, if $b \neq 0$. The purpose of the regression analysis undertaken in this study is thus to estimate, in each case, whether the actual regression coefficient (b), representing the effect of the particular cleavage in question, is significantly different from zero (in light of its standard error in particular). If it is, the null hypothesis should be rejected.

The critical test for the recognition of a politically relevant cleavage is thus only the *nonrandomness* of electoral support for a given party among the categories defined by this cleavage. A one-to-one correspondence between party votes and one of these categories is therefore *not* required, in *either* direction (i.e., that all party votes come from this category or, conversely, that all of this category vote for the party in question). This should be kept in mind regardless of the fact that, if awkwardness is to be avoided, simplified verbal statements will have to be used, such as that “category A supports party B ,” or that “party C is based on categories D and E .”

Estimation and Presentation

A simple, single-equation, linear model seemed most appropriate throughout this analysis for its limited purposes. Arriving at the best possible prediction of the party vote or separating direct and indirect causal effects was not among its ambitions—nor did such ambitions appear justified in view of the quality of the data at hand. The specification of more complex models was therefore not pursued.

The method of estimation used throughout this analysis was ordinary least-squares regression, whether simple or multiple. All reported results were produced by the SPSS subprogram REGRESSION. In the few instances where simple correlation coefficients (r) appear by themselves, they were produced by the SPSS subprogram PEARSON CORRELATION.¹²¹ Regression results are presented in subsequent chapters according to political bloc or party in tables of the following standard form (only one column given for illustration):

TABLE . . . NAME OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE, NAME(S) OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLE(S) (NUMBER OF CASES)

Election Year	
Name of Independent Variable (X_i)	Regression Coefficient (b_i) (Standard error of b_i) Significance of b_i
a	Intercept (a) (Standard error of a) Significance of a
r	Correlation Coefficient
s	Standard Error of the Estimate

Whenever more than one independent variable is included, the results are those of multiple regression. Otherwise, they were produced by simple regression. Each column represents one regression, with party strength in that particular election as the dependent variable. In the fifth column, entitled 1928–1936, the dependent variable is average party strength over all four elections: 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1936. Finally, all numbers have been rounded to two decimals, except significance estimates, for which three decimals were retained, as reported by the SPSS subprogram.

The meaning of statistical significance may be questioned, since we are actually dealing with an entire population and not with a random sample. Several possible interpretations have been suggested in this respect: (1) The data can be thought of as a random sample from some *hypothetical* universe, which may perhaps best be understood as a universe of all the possible, or conceivable, outcomes. (2) Otherwise, the data can be considered random, to some unknown extent, due to random

121. On SPSS, see Norman H. Nie et al., *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975). The version used in this analysis was 7.0.

measurement error. (3) Alternatively, it may be assumed that the data were generated by some unspecified random process, in which case the results obtained may in some sense be due to chance.¹²² Among these interpretations, the first seems most attractive on logical grounds, even though the second may in fact be far more justified, especially with census data. In any event, given the continuing debate on this issue, it did not seem superfluous to report significance estimates in the presentation of regression results.

Interpretation and Ecological Inference

Intuitively, the regression coefficient (b) represents the average change in the dependent variable (Y) occurring with every unit change in the independent variable (X). Given that cleavages are operationalized by dividing the population into two (or more) categories, the independent variable (X) will typically represent one of these categories (e.g., the percentage refugees in each area), whereas the dependent variable (Y) will represent the percentage of the vote received in each area by a particular party or bloc. The regression coefficient (b) will therefore represent the average change in party vote (in percentage points) when the category represented by the independent variable (here the percentage refugees) increases by one unit, that is, by one percentage point.

If this average change is significantly different from zero, one may conclude that the division between refugees and natives is a politically relevant cleavage and that the political alignments of an area are affected by the relative strength of these two groups locally. Going further, in the direction of "ecological inference," one may also conclude that each of the groups in question mostly or, at least, disproportionately supports a particular party or bloc.

Ecological inference involves drawing conclusions about the behavior of individuals or groups from data which are only available for geographical areas—a task which was for a long time considered unproblematic. Given that aggregate data may be grouped in a variety of ways and not only by areal units, ecological inference is actually a particular aspect of the wider question of cross-level inference.

Thorndike was apparently the first to show that correlations found

122. Ramon E. Henkel, *Tests of Significance*, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 4 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 85–86; and Margaret Jarman Hagood, "The Notion of a Hypothetical Universe," in Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, eds., *The Significance Test Controversy: A Reader* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 65–78. See also the editors' conclusion in *ibid.*, pp. 305–311.

on the level of groups cannot be imputed to their constituent individuals or subgroups.¹²³ Yet, it was an article by Robinson in 1950 which actually inaugurated the debate on the "ecological fallacy" in sociology and political science. In his devastating critique of the common use of ecological correlations as equivalent to individual-level correlations, Robinson conclusively demonstrated that the two measures will not generally coincide and that even their signs need not agree.¹²⁴ In the wake of Robinson, both conceptual and statistical aspects of the ecological fallacy were thoroughly examined. Nevertheless, recognition and awareness of the ecological fallacy does not dispense with the problem of directly recovering individual behavior when *only* areal data are available—which is typically, but not exclusively, the situation that the researcher faces when he studies the past. In reaction to Robinson, Duncan and Davis proposed, as an alternative to ecological correlation, an ingenious technique for estimating from areal data the limits or boundaries within which the unknown individual-level probabilities (or, equivalently, proportions of the population) must fall.¹²⁵ It was, however, Goodman's imaginative alternative, based on the use of ecological *regression* (rather than correlation) coefficients, that offered a real breakthrough.¹²⁶

An example from the present study may serve to briefly illustrate his approach, with a minimum of notation. For each unit of analysis, we know the proportion Venizelist in 1928 (Y , hence $1-Y$ the proportion for all other parties). Assuming that the electorate reflects the composition of the (male) population, we also know the proportion of refugees (X , hence $1-X$ the proportion of natives). We do not know and wish to estimate: p = the proportion of refugees who voted for Venizelism, and q = the proportion of natives who voted for Venizelism. By multiplying these with the corresponding proportions of refugees and natives in the electorate, the proportion Venizelist may be written as the sum of refugee and native support:

123. E. L. Thorndike, "On the Fallacy of Imputing the Correlations Found for Groups to the Individuals or Smaller Groups Composing Them," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 1939), pp. 122–124.

124. William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (June 1950), pp. 351–357. Yule and Kendall had already shown that correlations computed for "modifiable" (i.e., areal) units will generally vary, depending on the size and number of the units chosen. See G. U. Yule and M. G. Kendall, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, 14th ed. (London: Charles Griffin, 1950), pp. 310–315.

125. Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Davis, "An Alternative to Ecological Correlation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18, No. 6 (December 1953), pp. 665–666.

126. Leo A. Goodman, "Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18, No. 6 (December 1953), pp. 663–664; and his "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, No. 6 (May 1959), pp. 610–625.

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y &= pX + q(1-X) \\
 &= pX + q - qX \\
 &= q + (p-q)X
 \end{aligned}$$

which is equivalent to the familiar regression model:

$$Y = a + bX$$

with the proportion Venizelist as dependent variable, and the proportion refugees as independent variable.

Given that $a = q$ and $b = p - q$, ecological regression over all units of analysis makes it possible to *estimate* the unknown proportions p and q . The intercept will be the estimated proportion of the natives who voted for Venizelism ($a = q$). The *sum* of the intercept and the regression coefficient will be the estimated proportion of the refugees who voted for Venizelism ($a + b = q + p - q = p$).

The actual estimates, reported in Table 35, are:

$$Y = 60.33 + .31X$$

Given that the intercept is in percentage points, the proportion q of the natives who voted for Venizelism is .60 (or 60 percent). The proportion p of the refugees who voted for Venizelism is $.60 + .31 = .91$ (or 91 percent). Repeating the same procedure for each party and each election yields the estimates reported in Table 38.

The same procedure, now requiring multiple regression, can be extended to classifications of the population into more than two (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) categories. Thus, in the same example, the population (electorate) may be classified into the proportion Asia Minor refugees (X_1), the proportion other refugees (X_2), and the proportion natives ($1 - X_1 - X_2$). If p_1 and p_2 are the proportions voting Venizelist among Asia Minor refugees and all other refugees, respectively, the Venizelist vote may be written as the sum of three components:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y &= p_1X_1 + p_2X_2 + q(1-X_1-X_2) \\
 &= p_1X_1 + p_2X_2 + q - qX_1 - qX_2 \\
 &= q + (p_1-q)X_1 + (p_2-q)X_2
 \end{aligned}$$

which is equivalent to a multiple regression model:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$$

with the proportion Venizelist again as dependent variable, and the proportions Asia Minor refugees and all other refugees as independent variables.

The intercept will again represent the estimated proportion of the natives who voted for Venizelism ($a = q$), whereas the sum of the intercept and the corresponding regression coefficient will represent the estimated proportions of Asia Minor and other refugees who voted for Venizelism:

$$a + b_1 = q + p_1 - q = p_1$$

and

$$a + b_2 = q + p_2 - q = p_2$$

The actual regression estimates in this case are

$$Y = 60.08 + .40 X_1 + .27 X_2$$

According to these estimates, therefore, 60 percent of the natives, 100 percent of the Asia Minor refugees, and 87 percent of all other refugees voted for Venizelism in 1928.

The method of estimation introduced by Goodman has received considerable recognition and elaboration as a solution to the problem of ecological inference.¹²⁷ It has also been widely applied, typically for the estimation of voter realignments (transition probabilities) from one election to another.¹²⁸ Yet, the principal assumption on which it rests seems to be usually untenable. This assumption requires that the unknown proportions p and q be approximately constant across ecological units or, at least, vary independently of the values of X . If this assumption is violated, regression estimates of p and q will be biased and often clearly inadmissible. Typically, such inadmissible estimates fall well below 0, or exceed unity, whether individually or collectively (as, e.g., when it appears that 99 percent of Asia Minor refugees voted for Venizelism and 14 percent for Communism in 1928).¹²⁹

Several strategies have evolved to cope with this problem and to

127. See, e.g., Raymond Boudon, "Propriétés individuelles et propriétés collectives: Un problème d'analyse écologique," *Revue française de sociologie*, Vol. 4 (July–September 1963), pp. 275–299; and O. D. Duncan, R. P. Cuzzort, and B. Duncan, *Statistical Geography: Problems in Analyzing Areal Data* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 60–187.

128. Among early examples, see Jacques Desabie, "Le référendum: Essai d'étude statistique," *Journal de la Société Statistique de Paris*, Vol. 100, Nos. 7–8 (July 1959), pp. 166–180; and Gabriel Vangrevelinghe, "Etude statistique comparée des résultats des référendums de 1958 et 1961," *Journal de la Société Statistique de Paris*, Vol. 102, Nos. 10–12 (1961), pp. 279–295.

129. On inadmissible estimates, see Theodore W. Meckstroth, "Some Problems in Cross-Level Inference," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (February 1974), pp. 45–66; and Donald E. Stokes, "Cross-Level Inference as a Game against Nature," in Joseph L. Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science IV* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1969), pp. 62–83.

salvage a method of estimation that seems as yet irreplaceable. Among them, one simply by-passes the problem of bias by artificially producing admissible estimates (i.e., constrained between 0 and 1) through quadratic programming or analogous techniques.¹³⁰ Another focuses on the grouping procedure as the source of bias.¹³¹ However, the way in which ecological data have been grouped, in this sense, is most often *not* unambiguously evident to the researcher and therefore offers little practical guidance on how to identify and avoid bias. Given that the basic model is technically overidentified, it has also been suggested that a second set of estimates be derived by reversing the regression equation.¹³² In our example, this would involve estimating the refugee proportion of Venizelism (r) and of all other parties (s) according to the equation: $X = rY + s(1 - Y)$. All other proportions, including p and q , can then be derived from these estimates. The two sets of estimates, however, will not generally agree, and if both are biased and inadmissible, choosing between them remains problematic.

The obvious limitations of these strategies have inspired a return to the Duncan-Davis technique of boundary estimation in an effort to increase its precision.¹³³ Nevertheless, the method of estimation introduced by Goodman remains the most powerful approach to ecological inference. It has been conclusively shown that proper model specification, through the introduction of all relevant control variables, should reduce aggregation bias regardless of grouping procedures and should yield reasonably valid inferences.¹³⁴ With ecological data, however, efforts at proper specification will typically be stymied by high multicollinearity (strong correlation between the independent variables).

This proved to be the case in the present analysis also: multicollinearity repeatedly placed insuperable limits on specification and estimation. For the purposes of this study, however, multicollinearity of the indepen-

130. For an example of this approach, see Galen A. Irwin and Duane A. Mectter, "Building Voter Transition Models from Aggregate Data," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (November 1969), pp. 545–566.

131. See Laura Irwin Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference*, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 10 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 14–33.

132. See W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 4 (December 1969), pp. 1183–1196.

133. W. Phillips Shively, "Utilizing External Evidence in Cross-Level Inference," *Political Methodology*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Fall 1974), pp. 61–73.

134. See, e.g., Laura Irwin and Allan J. Lichtman, "Across the Great Divide: Inferring Individual Level Behavior from Aggregate Data," *Political Methodology*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1976), pp. 411–439; and Eric A. Hanushek, John E. Jackson, and John F. Kain, "Model Specification, Use of Aggregate Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy," *Political Methodology*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1974), pp. 89–106.

dent variables is in itself an important substantive finding, because it reflects the degree to which the cleavages measured by these variables are *superimposed* rather than crosscutting.

It remains to be explained whether, and to what extent, the problems of ecological inference are relevant to the present study. The results of ecological regression reported in Chapters 3 to 6 fall into three broad categories:

1. Ecological inference is carried to its limits, including the estimation of proportions, in *only one case*: that of the refugees as a whole (Tables 34–38). In this particular case, given the pivotal role of the refugee vote, it seemed worthwhile to make the necessary assumption, since it is not manifestly invalidated by the resulting estimates: they all fall between 0 and 1, with negligible deviations, and are otherwise eminently plausible.
2. In contrast, several analyses fall into the opposite category. In these instances, the variables used are such that inferences about individual behavior are not intended *directly*, but only insofar as the population of an area can be assumed to be affected in its political behavior by characteristics of the area (contextual effects). Such is the discussion of the territorial cleavage and of relative deprivation in Chapter 6, as well as that of independent variables like the ratio of workers to employers, the proportion of peasant owners, crops, etc.
3. All other analyses, where independent variables consist of the percentage of some group or stratum in the population, fall into an intermediate category. If strictly interpreted as exact estimates of group proportions, regression results are generally biased, as indicated by their typically inadmissible values. Apart from specification and multicollinearity problems, the assumption itself that the composition of the electorate matches that of the census population must be considered more or less implausible, depending on the variable. Nevertheless, such regression results can and should still be interpreted in the context of ecological inference, as gross indications of tendencies and of a general order of magnitude with respect to group alignments. In this sense, it remains possible to speak of the majority, the bulk, or the minority of a group aligning itself with a particular party, even though exact proportions cannot be estimated with any confidence. The existence, direction, and gross magnitude of such relationships have been controlled and confirmed in a variety of alternative regression models, which could not be reported here. Finally, all such results are supported and interpreted in light of outside information, including theoretical expectations and historical evidence, which should preclude the most extreme cases of fallacious inference. There is no doubt, for example,

that Communist strength was concentrated among workers. Regression results, therefore, cannot possibly be interpreted as showing that C.P. support came from nonworkers and increased with the proportion of workers in the population. Under these conditions, ecological regression can reliably confirm the existence of mass cleavages, which was the main purpose of this analysis. Exact proportion estimates, however desirable, are not essential for that purpose.

· 3 ·

BOURGEOIS, WORKERS, PEASANTS: CLASSES AND CLASS ALLIANCES

The Greeks are equal before the law. . . . Unfortunately, however, all men and all Greeks are not equal. Unfortunately, they are divided into classes, not as sharply as elsewhere, but still they are divided into the class of those possessing the capital, the class of those possessing only labor, and the middle class.

Venizelos addressing the Chamber, 30 September 1914, quoted in Hoi Historikoi Logoi, Vol. 2, pp. 238–239

FROM “PARTIES OF PRINCIPLE” TO “CLASS PARTIES”

On the eve of the Revolution of 1909, a novel dimension was added to the continuing debate on “parties of principle,” their desirability, and the conditions for their emergence. It was the argument that “parties of principle” could only be class-based parties, representing class interests and reflecting the class struggle. Although such ideas may not have been unknown before, their first systematic and most forceful formulation appeared in 1907, in a small book by G. Skleros which also marked the beginning of Greek Marxism. Its first chapter was characteristically entitled “The Class Struggle as Indispensable Factor of Social Progress.”¹

Although the book itself seems to have been hotly debated within only a limited circle of intellectuals,² it certainly announced a new awareness in Greek political discourse. The Sociological Society under A. Papanastasiou was founded a year later, aspiring to become a party “of the working people.” Parliamentary debates on agrarian and labor questions

1. See Skleros, *To Koinoniko Mas Zetema*.

2. See Rena Stavrides-Patrikiou, ed., *Demotikismos kai Koinoniko Provlema* [Demoticism and the Social Question] (Athens: Hermes, 1976). Demoticism was the intellectual movement in favor of the popular language or “demotic” (*demotike*).

in 1911–1914 also reflected this new awareness. And in 1918, the emergence of the Socialist Labor (later Communist) Party in the wake of the October Revolution not only offered the first example of a distinctly class party in Greece, but also seemed to confirm conservative suspicions that the concept was inherently both alien and subversive.

From the very beginning, conservatives and traditionalists had violently denied both the possibility and the desirability of class parties. Social classes did not exist in Greece, or, if they did, it was essentially as occupational categories, while the enormous “bourgeois” or “petty bourgeois” majority (i.e., all property owners) precluded meaningful political divisions along class lines. Under these circumstances, class parties could only be foreign imports, from Western Europe, which would artificially produce a class struggle where none existed before.³

The conservative position briefly summarized here was continually reiterated throughout the interwar period in a variety of contexts. As with “parties of principle,” the debates on proportional representation were such an occasion. By favoring “parties of principle,” and in particular class parties, proportional representation was accused of artificially promoting class conflict and the growth of revolutionary groups—to which its supporters retorted that such developments were due to social causes and certainly not to the electoral system.⁴

A characteristic example from the Fourth Constituent Assembly may serve to illustrate the tenor of the debate. Attacking proportional representation, Sofoules emphatically stated in 1925:

Neither the antagonism of the classes, nor the economic conflicts, nor other programmatic differences constitute the basis of the electoral struggle here [in Greece]. . . . The parties are distinguished from each other only by virtue of the leader's personal character and temperament.⁵

To which Kafandares retorted with his usual acid irony:

There is no conflict of ideas and interests here. Everything is in a state of blissful monotony. Is there a conflict between capital and labor here? Is there a conflict between landowners and peasants here? Is there a conflict here on educational policy, on popular reform, on social policy? . . . None of these conflicts exists. The honorable politician from Samos appears to perfectly ignore all this. . . .⁶

3. For early examples of this position see *ibid.*, passim. See also *Programmatika Arthra*, pp. 67–69.

4. See Charitakes, p. 139; and Papanastasiou, pp. 87 and 93–96.

5. Fourth Constituent, 22 June 1925, *Praktika*, Vol. 5, p. 669.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 681.

Nevertheless, the imperturbable Sofoules repeated the same arguments against proportional representation ten years later:

In Greece, there is a peculiar constitution both of the individuals and of the groups. Above the economic interests which may create an identity, one places the esteem of persons, the Greek tradition, the belief in the person of a strong leader, the local origin, the good management of the country by a party. The industrialists have common economic interests, but do not constitute one party. They place themselves politically according to the individual temperament of each.⁷

A systematic study of interwar political discourse would be required to determine the actual conceptions of class and party held by the various political leaders and parties, especially among the bourgeois forces. Although this has not been possible here, certain significant differences between the two bourgeois blocs may be tentatively identified and briefly outlined.

“POPULAR,” “NATIONAL,” AND “CLASS” PARTIES

As the case of Sofoules eloquently shows, parochial and traditionalist views on classes and parties were by no means absent from the Venizelist camp. Nevertheless, the conservative denial of class divisions and of their representation by political parties seems to have been more typical of Antivenizelism. In a famous 1912 interview, D. Gounares had expressed his views quite categorically:

You want parties of ideas, or rather of interests? But such parties will exist in Greece when large groups exist, groups whose interests clash with the interests of other groups, likewise organized. But there is no such thing here.⁸

Having argued that no big industry existed, nor any disagreement over the regime or the agrarian question, he concluded:

On fundamentals, there is agreement. Since there is no disagreement on fundamentals, do you want us to create it? Since there are no group interests conflicting with each other to a great degree, how do you expect parties representative of these groups to exist?⁹

7. *Neos Kosmos*, 13 July 1934. Sofoules made it clear that he was speaking for himself on this occasion and not for the L.P. According to *Eleftheron Vema*, he also said that “all parties here consist equally of the same elements.”

8. *Akropolis*, 17 March 1912.

9. *Ibid.*

Refusing to recognize conflicting group interests in Greece, Gounares essentially viewed “the people” as a mass of *atomized* individuals.¹⁰

Similar conceptions of social reality apparently continued to characterize the P.P. and Antivenizelism in general throughout the interwar period. This does not mean that references to “classes” were absent from Antivenizelist political discourse. But they must be interpreted in light of these underlying conceptions as merely designating occupational categories. The P.P. characteristically proclaimed itself the party of (all) “the people,” as the statement issued by the 1936 General Meeting reaffirmed:

The People’s Party has been and is in fact a party of the people . . . whose greatest mass consists of the peasants, tradesmen, the workers, the salaried, and all the small bourgeois class. It has considered and considers itself as the supremely Popular party, the party of the working classes. Having the above principles, the People’s Party has aimed and aims at the moral, intellectual, and material elevation of these classes through the more just organization of our economic and social life and their provision with a really tolerable economic and social life, for the benefit of society as a whole.¹¹

In conclusion, this conception of a catch-all *Volkspartei*, which was clearly congruent with a clientelist party structure, is far more representative of Antivenizelism than occasional references to “organic” or “corporatist” representation made by some of its leaders. Although quite fashionable, such notions remained amorphous and inconsequential throughout the interwar years and never displaced the traditional conception of parliamentary representation which was a central tenet of Antivenizelism.

In sharp contrast to his adversaries (and the more traditionalist among his supporters), Venizelos embodied in this, as in most other respects, a distinctly modern and pragmatic outlook, which may be considered typical of mainstream Venizelism. He explicitly and unambiguously recognized the existence of classes and class inequality.¹² The emergence of class parties, that is, parties representing a particular class, was therefore certainly possible—but nevertheless highly undesirable. It would substitute irreconcilable class conflict for political compromise, at the short-term expense of underprivileged classes (which could not hope to extract concessions comparable to those they would obtain otherwise) but, in the long run, at the expense of the existing social order. Its preservation required the continuing existence of “national” or “general” parties, that is, “those including several classes joined together in some general direc-

10. See his 1906 speech quoted in Chapter 2.

11. Quoted in Efstratiou, p. 108.

12. See, e.g., his 1914 statement on the opening page of this chapter.

tion.”¹³ Within such parties, the role of political leadership was that of an *arbiter* between conflicting class interests, in the name of interclass cooperation, social solidarity, and national interest.¹⁴

Venizelos seems to have been consistently inspired by this conception of the political party and of the role of leadership throughout his career, even if the actual content of such “arbitration” became increasingly conservative in later years. Accordingly, he always condemned the creation of class parties—not just on the left, but also on the *right* of the Liberals. It was on such an occasion, in 1920, that he made one of the most elaborate and revealing statements on this issue, specifically linking it to the requirements of economic development:

The party that Mr. Embeirikos has sought to create, if it remains true to the thoughts that led to its creation, cannot but be a party of one class—the capitalist class. I do not say that the constitution of such a party is not legitimate. But I greatly doubt whether such a class party can serve the legitimate interests of the capitalist class. The class struggle is the slogan of the elements which reject the social order as it exists today and look forward to its radical overthrow. Those seeking to prevent radical changes and struggling for gradual evolution in a spirit of ever greater social justice oppose the principle of social solidarity to the class struggle. That the representatives of capitalism can look forward to class struggle for the defense of their interests, abandoning the principle of social solidarity, is of course astonishing. . . .

If the social order is to be conserved, it will only be conserved through the implementation of prolabor policy. . . . On the other hand, a move by the governing parties away from prolabor policy will obviously exacerbate dangerously the antagonism between labor and capital. In such a case, those moving away from prolabor policy, to be consistent, must seek that Greece turn one-sidedly to the development of agriculture and animal husbandry, systematically neglecting industry and merchant marine, and carefully obstructing any development of the latter two. Because their development can only proceed safely in conjunction with the implementation of prolabor policy on the part of the governing classes. As soon as the governing classes would stop systematically implementing prolabor policy, the development of industry and shipping would become a most grave danger against social peace. Greece, however, cannot confine itself to its agricultural and animal husbandry development, and it must concern itself with the development of its industry and shipping if it wants to develop all its sources of wealth and become a rich and powerful state.¹⁵

13. Senate, 4 March 1931, *Efemeris*, p. 425.

14. Chamber, 28 January 1920, *Efemeris*, p. 549.

15. Notes for an electoral address in Syros (1920), 1920 Notebook, VA File 267, as published in Papakonstantinou, pp. 249–251. Shipowner Leonidas Embeirikos—longtime supporter, financial backer of the Thessaloniki Provisional Government, and a cabinet minis-

The critical difference separating the Farmer-Labor Party from the L.P. in this respect was that, although it also sought to represent a coalition of several classes, the bourgeoisie was not one of them. The party was conceived as one which would rely primarily on the peasants and workers, but also on the white-collar employees, artisans, intellectuals, and “working people” in general.¹⁶ Actually, however, the party increasingly addressed itself to the peasantry and its problems in particular.¹⁷

Finally, the A.P. and the C.P. would typically be considered “class” parties in interwar Greece. Neither, however, would accept the common assumption that it was confined to the representation of one class. Both ostensibly sought to build a broader antibourgeois coalition around the peasants or the workers, respectively. The C.P. in particular was faced with the formidable task of winning the support of peasants, refugees, and petty bourgeois without ceasing to be *the* party of the (entire) working class.¹⁸

In conclusion, three principal conceptions of the relationship between party and class may be distinguished in interwar political discourse, broadly corresponding to Antivenizelism, Venizelism, and the Left: (1) that of the “popular” party, addressing itself to all “the people” rather than classes; (2) that of the “national” party, addressing itself to several (or all) classes; and (3) that of the “class” party, addressing itself primarily, but not exclusively, to a particular class. As one would expect, the awareness and importance of class increases as one moves from Right to Left. It remains to be seen whether (and how) interwar parties were true to their respective conceptions.

THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF INTERWAR GREECE

The social history of modern Greece—one based on concrete and detailed research—remains to be written, for the most part. Meanwhile, in the context of largely conjectural analyses increasingly inspired by a crude

ter until 1919—had recently left the L.P., accusing Venizelos of having “awoken” the workers through his labor policy.

16. This is why Papanastasiou indignantly rejected the characterization “class party” that Venizelos used as a pretext for the overthrow of his short-lived government in June 1932. See *Demokratia*, 12 June 1932. Papanastasiou’s conception of class representation first appeared in the program of the “People’s Party” in 1910 and then was repeated in the 1922 program of the Republican Union, which was subsequently renamed the Farmer-Labor Party. See Lefkoparides, Vol. 1, pp. 75 and 309.

17. In 1936, Papanastasiou characteristically declared that in any conflict between peasant and other interests, the first should take precedence as “more vital.” See his article in *Kathemerine*, 29 May 1936.

18. See, e.g., KKE, Vol. 1, pp. 132 and 226; and Vol. 2, p. 63. With respect to the A.P., see the views of Sofianopoulos in *Akropolis*, 24 January 1931.

dichotomy between ruling and subordinate classes, even the original and valuable insights of early Greek Marxists, like Skleros and Kordatos, are now usually ignored. The most serious consequence is that conflicts between bourgeois parties, which have dominated most of the history of modern Greece, become unintelligible—or else secondary, if not deceptive, “family quarrels.”

Providing the missing social history of interwar Greece lies beyond the scope and ambitions of this research. It may, however, indicate hitherto neglected divisions, as well as gaps which need to be filled. Among these, one may point at the outset to the total lack of research into native concepts of social differentiation, some of which will be discussed in the appropriate places.

Another source of difficulty, unrelated to Greece, is the continuing unsettled state of terms and concepts in class analysis. Again, it is beyond the scope and ambition of this study to innovate in this field or even to take sides in the several theoretical disputes that have been plaguing it for more than a century. The modest purpose of this research required, instead, a conceptual framework suited to its object, yet capable of the widest possible acceptance and comparability, and free of ambiguity and inconsistency.

Classes are therefore here defined primarily in terms of their relation to the means of production and of the employment of hired labor, in conjunction with market and other economic, as well as political and ideological aspects. It is mainly in terms of the latter that classes are further subdivided into fractions or strata. Although these two terms are typically used interchangeably, there are important differences in connotation. “Fraction” implies a potential for autonomous consciousness and political action, but not an intraclass hierarchy. Conversely, “stratum” implies the latter but not the former.¹⁹ As much as possible, the two terms will be used accordingly.

For the purposes of this analysis, interwar Greek society can thus be divided into *four* exhaustive classes: bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, working class, and peasantry. Landowners will be examined as part of the bourgeoisie, whereas the status of the lumpenproletariat (i.e., whether it is a class or a stratum) need not be defined. Finally, the term “middle class” will be generally avoided, except where *no* distinction between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie is required or intended.

The only complete data available on the interwar strength and composition of these classes are provided by the 1928 Census (see Table 13). Its data on the male population aged ten or older will therefore serve as the

19. See, e.g., Ossowski, p. 73; and Poulantzas, pp. 88–89.

basis of this analysis, despite the ambiguities involved.²⁰ In terms of the census categories, and for the purposes of data analysis:

1. The *petty bourgeoisie* consists of all status categories except manual workers, and all occupational categories except agriculture and animal husbandry. Ideally, an unknown number of petty bourgeois rentiers and pensioners should also be included, but cannot be actually separated from the total inactive. Similarly, the insignificant numbers of the bourgeoisie cannot (and need not) be subtracted from the categories which are here considered petty bourgeois in their entirety.
2. The *working class* consists of all manual workers.
3. The *peasantry* consists of agriculture and animal husbandry, without manual workers. As in the case of the urban bourgeoisie, the insignificant number of landowners cannot (and need not) be subtracted from this total.²¹

It may be seen that the salaried constitute only about one-third of the active male population, and employers about 7 percent, leaving an overwhelming majority of either self- or family-employed. The bulk of these is in agriculture and animal husbandry, which together represent over one-half of the active male population.

In terms of the gross classification of census categories adopted here for the purposes of data analysis, the approximate strength of the three most numerous classes is the following, in percentages of the active population: 26 percent petty bourgeois, 26 percent workers, and 46 percent peasants. If, alternatively, the 5 percent "workers" in agriculture and animal husbandry were counted as part of the peasantry, the distribution would become: 26 percent petty bourgeois, 21 percent workers, and 51

20. Women, regardless of occupation, are assigned to the class of their father or spouse. This assumption, practically universal in class analysis, appears even more justified in the case of interwar Greece, where women were totally excluded from social and political life, with minor exceptions. Census categories require perhaps some explanation, wherever significant numbers are involved: (1) *Occupation*: "Manufacturing" includes construction and utilities. It also covers all enterprises, regardless of scale. The same is true of all other categories. "Personal services" consists of barbers, house servants, and bootblacks. "Professions" includes: religion (priests, monks, etc.), education (both public and private), health, law, accounting, journalism, engineering, and the fine arts. "Government" includes the professional military, the police, the judiciary, and all other civil servants. Finally, the inactive population ("no occupation") includes rentiers, pensioners, students, beggars, etc., indiscriminately. (2) *Status*: Category II consists of those working on their own. Category III is defined as those "employing" exclusively members of their family. Category IV consists of such family members. Finally, the distinction between white-collar and manual workers (Categories V and VI) was based on whether their work was predominantly "mental" or "physical."

21. Rural workers may also be considered part of the peasantry, but, as will be seen, their classification is of no consequence to the analysis. Because of the insignificant numbers

Table 13 MALE POPULATION (AGED 10 OR OLDER) BY OCCUPATION AND STATUS, 1928

Occupational Categories	Status Categories						Total	%
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI		
	Employers	Self- Employed	Family Enterprise Heads	Family Aides	White Collar Workers	Manual Workers		
1. Agriculture	62,807	206,148	290,677	225,247	1,425	72,471	858,775	44
2. Animal Husbandry	5,468	53,048	22,908	29,778	11	23,068	134,281	7
3. Fishing	1,215	7,020	683	1,055	9	4,918	14,900	1
4. Mining	107	147	19	73	200	5,430	5,976	0
5. Manufacturing	27,200	88,495	10,884	15,640	3,854	184,046	330,119	17
6. Transportation Communication	3,808	30,142	1,409	2,530	17,077	50,878	105,844	5
7. Finance, Insurance, Brokerage	1,910	6,043	316	448	11,614	832	21,163	1
8. Trade	25,246	83,633	11,202	12,764	15,346	32,411	180,602	9
9. Personal Services	2,013	6,268	467	626	64	10,755	20,193	1
10. Professions	2,601	21,960	312	404	40,545	1,917	67,739	3
11. Government	—	—	—	—	38,814	3,237	42,051	2
12. Unspecified	—	—	—	—	15,576	130,144	190,581 ^b	10
Total Active ^a	132,375	502,904	338,877	288,565	144,535	520,107	1,972,224	100
%	7	26	17	15	7	26	100 ^b	

^aTotal Inactive: 393,354 or 17% of the male population aged 10 or older.

^bIncludes 44,861 of unspecified status (2% of the total active).

percent peasants. In either case, these approximate proportions provide a key to an understanding of interwar class structure.

BOURGEOIS: ENTREPRENEURS AND RENTIERS

There was little doubt in the minds of contemporaries that the Liberal Party was the foremost political expression of the bourgeoisie. For Skleros, it was

the party par excellence *of the great and especially of the middle bourgeoisie*, which wants a modern, progressive life in order to develop its business, its trade, its industry, shipping and financial enterprises.²²

In sharp contrast to such clarity, assessments of the class character of Antivenizelism are typically fraught with ambiguity and vagueness. Skleros noted its heterogeneity and its lack of a national and social program, adding that it embraced all the discontented elements, which could not adapt themselves to rapid and cumulative change. He could only list, however, such groups as: courtiers and military, the pseudoaristocracy of the royal palace, the partisans of the Old Parties, the greatest part of the clergy, especially the higher, and "the conservatives and nostalgics of patriarchal life."²³ Typical references to "the oligarchy," the "*tzakia*," "feudalism," or even "part of the bourgeoisie" are hardly more precise.²⁴

Clearly, the difficulties mostly stem from the heterogeneity and ambiguity of Antivenizelism. To overcome, or rather by-pass, these difficulties, two devices have been commonly adopted and typically combined. One is to view Venizelism as representing the "greater part" of the bourgeoisie, and Antivenizelism the smaller. The other is to define the two

involved, certain categories were collapsed during the data analysis. Manual workers in occupational categories 7 and 10 were counted as white collar. White-collar workers in occupational categories 1 through 4, and 9 were counted as manual workers.

22. Skleros, *Ta Synchrona Provlemata*, pp. 210–211 and 227 (this book appeared in 1919). One could multiply such statements, especially, but not exclusively, from Marxist sources. For Maximos, the L.P. was "capitalist par excellence, with a social consciousness." See Maximos, pp. 35, 41–42, and 53–54. For the KKE Third Congress (1927), Venizelism mainly represented the commercial, shipowning, banking, and industrial bourgeoisie. See KKE, Vol. 2, p. 206.

23. Skleros, *Ta Synchrona Provlemata*, pp. 203–210 and 226. For a similar analysis, see Mavrommates, pp. 55ff.

24. As seen earlier, "*ta tzakia*" referred to established political families. According to the KKE Third Congress (1927), Antivenizelism represented "the remnants of feudalism and part of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie." KKE, Vol. 2, p. 206. For Spartacus, a radical Marxist group, "whereas the L.P. has been a consistent capitalist party since its inception, the P.P. evolved into one while still maintaining internal contradictions as a consequence of its particular historical origin," i.e., its links to the monarchy, the "feudal remnants," and the "small aristocracy." Quoted in Pouliopoulos, p. 75.

bourgeois fractions merely in terms of their identification with different foreign powers.²⁵ Both conceptions are essentially valid, but remain superficial and inadequate, often leading to circular explanations. Furthermore, linkages to foreign interests become far less divisive, transparent, and consistent after 1922 than they had been in 1915.²⁶ To go beyond these two approaches, it becomes necessary to turn to the Revolution of 1909 and its interpretations.

1909: A Bourgeois Revolution

At least since the interwar period, the interpretation of 1909 as a bourgeois revolution has dominated Greek historical consciousness and historiography of practically all shades. A consensus was already apparent in the early 1930s:

we don't think there is, by now, any serious objection regarding the actual significance of the revolution of 1909: it is the social revolution of our bourgeois, it is the Greek 1848.²⁷

The authoritative Venizelist history of 1910–1920 by Venteres was clearly the most influential and forceful exponent of this thesis. But it was also shared by Greek Marxism, and it even came to be adopted by Antivenizelist historiography as well.²⁸

Critics of this predominant interpretation have argued that the bourgeois could not possibly “rise to power” in 1909, given that they were already in power long before. Instead, they successfully resisted and eventually *captured* what was essentially an abortive revolution of the petty

25. Kordatos thus states that Venizelos in 1915 was “the political leader of that part of the bourgeoisie whose interests were linked with British and French capitalism.” He therefore “had no difficulty in deciding. He took the decision that was in the interest of the great majority of the bourgeoisie.” On the other hand, Gounares was “the leader of the bourgeoisie that disagreed with Venizelos, leader mainly of the landowners, the merchants and the industrialists who had business and economic relations with Germany and Austria.” See Kordatos, *Neotere Hellada*, Vol. 5, pp. 397, 429, and 546. See also Elefantos, p. 239, who states that the L.P., during the interwar period, was “the political representative of the greater part of the comprador bourgeoisie, and especially of the anglophile.”

26. This is well illustrated by C.P. analyses in particular. Given the obvious polemical value of distinguishing among bourgeois forces merely in terms of foreign ties, it is no wonder that the C.P. increasingly resorted to such facile interpretations. In June 1935, it thus proclaimed that Venizelists were linked to “Anglo-Italian” (*sic*), Kondyles and Tsaldares to French, and Metaxas to German imperialism. *KKE*, Vol. 4, p. 179. Only three months later, however, the capitalists represented by the P.P. were linked to “British, but also French imperialism.” *Ibid.*, p. 243.

27. Tsoungos, p. 8.

28. Venteres, especially Vol. 1, pp. 17–46. This book first appeared as a series of articles in *Eleftheron Vema*, the leading Venizelist paper. Venizelos was reluctant to endorse this

bourgeois, the workers, and the peasants.²⁹ Such views, however, are misled by mass participation (which could not be predominantly bourgeois in any case), while they ignore what seems to have been a bitter struggle between two distinct fractions of the bourgeoisie, leading to the overthrow of one and the rise to power of the other.³⁰

The "oligarchy" overthrown in 1909 and represented by the Old Parties has proven particularly elusive to class analysis, in the absence of detailed historical research. Among the most recent interpretations, Deritiles has concluded that this "oligarchy" cannot be defined in class terms: it was rather an autonomous *political elite*, which did not faithfully reflect in the political sphere the joint economic domination of two classes: landowners and bourgeois.³¹ According to Tsoucalas, however, this "oligarchy" was essentially a *state bourgeoisie* of politicians, state officials, and lawyers; it constituted the "nucleus" of a ruling class, which also included the landowners, the Ionian aristocracy, and the commercial bourgeoisie.³² Although considerable ambiguity persists, it is this latter interpretation that will be tentatively adopted here, if only because it avoids the problems associated with an autonomous elite.³³

The "oligarchy" of the *tzakia* (the great families) may be characterized as the dominant or "hegemonic" fraction (in a Gramscian sense) within the 19th-century ruling class. The *tzakia* typically derived their social prestige from their leading role during the War of Independence, but actually could be traced back to the notables (*kodzabashis* or *proestoi*)

identification with a particular class, in view of his conception of class and party. He rather preferred to speak of 1909 as the rise of "new elements." See Venteres, Vol. 1, pp. 70–71.

The views of Venizelist leaders on the Venteres thesis were specifically requested at the beginning of another important newspaper series, "The Political History of the Liberal Party," *Neos Kosmos*, 2 December 1933–22 March 1934. Venizelos replied with considerable ambiguity: "I do not believe that there actually existed in Greece a bourgeoisie with the form and the character that the bourgeoisies have in Europe. The movement of 1909 was directed mainly against the *tzakia*." The people struck at the ruling oligarchy, which possessed hereditary influence to such an extent that the local parties were often transmitted even as dowry. Democratization of political life was then realized, and the abolition of the *tzakia*. Of course, in one respect, since the *tzakia* constituted the country's aristocracy, their abolition also meant that other social classes prevailed. . . ." Ibid., 4 December 1933. Similarly, Kafandares and Papanastasiou emphasized the opposition of all classes, especially "popular classes," to the ruling "oligarchy." Ibid., 7–12 December 1933. While Venizelist leaders understandably insisted on the widest possible interpretation of 1909, none of their statements actually constituted an open and categorical rejection of the Venteres thesis, as Stefanou would have it. Stefanou, Vol. 2, pp. 302–303.

On the Marxist side, Kordatos explicitly endorses the Venteres thesis. See Kordatos, *Neotere Hellada*, Vol. 5, p. 14. In 1930, he had himself argued, in his characteristically hyperbolic style, that the officers of 1909 "merely executed the decisions taken in the Merchant Associations." See Kordatos, *Hellenike Kefalaiokratia*, p. 63. On the Antivenizelist side, see Vouros, pp. 49–50.

29. Dafnes, *Kommata*, pp. 108–109, argues that the bourgeois had been in power since 1843. Michalakopoulos had said: since 1864. See Venteres, Vol. 1, pp. 70–71. Going even

and the military chieftains of Ottoman rule.³⁴ As a result of that rule, most of Greece lacked a genuine feudal tradition, with the solitary exception of the Ionian Islands (where it was due to Venetian domination). The *tzakia* could therefore have no pretensions to nobility (hence the polemical label “pseudoaristocracy”); nevertheless, they might be described as a “gentry.”³⁵ In terms of private property, their economic base typically consisted of agricultural land, or urban real estate, but seems to have been on the whole inadequate for continuing political domination. Hence, it would be misleading to speak of a *landed* gentry or of a dominant class of landowners. The emergence of such a class, as Tsoucalas brilliantly argues, was effectively prevented by the eventual distribution of the “national” (formerly Turkish) lands to the peasants of Old Greece. To preserve their traditional political power, the *tzakia* turned, therefore, to nonagricultural activities: the professions and, above all, the state itself, as politicians, state officials, academics, lawyers, and tax farmers. Moreover, clientelism proved a remarkably effective strategy, which turned universal suffrage to their lasting advantage. Ultimately, the state budget itself became their principal economic base: hence the designation “state bourgeoisie.”³⁶

Towards the end of the 19th century, a new field of state-related activities developed spectacularly, involving financial operations and speculative ventures around state loans, public works, and various state concessions. At its center stood the National Bank of Greece, a peculiarly semipublic, all-powerful, and largely autonomous institution—a state

further, Dertiles, p. 222, claims that a bourgeois revolution *never* happened in Greece, because it was never “required.”

30. See, e.g., Dertiles, pp. 203–208, where it is argued that the (numerical) majority of guilds, merchant associations, and even mass rallies was not bourgeois—as if this was a decisive criterion. Dertiles curiously fails to recognize that 1909 became a bourgeois revolution *precisely* because, as he puts it, Venizelos “chose the way of true bourgeois transformation” which “meant an economically powerful, class-conscious, and farsighted bourgeoisie, which would also be politically dominant without the alliance of the, by then, useless class of landowners, and with the autonomy of the political oligarchy drastically restricted.” *Ibid.*, p. 223.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 130, and 201.

32. Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 209ff.

33. On these problems, see especially Bottomore.

34. On these, see Petropoulos, pp. 27–35.

35. Cf. Markezines, Vol. 3, p. 141, who notes that, after 1915, “the indigenous high society (*kale koinonia*) was as a rule Royalist.”

36. Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 219ff., and also “To Provlema tes Politikes Pelateias.” The term “state bourgeoisie” has been used with reference to the new African states, as well as the Soviet Union. See, e.g., Charles Bettelheim, *Les luttes de classes en URSS* (Paris: Maspero, 1974), p. 41. Despite its adoption here, no common theoretical framework is implied. Alternative labels, such as “bourgeoisie de robe,” “service bourgeoisie,” “prebendal” or “patrimonial” bourgeoisie, would be even more awkward and potentially misleading.

within the state yet inseparable from it. As a result of these developments, a particular type of financier emerged, whose representatives were either recruited from the state bourgeoisie itself or else were assimilated by it. Similarly, after the annexation of the Ionian Islands in 1864, their residual nobility (which lacked any recognition under the Greek constitution) seems to have rapidly fused with the state bourgeoisie and should be regarded as an integral part thereof, rather than as a distinct stratum—except perhaps on the local and regional level.

Landowners, on the other hand, insofar as they did not belong to the state bourgeoisie itself, should be considered a bourgeois fraction rather than a separate class in 19th-century Greece, given especially the origin of their property. They were mostly Greek bourgeois of the diaspora, who had bought large Ottoman estates from their former owners. After Independence, such estates survived only in Eastern Sterea and Euboea, because of treaty provisions that exempted them from “national land” status. Otherwise, they were concentrated in Thessaly and the district of Arta, which were incorporated in 1881. Without entering here into the agrarian question, which will be discussed in connection with the peasantry, suffice it to note that large landed property dominated certain areas, but did not (and could not) aspire to national leadership.³⁷

Besides the state bourgeoisie and the landowners, the 19th-century ruling class also included a commercial bourgeoisie. This third bourgeois fraction may be regarded as the politically weakest of the three throughout the 19th century: the fact that the major centers of Greek business remained outside the borders of the diminutive kingdom had apparently condemned it to lasting political impotence. Under conditions of universal suffrage, its influence was limited to the kingdom’s few urban centers and was electorally submerged by the countryside, which remained under the hold of tradition, clientelism, and the *tzakia*. Under these circumstances, attempts by the commercial bourgeoisie to establish its own hegemony, first with the “English” party under A. Mavrokordatos and later, more forcefully, with the “Modernist” party under Ch. Trikoupes, ended in failure. Nevertheless, the Trikoupes era inaugurated a period of sustained, if not spectacular, economic development, during which both the strength and the political aspirations of the domestic commercial (also shipping and incipient industrial) bourgeoisie rose rapidly.³⁸

A parallel development involved the more powerful commercial

37. Dertiles, pp. 196–198, insists that a conflict never developed between landowners and bourgeois during the 19th century. Even if somewhat exaggerated, this argument runs against his view of the landowners as a separate class.

38. Venteres, Vol. 1, pp. 20–24.

(also banking and industrial) bourgeoisie of the Greek diaspora. In response to changing economic and political conditions in the Near East, where it mostly operated, it abandoned its earlier caution and espoused Greek irredentism with unprecedented fervor, aspiring for the first time to become a *national* bourgeoisie. The preservation of its economic position against hostile foreign pressures required, by this time, the backing of political power. And this in turn required a *double* strategy: retrenchment behind the national borders *and* irredentist extension of these borders. As Tsoucalas brilliantly puts it, this was the *first* time that the diaspora bourgeoisie actually assigned to the existing Greek state the role of a Greek "Piedmont."³⁹

These converging trends were decisively accelerated by the 1897 debacle in the Greco-Turkish war, which spelled the political bankruptcy of the state bourgeoisie and effectively destroyed its hegemony. The humiliating defeat of 1897 opened a protracted legitimacy crisis, whose ultimate resolution was only delivered by the military revolt of 1909. In its wake, the commercial, shipping, and industrial bourgeoisie as a whole, both in Greece and in the diaspora, had at last a chance to establish its own hegemony, under Venizelos and the Liberal Party.⁴⁰

In line with this interpretation, the Revolution of 1909 apparently involved a bitter struggle for supremacy between two bourgeois fractions: the established state bourgeoisie (together with the landowners), represented by the Old Parties, and the rising commercial, shipping, and industrial bourgeoisie, represented by the Liberals. Eventually, the latter prevailed and imposed its own hegemonic project: in *this* sense, 1909 became a bourgeois revolution.

If we consider the economic role of the two opposed bourgeois fractions, their conflict may be described, in the most general and abstract terms, as a cleavage between *rentiers* and *entrepreneurs*, in Pareto's words, or *nonproducers* and *producers*, as Saint-Simon would put it.⁴¹

39. Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 338–371.

40. The meeting between Venizelos and the commercial bourgeoisie was by no means fortuitous, as is often implied. On his analogous role in the political context of autonomous Crete, see Konstantinos D. Svolopoulos, *Ho Eleftherios Venizelos kai he Politike Krisis eis ten Aftonomon Kreten, 1901–1906* [Eleftherios Venizelos and the Political Crisis in Autonomous Crete, 1901–1906] (Athens: Ikaros, 1974), pp. 141–159.

41. See Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* [Trattato di Sociologia generale], trans. and ed. Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935), Vol. 4, pp. 1558ff.; and *Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin* (Aalen: Otto Zeller, 1964), Vol. 19, pp. 195–234, and Vol. 20, pp. 17–26. A third distinction which is directly applicable to the Greek case is the one made for Spain, between *bourgeois* (merchants and industrialists) and *clases medias* (professionals, civil servants, military, intellectuals, and rentiers whose income is at least partly derived from land). See Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differ-

Quite significantly, the cleavage *was* so perceived at the time. As Venizelos wrote in 1912:

Before the revolution, it was those connected with the *expenditure* column of (those feeding on) the budget that mainly governed Greece. Now, its fortunes are mainly in the hands of those who feed the budget's *revenue* column.⁴²

The same conception was embodied in the contemporary invidious distinction between *independent* and *dependent* classes, which Gounares characteristically refused to endorse.⁴³ Its meaning was unmistakable: "independent from the public treasury, independent from patronage, for which political support is often exchanged."⁴⁴

As in other countries, the cleavage was also reflected in arguments about the propriety of the entrepreneurs' entry into active politics. As late as 1932, Venizelos angrily responded to Antivenizelist insinuations about the commercial capacity of one of his ministers:

And truly you wish to maintain that those suitable to rise to this tribune, to occupy these seats, are none other than the lawyers, the doctors, the former officers, and the idle? You wish precisely those dedicated to the so-called productive occupations—and you know that true commerce is a productive occupation creating wealth for the country—you wish to say that these are stamped with a stamp which incapacitates them from occupying the highest office in the land, the office of minister?⁴⁵

The concrete manifestations of this cleavage during the Revolution of 1909 and its aftermath have always been noted, but never systematically studied, despite the prolific bibliography on the period. Only a general outline can be briefly indicated here.

The more educated classes, linked to the falling political oligarchy, were against the revolution. A poll of the newspaper *Akropolis* proved this. The

ences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 290 and 294ff.

42. Notes for the 1912 electoral program, VA File 265. Emphasis added.

43. In July 1910, the Political Association of Patras invited Gounares to include on his ticket representatives of the "independent popular classes." Having already chosen to side with the Old Parties, despite his earlier image as a reformer, Gounares adamantly refused to accept the distinction and the proposal: "I consider all citizens . . . independent." See Mallos, Vol. 1, pp. 224–225; and *Neos Kosmos*, 8 February 1934.

44. From an electoral address of N. Demetrakopoulos, then a Liberal, in Tripolis, 4 March 1912, quoted in Nikolaos P. Demetrakopoulos, *Politika* [Politics], ed. Georgios Speliopoulos (Athens, 1915), Vol. 1, p. 490.

45. Quoted in Stefanou, Vol. 1, p. 231.

merchants, the tradesmen, the working people were in favor of regeneration. The lawyers, the doctors, the scientists were distrustful and opposed.⁴⁶

This pattern was clearly reflected in the unprecedented organizational activity and agitation of the time. Against the pronounced hostility of the prestigious Bar Association of the capital,⁴⁷ the newly founded Merchant Associations (*Emborikoi Syllogoi*) spearheaded the regenerationist movement and actively participated in the creation of the Liberal Party. Outside the capital, similar patterns can be identified in the provinces as well.⁴⁸

1915: The National Schism as Class Conflict

The 1915 National Schism essentially repeated, reinforced, and crystallized the bourgeois cleavage of 1909. Whereas personal and economic ties to Britain or Germany are fairly obvious and well documented, they by no means exhaust the content of this bitter struggle, nor can they adequately explain its unprecedented ferocity and divisiveness.

As was obvious at the time, the king's policies represented a counter-offensive of "the oligarchical interests hit by the revolution and the post-revolutionary life of Greece," which remained strong and did not recognize their defeat as final.⁴⁹ The struggle therefore explicitly or implicitly involved conflicting *total conceptions* of the future of the Greek nation, state, and society, "a fundamental difference of conceptions regarding the

46. *Neos Kosmos*, 20 December 1933. "Regeneration" translates the Greek "*anorthosis*," which became the rallying cry of 1909.

47. In its elections, supporters of the Old Parties triumphed, with 242 (for K. Eslin) against 58 (for N. Demetrakopoulos). See *Neos Kosmos*, 20 December 1933. Kordatos also notes that the Athens Bar Association was the "only" hostile interest group. See Kordatos, *Neotere Hellada*, Vol. 5, p. 129. The strange assertion that "practicing lawyers were the main beneficiaries of the revolution of 1909" can therefore only mean that more lawyers were elected to Parliament. See Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, pp. 305–306.

48. It was the Athens Merchant Association that placed the name of the absent Venizelos on the August 1910 ballot, reportedly without consulting him. See the interview with A. Alexandres in *Neos Kosmos*, 13 December 1933. In the November 1910 election, many Liberal candidates were officially sponsored by Merchant Associations. See the list of candidates in VA File 97. The entrepreneurial middle class was also behind the mushrooming political clubs and particularly the Political Association of Athens, a precursor of the Liberal Club. As for the provinces, it should be noted that in Volos, for example, A. Kassavetes, representing the town's merchants and industrialists, had vainly tried to break the hold of the two established local factions between 1900 and 1910. See Kordatos, *Eparchia Volou kai Agias*, pp. 988–995. Kassavetes was among the first to join the Liberal Party, and later became president of the Athens Liberal Club.

49. Venizelos addressing the L.P. caucus, on 5 July 1915, quoted in Venteres, Vol. 1, p. 337. Venteres insists on this interpretation of 1915: it was 1909 all over again, with the traditional "oligarchy" on the offensive. See *ibid.*, p. 315.

nature of the Constitution and the fortune of the Race, . . . *a difference between two political worlds!*"⁵⁰

The Venizelist entrepreneurial bourgeoisie thus supported belligerence on the side of the Entente not merely because of traditional economic links to Britain nor simply because of the prospect of war gains: *its entire hegemonic project was at stake*. The war offered the long-awaited opportunity for the realization of irredentist goals and territorial expansion—an expansion of the state, hence of the market, which would incorporate and consolidate under Greek sovereignty as much as possible of the economic space in which this bourgeoisie had previously operated as diaspora bourgeoisie. This, in turn, held the promise of lasting political domination and accelerated rationalization of state, economy, and society, for which the Western democracies—and above all Britain—naturally offered an unquestioned model. Conversely, it was becoming increasingly obvious with time that neutrality threatened to seal the final destruction of most of the Greek diaspora and even the loss of the hard-won gains of the Balkan Wars themselves. Moreover, domestically the king's opposition posed with increasing clarity an immediate danger to the gains of 1909 and to liberal parliamentary democracy itself.⁵¹

Narrow and naked economic interests are even less adequate as an explanation of the opposite camp, where support of the king *against* Venizelos, rather than genuine pacifism, neutralism, or germanophilia, provided a measure of unity and common purpose. True, there were businessmen with economic ties to Germany or Austria. There were also the landowners who wanted to avert the specter of land reform, and conservative opportunists in general, intent on exploiting the Schism to check and cancel the socioeconomic and cultural reforms of Venizelism. But the *central* and determining aspect was a counteroffensive of the state bourgeoisie, behind and around the crown, to crush Venizelist hegemony and regain its lost power.

The spearhead of this counteroffensive in 1915–1917 was inspired by a *novel* hegemonic project, which *sharply contradicted* the orthodox parliamentary past of this bourgeoisie and reflected the ascendancy and growing emancipation of a military-bureaucratic stratum around the crown. Distinctly antiliberal and even anticapitalist in inspiration, this novel project essentially involved the establishment of a traditionalist mili-

50. Georgios Papandreou, "Hoi Dyo Politikoi Kosmoi" [The Two Political Worlds], originally published in May 1916, and reprinted in Papandreou, p. 84.

51. For a perceptive analysis, largely in the steps of Venteres, see Christinidis, pp. 108–128. On the fanatical Venizelism of Greek businessmen in London, for example, see Kitsikis, pp. 392–395.

tary-bureaucratic regime under the monarchy. In contemporary Liberal perceptions, it involved the creation of a "Court Clergy," a "Court Army," a "Court Bureaucracy," and a "Court Aristocracy" to complete the monarchical system.⁵² Moreover, in sharp contrast to the pragmatic irredentism of Venizelism, the Royalist camp projected into some unspecified future a romantic and utopian irredentism, whose principal instrument would be, significantly, the king and "his" army.⁵³ This contradiction between parliamentary and antiparliamentary trends was to remain at the core of Antivenizelism, whereas a similar contradiction would emerge within Venizelism only after it had prevailed militarily through the Revolution of 1922.⁵⁴

If the Western democracies and, especially, Britain understandably served as a model for the Liberal entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, the acknowledged Prussian inspiration of the monarchist project was neither fortuitous nor merely due to the educational background of protagonists, but quite logical. German education was common among the Greek elites of the time, including the Liberals; it therefore explains nothing by itself. The crucial point is, rather, that Ionian aristocrats, staff officers, university professors, judges, other state officials, and above all the crown itself found in the Prussian model a blueprint for their *own* hegemony (aided, of course, by whatever familiarity they had with it). It may thus be seen that the foreign sympathies of the two camps were inextricably linked to their domestic political conceptions and aspirations.

On a very general and abstract level, and following the analogous views of the 1909 bourgeois conflict, economic interpretations of the 1915 Schism also suggest an underlying differentiation between *entrepreneurs* and, mostly, *rentiers*. For Maximos, the Antivenizelist counteroffensive was essentially a struggle of the traditional precapitalist economy against Liberal capital and the sociopolitical bloc of 1909.⁵⁵ Going further, Elefantas suggests that the two antagonistic bourgeois fractions corresponded "to two different forms of distribution of the social surplus." In his view, Venizelism corresponded to profit maximization through intensive and rationalized use of the productive forces—essentially an *entrepreneurial*

52. Papandreou, "Hoi Dyo Politikoi Kosmoi," in Papandreou, p. 81.

53. On Antivenizelism in 1915, see especially Christinidis, pp. 115–116 and 120–121, and Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers*, pp. 73–78.

54. See the discussion of the relationship between the electoral and the military arena in Chapter 7. The fact that Venizelism stepped outside the parliamentary arena in 1915–1916, as well as the dubious constitutionality of its heavy-handed and repressive rule in 1917–1920, are not conclusive in this respect: these were then perceived as expedients in a national emergency, once the king had subverted parliamentary rule, and *not* as a prospective system of government.

55. Maximos, pp. 12–14.

vision. It represented an effort to develop domestic capitalism and above all to industrialize. In contrast, Antivenizelism corresponded to the mere pursuit of immediate gain, through the appropriation of the agricultural surplus and the accumulation of land rent.⁵⁶

The Interwar Years: Continuity and Change

The bourgeois cleavage of 1909 and 1915 was inherited by the interwar period and seems to have essentially persisted into it. Against this background of historical continuity, however, important changes occurred, which, in the absence of thorough and systematic studies and given that issues became far more complex and alignments less transparent, can only be sketched schematically and tentatively here.

Ecological data are of course inadequate, if bourgeois alignments are to be identified. Some analyses, nevertheless, are relevant and support the interpretation presented here, however indirectly. A prime example is the unexpectedly significant relationship found between Antivenizelism and the proportion of the male population (aged ten or older) which is economically inactive and comprises rentiers, pensioners, and students. Although ecological inference is particularly untenable here, what is far more important is the finding that Antivenizelism was stronger in areas whose social and economic structure was characterized by a disproportionately larger nonproductive population.⁵⁷

Otherwise, to infer interwar bourgeois alignments, one has to rely on miscellaneous evidence, such as the composition of party tickets, the politics of individual businessmen, but also of business associations, both private and public (the Chambers of Commerce and Industry), including their representation in the Republic's Senate. Although such evidence represents a hitherto untapped wealth of material, it is often marred by ambiguities due to the ostensibly nonpartisan aspect of such activities.⁵⁸

56. Elefantes, pp. 189–194 and 318.

57. Other analyses show a relationship of Antivenizelism with personal and government services, and above all with the professions, whereas Venizelism is mostly associated with the credit and commercial sectors.

58. For a gallery of prominent businessmen, see Tsoungos. Among private business associations, the most important were the Athens Merchant Association (*Emborikos Syllogos Athenon*), the Union of Greek Shipowners (*Henosis Hellenon Efopliston*), and the League of Greek Industrialists and Craftsmen (*Syndesmos Hellenon Viomechanon kai Viotechnon*, commonly translated as Federation of Greek Industries and Handicrafts). The Chambers of Commerce and Industry (*Emborika kai Viomechanika Epimeleteria*) were created in 1914 by Law 184, which was put into effect in 1919.

Among the 18 Senate seats held by the so-called "organizations," there were (a) 1 for merchants and 1 for industrialists, filled by the respective sections of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry; (b) 1 for shipowners, filled by the Union of Greek Shipowners; (c) 2

On the basis of such evidence, one may conclude that interwar Venizelism continued to represent essentially the *entrepreneurial* fractions of the bourgeoisie: merchants, shipowners, independent and *small* bankers, and above all industrialists, who were clearly in the ascendant, as well as an emerging stratum of their “organic intellectuals”—engineers and technicians. Perhaps no other indication is more eloquent in this respect than a list of prospective candidates for the L.P. Athens ticket, drawn by Venizelos in 1928. It included: (1) the perennial (1919–1958) director of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry (who ran again in 1932), (2) four merchants, (3) four industrialists, including the president of their league, and (4) two engineers, including the president of the Technical Chamber.⁵⁹ No less significantly, the Senate seats for merchants, industrialists, and technicians were all filled by Venizelists, both in 1929 and in 1932.

The merchants of Athens, in particular, and the capital's commercial district remained a stronghold of Venizelism ever since 1910.⁶⁰ What was true of merchants and industrialists in Athens seems to have been on the whole also true in Piraeus (a Venizelist “acropolis,” i.e., fortress), in Thessaloniki (among Greeks, not Jews), in Volos, and in the smaller commercial and industrial centers. Small private banks, which mushroomed for a brief period, appear to have been mostly Venizelist also. Finally, shipowners are known to have been overwhelmingly Venizelist and to have greatly benefited from Liberal policies.⁶¹

It was Antivenizelism that underwent a more visible transformation, as several powerful capitalists, or “plutocrats,” stepped into the foreground. This may have partly reflected the decline of other Antivenizelist

for the academic world, filled by the Academy of Athens and the universities; and (d) 1 for the technical world, filled by the Technical University and the Technical Chamber of Greece (*Technikon Epimeleterion Hellados*). Elections for the 18 seats of “organizations” were held twice, in 1929 and in 1932.

59. See undated memorandum, VA File 277.

60. In 1916, the commercial district of Athens had been a prime target of the Antivenizelist mob. In 1923, Metaxas estimated that 70 percent of the Athens merchants were Liberals. See his letter to I. Spetsiotes, 4 March 1923, quoted in Giannopoulos-Epeirotis, p. 36. In 1926, the Liberal candidates, including the last president of the Athens Merchant Association, triumphantly toured the commercial district in what appears to have become an integral part of Liberal electioneering in Athens. See *Eleftheron Vema*, 30 October 1926, which adds: “It is known that almost the entirety of the merchants enthusiastically support the Liberal camp.” In 1928, a prospective campaign contractor proposed to make use of the centrally located stores of the “fanatical friends of the Party.” See Emm. D. Blazoudakes to Venizelos, 7 August 1928, VA File 419. In 1933, Athens merchants were still considered a “Liberal par excellence element.” See I. Kalogeras to Venizelos, 14 March 1933, VA File 348.

61. See, e.g., the small book by Papamichalopoulos. Representation of the shipowners in the Senate by an Antivenizelist member of the Embeirikos family has probably no political significance, as indicated by the fact that he was the sole candidate, both in 1929 and in 1932.

fractions. Venizelist control of the state, and especially of the armed forces, for over a decade (1922–1933) must have been a severe setback for the traditional state bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, to the extent that they were *not* affected by political appointments and dismissals, state officials seem to have remained mostly Antivenizelist. This was especially true of the judiciary—the most prestigious and protected corps. A judge was thus mentioned in 1932 as “one of the very rare Liberals of the judiciary branch.”⁶² The same was distinctly true of another privileged body, the academic world, which sent to the Senate one Antivenizelist and one Venizelist in 1929 and two Antivenizelists in 1932. The Church also remained a stronghold of Antivenizelism and the monarchy, despite political changes at the top.⁶³ In contrast, landowners were greatly weakened, if they did not vanish as a political force, as a result of the vigorous implementation of land reform. Finally, other rentiers, especially holders of state securities, apparently suffered because of inflation. Nevertheless, Antivenizelism seems to have significantly held a commanding position in the Athens stock exchange (dealing almost exclusively in state securities and foreign currency) and to have exploited this position for partisan purposes.⁶⁴

Prominent Antivenizelist capitalists included a couple of big industrialists (N. Kanellopoulos and E. Charilaos), but mostly big financiers (D. Loverdos, D. Maximos, G. Pesmazoglou).⁶⁵ All were closely linked to the National Bank, which continued to be a fundamentally Antivenizelist and largely autonomous center of tremendous economic power. Government intervention was effectively abolished after the National Bank was divested of control over the currency and over agricultural credit—with the creation of the Bank of Greece (1928) and of the Agricultural Bank (1929), respectively. The National Bank thus reverted to practically unchecked control by its own particular bureaucracy, which had traditionally been an

62. L. Makkas to Venizelos, 28 November 1932, VA, unclassified.

63. On the Royalist sympathies of the Church, see, e.g., Venteres, Vol. 1, p. 335; and Markezines, Vol. 3, p. 348. See also the discussion of the Old Calendar issue in Chapter 5.

64. See, e.g., N.D. Karydakis to Venizelos, 25 November 1933, VA File 399; and D.N. Filaretos to Venizelos, 28 December 1933, VA File 349.

65. A prominent Germanophile in 1915–1917, Nikolaos Kanellopoulos enjoyed an effective monopoly in chemical fertilizers after 1931, thanks to prohibitive tariffs, and had the largest factory in Greece, employing three thousand workers. His brother was a P.P. politician, and his brother-in-law Epameinondas Charilaos enjoyed a monopoly position in wines and alcohol. Among the others, Dionysios Loverdos is perhaps the most typical of the traditional finance bourgeoisie. A scion of the “anticapitalist aristocracy” of Cephalonia, he entered the career of the National Bank and founded under its auspices the People’s Bank (*Laïke Trapeza*), a popular savings and loan institution. It is telling that he excelled in speculation on foreign exchange, but failed in industrial investments. See Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers*, pp. 73–78; and Tsoungos, pp. 39–53, 67–83, and 165–175.

integral part of the old state bourgeoisie.⁶⁶ Against this general background, interwar developments can only be barely sketched here.

Although the 1922 Disaster had irrevocably destroyed the irredentist cement of its hegemonic project, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie rapidly recovered from the shock and entered the interwar period in buoyant spirits, bolstered by sizable wartime profits, an expanded and highly protected market, and the influx of the refugees—as entrepreneurs, as consumers, and above all as cheap labor. “Enrichissez-vous” and industrial development were the order of the day. Small industries and banks mushroomed.⁶⁷

The immediate priorities of an expanding capitalist economy clearly appeared to take precedence over the legacy of intrabourgeois conflict. In 1926–1928 it was thus primarily the Venizelist entrepreneurial bourgeoisie that imposed the formation and maintenance of the Ecumenical Cabinet for the sake of economic and political stabilization, even at the cost of disproportionate Antivenizelist political gains. Kafandares is characteristically reported to have prolonged the life of the Ecumenical Cabinet, despite the crisis provoked by the military question, “because he understood that Public Opinion, and *especially that of the commercial world*, mistaken as to the significance of the Ecumenical, hostile to any military intervention, and in the dark because of the confusion produced by the press, desired the preservation of the Ecumenical. . . .”⁶⁸

66. Cabinet approval of the choice of management had been imposed in 1914 by Venizelos, following a bitter conflict with the bank (which was strongly supported by the Old Parties). Consequently, the bank's governor changed according to the changes in government until 1928, but its bureaucracy remained essentially intact. It regained its earlier autonomy in 1928, when the Bank of Greece was founded as the state reserve bank. Both the creation of the Bank of Greece and that of the Agricultural Bank were Liberal policies, vociferously opposed by Antivenizelism, and both threatened to irreparably damage the National Bank's privileged position. Nevertheless, the bank managed to secure a satisfactory compromise and weather the crisis, preserving its powerful influence on the state's financial affairs and especially on those of the Agricultural Bank.

The new governor of the National Bank, Ioannes Drosopoulos, was a typical product of its particular bureaucracy. The son of a yeoman, he had entered the bank's career and risen through the ranks, becoming a “merciless defender” of the bank's interests. Under his leadership, the bank proceeded to destroy its small competitors, and repeatedly obstructed or even violated the policies of the Venizelos government. See Tsoungos, pp. 23–38, 142, and 188; and also Speliotopoulos, pp. 174–182. The new vice-governor, Alexandros Korizes, was also a product of the bank's bureaucracy and is described as “a model ‘loyal employee,’ who learned to sacrifice everything to the bank.” See Tsoungos, pp. 103–113.

67. Manufacturing output doubled between 1924 and 1938, but this was mainly due to the addition of new firms. The number of manufacturing establishments doubled between 1920 and 1930, but their average size decreased. Only 724, or 1.1 percent of the total, employed more than 26 salaried in 1930, whereas the average establishment employed only 1! See Coutsoumaris, pp. 19–28, 34, and 47; Alexander, pp. 59–64; and Tsoungos, pp. 9–18.

68. See G. Mares to Venizelos, 2 June 1927, VA File 329. Emphasis added.

An increasingly important aspect of the same trend was the growing defensive, short-sighted, and repressive attitude of the industrial bourgeoisie in particular, before the rise of labor militancy and communist agitation. As Tsoungos characteristically observes:

The labor question is perhaps the only point among the main and basic goals of the Liberals, with which our economic leaders disagree. . . . With unusual vehemence, they all, without exception, criticize the labor policy inaugurated by the L.P., to which "labor disorders" are due.⁶⁹

A common bourgeois front therefore appeared imperative, and operated on an ad hoc basis on several occasions, such as major strikes, repressive legislation, etc.

Although Venizelos adopted an increasingly repressive anticomunist and antilabor course, he perpetually admonished his capitalist supporters against short-sightedness and a class-war mentality. His speeches during 1928–1932 are replete with such telling admonitions. On such an occasion, addressing the national congress of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, he adamantly rejected business demands concerning the port authority of Piraeus and involving the dismissal of redundant workers:

Our society cannot go ahead with such conceptions. . . . Will you be able to deal with the workers, when you shall have to confront them with the knife? [I will tell the workers not to be misled by some because they will face the organized force of the state.] To you, I don't need to speak this language. I'm only telling you that we cannot, that it is impossible for us to disregard the interests of the workers. We cannot let them go hungry.⁷⁰

Other severe strains and contradictions developed, especially during the four years of the Venizelos government (1928–1932). The top priority placed on agricultural development was widely resented, despite its long-term promise of a drastically expanded domestic market for commerce and industry. Not unexpectedly, a bitter conflict developed between the commercial and the industrial bourgeoisie as the latter's products began to compete with imported goods. And industry vainly clamored for cheap and long-term credit, which the National Bank refused and smaller banks were unable to provide.⁷¹ In this phase, Venizelos appears to have represented primarily the aspirations of the rising industrial (or "national")

69. Tsoungos, pp. 16–17.

70. *Eleftheron Vema*, 19 February 1930.

71. One of the most comprehensive and illuminating statements on these issues is the speech of Venizelos to the Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 26 February 1933. See VA File 299; and *Eleftheron Vema*, 28 February 1933.

bourgeoisie struggling against a tradition of "compradorism," even at the expense of other loyal supporters.⁷²

The dream of sustained industrial expansion effectively collapsed with the Great Depression, which hit primarily the Venizelist entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. Several small banks were destroyed by the relentless war of the National Bank against them.⁷³ Nonviable industries closed down or passed under its control. And commerce was severely hit by the crisis and by the emergency measures that it brought in its wake, such as debt moratoria and above all strict import restrictions and clearing arrangements.⁷⁴ Conversely, the National Bank seems to have emerged from the crisis in a more dominant position than ever before.⁷⁵ So did its affiliated industrial monopolies of Kanellopoulos and Charilaos. And the clearing arrangement with Germany produced a spectacular development of trade with that country, with a corresponding reorientation of the commercial bourgeoisie.⁷⁶

In conclusion, it appears that, towards the end of the interwar period, economic developments, and above all the Depression, resulted in a drastic restructuring and realignment of bourgeois fractions—at the expense of Venizelism. Its aspiration to represent a broad interclass coalition headed by the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie as a whole was critically undermined by the increasing conservatism of this bourgeoisie and by developing conflicts in its midst. The Depression not only exacerbated these trends, but also shattered the momentum of Venizelism as an agent of bourgeois transformation and dealt a death blow to the ambitious vision that it had historically embodied: overall rationalization of state, economy, and society, continuous economic growth, and especially industrial-

72. An exemplary case was the chemical industry (fertilizers). Government intervention in 1930 (and a prohibitive tariff in 1931) effectively established the domestic monopoly of the Antivenizelist Kanellopoulos, while it ruined his Venizelist competitor (A. Zannos) as well as the importers of foreign fertilizers. See the speech of Venizelos cited above and his correspondence in VA Files 337 and 384–387. See also *Kathemerine*, 2 July 1936.

73. Almost all were linked to prominent Venizelists. Their bankruptcy caused considerable political damage to the L.P. on the eve of the 1932 election. See, e.g., G. Sartzetakes to Venizelos, 23 March 1932, VA File 358.

74. These policies were inaugurated by the Venizelos government in 1932 and produced great resentment among the commercial middle class, which seems to have partly deserted Venizelism in 1932–1933, as various documents in the VA indicate.

75. Kordatos notes that industrial and shipping capital declined, whereas big banking capital remained all-powerful and the National Bank in particular remained in control of economic and political life. Kordatos, *Hellenike Kefalaiokratia*, pp. 87–89. He also notes the complaints of industrialists against the bank, whose goal was perceived to be "the enslavement of industry." *Ibid.*, p. 114.

76. Elefantos suggests that this development greatly strengthened two components of Antivenizelism: the fraction of the commercial bourgeoisie linked to German capital, and the

ization. The 1928 Venizelos promise to make the country “unrecognizable” turned sour, despite the many lasting achievements of Liberal policies.

Severely hit and irreparably disillusioned by the shock of the Depression, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie appears to have largely deserted the L.P., its traditional party, and to have rallied to Antivenizelism, with its reassuring image of conservative housekeeping and economic consolidation. This image was specifically embodied in, and underwritten by the National Bank, whose aggressive rise to a dominant position might even be interpreted as an economic counteroffensive of the traditional state bourgeoisie, through a financial institution it had historically controlled. In the present state of historical research, it does not seem possible to advance beyond this preliminary and rough sketch of an interpretation.⁷⁷

PETTY BOURGEOIS: ARTISANS AND STOREKEEPERS

Just as the Liberal Party was perceived as the party of the bourgeoisie par excellence, so was Antivenizelism seen as the foremost political expression of the petty bourgeoisie.⁷⁸ In this case, however, the origins are *not* to be found in the Revolution of 1909, in which the petty bourgeoisie seems to have provided the principal basis of popular support for the regenerationist program. Its guilds and other organizations played a conspicuous and critical role, especially in Athens.⁷⁹

In contrast to the bourgeoisie, for which 1915 essentially reproduced the 1909 cleavage, the National Schism was a historical turning point for the petty bourgeoisie, which underwent a massive realignment. If 1909 was or became a bourgeois revolution, 1915 evolved into a *petty bourgeois counterrevolution*, when the traditional world of the *noikokyraioi* in town and country became the backbone of Constantinism and provided the bulk of its shock troops, the Reservists.⁸⁰ Against the immediate dan-

Germanophile military-bureaucratic bloc, whose political expressions in 1936 were the General People's Radical Union (Kondyles), the Free Opinion Party (Metaxas), and the Reformist Party (Gotzamanes). See Elefantas, pp. 162–169 and 182–184.

77. The most recent C.P. study on the period links the fall of Venizelism to its abandonment by “part” of big capital, and implies a distinction between monopoly capital, represented by Antivenizelism, and nonmonopoly capital, represented by Venizelism—a distinction that the party failed to make at the time. See Sarles, pp. 37–39 and 150–154. Although attractive, this hypothesis is unfortunately not documented.

78. See, e.g., Benaroyas, pp. 140–141 and 208–209. Similarly, in 1933, the leftist group “Archive of Marxism” interpreted the electoral victory of Antivenizelism as the “overthrow of the capitalist oligarchy” by the petty bourgeois, dragging the working masses behind them. See Pouliopoulos, p. 86.

79. See *Neon Asty*, 10 August 1910, on the role of the guilds in the recent election.

80. On the “Constantinist world of the *noikokyraioi*,” see A. Kalevras to Venizelos, 11 November 1922, VA File 319. *Noikokyres* (pl. *noikokyraioi*), literally the “master” of a

gers of war, against the humiliation and hardships of direct foreign intervention (by the Entente), but also against the long-term threat of capitalist modernization, the petty bourgeoisie reacted by rallying around the crown under slogans in which church-steeple patriotism, chauvinism and xenophobia, religious bigotry, romanticism, and anticapitalist resentment were inextricably linked.⁸¹

This petty bourgeois and anticapitalist aspect of Antivenizelism persisted into the interwar years.⁸² As Maximos observed, the People's Party

dragged with it, apart from the monarchical tradition, masses of petty bourgeois, peasants, and tradesmen, nostalgic of old times, molded with a past era, [which had been] plain and severe, limited and poor.⁸³

The foremost ideologue of Antivenizelism, G. Vlachos, effectively condensed a petty bourgeois world view, when defining his party:

The People's Party is the party of the respect for the Laws, even to the avengers, nor the party of the Court, nor the party of the counterexecutions. The People's Party is the party of the respect for the Laws, even to the detriment of the country, the party of old habits, of old methods, of old traditions, of parliamentarism, of good housekeeping, of order, with all the benefits, all the advantages, and all the defects of these attributes. The People's Party will probably not accomplish great things, but it will not destroy. It will not make great policy, but neither will it pay for its consequences, great and unbearable.⁸⁴

Other evidence also points to the petty bourgeois basis of Antivenizelism during the interwar years.⁸⁵

household, is a native concept of social differentiation with a distinctly petty bourgeois flavor, which implies an established background of property, economic independence, if not prosperity, typically the employment of some hired labor, and above all high social status. The term therefore denotes the upper and most solid stratum of the urban petty bourgeoisie and, in a rural setting, of the peasantry.

81. See Venteres, *passim*; and Christinidis, pp. 115–121. On the relation between the petty bourgeoisie and romanticism as a reaction against the Enlightenment and modern capitalism, see Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 90 and 123.

82. This image was systematically promoted in party literature. See, e.g., Efstratiou, pp. 24–25, as well as the 1936 P.P. declaration quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Among Marxist sources, see, e.g., Elefantos, pp. 189–194; and Maximos, pp. 12–14.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 138–142.

84. "Afeleis Deloseis" [Naïve Statements], *Kathemerine*, 22 June 1932, reprinted in Vlachos, p. 52. This editorial was written in response to the demand by Venizelos that the P.P. explicitly recognize the Republic. "Avengers" and "counterexecutions" refer to the 1922 execution of the Six.

85. In 1923, for example, Metaxas reported that the organizations of the trades, as well as 85 percent of the "little people" (*kosmikes*), were Antivenizelist. See I. Metaxas to I.

Nevertheless, it would be Procrustean to hastily conclude that the Schism simply involved a conflict between bourgeois and petty bourgeois in general. If the bourgeoisie was itself divided into two hostile camps, as seen previously, so was the petty bourgeoisie. This is also suggested by ecological analysis, if the sum of all the categories previously defined as petty bourgeois (in connection with Table 13) is used as the independent variable; although an overall tendency towards Antivenizelism is apparent, the relationship is quite weak. It therefore becomes necessary to differentiate among the petty bourgeois strata, despite the difficulties involved.⁸⁶

The results of several alternative regression models point in the same general direction and may be represented by those reported in Tables 14 and 15, where the independent (i.e., nonsalaried) petty bourgeoisie is dif-

Table 14 ANTIVENIZELISM AND PETTY BOURGEOIS STRATA
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Petty Bourgeois	+1.34	+1.25	+1.21	+1.70	+1.37
Manufacturing,	(.36)	(.35)	(.37)	(.35)	(.33)
Transports,	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000
Personal Services,					
Professions					
% Petty Bourgeois Trade	-1.53	-1.10	-1.29	-2.26	-1.54
and Finance	(.51)	(.49)	(.52)	(.50)	(.47)
	.003	.027	.014	.000	.001
<i>a</i>	26.34	26.61	38.49	42.13	33.39
	(2.69)	(2.60)	(2.74)	(2.62)	(2.47)
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
<i>r</i>	.26	.26	.23	.33	.29
<i>s</i>	18.39	17.80	18.69	17.88	16.86

Spetsiotes, 4 March 1923, quoted in Giannopoulos-Epeirotas, p. 36. The trades actually organized the Antivenizelist rally of 9 November 1923. See Vouros, p. 65. In the Senate, artisans and tradesmen were almost exclusively represented by Antivenizelists. An anonymous L.P. memorandum noted their continuing hostility in 1934. See VA File 431.

86. These include extreme multicollinearity and the ambiguity of terms such as *epangelmatias* (tradesman or shopkeeper), which does not distinguish between artisans and small merchants (storekeepers).

Table 15 VENIZELISM AND PETTY BOURGEOIS STRATA
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Petty Bourgeois Manufacturing, Transports, Personal Services, Professions	-1.16 (.37) .002	-.83 (.33) .013	-.79 (.36) .031	-1.40 (.36) .000	-1.05 (.32) .002
% Petty Bourgeois Trade and Finance	+1.26 (.52) .016	+.83 (.46) .077	+.63 (.51) .217	+1.49 (.51) .004	+1.05 (.46) .022
<i>a</i>	69.90 (2.73) .000	58.56 (2.45) .000	54.63 (2.70) .000	52.20 (2.71) .000	58.82 (2.41) .000
<i>r</i>	.22	.18	.17	.27	.23
<i>s</i>	18.67	16.75	18.47	18.49	16.48

ferentiated into two basic camps, one leaning towards Antivenizelism and the other leaning towards Venizelism.⁸⁷ Although these results are clearly inadequate for precise ecological inference, they certainly confirm an overall tendency and suggest that the bourgeois cleavage discussed previously was largely *reproduced* within the petty bourgeoisie: the petty bourgeois in most occupational categories tended to side with their bourgeois counterparts. Not surprisingly, manufacturing is the major exception: in sharp contrast to industrialists, artisans mostly aligned themselves with Antivenizelism and actually provided the largest component of its petty bourgeois base, which seems to have also included the independent petty bourgeois in the professions, in transports, and in personal services. On the other hand, the Venizelist petty bourgeoisie apparently consisted mainly of storekeepers, together with miscellaneous middlemen.

These results are congruent with and in fact explain the distinctly petty bourgeois image of Antivenizelism (just as the bourgeois image of Venizelism was previously interpreted in light of its distinctly entrepre-

87. Multicollinearity seems to preclude any certainty with respect to white-collar employees, about whom no other conclusive evidence is readily available. It is probable, however, that the majority of those in government service (to the extent that they were *not* Venizelist patronage appointees) mostly sympathized with Antivenizelism, as suggested during their confrontation with the Venizelos government in 1931. See, e.g., *Kathemerine*, 25 February 1931. In contrast, those in the private sector may have mostly leaned towards Venizelism.

neurial base). The strata leaning towards Antivenizelism constitute a clear majority of the independent petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, they constitute both the *precapitalist* and the *anticapitalist* petty bourgeoisie par excellence.

Artisans were the stratum most obviously and directly threatened by the growth of a capitalist market economy, which meant for them increasingly unequal competition against industrial goods, whether imported or domestically produced.⁸⁸ Having reached a peak of prosperity apparently "sometime around the last decade of the 19th century," their position seems to have steadily deteriorated ever since, under the combined impact of industry (first foreign, then also domestic) and overpopulation in their sector.⁸⁹ Traditional independent carriers in transports were similarly threatened with obsolescence and extinction.

The remaining Antivenizelist petty bourgeois strata were marginal to the market and were therefore threatened by capitalist development in less direct or tangible ways. If it did not represent for them a danger of immediate proletarianization, as for artisans, it would nevertheless displace them from the important role and the considerable status they had enjoyed within a precapitalist society.

Common hostility to modern capitalism was not the only link between the petty bourgeois and the bourgeois of the Antivenizelist camp. In the course of the 19th century, strong and organic bonds had been forged between them, under the hegemony of the state bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois in the professions, in government, and in personal services had been its auxiliaries and dependents. The artisans had also benefited from its patronage and protection, manifested around the turn of the century with two particular institutions: the Greek Crafts Society (*Hellenike Viotechnike Hetaireia*), founded in 1892, and the People's Bank of Loverdos, created by the National Bank in 1905 with the explicit purpose of strengthening and defending the artisans against the future onslaught of industry.⁹⁰

Conversely, and unlike artisans, storekeepers could expect to partake in the benefits of capitalist market expansion, whether from foreign trade or from domestic industrial development. An expanded market and

88. On this point, with reference to their support of Constantine, see Christinidis, pp. 115–121.

89. Alexander, p. 58; and Zolotas, p. 12.

90. On the society, see *Hellenike Viotechnike Hetaireia*, *Perileptike Ekthesis Peri ton Ergon tes Hetaireias Kata ten Proten Aftes Dekaitian* (1892–1902) [Summary Report on the Activities of the Society During Its First Decade (1892–1902)] (Athens, 1902). On the bank, see Speliotopoulos, p. 83; and especially Dionysios Loverdos, *Peri ton Praterion tes Laikes Trapezes* [On the Branches of the People's Bank] (Athens, 1906). This was a lecture he gave at the inauguration of the first such branch.

a buoyant economy would guarantee the survival of their inflated numbers, whereas the threat of concentration in retail trade was entirely absent at the time. It is therefore not surprising that these petty bourgeois economic auxiliaries of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie should also be its political allies under the Venizelist banner.⁹¹ To parallel an earlier discussion, it may be noted that the social stratum most severely hit by the Depression seems to have been precisely the commercial petty bourgeoisie—a Venizelist stronghold.⁹²

THE WORKERS: PETTY BOURGEOIS VS.
PROLETARIAN CONSCIOUSNESS

The Communist Party certainly was the unique distinctly, if not exclusively, working-class party in interwar Greece. Yet, it was not *the* party of the working class, except in an ideological or, as Elefantès puts it, “prospective and metaphorical” sense. Throughout the period, it never won the support of more than a minority of the (manual) workers, as ecological inference clearly implies (see Table 16) and as the party itself repeatedly recognized.⁹³

Table 16 THE C.P. AND WORKERS
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Workers	+.11 (.02) .000	+.22 (.03) .000	+.23 (.03) .000	+.21 (.04) .000	+.20 (.03) .000
<i>a</i>	−.81 (.48) .092	−.65 (.91) .480	−.99 (.94) .292	.26 (.96) .784	−.37 (.77) .637
<i>r</i>	.40	.42	.44	.40	.44
<i>s</i>	3.36	6.42	6.57	6.73	5.43

91. On the Venizelism of storekeepers, see e.g., Birtles, pp. 50–51.

92. On the plight of the petty bourgeoisie, severely hit by the moratorium on peasant debts and crushed between the peasants and the capitalists, see K. G. Giavasoglou (Thessaloniki senator) to Venizelos, 24 October 1931, VA File 388; and the Kozane Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Trades to Venizelos, 17 December 1933, VA File 393.

93. Elefantès, pp. 375 and 308; and KKE, Vol. 2, p. 276. See also Sarles, p. 109, who speaks of a “small minority” (5–8 percent) of the working class.

It is therefore both misleading and tendentious to equate the party's history, as is commonly done, with that of the labor movement or even of the working class as a whole, which still remains to be written and can only be barely sketched here. Once again, the antecedents of the interwar situation are to be found in the preceding decade.⁹⁴

Venizelism as Apprentice Sorcerer: 1910–1920

Workers were a conspicuous part of urban popular support for the 1909 Revolution and subsequently for its political heir: the L.P.⁹⁵ In response to such support and actually anticipating worker demands, Venizelism became the agent of both the first protective labor legislation and early labor organization, beginning with the Athens and Piraeus Labor Centers founded in 1910 and 1912, respectively. This remarkably prolabor attitude (which faced the immediate opposition of employers and earned their lasting wrath) must be placed within the framework of its overall regenerationist and modernizing program, increasingly inspired by the urgent practical requirements of irredentism.⁹⁶

A major turning point was Law 281 of 1914 (Associations Act). It not only provided for the freedom of association, but also put an end to the existing system of "guilds" or "craft associations" (*syntechnies*), in which small employers, independent craftsmen, and workers had traditionally joined together to minimize economic hazards through mutual help. Employers and employees could no longer be members of the same organization.⁹⁷

Subsequently, in 1917, the Provisional Government of Thessaloniki encouraged the creation of a (Greek) labor center in that city, to counter the influence of the Jewish *Federacion*.⁹⁸ Finally, and most ironically, the Venizelos government in 1918 actively pushed for the creation of both the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (*Genike Synomospondia Ergaton Hellados*, or GSEE) and of the Socialist Labor Party (future C.P.) in order to provide Greek representation and advocacy of national claims in impending international conferences.

94. On this period, see Kordatos, *Ergatiko*, pp. 177–308; Dertouzos, pp. 121–147; and Leon, *Socialist Movement*, and "Labor Movement."

95. On the continuing Venizelism of workers as of December 1915, see Kordatos, *Neotere Hellada*, Vol. 5, p. 444.

96. On the threatening attacks of employers against the "socialistic" policy of the Liberal government, see, e.g., the resolution of the Athens Labor Center, 13 November 1913, VA File 409.

97. On the guilds and Law 281, see Dertouzos, pp. 109–116 and 322; and Kordatos, *Ergatiko*, pp. 25–26 and 177–178.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 282–285.

The grapes of Liberal labor policies were rapidly turning sour, however. Caught between the reaction of employers and the growing radicalization of workers, Venizelism appeared to reverse its original course after 1917. While protective labor laws were not being enforced (until after 1918), the war brought to the workers a sharp decline in the standard of living and extreme hardship, culminating in the famine produced by the Entente blockade. Under these conditions and the impact of Antivenizelist and socialist neutralist propaganda, workers and the labor movement became more and more alienated from Venizelism.⁹⁹ Socialists in particular proved intractable. The new Socialist Labor Party immediately dispelled any illusions that it might cooperate with the government and promote Greek national claims, while the specter of subversion loomed larger than ever in the wake of the Russian Revolution. Renewed repression of socialist activities, increasingly extended to labor agitation in general, only produced further radicalization. Against this background, Venizelist labor leaders were losing control of trade unions to a mounting coalition of socialists and Antivenizelists, and a wave of strikes endangered the continuing war effort. Greatly alarmed by this situation, the Venizelos government eventually reacted in 1920 by imposing restrictions on trade union activity, and especially strike action, with Law 2151 (Professional Associations Act), which amended Law 281. Defending this legislation as intended only to check past "abuses," Venizelos denied any change in labor policy, which he vowed to continue against both the reactionary intransigence of employers and the subversive agitation of socialists. Industrialization clearly required cooperation between labor and capital, since both nationalization *and* a final solution like the one adopted for the agrarian problem, implying a regression to handicrafts, were out of the question.¹⁰⁰

Later in the year, however, the fateful November election proved that Venizelism had lost the support of workers, who massively and indistinctly voted for the Antivenizelist and for the Socialist (Communist) tickets. The remarkable confusion and de facto solidarity created by the common anti-war and anti-Liberal slogans was responsible for an artificial show of Communist strength, given that many workers and even petty bourgeois voted for both tickets. Nevertheless, most workers seem to have

99. Ibid., p. 298, notes that, by 1918, the Athens Labor Center was in the hands of Royalists, whereas that of Piraeus remained Venizelist. Leon, *Socialist Movement*, p. 69, notes that in January 1918 only 9 of the existing 26 trade unions participated in a welcoming ceremony prepared for Venizelos.

100. See his speech before the Chamber, 27 January 1920, *Efemeris*, pp. 528–532, especially p. 531, and his notes in VA Files 267–268. See also his Syros speech quoted at the beginning of this chapter. For the text of the law, see Dertouzos, pp. 401–406. It imposed majority and quorum requirements, a secret ballot for elections and strike actions, and otherwise regulated membership, dues, fines, and expulsions.

been won by the petty bourgeois appeal of Antivenizelism.¹⁰¹ Almost simultaneously, Venizelists lost control of GSEE to the Communist Left. On the eve of the interwar period, the workers had thus largely deserted Venizelism, the sponsor of industrialization and increasingly the expression of the rising industrial bourgeoisie, and turned to petty bourgeois Antivenizelism, or proletarian revolutionary socialism.

The Limits of Interwar Industrialization

The highly visible and growing incidence of strikes and labor militancy in general, together with the increasingly repressive reaction of the state, should not mask, as is often the case, the actually *limited* advance of industrial capitalism in interwar Greece—thereby creating a distorted image reminiscent of the contemporary Communist prophecies and of the symmetrical bourgeois paranoia of imminent revolution.

According to all existing indications,¹⁰² the majority of (nonagricultural) workers were still employed in artisan workshops (*magazia*) or other small businesses. Little economic or social distance separated them from their petty bourgeois employers, to whom they were closely tied through manifold personal and traditional bonds, and with whom they largely *shared* a common rural background and a common ideological outlook, aspiring to set up their own small business in time. Employment was unstable and typically regarded as a temporary expedient, in anticipation of artisan or other petty bourgeois status. Furthermore, the Greek worker commonly owned a little house where he lived or else some land in his village of origin, retaining strong economic and family ties with small property and with both the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. His ideol-

101. Benaroyas, pp. 140–141; and Stavrides, pp. 38–39, who quotes the contemporary couplet symbolizing the alliance of Antivenizelism and Communism: *sfyri-drepani/ki elia stefani*, i.e., “hammer and sickle, crowned by olive,” olive being the symbol of Antivenizelism.

102. Drawing on the 1930 Census of manufacturing, Coutsoumaris reports that out of a total of 65,811 establishments, there were 61,336 (93.2 percent) employing less than 6 employees, or no hired labor at all, 3,751 (5.7 percent) employing between 6 and 25, and only 724 (1.1 percent) employing 26 or more. Coutsoumaris, Tables 2.1 and 2.3, pp. 34 and 37. There are, however, unexplained discrepancies with the data reported in the official statistical yearbooks, although drawn from the same source. According to those figures, out of a total of 76,591 establishments, there were 70,644 (92.2 percent), 4,900 (6.4 percent), and 1,047 (1.4 percent), respectively. Furthermore, out of a total employment of 280,331 (including owners, managers, white collar, and workers), the three size categories employed 43.2 percent, 17.7 percent, and 39.1 percent, respectively. See *Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados*, 1935, p. 137. Finally, according to the 1928 Census figures, which do not match either, the ratio of workers to employers in manufacturing was 8.3 to 1, and in all other sectors taken together (except agriculture and animal husbandry) it was 8.1 to 1.

ogy was not significantly different from that of these other popular classes, with which there was constant interpenetration and movement across fluid and open boundaries. Under these conditions, labor organization remained limited and unstable. Furthermore, it was still imbued with the traditional "guild" mentality and plagued by personalist politics and endemic factional conflicts. Collective action mostly took the form of sporadic and anarchic outbursts, without continuity.¹⁰³

A broadly similar picture may be drawn for agricultural workers as well, who typically possessed some little land of their own and should be actually considered part of the peasantry. Contrary to wishful Communist expectations, agricultural labor remained unorganized and never emerged as a social force in the countryside, with the possible exception of a few areas where particular conditions obtained (e.g., olive gathering in Lesbos). As for the "workers" in animal husbandry (i.e., the hired shepherds), they were still held captive by traditional relations of dependence. Ecological analysis confirms the lack of political distinctiveness of these two rural strata, which do not deserve further discussion.¹⁰⁴

Against the overall picture sketched so far for nonagricultural workers, there existed, nevertheless, conditions leading to the emergence of important pockets or enclaves of growing labor radicalism. Real wages in manufacturing had generally dropped below the prewar level.¹⁰⁵ Unemployment was widespread and endemic, coupled with disastrous overcrowding and crisis conditions in the artisan stratum, which offered less opportunities for upward mobility than before, and was itself increasingly threatened with proletarianization. The refugee influx decisively contributed to both of these developments and generally had an adverse effect on working conditions and on the bargaining power of labor. As will be seen (in Chapter 4), the refugee workers themselves rapidly became the most radical part of labor. Regardless of their background, petty bourgeois illusions and ambitions were soon largely destroyed—lacking the support that small property, family ties, clientelism, and unbroken traditions provided in the case of native workers.

Furthermore, there were industries where employment was threatened, especially by modernization and mechanization, or where consider-

103. See Zolotas, p. 65; Gotzamanes, *Koinonikai Taxeis*, pp. 48–49, and *Hypomnemata*, pp. 21–22; and especially Elefantos, pp. 319–324, who pointedly defines the situation of labor organization as *ergatopaterikos syndikalismos*. *Ergatopateras*, literally "father of the workers," may be loosely translated as "labor boss." On the surviving guild mentality, see Benaroyas, pp. 223ff.

104. It should be added that, according to the 1928 Census, the ratio of workers to employers was merely 1.3 to 1 in agriculture and 4.5 to 1 in animal husbandry.

105. Zolotas, p. 73.

able concentration and factory size were to be found, thus offering classical conditions for militant labor organization. Finally, indiscriminate and heavy-handed repression was probably *the single most important* source of labor radicalization and Communist recruitment, especially after 1929 and the passage of the *Idionymon* Law. Although ostensibly aiming at Communist subversion, such legislation was in fact massively used as a weapon of class warfare against workers and the labor movement in general, as its implementation on the local level amply shows.¹⁰⁶

Several of these conditions were satisfied in the special case of the tobacco processing industry, which traditionally treated tobacco before it was exported (and should not be equated with cigarette manufacturing). Employment was seasonal and inherently unstable, as it depended on continual and sharp production and market fluctuations. Furthermore, it was perpetually threatened by the export of *unprocessed* tobacco, which merchants resorted to (and producers demanded) in times of crisis and falling prices. Work was done in large warehouses, involving greater labor concentration than any other Greek industry. According to the 1928 Census, the ratio of workers to employers in the tobacco industry (including cigarette manufacturing) was a staggering 272.8 to 1, with which extremely few factories in other branches could compete. Moreover, among the reported 48,007 tobacco workers (of both sexes), the overall proportion of refugees was 43 percent, more than double that in the general population.¹⁰⁷ Living and especially housing conditions among tobacco workers seem to have been worse than among any other group, except the urban refugees.¹⁰⁸ Finally, the tobacco processing industry, *unlike* any other, was lacking an artisan counterpart and consequently precluded smooth accession to petty bourgeois status.

Even before the interwar period and the refugee influx, tobacco workers had been the most militant and best organized, especially in

106. Among a multitude of cases, a particularly striking example is worth noting. In 1931, GSEE complained about the persecution of the Tobacco Workers Union in Samos, which was part of its membership and therefore manifestly not "subversive." Using the *Idionymon* Law, the local Gendarmerie sought to oust the union's president, as one "hated by the tobacco merchants." It justified its action to Venizelos by referring to the man's "latent communist principles." See GSEE to Venizelos, 2 June 1931, VA File 109, and the attached reply of the Samos Gendarmerie.

107. The proportion was 31 percent among males and 60 percent among females. There were reportedly 27,675 male and 20,332 female tobacco workers. It may be added that the tobacco industry is perhaps the one case where sex differences were least significant from a political point of view.

108. In his 1929 report on the needs of Macedonia and Thrace, A. Michalakopoulos characteristically gives top priority to the housing of 15,000 refugee and 15,000 tobacco worker homeless families, arguing that homeownership will stem the Communist current. See VA File 106.

Macedonia where they had offered a distinctly favorable ground for early Balkan socialism. By 1921, their nationwide federation (*Kapnergatike Homospondia Hellados*, or KOE) claimed 90 percent of the industry's labor force and was by far the largest such organization in Greece.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, strong organization and militant struggles won a distinctly privileged position for tobacco workers. Among early successes, one should note the 1922 law prohibiting the export of unprocessed tobacco, and the creation of an unemployment fund for tobacco workers (*Tameio Anergias Kapnergaton*, or TAK), the largest and most advanced institution of this kind in interwar Greece. It is also telling that the pressure of organized labor prompted the defensive organization of tobacco merchants, beginning in 1917, and culminating in 1924 with the creation of their own nationwide federation.¹¹⁰

Throughout the interwar period, tobacco workers remained the largest, most compact, organized, and combative force in Greek labor and were engaged in a bitter defensive struggle amidst the tobacco crisis. In 1930, KOE and its member unions were dissolved as Communist organizations, but labor militancy continued despite repression. When, in the spring of 1936, organizational unity (between Communists and non-Communists) was achieved in a new federation (*Panhellenia Kapnergatike Homospondia*, or PKO), a nationwide strike shook the country, escalating into the May events in Thessaloniki.¹¹¹

Worker Radicalism and Communism

Due to historical conditions peculiar to Greece, communism became the practically exclusive political expression of worker radicalism and class consciousness. Timing was clearly decisive in this respect. At the time of the Russian Revolution, there was no socialist party in Greece nor solid socialist traditions in the labor movement, which was itself in its infancy. Born in the immediate wake of the Bolshevik rise to power and perhaps prematurely with respect to domestic conditions, the country's first socialist party quickly became slavishly dependent on Moscow, and transformed itself into a C.P. of the Third International, largely because of its own weakness and inexperience.¹¹² Ever since then, the unusual task of

109. Benaroyas, pp. 222–236.

110. See *To Helleniko Kapnemborio*, pp. 45–50.

111. See Linardatos, pp. 207–220.

112. This is an obviously complex question, which cannot be adequately treated here. For instance, the fact that the most advanced and firmly established socialist and labor organization, the Thessaloniki *Federacion*, was distinctly Jewish effectively prevented it from exercis-

creating a socialist party in opposition to an existing communist party has proved a formidable, if not an impossible one. Throughout the interwar period, socialist and reformist groups in general failed to transform their considerable influence in the labor movement into a separate and viable political party.¹¹³

From its inception, the C.P. was closely identified with the working class, and with the labor movement. This identification appeared particularly justified between 1920 and 1926, when the party controlled GSEE. The loss of GSEE in 1926, however, put an end to the "mutual osmosis between party and class," and the KKE entered a course of increasing isolation.¹¹⁴ This course was sealed in 1928, when the Communist delegates were excluded from the Fourth GSEE Congress, and proceeded to create a separate "Unitary GSEE." Despite repeated attempts, and although it seemed imminent on the eve of the Metaxas dictatorship, the reunification of the labor movement was not achieved by the end of the interwar period.¹¹⁵

The party decisively contributed to its own isolation by espousing an ideology of *ouvriérisme*, which prevailed especially after its Fourth Congress (1928), and led to increasing political and organizational sectarianism.¹¹⁶ Its spirit is reflected in the continuing discussions of membership composition and the priorities of recruitment. In 1927, it was thus stated that "our Party, as party of the working class, should be mainly based on it." Despite the recognition that only a minority of the workers had joined the party, it was also stated that workers should not be recruited individually, but only once they had become unionized. Moreover, factory workers were to be the first priority: "Naturally, our attention will be concentrated on factory workers, without obstructing the entry of other workers. As for the petty bourgeois in general, we shall be careful in registering members." Recruitment goals were quantified accordingly: 65 percent industrial workers and 35 percent other workers and peasants.¹¹⁷ In 1929, recruitment priorities were again defined: factory workers, transport workers, and poor peasant strata, in that order.¹¹⁸

Measured against these doctrinaire priorities, which remained essentially unchanged, the actual composition of party membership continued

ing the leadership to which it would otherwise be entitled. On these questions, the most penetrating analysis is certainly Elefantas.

113. On the history of such efforts, see Somerites.

114. Elefantas, p. 308.

115. For a brief review, see Dertouzos, pp. 147–155.

116. Elefantas, pp. 82–83 and 110–111.

117. KKE, Vol. 2, pp. 231, 276, and 444.

118. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 48.

to be considered unsatisfactory. In 1928, the breakdown was: 61.7 percent workers, 28.9 percent peasants, and 10.2 percent miscellaneous. Party cells were classified as: 25.6 percent enterprise, 22 percent small shop (*mikromagazia*), 14 percent residence, and 37.6 percent rural.¹¹⁹ By the end of 1932 and after a 120 percent membership increase in one year, the proportion of workers had actually dropped to 46.3 percent, including 6.6 percent factory workers, 36 percent other workers, and 3.7 percent agricultural workers. "Poor and middle" peasants were 50.7 percent, white-collar 1 percent, and miscellaneous 2 percent. The Fifth Plenum concluded that the great mass of party members remained outside the factories, whereas the majority of the industrial proletariat was "outside the cycle of party influence and work."¹²⁰ In 1934, party membership had again increased by 150 percent in one and a half years, but the composition remained unsatisfactory, as the Sixth Plenum recognized: 44 percent workers, including 9.1 percent factory workers. Out of 590 party cells, only 44 (7 percent) were factory cells.¹²¹ No information seems to be available for the following years (1935–1936), during which party membership reportedly more than doubled. The proportion of workers may be assumed to have remained about the same, if it did not decline even further. Nevertheless, this must have been less disturbing in the context of the new "Popular Front" strategy, which may account for the apparent lack of party concern and analyses.¹²² Finally, a broadly similar picture emerges if those convicted for "subversive" activities under the *Idionymon* Law are assumed to be fairly representative of Communist activists as a whole, despite the notorious arbitrariness of repression.¹²³

These fragmentary data on the class background of C.P. members and activists should *not* be interpreted as sufficiently proving the party's broad popular appeal, as opposed to its specifically working-class character.¹²⁴ They should rather be interpreted, in light of the party's declared recruitment objectives, as indicating the *limits* of Communist influence within the working class. Beyond these limits, it failed to grow, if it did not actually decline. Another telling indication is that in 1928 the presumably

119. As quoted in Elefantas, p. 307. Totals do not exactly make 100 percent.

120. *KKE*, Vol. 3, pp. 472–473. Burks, p. 35, counts the agricultural workers as peasants.

121. *KKE*, Vol. 4, pp. 26–27.

122. It may be noted that the dissolution of rural party organizations for the benefit of the "Unified" A.P., initiated in 1936, was bound to leave an almost exclusively working-class membership to the C.P.

123. See Koundouros, p. 152.

124. Both Burks and Elefantas seem to imply such an interpretation. See especially Elefantas, p. 375, which, however, contradicts pp. 110–111.

Table 17 THE C.P. AND COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED UNIONS
(urban areas only, n = 56)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Delegates excluded from Fourth GSEE Congress (1928) per 10,000 workers	+ .19 (.07) .006	+ .37 (.14) .012	+ .39 (.15) .012	+ .45 (.14) .002	+ .34 (.12) .006
<i>a</i>	2.18 (.71) .003	6.15 (1.49) .000	6.31 (1.57) .000	7.04 (1.47) .000	5.75 (1.24) .000
<i>r</i>	.36	.33	.33	.40	.36
<i>s</i>	4.48	9.41	9.92	9.25	7.84

Communist delegates excluded from the Fourth GSEE Congress claimed to represent 75,000 organized workers, whereas by 1934 the “red unions” (i.e., those controlled by the C.P.) merely claimed some 20,000 members, according to the party’s Sixth Plenum.¹²⁵ Table 17 suggests the growing importance of Communist-controlled unions (measured by the ratio of delegates excluded in 1928 to the number of workers in each town) for the C.P. But it may also be interpreted as indicating the party’s increasing sectarian *retrenchment* around them.

Going beyond the fragmentary membership data, ecological regression makes it possible to approach the question of worker support for the C.P. in successive steps of increasing precision. Given a weak negative relationship with rural workers (i.e., workers in agriculture and animal husbandry), the link with workers in general (see Table 16) in fact reflects a strong association with workers in manufacturing. Similarly, the link between C.P. strength and labor concentration, as measured by a gross ratio of workers to employers, is specifically true of manufacturing. Within manufacturing itself, it is clearly the workers, rather than the petty bourgeois artisans, that support the C.P. In conclusion, it becomes apparent that Communist support distinctly came from the workers in the manufacturing sector, increasing with labor concentration, that is, with the assumed size of the average enterprise (see Table 18). Finally, such support was mostly concentrated in the tobacco industry (see Table 19). The most radical and organized part of the working class, as seen earlier, tobacco workers were the backbone of the Communist labor movement and the

125. KKE, Vol. 4, pp. 26–27.

Table 18 THE C.P., WORKERS, AND RATIO OF WORKERS
TO EMPLOYERS IN MANUFACTURING
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Workers in Manufacturing	+.23 (.03) .000	+.53 (.06) .000	+.58 (.06) .000	+.57 (.07) .000	+.48 (.05) .000
Ratio of Workers to Employers in Manufacturing	+.17 (.06) .004	+.26 (.11) .020	+.26 (.11) .019	+.18 (.11) .120	+.21 (.09) .023
<i>a</i>	−.89 (.42) .036	−.73 (.77) .341	−1.05 (.77) .174	.33 (.81) .679	−.31 (.65) .629
<i>r</i>	.53	.59	.62	.57	.61
<i>s</i>	3.13	5.74	5.77	6.02	4.82

largest compact base of mass support for the C.P. throughout the interwar period.¹²⁶

Several conclusions may be drawn from the preceding analysis. The C.P. remained a distinctly working-class party throughout the interwar period. However, its class basis was highly concentrated within a particular segment of the working class: the tobacco workers. Outside this segment, Communist influence remained limited among industrial workers or, more accurately, workers in manufacturing, as Table 19 indicates, and practically insignificant among other workers.

Although the vanguard of the working class politically, tobacco workers actually represented a traditional sector threatened by modernization, rather than a growing industrial proletariat, properly speaking. It is precisely in this sense that the party, taking a path of sectarian isolation, failed to win the majority of the industrial proletariat, as it repeatedly

126. The variable representing the tobacco industry was coded only for the urban areas, where about 80 percent of the industry was located. Results over all areas would not be significantly different. On the tobacco workers, see Burks, pp. 54–56; and Somerites, pp. 80–82. On their electoral impact, specifically in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, see Stavrides, pp. 38–39; Dafnes, *Kommata*, p. 141; and Somerites, pp. 105–108, with reference to the elections of 1920, 1926, and 1932, respectively. On the close links between the party and the tobacco workers, see also *KKE*, Vol. 1, p. 81 (1920); Vol. 2, pp. 328–332 (1927); Vol. 3, pp. 127–130 (1929), 185–208 (1930), and 250–256 (1931). See also the annual reports for 1930 and 1932 of G. Kalochristianakes, Police Director of Thessaloniki, VA Files 107 and 113.

Table 19 THE C.P., TOBACCO INDUSTRY, AND WORKERS
IN MANUFACTURING
(urban areas only, n = 56)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Tobacco Industry	+.20 (.12) .121	+.52 (.25) .038	+.73 (.24) .004	+.62 (.26) .024	+.52 (.20) .013
% Workers in Manufacturing	+.20 (.11) .081	+.36 (.22) .102	+.30 (.21) .163	+.21 (.23) .375	+.25 (.18) .176
<i>a</i>	−.17 (1.45) .909	1.42 (2.87) .623	2.02 (2.80) .472	4.78 (3.09) .127	2.54 (2.37) .289
<i>r</i>	.60	.65	.71	.59	.67
<i>s</i>	3.87	7.65	7.45	8.22	6.32

recognized.¹²⁷ Confined to the ghetto of its “red unions,” whose backbone were the tobacco workers, it was accurately described as a “sect” within the labor movement.¹²⁸ Moreover, the limits of interwar party growth among the workers seem to have been reached by 1933–1934. Among other indications, it is striking that *all* relevant ecological coefficients increase until 1933 and peak in that year, but drop in 1936.¹²⁹ This is one more sign that, towards the end of the interwar period, Communist support was growing *outside* the working class, where it remained stationary, or even declined.

Worker Antivenizelism

The non-Communist majority of the workers, and of the labor movement, continued to be either Antivenizelists or Venizelists in interwar politics. The same was true of most otherwise reformist socialist labor leaders, with few exceptions.¹³⁰ The factional disputes and splits in GSEE and the non-Communist unions, as well as the political alignments of the various fac-

127. This is also the thrust of the discussion in Somerites, pp. 80–82.
128. “Political Parties and Social Classes in Greece,” anonymous and undated (probably 1933) memorandum, Plasteras Archive, File 16.
129. This trend is confirmed in Burks, p. 40, who reports the following correlations between the C.P. and industrial workers: .40 in 1926, .70 in 1933, and .59 in 1936 (with N = 34).
130. This important point is made by Elefantas, p. 233.

tions between 1926 and 1936, need not be described in any detail here, since they offer no firm indications as to the real strength and representativeness of the factions and leaders in question. Nevertheless, it would seem that Antivenizelist tendencies were on the whole stronger than Venizelist ones, especially towards the end of the period. This impression is confirmed by labor representation in the Senate and is also suggested by ecological regression, however indirectly. One may therefore tentatively conclude that the majority of non-Communist workers apparently continued to side with Antivenizelism after 1920.¹³¹

This historical continuity with 1920 may be interpreted in light of the anticapitalist petty bourgeois dimension of Antivenizelism, in conjunction with the general characteristics of Greek workers discussed earlier. As workers in relatively large enterprises, they were mostly confronted with Venizelist capitalists. As workers in small shops and businesses, they identified with their typically Antivenizelist petty bourgeois employers, in a common defensive front against Liberal capital. In Old Greece, as recent migrants from the countryside, they largely kept their village loyalties.¹³² Finally, as petty bourgeois aspirants, they followed the lead of the Antivenizelist petty bourgeoisie, their reference group. As noted earlier, a Marxist group characteristically regarded the 1933 Antivenizelist rise to power as a victory of the petty bourgeois, "dragging the working masses behind them."¹³³ The petty bourgeois and especially *artisan* dimension of worker Antivenizelism is also suggested by ecological regression, however indirectly. Perhaps no other statement reflects it more eloquently than the 1926 electoral program of Metaxas. It promised to assist the trades while "giving to the working class as well that protection, which will make *the acquisition of small property* possible for the worker."¹³⁴ Finally, Antivenizelism seems to have successfully used patronage and material benefits to increase and consolidate its worker support, especially after it came to power in 1933.¹³⁵

131. There were two main labor factions: a "right wing" around I. Kalomoires and a "reformist Left" around A. Demetratos. The former generally sided with Antivenizelism, the latter with Venizelism. In the Senate, there were 4 labor seats, filled by GSEE. In 1929 and again in 1932, I. Kalomoires was elected almost unanimously. Suffice it to add that he was an official P.P. candidate in Piraeus both in 1928 and in 1936. The other labor senators elected in 1932 also sided with Antivenizelism subsequently. See *KKE*, Vol. 3, pp. 547–548.

132. See, e.g., the Security Police Bulletin, 20 July 1928, VA File 103. It reports Antivenizelist electoral preparations (for double voting) among 3,500 Athens workers, who are said to be originally from the surrounding villages (notorious Royalist strongholds).

133. Quoted in Pouliopoulos, p. 86.

134. *Eleftheron Vema*, 12 October 1926. Emphasis added.

135. For a scathing Venizelist attack on such P.P. tactics, which implicitly recognizes their political effectiveness, see *Neos Kosmos*, 13–19 March 1934.

RURAL SOCIETY: YEOMEN AND PEASANTS

In interwar Greece, still a predominantly agrarian society, the rural population constituted a clear numerical majority. The assumption that it could be transformed into a permanent electoral majority as well inspired the various efforts around the Agrarian Party, whose eventual political triumph appeared assured. The same assumption has explicitly or implicitly inspired most discussions of the peasantry's political role. Yet, this common assumption ignores the profound internal divisions of this class and is therefore superficial, if not misleading.

With the data available, and for the purposes of ecological analysis, one has to treat three census categories as reflecting the peasantry's internal stratification and as equivalent to three peasant strata, in descending order: employers, self-employed, and family enterprises in agriculture.¹³⁶ The census distinction between the latter two in particular is unfortunately neither self-explanatory nor easily interpretable. Nevertheless, their

Table 20 ANTIVENIZELISM AND PEASANT STRATA
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Employers	+1.01 (.43) .019	+.68 (.40) .094	+1.01 (.43) .021	+.92 (.43) .035	+.91 (.39) .021
% Self-Employed	+.58 (.14) .000	+.58 (.13) .000	+.53 (.14) .000	+.54 (.14) .000	+.56 (.13) .000
% Family Enterprise	-.26 (.07) .000	-.36 (.06) .000	-.29 (.07) .000	-.24 (.07) .000	-.29 (.06) .000
<i>a</i>	28.75 (2.72) .000	34.65 (2.56) .000	42.19 (2.76) .000	44.03 (2.75) .000	37.40 (2.47) .000
<i>r</i>	.41	.47	.41	.38	.45
<i>s</i>	17.37	16.36	17.61	17.57	15.79

136. This discussion of the peasantry focuses on agriculture alone. Animal husbandry, whose inclusion would not affect the overall regression results, will be discussed separately. "Family enterprises" includes status categories III and IV of Table 13.

Table 21 VENIZELISM AND PEASANT STRATA
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Employers	-.89 (.45) .048	-.39 (.41) .333	-.73 (.43) .093	-1.00 (.44) .024	-.75 (.39) .055
% Self-Employed	-.42 (.15) .005	-.31 (.14) .023	-.38 (.14) .008	-.36 (.15) .015	-.37 (.13) .005
% Family Enterprise	+.25 (.07) .000	+.20 (.06) .002	+.30 (.07) .000	+.31 (.07) .000	+.26 (.06) .000
<i>a</i>	65.78 (2.82) .000	53.98 (2.57) .000	48.31 (2.74) .000	44.85 (2.80) .000	53.23 (2.47) .000
<i>r</i>	.34	.27	.36	.37	.37
<i>s</i>	18.02	16.43	17.52	17.87	15.77

sharply contrasting political orientations (see Tables 20 and 21), in conjunction with a series of other indications, lead to the conclusion that these two census categories essentially (though by no means perfectly) correspond to distinct peasant strata, which differ along several significant and largely overlapping dimensions: historical background, property relations, crops, consumption patterns, general cultural outlook, and ultimately social status.

Similar considerations, including the fact that "self-employed" typically masks occasional or seasonal use of hired labor, justify lumping the first two strata together and speaking henceforth of *two* rather than three basic peasant strata: an upper, corresponding to employers and self-employed taken together; and a lower, corresponding to family enterprise. For the purposes of this analysis, these two strata will be labeled *old* and *new* smallholders, which reflects both the history of their property, and their regional concentration—in Old Greece and in the New Lands. To preserve the aspect of stratification, they will also be referred to as *yeomen* and as (mere) *peasants*, respectively.

The distinctions made and the choice of terms may be explained and justified by the discussion to follow. Its principal purpose, however, will be to explain why Antivenizelism was the political expression of the yeomen

par excellence, whereas the bulk of the peasants or new smallholders supported Venizelism, as ecological inference from Tables 22 and 23 clearly indicates.¹³⁷

Peasant Property and Land Reform

By 1930, Greece had finally and irrevocably become a country of peasant proprietors. According to the 1928 Census, 88 percent of the heads of agricultural enterprises (i.e., status categories I, II, and III of Table 13) owned their land. Even this is probably an underestimate and was bound to increase even further. Nevertheless, this fact alone did not yet produce class homogeneity. On the contrary and more significantly, peasant prop-

Table 22 ANTIVENIZELISM AND PEASANT STRATA II
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Yeomen (old smallholders)	+ .65 (.12) .000	+ .59 (.11) .000	+ .61 (.12) .000	+ .60 (.12) .000	+ .61 (.11) .000
% Peasants (new smallholders)	- .26 (.07) .000	- .36 (.06) .000	- .28 (.07) .000	- .24 (.07) .000	- .28 (.06) .000
<i>a</i>	28.95 (2.71) .000	34.69 (2.54) .000	42.41 (2.75) .000	44.20 (2.74) .000	37.56 (2.46) .000
<i>r</i>	.41	.47	.40	.38	.44
<i>s</i>	17.36	16.32	17.60	17.56	15.77

137. In terms of a previous discussion, “yeomen” correspond to the rural *noikokyraioi*, i.e., the upper and most solid stratum of the peasantry. Interwar native usage also conveyed the flavor of peasant stratification through the common distinction between *mikroktematies* (“small landowners”) or *georgoktematies* (“farmer-landowners”), as members of the upper stratum would typically define themselves, and mere *chorikoi* (“countrymen” or “peasants”).

In the uniquely penetrating analysis of rural society by Karavidas, the stratum of yeomen, or old smallholders, essentially corresponds to his “transitional” form, typical of Old Greece: the “narrow individualistic peasant family of free smallholders” (pp. 33-34 and 433-514). In this case, the reduction or absence of family labor, as family members turn to nonagricultural occupations, may be the key to the census category of “self-employed,” i.e., working without family help. To the extent that this peasant family employs hired hands, it falls under

Table 23 VENIZELISM AND PEASANT STRATA II
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Yeomen (old smallholders)	–.50 (.13) .000	–.32 (.11) .005	–.44 (.12) .000	–.46 (.13) .000	–.43 (.11) .000
% Peasants (new smallholders)	+.25 (.07) .000	+.19 (.06) .002	+.29 (.07) .000	+.30 (.07) .000	+.26 (.06) .000
<i>a</i>	65.57 (2.81) .000	53.94 (2.56) .000	48.15 (2.73) .000	44.55 (2.79) .000	53.05 (2.46) .000
<i>r</i>	.34	.27	.36	.36	.37
<i>s</i>	18.01	16.39	17.49	17.90	15.76

erty was the result of two distinct historical processes, separated by more than a half-century, which created two correspondingly distinct strata of smallholders.

The stratum of old smallholders partly dated back to the Ottoman period. Its bulk, however, in Old Greece was the product of the distribution of the “national lands”—the previously Turkish properties taken over by the Greek state. Final settlement of this crucial question was achieved in 1871, resulting in almost universal peasant ownership in the areas affected, that is, the original kingdom as a whole except parts of Eastern Sterea, where enclaves of large estates, exempted from the overall settlement, survived. By the end of the 19th century and after the incorporation of additional territories, Greece was thus sharply divided into the *core*

the census category of “employers” in agriculture. This is less clear in the case of the last and “bastard” form, a descendant of the previous one, and also typical of Old Greece: the “mixed petty-bourgeois-peasant family” (pp. 34 and 515–529). According to Karavidas, these are so-called landowners (*ktematies*) but actually petty bourgeois tradesmen, small merchants, doctors, and lawyers, who grow specialized crops through hired hands and bank loans, and lead peasant agitation and organization, especially in the currant areas of the Peloponnesus.

Another valuable source is the series of area studies published by the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE), beginning in 1937, and authored by N. E. Anagnostopoulos and others. They are listed in the Bibliography under his name and those of N. E. Aivaliotakes, F. Altsitzoglou, and A. A. Diamantopoulos and will be hereafter collectively referred to as *ATE Area Studies*. Among the areas covered, Serres and Xanthe are typical for new smallholders, whereas Messenia, Xylokastron, and Feneos are typical for old smallholders, and Argolis, Mornos, and Thebes somewhat less so.

areas of small and middle peasant property and the *enclave* or *peripheral* areas of large estates (Attica, Fthiotis, Euboea, Thessaly, and Arta).¹³⁸

Neither the historical background nor the detailed development of the agrarian question (i.e., the question of large estates) before 1910 can be presented here.¹³⁹ Suffice it to note that the position of the landless peasants attached to these estates under a sharecropping arrangement (*kolli-goi*) sharply deteriorated when, under Greek ownership and sovereignty, the provisions of Roman private law brutally replaced those of Ottoman and customary law. At the beginning of the 20th century, and after various half-hearted attempts at land reform had been effectively blocked by the landowners, the explosiveness of the agrarian question outgrew its otherwise sharply circumscribed regional character. In the wake of the Revolution of 1909, it erupted into the massive peasant protests of 1910 in Thessaly, culminating in the Kileler events, during which savage repression by the troops shocked and shook the entire country.

It thus became the historical task of Venizelism to resolve the agrarian question. Land reform evolved into its most *radical, far-reaching, and enduring* domestic achievement. Although economic arguments based on the dismal improductivity of large estates were commonly used, the overriding considerations were explicitly political from the outset.¹⁴⁰ This was first demonstrated during the historic constitutional debate of 1911 about the inviolability of private property, on which Venizelos and his majority (including primarily the Sociologists) imposed new and wider limitations, thereby sealing the alliance of Venizelism with the landless peasants.¹⁴¹

Once the 1911 constitutional revision had cleared the way, Liberal land reform proceeded through several successive phases, each time gaining in urgency and thoroughness. The initial phase, characterized by limited stop-gap legislation, came to a halt with the 1915 Schism. In the meantime, the territorial gains of the Balkan Wars (Macedonia and Epirus in particular) had enormously exacerbated and complicated the agrarian question. These were predominantly areas of large estates, which drasti-

138. An exceptional work, which recognizes the central importance of this division, is Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, especially pp. 67 ff.

139. See, e.g., *ibid.*, and Vergopoulos.

140. See, e.g., the speech of Venizelos before the Chamber, 27 January 1920, *Efemeris*, pp. 528–530, and his notes for it in VA File 267. Using economic arguments only to reject the demand for higher compensations to expropriated landowners, he stresses that almost all of them simply made a “usurious” investment in the land without caring to improve its productivity.

141. This was immediately demonstrated in the ensuing March 1912 election, when the L.P. won *all* the seats in Thessaly. In August 1910, almost all deputies elected in the region (46 out of 48) had been declared Agrarians, i.e., advocates of land reform. In the November 1910 election, they had again won two-thirds of the region’s seats. See Dafnes, *Kommata*, pp. 105, and 123–124.

cally upset the previous geographical balance at the expense of small and middle peasant property. Furthermore, these estates remained almost exclusively in the hands of Moslem (Turkish and Albanian) beys, whom the Greek state could not dispossess without grave diplomatic risks. It was for this reason that Venizelos then followed a policy of strict respect for Moslem property, thereby initially frustrating the expectations of the predominantly Christian (Greek or Slavo-Macedonian) landless peasants in these areas.¹⁴²

The Schism of 1915, however, drastically altered the situation. While the yeomen of Old Greece, together with landowners in general, both Greek and Moslem, sided with Antivenizelism, the landless peasants, especially in Thessaly and the New Lands, found in Venizelism the agent of radical land reform. It was first decreed by the Provisional Government of Thessaloniki and subsequently extended to the entire country after Venizelism prevailed in 1917. By that time, the urgent need to rally peasant support against the king, coupled with the pressing need to consolidate the Greek presence in the New Lands, had relegated the earlier, equally political, considerations of domestic social peace to second place.¹⁴³

The same was true of the final and most radical phase of land reform, ushered by the 1922 Disaster and the exchange of populations. Faced with the tremendous problem of refugee settlement, the Revolution of 1922 removed the last remaining obstacle (i.e., the constitutional requirement of previous compensation) in February 1923. Amidst great disorder, land expropriation and immediate redistribution, whether to rural refugees or to landless native peasants, swept the northern part of the country at a vertiginous rate. *Within three years* the process was for the most part practically completed in the field, even though the liquidation of its legal and financial aspects would drag on for decades subsequently.

A few selected and gross figures sufficiently convey the impressive magnitude and pace of the process.¹⁴⁴ Post-1917 land reform expropriated 1,724 estates and settled 130,000 landless native families. Out of these

142. On the situation in Epirus, for example, see G. Chrestakes-Zografos (governor-general of Epirus) to Venizelos, 26 April 1913, VA File 311. See also the discussion of the Cham minority in Chapter 5.

143. In 1916–1917, Venizelist agitation among the peasants of Thessaly, coupled with the prospect of a Venizelist conquest of the area from the North, threatened the Constantinist regime with the loss of its principal granary, especially during the blockade imposed by the Entente. On this, see Gerakares, Vol. 1, p. 182; and an undated memorandum by Venizelos, VA File 267. See also Venteres, Vol. 2, p. 229.

144. See Anagnostopoulos, *He Agrotike Metarrythmisis*, p. 48; Katsoules, pp. 12–13; Sideris, p. 181; and especially Varvaresos, pp. 5–10, from whom the global figures are taken. Unfortunately, these data on land reform are not adequately broken down geographically and chronologically and cannot be readily compared with census and refugee settlement data. On refugee settlement, see Chapter 4.

estates, 64 were expropriated in 1918–1920, only 12 in 1921–1922 under Antivenizelism, and as many as 1,203 in 1923–1925. By June 1928, the total had risen to 1,554, and by 1933 to 1,645. Together with rural refugee settlement, pre-1917 land distribution in Thessaly (limited to 7,100 families), and interwar distribution of drained lands (to 28,000 families), agrarian reform globally involved over 3,000 estates, close to 40 percent of the country's arable land, and some 310,000 peasant families, representing approximately the same proportion of the total or about *one-half* of peasant proprietors as a whole.¹⁴⁵

No less significant was the striking geographical concentration of this agrarian revolution. While grossly 90 percent of the rural refugees were settled in Macedonia and Thrace, 62 percent of the landless natives were settled in the same regions and Epirus and 26 percent in Thessaly, with the remaining 12 percent mostly located in Sterea. On the basis of the 1928 Census figures, it may be grossly estimated that in Macedonia, Epirus, and Thrace these new smallholders represented approximately 90 percent of peasant proprietors, in Thessaly more than 60 percent, whereas in the rest of Greece the proportion fell well below 10 percent.

In a comparative perspective, Venizelist land reform in interwar Greece clearly represented a remarkable achievement and has justly been hailed as such.¹⁴⁶ Apart from the sheer numbers and proportions involved, what is even more striking, and perhaps unique, is the swiftness of the process, which was the principal key to its political success.¹⁴⁷ Prompted by considerations of political legitimacy, as elsewhere, reform was not significantly obstructed by the resistance of landowners, who only managed to extract minor concessions (mainly the exemption of relatively small portions of their estates). No doubt, part of the explanation lies in the unique crisis of the post-1922 population exchange. What was probably decisive, however, was the lack of strong political links between land-

145. The figure of 310,000 families is based on the 1930 total of 145,000 rural refugee families. It is not clear whether the additional 22,000 such families reportedly settled by 1938 are included in the 28,000 families receiving drained lands. If not, the global figures should be increased accordingly. On the political motivations inspiring the distribution of these particular lands, see D. N. Filaretos to Venizelos, 16 August 1932, VA File 347.

146. Among comparative studies, see in particular Hung-chao Tai, *Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); and Elias H. Tuma, *Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). In terms of the latter's typology, on p. 224, the Greek case clearly exemplifies Class I. Furthermore, it was inspired by a "family farm" theory of land tenure. See Rainer Schikele, "Theories Concerning Land Tenure," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (December 1952), pp. 734–744.

147. In this respect, the sharp contrast with the Spanish case is highly instructive. See Edward E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

owners and Venizelism, and its unchallenged political dominance between 1922 and 1933, by which time land reform was an accomplished and irreversible fact.¹⁴⁸

That Greek landowners were a constitutive element of the Antivenizelist bloc, as noted earlier, was amply demonstrated by its obstructionist tactics once Liberal land reform was initiated and became politically impossible to reverse. The Antivenizelist regime of 1920–1922 not only practically halted the process of expropriations, but also amended reform legislation in ways which would delay its implementation, while benefiting the owners of estates.¹⁴⁹ Subsequently, when confronted with the rapidly accomplished facts, Antivenizelism could only exploit politically the manifold flaws of agrarian reform and the related conflicts between natives and refugees, while focusing concretely on the inadequate compensations paid to dispossessed landowners.¹⁵⁰ Quite significantly, after its rise to power in 1933, its immediate priorities included the speedy payment of such compensations and the urgent restitution of those parts of large estates which had eventually been exempted from expropriation.¹⁵¹

In conclusion, interwar agrarian reform created a massive stratum of new smallholders out of the refugees and landless natives, which was not only socially conservative at heart and dependent on state agencies (partly through compulsory cooperatives),¹⁵² but also the most solid and numerous base of support for Venizelism and the Republic, the twin agents of its emergence. In contrast, the stratum of old smallholders largely owed its existence (and hence its allegiance) to the 19th-century policies of the monarchy and the state bourgeoisie.

Another important difference between these two strata was also due to interwar agrarian reform. In the areas it affected most, a markedly egalitarian social structure came into being, safeguarded by the burdensome restrictions imposed on the transfer of the new properties. In contrast, distinctly greater inequality characterized the rest of Greece, where it was either due to unbroken historical continuity or had developed under the impact of market forces since the earlier distributions of the 19th century. It may be added that this underlying contrast between zones of

148. Among the comparative studies cited in note 146 above, see Tai, esp. p. 360, who emphasizes the critical importance of the relationship between the landed class and the political elite responsible for the implementation of land reform.

149. See Sideris, pp. 174–176; Papagaryfallou, p. 120; and the 1922 views of Papanastasiou in Lefkoparides, Vol. 1, pp. 324–330.

150. See Anagnostopoulos, *He Agrotike Metarrythmis*, pp. 46–54.

151. See Pamboukas, pp. 28–29.

152. On the similar effects of land reform in Southern Italy, see Tarrow, pp. 297–299 and 344–354.

lesser or greater rural inequality has persisted to the present, both between North and South and on the local level.¹⁵³

Venizelism and Antivenizelism therefore represented not only a cleavage between *new* and *old* peasant property, but also a closely related cleavage between agrarian *equality* and *inequality*. Among several indications which support this interpretation, the most reliable and unambiguous consists of the relationship between the two blocs and the proportion of peasant owners in each area (among heads of agricultural enterprises, i.e., status categories I, II, and III of Table 13). Venizelism is clearly stronger in areas with higher proportions of peasant owners, whereas the reverse is true of Antivenizelism (see Tables 24 and 25).¹⁵⁴

Table 24 ANTIVENIZELISM AND PEASANT OWNERSHIP
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
Proportion Peasant Owners	-.19 (.14) .163	-.34 (.13) .011	-.36 (.14) .010	-.27 (.14) .050	-.29 (.13) .022
<i>a</i>	47.89 (11.78) .000	62.58 (11.28) .000	74.21 (11.75) .000	69.49 (11.68) .000	63.54 (10.79) .000
<i>r</i>	-.10	-.18	-.18	-.14	-.16
<i>s</i>	18.88	18.09	18.84	18.73	17.31

153. On the continuing contrast between Northern and Mediterranean (or Southern) Greece, see Guy Burgel, "Recherches agraires en Grèce," *Mémoires et Documents*, Vol. 13 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1972), pp. 25-32. Greater equality in the former is linked to population exchange, land reform, and extensive agriculture (mainly cereals and cotton). Greater inequality in the latter is linked to historical continuity, cash crops (except tobacco), and the presence of small towns, where absentee proprietors reside, engaged in speculative, specialized, and highly commercialized agriculture. The importance of these aspects will appear in the subsequent discussion. In Thessaly, the greater diversity in land tenure found in areas of old property has been contrasted to the egalitarian society created by land reform in the areas it swept. See Sivignon, *La Thessalie*, pp. 143-145. Similarly, in Thrace, inequalities are greater among Turks or Sarakatsans than among the refugee settlers of the region. See Pierre-Yves Péchoux, *Les paysans de la rive orientale du bas Nestos (Thrace grecque)* (Athens: Centre National de Recherches Sociales, 1969), pp. 18-19.

154. Another telling aspect is the relationship of the two blocs with the proportion of peasant holdings in each area which fall into one of three main classes by size. Venizelism is clearly associated with the middle range of peasant holdings, whereas Antivenizelism appears related to both extremes, i.e., is stronger in areas with greater disparities. Ecological regression with an imperfect and approximate Gini index of inequality points in the same direction.

Table 25 VENIZELISM AND PEASANT OWNERSHIP
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Proportion Peasant Owners	+.27 (.14) .049	+.30 (.12) .014	+.49 (.13) .000	+.39 (.14) .005	+.37 (.12) .003
<i>a</i>	41.74 (11.79) .001	28.87 (10.43) .006	7.73 (11.25) .493	12.75 (11.70) .277	22.77 (10.29) .028
<i>r</i>	.14	.17	.26	.20	.21
<i>s</i>	18.90	16.73	18.05	18.76	16.50

Crops and Markets

The relationship between rural inequality and historical market forces points to the critical importance of crops and commercialization. The actual size of holdings by itself does *not* necessarily differentiate old from new smallholders nor, equivalently, yeomen from mere peasants. Far more important is the degree of commercialization, crop specialization, and the concomitant price and income disparities, which varied enormously between otherwise comparable holdings in interwar Greece.¹⁵⁵

The cleavage between old and new peasant property thus largely corresponded (with the important exception of tobacco, which will be discussed separately) to an underlying, sharp, and fundamental division between two agricultural sectors: a historically and highly commercialized, specialized, and mostly *export*-oriented sector, and a subsistence sector, in the process of rapid, but controlled commercialization for the *domestic* market.¹⁵⁶ In terms of specific crops, the former had traditionally been dominated by currants, followed by other grapes, olives, etc., whereas the latter was almost exclusively confined to cereals. Dating back

The only available, and rather doubtful areal data on the gross distribution of holdings were taken from *Agrotikon Eisodema kai Anoikodomesis* [Rural Income and Reconstruction] (Athens: Hypourgeion Anoikodomeseos, 1948), Table III, and come from the unpublished 1939 Census of Agriculture.

155. In Fthiotis alone, for example, tobacco yielded *five* times the gross income of wheat. See the prefect's undated report (probably 1931–1932), VA File 113. Otherwise, data on agricultural prices are so fragmentary and diverse, varying by year, area, and quality, that they could not be systematically used in this analysis. In terms of income, the *ATE Area Studies* suggest that old smallholders enjoyed grossly *double* that of new smallholders (except tobacco growers).

156. See, e.g., Coutsoumaris, p. 20.

to the 19th century, the two sectors had then reflected the division between areas of small or middle peasant property and those of large estates.¹⁵⁷

Currants had been the principal Greek export (mostly to Britain) and the actual *axis* of the Greek economy in the 19th century, thereby enjoying a privileged position. A Golden Age of unparalleled prosperity, particularly in the Peloponnesus, was brutally succeeded at the end of the century by a protracted crisis of overproduction and falling prices, which eventually provoked state intervention and regulation. After earlier arrangements had failed to satisfy the producers and had worked in favor of merchants and industrialists, the Autonomous Currant Office (*Aftonomos Stafidikos Organismos*, or ASO) was created in 1925.¹⁵⁸ It rapidly became an instrument of the growers, especially those of the Peloponnesus, against the continuing market fluctuations and, most significantly, against the merchants.¹⁵⁹ When, in 1931, the Venizelos government drastically curtailed ASO's autonomy and marketing activities, the action was characteristically opposed by the P.P. and also denounced by Papanastasiou as a counteroffensive of the commercial and industrial interests against the producers.¹⁶⁰

Given the historical and social background of the currant question, it is hardly surprising that the P.P. should be the staunchest defender of currant and other grape growers in the interwar period. Nor is it surprising that Antivenizelism should be stronger in areas where currants and other grapes represented a higher percentage of the area under cultivation (see Table 26).¹⁶¹

Tobacco displaced currants as the principal Greek export in the 20th century and took a similar course—with years of great prosperity, especially during World War I, succeeded by disastrous crises.¹⁶² A key difference, however, was that the tobacco growers were mostly new smallholders, and largely refugees, concentrated in Eastern Macedonia and in Thrace.¹⁶³ Another critical difference was that the tobacco question

157. See Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 67ff.

158. See Sideris, pp. 227–243.

159. See Tsoungos, pp. 77–78. In 1928, the middlemen of Kalamata characteristically complained to Venizelos that they had been “inhumanely displaced” since the creation of ASO, adding that they were Venizelists almost to a man. See Pammesitikos Syllogos Kalamon to Venizelos, 3 June 1928, VA File 375.

160. Chamber, 20 and 22–25 June 1931, *Efemeris*, pp. 601ff. See also Sideris, pp. 339–349. Papanastasiou personally attacked Minister of National Economy P. Vourloumes, who was himself in the currant export business and a strong opponent of marketing activities by the producers.

161. On the earlier concern of Gounares on behalf of the currant growers, see Efstratiou, pp. 12 and 21–23. During the 1933 electoral campaign, the P.P. made particularly attractive promises to the currant growers, and subsequently swept the ASO elections in April 1934. See *Neos Kosmos*, 13 April and 9 July 1934; and *Eleftheron Vema*, 23 June 1934. In sharp

Table 26 ANTIVENIZELISM AND GRAPES
(rural areas only, n = 139)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Percentage Grapes (of cultivated area, 1939)	+.45 (.14) .002	+.50 (.13) .000	+.49 (.14) .001	+.31 (.14) .030	+.44 (.13) .001
<i>a</i>	27.52 (1.95) .000	28.39 (1.90) .000	39.06 (1.95) .000	44.52 (2.02) .000	34.87 (1.80) .000
<i>r</i>	.27	.30	.29	.18	.28
<i>s</i>	17.95	17.51	17.99	18.64	16.59

involved complex conflicts between growers, (increasingly foreign) merchants, industrialists, and the most compact, organized, and militant segment of the working class: the tobacco workers. Apart from their physical proximity, growers actually often worked as seasonal tobacco workers as well. This is the general background to the growing radicalization of tobacco peasants, which will be further discussed below.¹⁶⁴

The third major commercialized culture, olives, unlike currants and tobacco, enjoyed a secure *domestic* market, to which it was mostly oriented. Measures taken by the Venizelos government in 1929 effectively protected this agricultural sector, which was particularly important in Crete and the other Aegean islands.¹⁶⁵

Venizelism was not only linked to business interests engaged in perpetual conflict with the producers of commercial, and especially export crops. It also represented, during the interwar period, a radical historical reorientation of Greek agriculture from the foreign to the *domestic* mar-

contrast, Venizelos openly considered the currant situation hopeless, given its uniquely exclusive dependence on foreign markets. Noting that currant growers had become accustomed to high prices since the foundation of ASO until the loss of foreign markets inevitably brought a sharp drop, he pragmatically concluded that the time had come to terminate the "artificial" system of protection inaugurated thirty years earlier. See his 1930 speech at the "Pendelikon" Hotel, VA File 281.

162. See, e.g., Tsoungos, pp. 117–130.

163. According to the 1928 Census, post-1922 refugees represented 37.6 percent of tobacco growers, more than double their share in the active male population as a whole.

164. This situation may be compared to that of the Chilean miners, whose radicalism affected the peasants of the surrounding areas. See James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (August 1967), pp. 578–586.

165. On these measures, see Sideris, pp. 330–332.

ket. This was the product of several converging trends and considerations. One was the continuing instability and recurrent crises plaguing traditional luxury exports (currants and tobacco), despite increased state intervention, while the country's enormous deficit in grain persisted, amounting to some two-thirds of domestic needs. Another was the perceived urgent need to consolidate the fragile social and political gains of land reform. Massive assistance to the stratum of new smallholders (overwhelmingly confined to cereals and subsistence farming) was required, if they were to stand on their own feet and raise their standard of living above its initial rock-bottom level, given that reform had provided them with little except land.¹⁶⁶ Consequently, the growth of grain production would not merely alleviate balance of payments problems, but would also decisively enable the peasant masses to constitute an expanded market for commerce and especially for the nascent domestic industry.¹⁶⁷

These, then, were the central tenets of Venizelist agricultural policy as it evolved, especially after 1922, reaching its most elaborate and ambitious formulation under the Venizelos government of 1928–1932. Its twin principal instruments were the high tariff on imported wheat and other cereals, and the state purchase of domestic wheat at artificially inflated prices (based on the foreign price plus the tariff and actually exceeding this sum after 1929). Inaugurated in 1927 by Papanastasiou as minister of agriculture, state purchase absorbed 30 percent of domestic wheat production by 1932, and dramatically increasing proportions thereafter. While obviously raising the cost of living for the rest of the population, these policies greatly benefited the producers and effectively guaranteed a minimum of purchasing power to the peasant majority.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, they largely *removed* the prospect of direct class conflict between merchants and producers from the commercialization of cereal production.

In view of their central importance, these policies provoked controversies clearly and unambiguously involving the conflicting conceptions and interests at stake. One such occasion was the parliamentary debate on wheat, rye, and barley tariffs in June 1930.¹⁶⁹ The conservative Zavitzianos, representing in this case not just his Corfu constituents but Old Greece as a whole, advocated the protection of “suitable” specialized crops (currants, tobacco, olives) instead of cereals. The ever-cautious and

166. Papanastasiou in particular was strongly identified with this position. See, e.g., his 1928 views in Lefkoparides, Vol. 2, pp. 569–574.

167. On the relationship between land reform and industrialization, see Vergopoulos, pp. 146–151 and 168–171, who also emphasizes the “spontaneous protectionism” provoked by the overall decline of foreign trade during the Depression. It naturally affected the traditional agricultural exports most. It is obvious that the classic requirement of industrialization, cheap food, was not met. But it could only be met at the expense of the peasant majority, i.e.,



Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936) “Chief, savior, symbol of half of Greece, Satan to the other half” (p. 57).



The Face of Defeat Greek prisoners of war from the Asia Minor campaign, upon their return from captivity in Turkey. (Photograph by Joseph Hepp, courtesy of Vassilis Maros.)



Mourning the "Great Idea" Refugee priest on an Asia Minor road. (Photograph by Joseph Hepp, courtesy of Vassilis Maros.)



Taking Root in a New Country Laying the foundation of the refugee village Nea Sinasos in Euboea, 4 May 1925. (Courtesy of the Center for Asia Minor Studies.)



Arbiters of Interwar Elections Refugees listening to Venizelos in Chios, on the eve of the senatorial by-election of 5 November 1933. The sign reads: "Welcome, our Father. The refugees of Chios." (Photograph by Manolis Megalokonomos.)



Nemesis on Horseback Colonels Plasteras (center) and Gonatas (left), leaders of the Revolution of 1922, entering Athens on 15 September 1922. (Photograph by Petros Poulides.)



Antivenizelism on Trial Six among the accused, including Gounares (leaning on his hand), will be summarily executed on 15 November 1922, as responsible for the Asia Minor Disaster. (Photograph by Petros Poulides.)



Republican Guns Artillery of the Plastiras regime positioned in front of the Old Palace in Athens, during the Counterrevolution of October 1923. (Photograph by Petros Poulides.)



... And Republican Vox Populi Demonstrators in Athens, holding pictures of Venizelos and Papanastasiou, on the eve of the December 1923 election. (Photograph by Petros Poulides.)



Founding Fathers of the Republic General Pangalos (left), Minister of Public Order and future dictator, and Prime Minister Papanastasiou (right), in the spring of 1924. (Photograph by Manolis Megalokonomos.)



Top-Hat Coexistence The Ecumenical Cabinet of 1926, in front of the Zappeion in Athens. From left to right: (1) Metaxas, (2) Papanastasiou, (3) Tsaldares, (4) Zaïmes, and (5) Kafandares. (Photograph by Petros Poulides, courtesy of the Benaki Museum.)



"The Axis Around Which the Nation Was Starting to Whirl Again" (p. 57) Venizelos amidst a crowd, after his return to active politics in 1928. (Courtesy of the Benaki Museum.)



All Smiles at the Start of the "Four Years" Venizelos with Michalakopoulos on his right, and Sofoules on his left, in the Chamber of Deputies. (Courtesy of the Benaki Museum.)



Disciples and Master Reunited Papanastasiou, Kafandares, and Venizelos in 1933, after they had joined forces in the National Coalition. (Courtesy of the Benaki Museum.)



The Victor of 1933 Prime Minister Tsaldares (third from left) at his summer house in Kifissia, with a delegation of the Greek-American Progressive Association (GAPA), 9 August 1933.



Quenching the Fire of Popular Passion Fire engine used by the Tsaldares Government to disperse the Venizelist crowds in Chios, during the senatorial by-election of 5 November 1933. (Photograph by Manolis Megalokonomos.)




The Hatred of Old Greece Explodes Antivenizelist demonstrators in Athens hanging Venizelos in effigy, after the outbreak of the March 1935 coup. (Courtesy of the Athens Liberal Club.)



Woe to the Vanquished Republican officers court-martialed for their participation in the March 1935 coup are stripped of their insignia, before they become the target of the Antivenizelist mob in Athens, 2 April 1935. (Photograph by Manolis Megalokonomos.)



The Restoration: Beneficiary and Instrument Upon his landing at Phaleron, on 25 November 1935, George II (left) revises the proclamation prepared for him by Kondyles (right), whose regency and dictatorship are just ending. (Photograph by Kostas Megalokononimos.)



Curtain: The Twin Dictatorship Portraits of George II and Metaxas above the entrance of the Siemens offices in Athens, on the fourth anniversary of the dictatorship they established on 4 August 1936. (Photograph by Manolis Megalokononimos.)

politic Tsaldares began by stating his approval of wheat protection ("so that nobody would get upset") but proceeded to deny that autarky and the substitution of export crops by cereals were feasible. He therefore blamed the government for not extending the *same* concern and protection to other crops and, above all, to currants.¹⁷⁰ In sharp contrast, Papanastasiou insisted on the primacy of cereals, whereas Venizelos categorically rejected the notion that export crops should replace wheat—that "uncertain and anxiety-ridden consumption" should replace one which was assured—adding that measures had already been taken to curtail currants and tobacco production.¹⁷¹

In light of the preceding discussion, it is not surprising that interwar Venizelist strength should be associated with both cereals and olives (see Table 27). Related Venizelist policies, addressing primarily the needs of grain-growing new smallholders, cannot be adequately discussed here.¹⁷²

Table 27 VENIZELISM, OLIVES, AND CEREALS
(rural areas only, n = 138)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Percentage Olives (of cultivated area, 1939)	+.39 (.14) .006	+.33 (.13) .014	+.52 (.14) .000	+.44 (.15) .003	+.42 (.13) .001
Percentage Cereals (of cultivated area, 1939)	+.44 (.13) .001	+.33 (.13) .008	+.46 (.13) .001	+.37 (.14) .010	+.40 (.12) .001
<i>a</i>	36.71 (8.74) .000	33.34 (8.30) .000	19.48 (8.68) .026	21.26 (9.29) .024	27.70 (7.95) .001
<i>r</i>	.28	.23	.31	.25	.29
<i>s</i>	18.20	17.29	18.06	19.34	16.56

at a politically unacceptable cost. Defending the wheat tariff, Venizelos thus argued in the name of social solidarity that, since protectionism for industry forced the peasants to buy industrial products at higher prices, it would be inconsistent not to protect "our principal national production," which, *unlike* currants and tobacco, had an assured internal market. See his 1930 speech at the "Pendelikon" Hotel, VA File 281.

168. Sideris, pp. 278–281 and 315–325.

169. Chamber, 21 June 1930, *Efemeris*, pp. 1231–1262.

170. *Ibid.*, p. 1244.

171. See his notes, VA File 302.

172. The promotion of the Kanellopoulos industrial monopoly in fertilizers should also be linked to Venizelist agricultural policy.

Agricultural credit was of course a key area, where Venizelist policy repeatedly collided with that of the National Bank (which had traditionally favored landowners, yeomen, and export crops). Peasant dissatisfaction and the requirements of Venizelist policy eventually led to the creation of the state-owned Agricultural Bank (ATE) in 1929, against strong Antivenizelist objections. Agricultural cooperatives, which were essential for the expansion of agricultural credit, developed mostly among the new smallholders in the North, where they evolved into centers of peasant radicalism and agitation, forcing the Venizelos government to sharply curtail their political and commercial activities in 1930–1931. Under ATE supervision since 1929, cooperatives were thus increasingly confined to the twin role of funneling agricultural credit and serving as instruments of state policy and political control.¹⁷³

Peasant Culture

On yet another level, the cleavage between old and new property, between export crops and cereals, coincided with a deeply rooted cultural division—the result of exposure to the market at widely different points in time. During the 19th century, early commercialization (and taxation) had resulted in the more or less complete monetization of the yeoman economy in Old Greece, swiftly destroying the protective shell of traditional self-sufficiency. Increasingly adopting urban consumption standards and meeting its needs in cash through the market, the peasant family rapidly ran into chronic deficit and chronic indebtedness.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, this did not force a retreat into self-sufficiency, nor did it spell the destruction of small peasant property.

The distinctive strategies which assured its remarkable survival—and molded its character for the future—were several. One was further specialization and increased production of highly lucrative crops, above all currants, which was of course successful only as long as exceptionally favorable market conditions persisted. Another and, in the long run, more effective set of strategies involved sending off one or more family members in pursuit of supplementary income *outside* agriculture. The first step in this direction was to odd and seasonal jobs, trades, and petty commerce locally. The next step involved a move to the urban centers and, ideally, to

173. See Papagaryfallou, pp. 105–215. See also Chamber, 8 and 16 June 1931, *Efemeris*, pp. 354–367 and 464–487. Ecological analysis indicates that Venizelism was stronger in areas of cooperative development.

174. Demographic pressures, partible inheritance, and the typically small initial size of peasant holdings were of course critical factors in this development.

government service or the professions. The ultimate step was emigration, most massively at the turn of the century to the United States.¹⁷⁵

Karavidas has probably provided the most colorful and concise description of this process in his own inimitable style:

The male children, often the father himself, the leader of this peasant family, made the fatal step after harsh ordeals; once he had mortgaged the property, once he had become in turn rustler, bandit, carter, field guard, communal employee, president of the commune, free so-called citizen, lamplighter, descendant of the Ancient Greeks, gravedigger, and, worst of all, once he had become a voter negotiating his vote with the bosses, and a trusted follower of Mr. I. Kanavos and many others—who were in fact suffering from the same ills—once, finally, he had become a lawyer and got the degree, supreme title of the Balkan, and especially of the Greek social hierarchy, once he had thus taken all this unjust indignity by the handfull, he finally took the road to America in search of ready cash.¹⁷⁶

And, quite symbolically, the Tsaldares family provides a *typical* illustration: from yeoman status to handicrafts, currant production, and the currant trade, then onward to education and government service, and finally, with Panages, to the university and the legal profession.¹⁷⁷

Education was the *key* to social mobility, which in the 19th century “was characterized by a massive passage from the small peasantry to the urban petty bourgeoisie.”¹⁷⁸ Upward mobility thus involved a conscious and planned investment in education on the part of small peasant family property for its own preservation. This choice became historically possible only because of the extraordinary development of the educational system after Independence. Fundamentally imbalanced towards secondary and higher education, this system appeared to grow out of all proportion to the

175. See especially Karavidas, pp. 435ff.; and Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 67–155 passim. On the extensive movement from the yeomanry to government service, through political clientelism, see also Dertiles, p. 138. A Communist leader (N. Ploumbides) characteristically remembered that, in his native village in Arcadia (Central Peloponnesus) at the beginning of the 20th century, children were expected to become civil servants. See his autobiography in *Avge*, 17 August 1975. On the importance of emigrant receipts for the peasant economy, see the little book by Krikos. This rare 1914 empirical study of a village in Doris (Central Sterea) found that a deficit amounting to 37 percent of total expenses was covered through such receipts. An additional source of supplementary income for the yeoman family, especially after 1914, were the short-term loans from the National Bank. According to Karavidas, they enabled the smallholder to transform himself into a “pseudo-landowner” (*pseudoktematias*) by further reducing personal labor and increasingly resorting to hired hands. Karavidas, pp. 453–454.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 440. “Bosses” translates *kommatares*.

177. Vouros, pp. 17–33.

178. Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, p. 381.

kingdom's domestic resources and needs. Yet, the diminutive state naturally served as the cultural center for the more numerous unredeemed and diaspora Greeks. It was therefore in response to their needs *and* mostly through their financial contributions that its overgrown and imbalanced educational system emerged. Furthermore, it was the independent peasantry that mostly benefited, as indicated by the fact that access to secondary and higher education, the avenues of social ascent, was concentrated in the core areas of small and middle peasant property, which readily espoused an ideology of mobility through schooling.¹⁷⁹ In terms of that peasantry's own economic contribution, the currant's Golden Age seems to have heavily financed educational expansion and infrastructure, especially in the Peloponnesus. The same is true of emigrant receipts.

The conservative cultural and political implications of this singular historical process were of critical and lasting significance, especially for the peasantry.¹⁸⁰ The combination of universal suffrage, government employment, and social mobility through clientelist channels and a remarkably open educational system effectively masked, or even bridged, the conflict between city and countryside.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, it forged organic and enduring bonds between the peasant, petty bourgeois, and bourgeois strata which were later to constitute the class basis of Antivenizelism.

In sharp contrast to the areas of small and middle peasant property (i.e., the old smallholders), the landless sharecroppers (*kolligoi*) in the areas of large estates essentially remained in subsistence agriculture and outside the market well into the 20th century. Consequently, they also remained outside the mainstream of both emigration and education, particularly secondary and higher.¹⁸² This situation of economic and cultural marginality, and relative deprivation, persisted into the interwar period, when the formerly landless peasants became about one-half of the stratum

179. Ibid., pp. 67–68, 131–146, and 422–495. This otherwise landmark study does not adequately focus on the structural imbalance at the expense of elementary education.

180. On the remarkable persistence of these 19th-century cultural patterns, see especially Friedl, "Lagging Emulation," and "The Role of Kinship." In her analysis, "lagging" emulation is one inspired by the values of a *preindustrial urban elite* in terms of the prestige of occupations (professions and civil service rather than business), education (classical rather than vocational or technical), and language (*katharevousa* rather than demotic). On this last point, it may be noted that generations of government officials, university professors, and lesser educators, typically of humble peasant background, have been the most rabid defenders of the official, against the popular, language. Command of the official language was precisely the mark of their hard-won status.

181. See Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 525–526.

182. Ibid., pp. 67–120, and 422ff. The limited commercialization of wheat was mostly, if not exclusively, in the hands of the landowners, who appropriated the surplus as rent. On the greater illiteracy within areas of large estates in Thessaly, see also Sivignon, *La Thessalie*, pp. 135–140.

of new smallholders. The other half, that is, the rural refugees, found themselves in a similar situation, exacerbated by the trauma of downward mobility and by their alienation from native Greek society and even language. Educational reform and especially the massive 1928–1932 effort in elementary education were thus one more Venizelist policy primarily addressing the needs of that peasant stratum.¹⁸³

To summarize and conclude, Antivenizelism and Venizelism were the expressions of *two poles* within the rural world, diametrically opposed along several overlapping and interrelated dimensions (see Table 28 for a general overview). The former essentially represented a yeomanry of old smallholders, with marked inequalities, traditionally specialized in export crops and thereby dependent on the market, and historically enjoying a superior level of income, consumption, education, mobility, opportunities, and aspirations, hence ultimately a higher social status. The latter mostly represented an egalitarian peasantry of new smallholders just emerging from subsistence to production for the domestic market, and from a situation of economic and cultural deprivation, in both absolute and relative terms. What remains to be examined is the fault, or faults, through

Table 28 OLD AND NEW SMALLHOLDERS
(Pearson correlations)

	Old Smallholders (Yeomen)	New Smallholders (Peasants)	n
Proportion Peasant Owners	.21	.43	196
Grapes	.51	−.34	139
Olives	.06	−.31	138
Tobacco	−.12	.27	139
Cereals	−.25	.46	138
Male Illiteracy	−.02	.50	196
Doctors per 10,000 pop.	−.24	−.59	196

183. On education and cultural deprivation in general, see Chapter 6. In addition to the correlations in Table 28, the *ATE Area Studies* clearly indicate that interwar illiteracy among new smallholders (40 percent in the Serres and Xanthe districts) was much greater and probably at least double that among old smallholders: 20 percent around Thebes, and 5–15 percent among males in other districts, with one exception (Argolis). The nonuniform distinction between male and female illiteracy does not allow a more precise comparison.

which agrarian radicalism threatened to erode and supersede this established political division.

The Emergence of Peasant Radicalism

Seeking to explain why interwar Greek peasants did not develop an agrarian movement like their Bulgarian counterparts, Mouzelis has identified four critical differences between the two peasantries: (1) the higher commercialization, full exposure to the money economy, urban lifestyle, and concomitant indebtedness of Greek peasants; (2) the greater homogeneity and egalitarianism of Bulgarian peasants and their related hostility to outside mediators; (3) the greater urbanization, internal migration, and emigration in Greece, acting as safety valves; and (4) the greater permeation of the Greek countryside by the state and by the established political parties.¹⁸⁴ In light of the preceding analysis, it should be obvious that these arguments, although presented for Greek peasants as an undifferentiated whole, are mostly inspired by the particular characteristics of the old smallholders or yeomen of Old Greece. Hence, they do not adequately explain why interwar Agrarianism should and did in fact develop considerably among new smallholders, even though it never reached the dimensions of the Bulgarian phenomenon.

That support for the A.P. of Greece came mostly, if not exclusively, from the stratum of new smallholders can be inferred both from ecological regression (see Table 29) and from the party's tumultuous history. The impetus for its creation may have come initially from the better organized cooperatives of Old Greece and especially of the Peloponnesus. Yet, by 1929 this impetus had definitely shifted to the North. Displacing Old Greece conservatives, the more radical Agrarians of Thessaly and Macedonia remained in control of the young party, whose influence grew spectacularly in these regions and in Thrace, that is, precisely those areas where the bulk of new smallholders was concentrated, and prevalent. Although ostensibly aspiring to represent the Greek peasantry as an undifferentiated whole, the A.P. thus eventually came to represent the most radical among its lower stratum.¹⁸⁵

The growth of Agrarianism in the wake of land reform indicates the limits of the latter. Without anticipating the discussion of rural refugee settlement, suffice it to note that accession to the ownership of land could

184. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*, pp. 89–104, and especially 96–102.

185. See Pournaras, *E. Venizelos*, Vol. 4, pp. 77ff. On the radical potential of the "new peasantry," see also Somerites, p. 160. The A.P. naturally drew on the radical tradition created by recent class struggles for land, and claimed to be its continuation.

Table 29 THE A.P. AND PEASANT STRATA
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Yeomen (old smallholders)	-.07 (.04) .046	-.04 (.06) .478	-.02 (.04) .687	-.02 (.02) .224	-.04 (.03) .206
% Peasants (new smallholders)	+.06 (.02) .002	+.21 (.03) .000	+.06 (.02) .008	+.04 (.01) .000	+.09 (.02) .000
a	1.08 (.78) .168	1.24 (1.29) .336	.33 (.96) .732	-.04 (.35) .908	.65 (.65) .317
r	.25	.43	.19	.31	.39
s	5.01	8.27	6.16	2.26	4.17

not and did not by itself put an end to the miserable condition of new smallholders nor turn them into efficient farmers. For several years, many were hardly in a position to provide for their own subsistence, whereas the beneficial effects of Venizelist policies were slow in materializing. Thrust into the money economy to meet their immediate needs, new smallholders accumulated new debts on top of those attached to their new property. Agricultural loans were massively diverted to pressing living expenses, whereas the clamor for more loans and for the cancellation of old debts became the principal rallying cry of peasant agitation and threatened to engulf the new Agricultural Bank. Under these conditions, compounded by consecutive natural disasters, Venizelist agricultural policy could not keep abreast of peasant demands, despite repeated concessions. Such demands were simply unlimited, and Karavidas ironically advised a temporarily discouraged demagogue: “Demand the double, . . . demand everything!”¹⁸⁶

Regardless of the manifold limitations of Venizelist policy, Agrarianism thus essentially grew out of a “revolution of rising expectations” among new smallholders. This was particularly evident in the case of tobacco growers, the most commercialized and the only export-oriented

186. “Hoi Peirasmoi tes Agrotikes Demagogias” [The Temptations of Agrarian Demagogy], *Peitharchia*, 5 October 1930, reprinted in Karavidas, p. 691. The demagogue’s temporary discouragement was due to a concession by the Venizelos government concerning peasant debts.

segment of this stratum. Speculative crop specialization ushered a vicious circle of excessive consumption, indebtedness, overproduction, and extreme vulnerability to sharp market fluctuations. Currant growers had entered a similar vicious circle in the 19th century, but had disposed of options that interwar tobacco growers entirely lacked. Their historical response was a growing radicalism, which found its expression first in the Farmer-Labor Party, then in the A.P. (see Table 30), and eventually in the C.P. (see Table 31).

Given its particular appeal to the stratum of new smallholders, including those in cereal production (Table 30), the A.P. specifically threatened Venizelism rather than Antivenizelism—and was generally so perceived at the time. The actual extent of the threat is indicated by the fact that it involved not only the L.P. but also the Farmer-Labor Party, which had first paved the way of peasant radicalism through its own political action.¹⁸⁷ During 1928–1932, the Venizelos government thus watched the swift growth of Agrarian agitation with increasing alarm, especially after the impact of the Depression was added to the critical conditions created

Table 30 THE A.P., CEREALS, AND TOBACCO
(rural areas only, n = 138)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Percentage Cereals (of cultivated area, 1939)	+ .08 (.02) .001	+ .17 (.04) .000	+ .07 (.03) .027	+ .04 (.01) .001	+ .09 (.02) .000
Percentage Tobacco (of cultivated area, 1939)	+ .03 (.08) .679	+ .30 (.14) .038	+ .21 (.11) .053	+ .15 (.04) .000	+ .17 (.07) .018
<i>a</i>	−2.14 (1.24) .085	−1.72 (2.16) .429	−1.78 (1.62) .274	−1.38 (.59) .020	−1.76 (1.08) .107
<i>r</i>	.29	.40	.27	.43	.42
<i>s</i>	5.24	9.19	6.89	2.48	4.60

187. In 1930, the A.P. carried the Fifth Congress of tobacco growers in Thessaloniki, with 550 delegates against 280 for the L.P. and the Farmer-Labor Party. This spectacular success was attributed to earlier agitation, especially by the Farmer-Labor Party. See St. Stagos, “He Prote Politike Epideixis tou Agrotikou Kommatos” [The First Political Demonstration of the Agrarian Party], *Peitharchia*, 9 February 1930.

Table 31 THE C.P., TOBACCO, AND OLIVES
(rural areas only, n = 138)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Percentage Tobacco (of cultivated area, 1939)	+.08 (.04) .056	+.15 (.07) .043	+.24 (.07) .001	+.30 (.08) .000	+.19 (.06) .003
Percentage Olives (of cultivated area, 1939)	+.06 (.01) .000	+.07 (.02) .002	+.08 (.02) .000	+.05 (.02) .031	+.07 (.02) .000
<i>a</i>	.03 (.34) .936	1.49 (.57) .010	1.08 (.54) .049	2.08 (.58) .000	1.33 (.48) .006
<i>r</i>	.35	.28	.36	.34	.35
<i>s</i>	2.75	4.65	4.42	4.73	3.89

by bad harvests.¹⁸⁸ It responded through a combination of measures on behalf of the peasantry and tighter repressive controls, especially through the Agricultural Bank and the cooperatives. Nevertheless, the most decisive blow to the Agrarian tide was the polarization over the regime issue during the 1932 election. Despite a fourfold increase in votes over 1928, the A.P. fell far short of expectations, and its momentum seems to have been thereby broken. Its internal split, in the wake of electoral defeat, completed the job of defusing the formidable threat it had once represented.

Where the A.P. failed, the C.P. might have succeeded, had it not been plagued by a variety of handicaps and misperceptions. An obvious handicap was its image of hostility to private property, including peasant property, which the party initially encouraged and subsequently had a hard time dispelling.¹⁸⁹ Another source of difficulties was its hostility to rural refugee settlement, in line with the disastrous Macedonian policy.¹⁹⁰ In light of the preceding discussion, however, it appears that the major obsta-

188. See, e.g., A. Kalevras to Venizelos, 2 June 1928, VA File 330, and 1 May 1929, VA File 335. Successively serving as governor-general of Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus, Kalevras expressively warns that in every village someone is trying "to create a completely emancipated peasant consciousness, not to say a subversive one."

189. In 1920, the Second Congress had actually adopted a position against small peasant property and for the nationalization of land. See *KKE*, Vol. 1, p. 59.

190. See Chapters 4 and 5.

cle to effective Communist action among the peasantry was the absence of an adequate analysis of peasant differentiation, and above all the *total* failure to recognize the radical potential of the new smallholders. Despite its ritual insistence on the heterogeneity of the peasantry and its doctrinal emphasis on the poorer strata, the party consistently failed to make the connection with *crops*. Throughout the interwar period, it concentrated on the commercialized and export sector (tobacco, currants, olives) and was distinctly inimical to grain production, vociferously opposing both the tariff on imported wheat *and* the state purchase of domestic wheat.¹⁹¹ In this case, the interests of the working class clearly took precedence over those of the grain-growing new smallholders. On the contrary, the priority accorded to export crops, and especially to tobacco, directly served working-class interests linked to those crops and, above all, the interests of tobacco workers.

It should be obvious why its practically exclusive concern with the export-oriented agricultural sector decisively limited the C.P.'s appeal and penetration in the countryside. The bulk of this sector was composed of old smallholders, with a deeply rooted conservatism and a historical attachment to Antivenizelism and the monarchy. On the other hand, the bulk of the new smallholders, in cereal production for the domestic market, remained outside the party's concerns. In between, there only remained the export-oriented minority of the new smallholders, that is, the tobacco growers.

It is therefore not surprising that Communist influence among the peasantry remained limited throughout the interwar period. An early development with great potential, the movement of Veterans (*Palaioi Polemistes*), was arrested when Pangalos dissolved these largely Communist-led organizations in 1925.¹⁹² Despite the early slogan of a "united front of workers and peasants" under the leadership of the former, the party made little progress among the latter. In 1929–1931, it recognized that the A.P. was leading the wave of peasant agitation and that "Agrarian fascism"

191. In 1927, the C.P. justified its opposition to the wheat tariff by claiming that *most* peasants did not produce wheat but only tobacco, currants, olives, etc.! Its second argument, that most wheat growers did not produce for the market, was less preposterous. (Both arguments were shared by conservative critics of Venizelist policy.) The C.P. concluded that a higher wheat tariff would only benefit a minority of "rich peasants" and the merchants. See *KKE*, Vol. 2, p. 375. On the continuing hostility to wheat protection and on the perennial priority accorded to export crops, see the resolutions of the Sixth and Second Plenum (1934) and of the Sixth Congress (1935), *KKE*, Vol. 4, pp. 22, 122–124, and 302–305. The absurd extremes to which Communist propaganda was carried in this respect is exemplified by the demand that all crops be grown and sold freely, without restrictions. Far from securing higher export prices, such a policy would obviously depress them disastrously.

192. Elefantes, p. 60.

was the principal threat.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, the C.P. seems to have benefited from the decline of Agrarianism only slowly and only towards the end of the interwar period, mostly among rural refugees and tobacco growers.¹⁹⁴ The proximity and ties of the latter with the Communist tobacco workers have already been noted. Similarly, proximity to militant and refugee urban labor, together with the presence of rural workers, especially in Lesbos, may explain the relationship between C.P. strength and olives (see Table 31). Otherwise Communist support among the peasantry remained either localized or else extremely diffuse.¹⁹⁵ Despite its constant efforts to

Table 32 THE C.P. AND PEASANT STRATA
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Yeomen (old smallholders)	-.09 (.02) .000	-.18 (.05) .000	-.20 (.05) .000	-.18 (.05) .000	-.16 (.04) .000
% Peasants (new smallholders)	-.04 (.01) .002	-.09 (.02) .000	-.09 (.03) .001	-.09 (.03) .001	-.08 (.02) .000
<i>a</i>	4.19 (.54) .000	9.73 (1.02) .000	9.90 (1.05) .000	10.44 (1.07) .000	8.82 (.87) .000
<i>r</i>	.35	.39	.39	.37	.40
<i>s</i>	3.44	6.53	6.75	6.84	5.56

193. Already in 1927, the Third Congress had strongly opposed the creation of an agrarian party, *KKE*, Vol. 2, pp. 244–245. On the situation in 1929–1931, see *ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 71, 159, 303–304, and 325–326.

194. These two groups largely overlapped. On rural refugees, see Chapter 4. Burks, pp. 56–57, is therefore correct only about the interwar links of Communism to tobacco farming. Otherwise, he paints an unreal image, according to which the C.P. should logically draw the support of practically *all* peasants (!), given that he mentions both mountain peasants and those growing cash crops in the plains, *including* wheat.

195. This conclusion, a general statement about Greece as a whole, is consistent with the development of enclaves of Communist strength in the countryside, the growth of peasant membership in the party, and local or transient successes in communal elections and peasant protests, where Communism provided the most extreme expression of rural dissatisfaction, without actually taking permanent root. The Fifth Congress in 1934 significantly observed that peasant cells remained the weakest link in party organization. “In the villages, outside very few exceptions, we do not have cells with a clearly defined party image . . . with the enormous majority of villages, we do not even have a simple connection, even though our influence there rises very rapidly.” See *KKE*, Vol. 4, p. 59. Such “influence” was obviously of

Table 33 THE C.P. AND PEASANT OWNERSHIP
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Proportion	-.06	-.16	-.17	-.14	-.13
Peasant Owners	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
	.018	.002	.001	.008	.002
<i>a</i>	7.06	18.06	18.70	17.13	15.54
	(2.25)	(4.30)	(4.43)	(4.49)	(3.68)
	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000
<i>r</i>	-.17	-.22	-.23	-.19	-.22
<i>s</i>	3.61	6.89	7.11	7.20	5.90

exploit their dissatisfaction, the fundamentally conservative currant growers and other old smallholders remained attached to Antivenizelism. On the other hand, the mass of grain-growing new smallholders remained hostile, and so did small peasant property in general (see Tables 32 and 33).

As with the refugees, however, developments following the abortive March 1935 coup, in conjunction with the new “Popular Front” strategy of the C.P., created the conditions for a radical breakthrough in the countryside, specifically among the new smallholders, and as an extension of their fundamental republicanism. Implicitly recognizing its own enduring handicap, the C.P. ostensibly dismantled its separate organizations in the countryside for the benefit of a “Unified Agrarian Party.” A decisive step in the same direction was the agreement for the constitution of a Popular Front, signed on 22 July 1936 between the C.P. and Sofianopoulos on behalf of the A.P.¹⁹⁶ Although immediately arrested by the imposition of the Metaxas dictatorship before it could materialize, this policy would bear spectacular fruits in the dictatorship’s aftermath.

The Case of Animal Husbandry

Animal husbandry in the traditional form of nomadic pastoralism, with its distinctive social organization, had historically coexisted with Greek agri-

a very diffuse and unstable kind. Later in that year, the Second Plenum recognized that party development had remained stationary or had even *retreated* in the countryside, except in Western Macedonia, Lesbos, and Larisa. Ibid., p. 118.

196. The historic resolution for a “Unified A.P.” (“*Heniaio A.K.E.*”) was passed by the Sixth Congress in December 1935. On these developments, see *KKE*, Vol. 4, pp. 305 and

culture, especially in the zones of large estates and extensive cereal cultivation, where it had its winter pastures.¹⁹⁷ At the beginning of the interwar period, however, it had entered a protracted crisis, which would eventually lead to its destruction. The principal causes of this crisis were two: the new frontiers erected since the Balkan Wars, and agrarian reform. The new borders, especially with Yugoslavia, cut across traditional routes of pastoral movements, confining them henceforth to the territory under Greek sovereignty. This restricted space was itself rapidly shrinking for nomadic pastoralism as agrarian reform pushed it out of its earlier winter grounds, which it converted into fields for the new smallholders. Conflicts between these (especially the rural refugees), defending their new properties, and the shepherds, desperate for pastures, soon became endemic, requiring state intervention on behalf of the latter. In 1930, the Venizelos government thus imposed a system of protected leases for pastures (*enoikiostasio voskon*), characteristically against strong refugee opposition.¹⁹⁸

Apart from its struggle for survival against expanding agriculture, the situation of traditional pastoralism also involved a distinctive mode of rural life and a sharply hierarchical social organization (the *tselingato*) characterized by great inequality. Under these conditions, in conjunction with increasing economic and political marginality, patron-client relations were particularly important and prevalent.¹⁹⁹

The political implications of this situation appear somewhat contradictory. As a traditional hierarchical structure falling victim to specifically Venizelist policies and engaged in a merciless struggle with specifically Venizelist social forces, pastoralism should be expected to side with Anti-venizelism—but only insofar as this tendency was not counterbalanced and neutralized by the increasing dependence on state authorities, effective Venizelist intervention, as in 1930, and clientelism in general. In fact, a sharply defined political alignment of animal husbandry does not emerge from ecological analysis. Nevertheless, a shift from Venizelism to Anti-

395–401; and Sarles, pp. 316–318. Directly threatened by them, Papanastasiou characteristically reacted with virulent anticomunism. See Linardatos, pp. 226–228. On the refugees and the “Popular Front” strategy, see also Chapter 4 below.

197. Karavidas, pp. 35–110.

198. Chamber, 12 June 1930, *Efemeris*, pp. 1089–1110. See especially the views of Venizelos (p. 1089) and those of the refugee deputies S. Choursoglou (pp. 1097–1099) and L. Iasonides (pp. 1104–1106). On the crisis of nomadic pastoralism, see Campbell, pp. 14–18; and Arseniou, pp. 38–40. See also, G. Modes (Governor-General of Epirus) to Venizelos, 7 April 1931, VA File 386. As a gross indication of land reform’s impact on pastoralism, it may be noted that more than one-third of the acreage distributed consisted of pasture lands. See Varvaresos, p. 9.

199. On the greater inequality among nomadic shepherds than among the local villagers, see Sivignon, *Les pasteurs*, pp. 21–22. Campbell’s classic analysis of patron-client relations was precisely based on one of the last groups of traditional nomadic shepherds. See especially Campbell, pp. 213ff.

venizelism may be detected, and interpreted in light of the preceding discussion and Antivenizelist control of state power after 1933.

CLASS ALLIANCES AND HEGEMONY

In conclusion, it may be seen that the social base of interwar political blocs and parties *did* correspond to the particular conceptions of class and party held by them or about them, which were briefly reviewed at the beginning of this chapter. Both Antivenizelism and Venizelism constituted broadly based interclass coalitions, whereas the two “class parties” of the Left—A.P. and C.P.—essentially remained confined to a fraction of the particular class which each of them aspired to represent, that is, the peasants and the workers, respectively.

The most important conclusion, however, and one which goes against a widespread myth, is that the two major blocs did *not* represent interchangeable coalitions, constituted along similar lines, and drawn indistinctly from the same classes and strata—as a purely clientelist model would imply. Although drawn from every class of Greek society, these two coalitions were constituted along very different lines and mostly from different fractions or strata of each class.

Antivenizelism essentially represented a survival or even a resurrection of the class alliance which had characterized the “historical bloc” of 19th-century Greece (i.e., Old Greece). Bourgeois landowners, rentiers, and financiers around the National Bank, artisans and other precapitalist petty bourgeois strata, and the yeomanry had been integral parts of this alliance, constituted under the hegemony of the state bourgeoisie and the auspices of the monarchy. A remarkably open, if imbalanced, educational system, extensive social mobility, and the widespread operation of clientelism had been decisive in containing the relatively few potential conflicts among these fractions and strata and in forging organic and lasting bonds between them.

As noted earlier, the hegemony of the state bourgeoisie effectively ended with the debacle in the 1897 Greco-Turkish War. If further proof was required of its political bankruptcy, it was provided by the 1922 Disaster in Asia Minor, which in a sense was a repetition of 1897; only in this case, the first occurrence was farcical and the second tragic. Nevertheless, Antivenizelism survived, despite its apparent inability to play a hegemonic role and despite its concomitant lack of a program. It survived as a fundamentally traditionalist and romantic reaction of the conservative bourgeois, petty bourgeois, worker, and peasant strata most threatened by economic, social, and political change—for which the 19th century represented, in one way or another, an idyllic and lost Golden Age. A clientelist

structure and strategy, and the concept of a catch-all *Volkspartei*, were not only traditional but also particularly suited to this role of Antivenizelism as a vehicle for the defense of vested interests and for the expression of popular dissatisfaction in general.

In contrast, Venizelism essentially represented an effort to establish and consolidate the new hegemony of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie at the head of "several classes joined together in some general direction," that is, in a "national" party inspired by a comprehensive program. This program originally combined pragmatic irredentism with drastic internal reform and seems to have initially attracted widespread popular support among all petty bourgeois, worker, and peasant strata. Beginning in 1915, however, and amidst the crisis of World War I, the fragile hegemony of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie was shaken, and the Venizelist interclass coalition *contracted* dramatically after the massive defection of yeomen, artisans, other anticapitalist petty bourgeois strata, and workers. By 1922, it had been essentially confined to the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, its petty bourgeois allies (mostly storekeepers with a stake in capitalist market expansion), some workers, and the landless peasants, who had a stake in Liberal land reform. Even though historical responsibility was born by Antivenizelism, the original Venizelist program was itself irremediably amputated by the Asia Minor Disaster, which buried irredentism—the keystone of bourgeois hegemony.

Even though it prevailed militarily over its opponents in 1922, Venizelism was thus confronted with the urgent and formidable task of consolidating its interclass base around a *new* hegemonic project, which would secure the hegemony of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. Republicanism and capitalist modernization were the main ingredients of this new project, which received its most elaborate and ambitious formulation in the Venizelos program of 1928–1932. In light of the preceding analysis, it can be seen that this program was specifically tailored to the needs and aspirations of the particular fractions and strata which mostly constituted the Venizelist bloc: entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, commercial petty bourgeoisie, and new smallholders. It represented a concerted and urgent effort to weld them together, and check the growing contradictions and centrifugal tendencies which threatened to destroy Venizelism as an interclass alliance—and bourgeois hegemony with it.

Against this background, it may be said that the Depression, by shattering the Liberal vision of continuous capitalist expansion and modernization, effectively inaugurated a crisis of hegemony. With respect to Venizelism as a political force, it brought to the forefront what had been true ever since 1922: that its electoral chances depended on Republicanism and, concretely, on the refugee vote.

· 4 ·

REFUGEES VERSUS NATIVES: ETHNICITY AND CLASS

Better that they stay here and be slaughtered by Kemal because, if they go to Athens, they will overthrow everything.

Phrase attributed to Stergiades, high commissioner of Greece in Smyrna, when asked why he did not urge the Greeks of Asia Minor to leave before the Disaster he was foreseeing. Quoted in Dafnes, He Hellas, Vol. 1, p. 16

THE REFUGEE VOTE AS ARBITER

The invidious distinction between refugees and natives provided the basis for the most salient cleavage in interwar Greek society, which truly dominated the politics of the period. In general and comparative terms, this cleavage should be classified as *ethnic* in character—even though the term might offend Greek sensitivities and be construed as one more attack on the “Greekness” of the refugees. In fact, the “Greekness” of the refugees *was* essentially denied at the time by a large proportion of the natives. Furthermore, the distinction *was* then often characterized as *fyletike*, which in this context should be translated as “ethnic” rather than “racial.”¹ These indications, together with distinctive patterns of speech and culture, and the concomitant processes of identification and discrimination, fully justify the classification of this cleavage under the general heading of ethnicity, if only to transcend the uniqueness of the Greek situation and place it in a comparative perspective.

Ecological regression makes it possible both to confirm the existence of this cleavage and to measure its importance (see Tables 34–37). Inter-

1. See the letter of the Pontus refugee deputies to Venizelos, 9 June 1929, VA File 335.

Table 34 ANTIVENIZELISM AND THE REFUGEES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Refugees	-.36 (.06) .000	-.37 (.06) .000	-.33 (.06) .000	-.42 (.06) .000	-.37 (.06) .000
a	36.81 (1.57) .000	39.10 (1.51) .000	48.68 (1.61) .000	52.89 (1.51) .000	44.37 (1.42) .000
r	-.37	-.40	-.34	-.45	-.42
s	17.60	16.88	18.01	16.92	15.93

Table 35 VENIZELISM AND THE REFUGEES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Refugees	+.31 (.07) .000	+.19 (.06) .002	+.20 (.07) .003	+.28 (.07) .000	+.24 (.06) .000
a	60.33 (1.61) .000	51.71 (1.48) .000	46.79 (1.63) .000	41.90 (1.64) .000	50.18 (1.44) .000
r	.32	.22	.21	.29	.29
s	18.06	16.57	18.27	18.34	16.17

preting the results as estimates of proportions, we may arrive at an approximate breakdown of refugees and natives by political allegiance in the four elections examined (see Table 38).²

2. Deviations from a total of 100 percent are negligible and largely due to rounding errors. This should indicate that the assumption required for ecological inference is not violated to an alarming degree in this case, and that the resulting estimates of refugee percentages are on the whole reliable. They are, moreover, eminently plausible in light of all the available historical evidence. A major exception is the estimated Antivenizelist proportion of the refugees in 1936 (11 percent) which should be considered an overestimate (or else should be attributed to intimidation). Accordingly, the Venizelist proportion in that year (70 percent) may be underestimated. In any case, all these estimates should be regarded as *gross* approximations, given the sizable standard errors and the fairly small correlation coefficients. The same of course applies to estimates of native proportions. The second set of such estimates (enclosed in parentheses in Table 38) is certainly more reliable, especially insofar as Antivenizelist and Venizelist proportions are concerned.

Table 36 THE A.P. AND THE REFUGEES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Refugees	+.01 (.02) .444	+.09 (.03) .004	+.01 (.02) .575	+.03 (.01) .000	+.04 (.02) .018
a	1.50 (.46) .001	5.08 (.80) .000	1.63 (.56) .004	.26 (.20) .196	2.12 (.40) .000
r	.05	.20	.04	.27	.17
s	5.16	8.97	6.25	2.29	4.46

Table 37 THE C.P. AND THE REFUGEES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Refugees	+.04 (.01) .003	+.11 (.02) .000	+.13 (.02) .000	+.13 (.02) .000	+.10 (.02) .000
a	1.12 (.32) .001	2.82 (.60) .000	2.53 (.61) .000	3.37 (.61) .000	2.76 (.51) .000
r	.21	.31	.36	.35	.32
s	3.58	6.74	6.82	6.88	5.73

In interwar Greece, the refugees constituted the only compact voting bloc of nationwide importance which could be compared to a Dutch *zuil* or an Austrian *lager*.³ Moreover, this bloc was clearly the arbiter of inter-war elections, as the major refugee newspaper proclaimed in 1928:

It is an uncontestable fact that the refugee factor will play a significant role in the political life of the country. Nor can it be disputed that the refugee world is the one which for a series of many decades will give, by its compact block, the final victory to the one or the other side at the various political battles.⁴

Several crucial conclusions may be drawn from the estimates in Table 38, if they are converted into percentages of the valid votes, and especially if the

3. On the Dutch and Austrian cases, see Lijphart and Bingham Powell, respectively.
4. *Prosfygikos Kosmos*, 17 June 1928, quoted in Pentzopoulos, p. 169.

Table 38 REFUGEES AND NATIVES BY POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE
(estimated in percentages)^a

Election	Antivenizelism	Venizelism	Agrarianism	Communism
Refugees				
1928	1	91	3	5
1932	2	71	14	14
1933	16	67	3	16
1936	11	70	3	16
Natives				
1928	37 (41)	60 (57)	2 (1)	1 (1)
1932	39 (44)	52 (48)	5 (4)	3 (3)
1933	49 (54)	47 (41)	2 (2)	3 (2)
1936	53 (57)	42 (38)	0 (1)	3 (3)

^aRefugee percentages were estimated by adding, in each case, the intercept and the regression coefficient reported in Tables 34–37. An estimate of the native percentage is provided in each case by the intercept. A second set of estimates (in parentheses) was obtained by subtracting the estimated refugee votes from the totals reported in Tables 4, 6, 8, and 12, on the assumption that refugees represented 20% of the valid ballots in every election.

1928 distribution of refugee loyalties is assumed to be valid for 1924 and 1926 as well:⁵

1. If the refugees had thrown their support entirely behind Antivenizelism, it would have won a comfortable majority in *every* single election, and the Republic itself would never have been born.
2. Without the refugees, that is, if the natives alone had voted, Antivenizelism and the monarchy would have won a sweeping victory already in 1926.
3. On the other hand, without the defection of some refugees to Antivenizelism and the Left, Venizelism would have retained a comfortable majority in 1933 and in 1936, and would have remained in power throughout the interwar period.⁶

5. Other assumptions that the conversion requires include (1) assuming that refugees represented 20 percent of the valid ballots in every election, and (2) taking the *refugee* (rather than the native) percentages of Table 38 as the more reliable starting point.

6. Dafnes, *Kommata*, pp. 143 and 146, characteristically notes that, without the refugee votes, Venizelism would have remained a permanent minority and could not have held power

THE REFUGEE CONDITION

The massive arrival of almost 1,500,000 refugees into the confines of the Greek state may be generally described as the result of the forcible eradication of Greek communities in the East, under the pressure of hostile local nationalisms. Although the process began soon after the turn of the century, it only reached massive proportions in the aftermath of the Asia Minor Disaster in 1922, which sealed the destruction of the Greek presence in Eastern Thrace, Asia Minor, and the coasts of the Black Sea. The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations subsequently signed in Lausanne, on 30 January 1923, between Greece and Turkey, merely ratified an accomplished fact as far as the greatest bulk of Greek refugees from Turkish territories were concerned: they had already fled to Greece. On 27 November 1919, Greece and Bulgaria had signed an analogous Convention Respecting the Reciprocal Emigration of Their Racial Minorities.⁷ The Greek Census of 1928 counted 1,221,849 refugees and provides the most detailed breakdown by country of origin (see Table 39). According to the same census, the native-born population was close to five million (4,982,835).⁸

The historical background of the refugee question as well as the diplomatic, financial, and organizational aspects of their settlement in Greece have been the object of numerous and detailed studies, which it is both impossible and unnecessary to repeat or summarize here. What is of immediate relevance for this analysis is the general condition of the refugees in interwar Greek society, which may be defined in terms of three essential dimensions, in ascending order of political significance: (1) economic deprivation, (2) downward social mobility, and (3) status deprivation, segregation, and discrimination.

Economic Deprivation

With respect to the first dimension, which is the one most commonly emphasized, the fundamental fact is that the great majority of the refugees arrived in Greece with little more than the clothes or rags they were wearing. This was above all true of those 750,000 or so who fled to Greece in

through democratic methods during the interwar period. Although this is not born out for 1928 and 1932, it is clear that an Antivenizelist victory in 1926, or earlier, would have drastically altered the political situation and would have most probably precluded the return of Venizelos in 1928.

7. For a detailed discussion of the 1919 Convention, see Pentzopoulos, pp. 60–61; and especially Ladas, pp. 27ff.

8. The census figures have been considered an underestimate of the original number of refugees, even though the children born in Greece of refugee fathers were also counted as refugees. Part of the discrepancy may be explained by the high mortality rate among refugees

Table 39 REFUGEES BY ORIGIN, 1928

<i>Country and Region</i>	<i>Before 1922 Disaster</i>	<i>After 1922 Disaster</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Turkey</i>	86,422	1,017,794	1,104,216
Asia Minor	37,728	589,226	626,954
Eastern Thrace	27,057	229,578	256,635
Pontus	17,528	164,641	182,169
Constantinople	4,109	34,349	38,458
<i>Russia</i>	37,635	20,891	58,526
Caucasus	32,421	14,670	47,091
Russia	5,214	6,221	11,435
<i>Bulgaria</i>	20,977	28,050	49,027
<i>Other</i>	6,858	3,222	10,080
TOTAL	<u>151,892</u>	<u>1,069,957</u>	<u>1,221,849</u>

SOURCE: Census of 1928.

the immediate wake of the Disaster.⁹ After an initial phase of chaos, extreme physical hardship, and staggering mortality, refugee settlement proceeded along two distinct and profoundly different directions: rural and urban.

The rural or agricultural settlement¹⁰ aimed at the provision of each refugee household with adequate land, livestock, implements, and a house. Almost half of the land and houses provided were those abandoned by the exchanged Turks and Bulgarians. The remaining lands were mostly obtained through the drastic implementation of land reform and the summary expropriation and distribution of large estates, while the rest of the houses were mostly built by the Refugee Settlement Commission or the Greek government, typically in the form of entire villages, since rural refugee settlement involved groups rather than individual families. By 1926, 550,635 rural refugees had been permanently settled and had become economically self-supporting. By 1930, this number had increased to 578,844 (or 145,758 families) and, by 1938, to 668,316 (or 167,079 families), which may be considered as the final estimate. Of the 1930 total,

upon their arrival and by emigration to foreign countries. On this point and on the uncertainties surrounding the exact number of refugees, see Pentzopoulos, pp. 96–100; and Eddy, pp. 248–252. One and a half million may be considered an upper limit.

9. Pentzopoulos, p. 48.
10. Ibid., pp. 105–111.

about 90 percent had been settled in Macedonia and Thrace, a pattern which did not significantly change subsequently. These selected figures eloquently convey the dramatic magnitude of the undertaking, its regional concentration, and the impressive pace at which it proceeded during the first four years, when more than 80 percent of the total task was effectively completed.

The urban settlement,¹¹ on the contrary, proceeded at a much slower pace. It only involved the provision of houses, built in compact projects around the principal urban centers, mainly Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki, where about 60 percent of the urban refugees were concentrated. By 1926, only 72,230 urban refugees had been settled and become economically self-supporting, as opposed to the 550,635 rural ones mentioned above. Despite the construction of over 52,000 houses by 1930, there were still over 30,000 refugee families living in makeshift tin barracks. In 1952, there were still 35,248 refugee families entitled to urban settlement, including 14,241 living in miserable sheds. Although the refugee slums have since been cleared, there reportedly remained, as of February 1978, about 3,000 urban refugee families still entitled to settlement!¹²

The urban refugees were primarily absorbed by the developing industrial sector, mostly as workers, but also as industrialists or independent artisans. A large part engaged in commercial activities, including a parasitic miserable multitude of open-air peddlers, separated only by a thin line from a residual refugee lumpenproletariat, erratically employed in all sorts of odd jobs.¹³ The 1928 Census offers a breakdown by occupation only for refugees who arrived in Greece after the 1922 Disaster (see Table 40).

Apart from their general poverty and the manifold difficulties in finding employment, or in getting started within an entirely new and often hostile physical and social environment, the refugees were also affected by two particularly vexing economic questions: the debts owed by them and the compensations owed to them. The first were a consequence of settlement itself, which was not conceived as a free grant. Although the refugees took immediate possession of the houses and land allotted to them, definitive title deeds of ownership were not issued before they could pay an administratively fixed amount, which was typically only a fraction of the property's actual commercial value. Nevertheless, few were able, or will-

11. Ibid., pp. 111–115 and 226.

12. Chamber, 21 February 1978, *Praktika*, pp. 1289–1295.

13. With respect to refugees as industrialists, a 1961 study found that 25 percent of Greek industrialists were born abroad, for the most part (20 percent) in Turkey. See Alexander, p. 93. For a vivid description of an urban refugee settlement typical of industrial districts in 1936, see Birtles, pp. 348–354.

Table 40 POST-DISASTER MALE REFUGEES (AGED 10 OR OLDER)
BY OCCUPATION, 1928

<i>Occupational Categories</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
1. Agriculture	147,139	41
2. Animal Husbandry	7,904	2
3. Fishing	3,447	1
4. Mining	936	0
5. Manufacturing	78,424	22
6. Transportation, Communication	18,607	5
7. Finance, Insurance, Brokerage	4,023	1
8. Trade	37,133	10
9. Personal Services	6,056	2
10. Professions	9,114	3
11. Government	4,286	1
12. Unspecified White-Collar	2,938	1
13. Unspecified Manual Workers	28,345	8
14. Unspecified	9,645	3
<i>Total Active^a</i>	<u>357,997</u>	<u>100</u>

SOURCE: Census of 1928.

^aTotal Inactive: 56,565 or 14% of male refugees aged 10 or older.

ing, to pay, despite repeated across-the-board reductions. Furthermore, ownership was also hampered (especially with respect to the transmission of property) by a number of legal restrictions requiring burdensome bureaucratic formalities. Although refugee debts were all canceled in 1944, within the context of the overall financial adjustments imposed after the Axis Occupation, the problem of definitive titles and other aspects of ownership was perpetuated into the postwar period and up to the present.¹⁴

The manifold inadequacies of their settlement and in particular the financial obligations it involved were all the more vexing for the refugees when seen in conjunction with their right to be compensated for the properties left behind, in Turkey and Bulgaria. The hopelessly intricate evolu-

14. See Pentzopoulos, p. 234; and Chamber, 21 February 1978, *Praktika*, pp. 1289–1295.

tion of this question need not be presented here, where only its most general and essential aspects can be described.

Because priority was given to the refugees who had not received rural or urban settlement, and because the compensations due to rural refugees were eventually almost entirely canceled against their settlement debts, the actual payment of compensations mostly concerned the urban refugees. Those entitled to compensation were to receive only a fraction of their estimated lost property, ranging from 25 percent to 5 percent in inverse proportion to its value.¹⁵ In each case, only one-fourth was paid in cash, the rest in bonds. The whole process dragged on in chaotic fashion throughout the interwar period. Among those entitled, many did not apply or missed successive deadlines. The estimation of lost properties gave rise to abuses and frauds of great proportions. Last, but not least, the cash received rapidly evaporated for pressing living expenses, while the bonds also changed hands and often depreciated at a vertiginous rate. On the whole, only a minority may be said to have received adequate or even excessive compensation, either because they belonged to special categories or through luck and corruption, while for the great majority the process degenerated into a humiliating, harassing, and frustrating farce. All this should be set against the fact that, by virtue of the 1930 Ankara Convention between Greece and Turkey, the latter was released from any obligation to pay the difference between the properties abandoned by the exchanged populations, which was expected to be heavily in favor of Greece, but was evened out by mutual agreement.¹⁶ On the other hand, the property of exchanged Turks, which was turned over to the Greek state by virtue of the same Convention to be used expressly for the settlement of the refugees, never adequately benefited them, because of its disastrous mismanagement and its extremely slow and unprofitable liquidation, a problem which has continued well into the postwar period.¹⁷ The real assets which would have provided a solid base for adequate compensation and settlement were thus either relinquished (to Turkey) or largely squandered (in Greece), a process which the hypothetical beneficiaries have tended to see as one of successive spoliations.

To conclude, while it has rightfully been hailed as a major achievement given the size and resources of the country, the settlement of the refugees in Greece was by no means an unambiguous success, and re-

15. During the parliamentary debate on the Ankara Convention, both Venizelos and Kondyles estimated that the refugees had received, on average, 15 percent of their lost properties. See Chamber, 25 June 1930, *Efemeris*, pp. 1322 and 1311–1314.

16. On the Ankara Convention, see Pentzopoulos, pp. 117–119.

17. Ibid., pp. 229ff; and Chamber, 21 February 1978, *Praktika*, pp. 1289–1295.

remained forever *incomplete*. To the extent that it did realize (mostly in the rural areas) its professed aim, that of establishing the refugees as self-supporting property owners, its achievement was undermined by the manifold burdens and the precariousness attached to this new property. On the other hand, to the extent that its aim was *not* realized, it created severe inequalities, mostly at the expense of the bulk of urban refugees. In particular, the twin problems of refugee debts and compensations became perennially explosive issues, which would flare up periodically throughout the interwar period.

Downward Social Mobility

The downward social mobility experienced by the refugees may be approached from three analytically distinct angles: (1) the move from urban to rural life, or vice versa; (2) the move from a superior social position in a foreign society to an inferior one in Greek society, irrespective of occupational change; and (3) downward occupational mobility as such.

1. The distinction between rural and urban refugees is exclusively based on their place and mode of settlement in Greece, *not* on their former residence and occupation, about which no statistics are available. Although the professed intent of settlement was to match the two, circumstances did not always permit it, especially during the first chaotic months. Some discrepancy therefore remained between actual and previous, urban or rural, residence and way of life, whose proportions cannot be estimated.¹⁸

This is only the first aspect of the brutal process of downward social mobility experienced by the refugees. Although a vertical conceptualization of mobility between rural and urban society is notoriously problematic, it may be safely argued that, in this particular case, a change in *either* direction typically represented a downward move, especially subjectively. Previously successful and propertied farmers, as seems to have been the case for most refugees of rural origin, found themselves suddenly cast into urban slums, jobless and propertyless. On the other hand, urbanites thrown on the land, under extremely adverse physical and technological conditions, obviously suffered a traumatic social demotion, especially in light of the distinctly urban values held both by them and by Greek society as a whole.¹⁹ In both cases, the decisive fact is that there were few refugees of purely proletarian background, whether rural or urban.

18. See Pentzopoulos, pp. 102–103 and 111–112; and Sandis, p. 83. Many make the mistake of ignoring this discrepancy. See, e.g., Elefantis, pp. 305 and 316–317.

19. As one of them later put it: "The tragedy of these fellow countrymen, who labored to exhaustion in such heavy and unaccustomed work, without even the essential means of life

2. This was due not only to the overall social structure of their areas of origin (especially the lack of industrialization), but also to the specific place of the Greek element within that structure. Typically, it had been a privileged or at least a distinctly comfortable position, not only in the urban centers (which is the most commonly emphasized aspect), but also in many rural areas as well.²⁰ This is the second aspect of refugee downward social mobility: with respect to their society of origin, both rural refugees of rural background and urban refugees of urban background often suffered a precipitous fall in social position and standard of living. The loss of property in particular created a lasting trauma:

Smyrna was an unforgettable place, we had our houses and our fortune there. . . . In Ikonion, we had our property, fields, cows, sheep, houses, while now we have nothing else except this house with those two small rooms.²¹

It may even be argued that often the very *same* occupation as the one previously held offered the refugees a position of lower status within the Greek social context.

3. Finally, for many (probably most) urban refugees, continuing the same occupation was itself impossible. This is the third and most obvious aspect of downward refugee mobility, involving a move from nonmanual to manual occupations, or from independent to salaried status (as was the case of artisans who became workers), or from plain job security to chronic unemployment or underemployment and odd jobs.²² In conclusion, the bulk of the refugees, both rural and urban, found themselves

and subsistence, was frightful, because most of them had been well-to-do tradesmen and merchants, who held a hoe in their hands perhaps for the first time." See Karageorgiou, p. 313.

20. A considerable body of literature exists on these Greek communities. See, e.g., the book by Maravelakes and Vacalopoulos, which, despite its title, mostly seeks to reconstruct the life that the refugees left behind. For a brief and general discussion of the social background of the refugees, see League of Nations, pp. 14–15. For Asia Minor in particular, see Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919–1922* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 26–29.

21. Quoted in Sandis, p. 95. These statements were made in 1965.

22. In terms of refugee intergenerational mobility, Sandis presents the following highly suggestive picture in her report on an Athens refugee suburb (in percentages):

	FARMER	HIGHER OCCUPATIONS	LOWER
Paternal Grandfather	55	24	21
Father	34	14	52
Respondent	0	6	94

"Higher" includes "independent artisans and upper white collar." "Lower" includes "unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled jobs, petty proprietorships, and lower white collar." See Sandis, Table 53, p. 119, and pp. 107–126.

brutally cast to the actual *bottom* of Greek social structure, the former as poor peasants, the latter as urban proletarians or even lumpenproletarians.

Status Deprivation and Discrimination

Over and above the dire economic difficulties and the abrupt downward social mobility which affected their vast majority, the refugees as a whole were a violently uprooted people, cast into a largely alien and hostile society. As suggested initially, this situation produced a fairly classical case of ethnic cleavage.

To begin with, Greek society—that defined by the narrow borders of the modern Greek state, and itself dominated by the state's original nucleus (Old Greece)—*was* essentially alien to the refugees, despite the overall common bonds of religion, language, and national identity. Although certainly valid on a fairly general and abstract level, these cherished assumptions were faced with a severe test as soon as more specific and concrete cultural patterns came into actual contact, patterns which had developed more or less independently, under radically different historical and social conditions. As one should expect, the conceptions and forms that Orthodox Christianity, the Greek language, and “Greekness” itself had assumed within the refugee cultural heritage were, or at least appeared to be, so different from those of the natives that both sides experienced what can only be described as a *traumatic cultural shock*.

Distinctive patterns of speech, including peculiar dialects such as the Pontic (not to speak of the Turkish-speaking, or bilingual refugees), manners, customs, and even surnames (often ending in the Turkish suffix *oglu*) served both to single out the refugee and to cement his ethnic identity, while communication with the natives and “their” state was impeded. Whether cosmopolitan (such as the bourgeoisie of Smyrna) or parochial (such as the peasants of inner Anatolia) in outlook, the refugees found themselves deeply alienated from the suffocating and narrow parochialism of the Greek state and its society.

Furthermore, one can hardly overestimate the central importance of residential and generally social *segregation*: most refugees, rural and urban, were concentrated in predominantly or exclusively refugee villages and neighborhoods, which often retain their distinctive character and name to the present day.²³

Under these conditions, assimilation remained a slow, tortured, and

23. The name typically consists of the qualification “New” and the name of a place or area in the country of origin, as, e.g., New Smyrna.

forever incomplete process, at least as far as the first-generation refugees were concerned.²⁴ More than forty years later, one of them could thus say epigrammatically:

Everybody is king in his own house, and in his own country. Here we shall always be refugees.²⁵

Assimilation was also decisively blocked by the set of native perceptions, attitudes, and behavior towards refugees, which approximated true racism.²⁶

On the level of perceptions, the "Greekness" itself of the refugees was questioned, or even denied, despite their own claims to be the purest Greeks. The same distinctive cultural patterns which served to cement the refugee *ethnic* identity also served to cast doubt on their *national* identity. The ethnic slurs commonly hurled at them, such as "Turkish seed" (*tourkosporoi*), "Turkish-born" (*tourkogenmenoi* and *tourkomerites*), and "baptized in yogurt" (*giaourtovaftismenoi*), forcefully reflect this basic native perception. Among other native stereotypes, suffice it to note those concerning the "loose" sexual mores of the refugees (women in particular), again a fairly classical syndrome.

Perceived as an alien, the refugee evoked feelings of fear, disgust, hatred, and hostility in general.

Should a person leave his house to give it to one of them? Forget the fact that all of them smell, that they're sick and penniless.²⁷

The refugee was also seen by the natives as a threat to the cultural purity and integrity of "their" country:

This *oglokratia* . . . which was to dominate our Athens in a little while. . . .²⁸

It may be added that the refugee was also a threat to children, serving as a new and convenient bogeyman.²⁹

24. See Pentzopoulos, pp. 209–212.

25. Quoted in Sandis, p. 94.

26. This discussion follows the one presented in Harding et al.

27. From a novel by I. M. Panayotopoulos, as quoted in Doulis, p. 64.

28. Travlantes, p. 196. *Oglokratia* ("oglu-cracy") refers to the characteristic Turkish suffix of refugee names.

29. The situation may be considered practically identical to that recently created in Cyprus, where a systematic survey study has been made. See Evdokus et al., especially pp. 53–65. It concluded that, among the Cypriot refugees, "70 percent think of themselves as undesirable by the nonrefugees." Ibid., p. 114. According to refugee perceptions, the other Greek Cypriots regard them "like people who never existed as people, nor lived like people," gypsies, beggars, vagabonds, lice-infested, thieves, and even bogeymen for children: "If you don't eat your food, the refugees will." Ibid., pp. 57–58. It should be added that the cultural

Native stereotypes and hostility led to open rejection, discrimination, and conflict, often involving physical violence. "Let them stay in their home lands!"³⁰ During the very first years following the Disaster, a petition such as the following (addressed to the Fourth Constituent Assembly) was by no means uncommon: "A committee of residents of Pourlia requests that the settlement of refugees in their area be averted."³¹ The first actual *pogrom* against refugees occurred during the infamous November Days of 1916, when the Antivenizelist mob showed a special predilection for the early Asia Minor refugees.³² Twenty years later, during which violent local clashes between refugees and natives were endemic, especially in rural Northern Greece, a fire which destroyed several refugee shacks in Volos was attributed to the antirefugee hysteria and the exhortations to arson in the rabid Antivenizelist press.³³ This press systematically attacked the refugees, often called for their extermination, and once (in 1933) even proposed that they be required to wear yellow armbands so that the natives could avoid any contact with them.³⁴

Among the underlying sources of ethnic conflict between natives and refugees, there were both economic and political factors. The most general economic aspect was the common native perception that the enormous financial burden of refugee settlement and compensation was born by the native population, while the refugees were lazy parasites with insatiable demands for more compensations and favors. The financial dimensions of the refugee question thus became a favorite ground for political exploitation. The common notion that the natives had already paid too much, and could not be expected to pay forever, provoked a heated running debate and inspired studies showing that the refugees had contributed more than

differences separating the Cypriot refugees from the rest of the Greek Cypriot population are minimal or nil compared with the much deeper and *visible* differences between refugees and natives in interwar Greece. The similarity of perceptions and affective reactions in the two cases indicates that it is not the cultural distance per se, but rather the uprooting and destitution that play a critical or catalytic role. Pursuing this point falls outside the scope of the present study.

30. From the same novel by I. M. Panayotopoulos, as quoted in Doulis, p. 65.

31. Fourth Constituent, 29 November 1924, *Praktika*, Vol. 1, p. 433.

32. According to Venteres, Vol. 2, p. 272: "From the 19th to the 23rd of November, Asia Minor refugees in particular were taken near the sanatorium Soteria and put to death as spies in the services of the Anglo-French." According to Kordatos: "The raging mob mostly chased the refugees from Asia Minor, because they were fanatical Venizelists. They paid very dearly for their Venizelist sentiments." Kordatos, *Neotere Hellada*, Vol. 5, p. 466. Chourmouzios, p. 102, also speaks of the "rage against refugees and Cretans."

33. See Linardatos, p. 172; and Gregoriades, *4e Avgoustou*, p. 101.

34. Mentioned in the anonymous "To 'Ek Vatheon' Enos Adikaïotou 'Prosfyga'" [The *De Profundis* of an Unvindicated "Refugee"], *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, 26 April 1973, pp. 101–102.

they had actually received.³⁵ Much more concrete and explosive was the economic competition between refugees and natives for: real property (especially agricultural land), jobs, and control of local markets.

The first was a major and permanent source of conflict, especially in the rural areas of the New Lands. The implementation of land reform and the massive departure of exchanged Turks and Bulgarians released enormous amounts of vacant agricultural land, which the local peasants expected to get and which they often seized without waiting.³⁶ Native expectations were brutally frustrated when rural refugee settlement perforce received first priority with respect to this land.³⁷ The whole process should be seen in the context of poor records, inadequate control by the authorities, great haste, and concomitantly great confusion. Evictions, quarrels over disputed land, and the manifest native aspiration to drive the refugees away and seize their fields produced continuous clashes in the countryside, throughout the interwar period. In what is obviously a routine press report of such clashes, the headline indicated: "Caused by disputes over land, as always."³⁸

Although less tangible than in the rural sector (except where urban real estate was involved), there was severe economic competition between natives and urban refugees as well, especially in industry and commerce. In the industrial sector, the refugees constituted a large reserve of cheap labor, desperate for employment and willing to work for lower wages, longer hours, on Sundays, and generally under any conditions.³⁹ Although relevant studies seem to be totally lacking, one can surmise the consequences, especially for the native workers: the average level of wages dropped and was kept low, protective labor legislation was in large part practically suspended, strikes became more difficult, and the bargaining position of labor was on the whole weakened. All this must have affected the attitudes of native workers, at least initially, even though the refugees

35. See, e.g., the article by Konstantinos Angelopoulos in *Eleftheros Anthropos*, 5 November 1933, where this prominent Antivenizelist argues that the loans for the settlement and compensation of the refugees were contracted "at the expense of the natives" and, furthermore, that "there was no obligation of the State and even less of the native taxpayers" to endure the burden of such loans. Quoted in Aigides, p. 69. Aigides is perhaps the best exponent of the opposite thesis.

36. Similarly, in towns and cities, natives illegally took possession of Turkish properties, which were supposed to house the refugees or be liquidated for their ultimate benefit.

37. See Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 111–112, where the bitterness of native landless peasants excluded from the distribution of the estates on which they had worked is sympathetically depicted.

38. *Kathemerine*, 28 October 1929. In the Kavalla area, refugees from one village had cultivated land claimed by natives of another village. A fight ensued, and gunshots were exchanged.

39. See Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 113; and Pentzopoulos, pp. 161–162.

rapidly became the most militant part of labor, at least in some sectors.⁴⁰ Although smaller numbers are involved, refugees also successfully competed with natives as industrial entrepreneurs or artisans.

Furthermore, refugees flooded the commercial sector of the most important urban centers, and largely displaced established native merchants from their previously comfortable and uncontested control of the local market. Over and above the purely economic aspect, the latter were particularly shocked and irritated by the aggressiveness of the newcomers and especially by the disorderly multitude of refugee open-air peddlers.

The specifically political sources of ethnic conflict were even more salient and emotionally charged than the economic ones. The early refugee identification with Venizelism provoked the open hostility of the natives, as shown during the November Days. After the Disaster and their massive influx, the refugees were accurately perceived as the pivotal voting bloc which would permanently deprive the native majority of its control of both national and local government. Commenting on the 1926 electoral results in Athens, a prominent Liberal characteristically noted that the city's disproportionate parliamentary representation by refugees threatened to produce "a union of the native population, irrespective of political loyalties, for their deliverance from the yoke of the refugee vote."⁴¹

In consequence, violent and even bloody local clashes for political reasons were also common. An example is offered by the town of Edessa in Western Macedonia, where refugees (all Venizelists) and natives (Antivenizelists in their great majority) massively came to blows on the day following the electoral triumph of Venizelos in 1928.⁴² On at least two occasions, which were the major military confrontations of 1923 and 1935, refugees and natives eagerly seized the opportunity to actually fight each other on a national scale.⁴³ In conclusion, and to dispel any impression of circularity, such politically motivated or triggered ethnic conflict continuously reproduced and reinforced previous political alignments.

Finally, although the refugees obviously did represent a *real* threat to native control of the economy and the polity, native behavior should also be in large part explained in terms of *displaced hostility*, which seems

40. Between 1926 and 1929, the C.P. repeatedly attributed depressed wages and unemployment to the refugee influx, among other factors. See *KKE*, Vol. 2, pp. 107, 205, 216, and 574.

41. K. Spanoudes to Venizelos, 8 November 1926, VA File 327.

42. Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 205. Such incidents on the same occasion seem to have been prevented elsewhere only through strict governmental measures.

43. This prospect was also very real in March 1933, when Plasteras considered leading a march of the refugee periphery into Athens. A few hundred refugees actually volunteered for action. See *ibid.*, pp. 298 and 303.

particularly relevant in this context. The refugees clearly offered a suitable target: they were highly visible, vulnerable, and typically not in a position to retaliate.⁴⁴ In the November Days of 1916, the pogrom against refugees thus began after the actual enemy (the Entente troops) had withdrawn beyond reach. Subsequently, first as unredeemed Greeks, then as refugees, they were regarded as responsible for the protracted and exhausting war effort and for its disastrous conclusion.⁴⁵ Throughout the interwar period, they were similarly perceived as responsible for economic and political developments adversely affecting the natives, ranging from heavy taxation to the abolition of the monarchy.⁴⁶

It is now time to bring the various threads of the preceding analysis together, and examine the political implications of the overall refugee condition in interwar Greece. It may be stated at the outset that these implications were largely contradictory, and essentially involved an interaction between forces pulling in three different directions: (1) an initial and fundamental Venizelist identification; (2) an intermittent availability for separatist or particularistic political action; and (3) an underlying propensity for radicalism.⁴⁷ Each of these will be discussed in turn.

REFUGEE VENIZELISM

The deeply rooted Venizelism of the refugees has usually, and somewhat superficially, been attributed to the specific historical responsibilities for the 1922 Disaster, which damned Antivenizelism as a whole, and the monarchy in particular. Although the significance of this aspect is indubitable, refugee Venizelism had its roots both *before* and *beyond* the Disaster. Again, three principal dimensions may be identified, and examined in turn: (1) initially, the situation of unredeemed Greeks, (2) subsequently, their integration and rehabilitation in Greek society, and (3) charismatic identification.⁴⁸

44. On displaced hostility, see Harding et al., pp. 1042–1044.

45. Cf. the remark of a Cypriot refugee: “They regard us almost as responsible for the situation.” See Evdokas et al., p. 56.

46. See Aigides, pp. 68–69, who violently attacks the view that “all the economic ills of Greece during the last decade flowed from the continuous and irresistible hemorrhage of the State budget” due to the refugee influx.

47. “Radicalism” is here used only with reference to the Left, i.e., mainly the A.P. and the C.P. in interwar Greece.

48. Pentzopoulos, pp. 173–177, emphasizes “two main forces”: the “progressive outlook” of the refugees, and their devotion to Venizelos personally. However, his argument on the refugee “progressive outlook” is both conceptually and factually weak.

The Situation of Unredeemed Greeks

The exuberant illusions created by the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 among the non-Turkish populations of the Ottoman Empire were rapidly dispelled when the new regime showed its doctrinal nationalist hostility and adopted a policy of forced "Ottomanization." The Greeks of Eastern Thrace and Anatolia soon became a prime target, because of their sensitive location in conjunction with the irredentist aspirations shared by them and by the neighboring "mother country." In 1914, the forcible deportation of Greeks from the Smyrna area into the interior was adopted, sending the first wave of about 150,000 Asia Minor refugees to Greece, and forcing the Venizelos government to accept a Turkish proposal for the exchange of the Greeks in Eastern Thrace and the Smyrna area with the Moslems of Greek Macedonia and Epirus. With the outbreak of World War I and Turkish belligerence, negotiations were broken off, and the Greek populations of Turkey were faced with the imminent danger of total annihilation.⁴⁹

In light of this situation, the Venizelos policy that Greece should enter the war on the side of the Entente was not merely a wild irredentist or even "imperialist" venture for the realization of the Great Idea, as it is often portrayed. In concrete terms, it represented the last and only realistic plan to save ancient Greek communities of probably more than two million people from imminent extinction.⁵⁰ After the Greek occupation of Eastern Thrace and the Smyrna area, this policy appeared to be reaching a successful conclusion.

In contrast, Antivenizelism, despite its bombastic nationalism and the Byzantine romanticism surrounding King Constantine, opted for neutrality, which, in practical terms, meant total inaction and the *abandonment* of unredeemed Greeks to their fate. Neutrality was sometimes construed by Antivenizelism as a better means of saving the Greeks in Turkey, by avoiding open hostilities with that country.⁵¹ However, given the actual situation in 1914–1915 and the massive implementation of the Turkish deportation measures, such an interpretation was naïvely unrealistic at best, if not grossly deceptive.

Despite its disastrous continuation of the Asia Minor campaign in

49. Ibid., pp. 53–57. The figure of 150,000 early refugees from Asia Minor is four times that reported in the 1928 Census. Many had returned to their homes in 1919–1922.

50. On population estimates, see *ibid.*, pp. 29–33; and Pallis, pp. 80–83. This interpretation of his policy was forcefully restated by Venizelos in 1930 during the parliamentary debate on the Ankara Convention. See Chamber, 25 June 1930, *Efemeris*, pp. 1328–1330.

51. This was the principal argument of Tsaldares, also during the debate on the Ankara Convention. Ibid., pp. 1337–1342.

1920–1922, this practical indifference of Antivenizelism (or at least a significant part thereof) to the fate of unredeemed Greeks appeared to persist. It was highlighted in several incidents, which acquired great symbolic significance and became forever engraved in Venizelist and refugee memory. In March 1922, the deputies from Thrace faced the undisguised hostility of the Antivenizelist Assembly during a heated session. A deputy reportedly urged them to go away, while another replied to their desperate cry that “the people are being slaughtered by Kemal” by exclaiming: “Better that you be slaughtered by Kemal than ourselves by Gypares!”⁵² Much more authoritative were the two infamous articles by G. Vlachos, the foremost ideologue of Antivenizelism, advocating the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor, and published on the very eve of the Disaster, after the final Turkish offensive had actually begun. Despite the careful and rather evasive wording, their meaning within the given historical context was unmistakable. The first explicitly proposed that the defense of Asia Minor be “handed over” to its “brave inhabitants” while “Greece” returned “homeward.”⁵³ The second did not even mention the Greeks of Asia Minor, except by implication: they were clearly not part and no concern of the “Greece” that Vlachos had in mind:

The blood of Greece does not flow in her veins to be spilled in farthest Asia Minor. It flows to warm Greece and move her into action, for herself, and for the Greece of tomorrow. The iron German chancellor once said: “Not one Pomeranian for the East.” And Greece must no longer give her Pomeranians for the East which is beyond her designs. Not one evzone for new adventures.⁵⁴

52. Quoted in Apostolopoulos, p. 105. These phrases do not appear in the official parliamentary record, but this is hardly conclusive, given the highly sensitive and disorderly character of the incident. In any event, whether actually uttered or not, these phrases reflected the spirit of the time, which accounts for their credibility and for their effectiveness as a Venizelist political myth. The allusion to Gypares, the most hated instrument of Venizelist repression against political opponents in 1917–1920, should perhaps be explained. As the war situation in 1922 appeared to have reached an impasse, there were voices proclaiming that Venizelos should be called to handle the crisis. In effect, the phrase attributed to the Antivenizelist deputy meant: “We prefer anything to a return of Venizelist oppression.”

53. “Oikade . . .” [Homeward . . .], *Kathemerine*, 14 August 1922, reprinted in Vlachos, pp. 16–18.

54. “Hoi Pomeranoi” [The Pomeranians], *Kathemerine*, 17 August 1922, reprinted in Vlachos, pp. 19–21. Vlachos later explained that the two articles in question had been suggested by Gounares, in order to prepare public opinion, and had not contributed to the collapse of the front, which had already occurred. Authorship of the second article was actually claimed by N. Kraniotakes, a rabidly Antivenizelist and antirefugee journalist. See *Kathemerine*, 11 and 12 January 1949. None of these belated explanations affects the point made here, i.e., that the two articles reflected a characteristic Antivenizelist indifference towards the fate of unredeemed Greeks.

It is therefore no wonder that the unredeemed Greeks and future refugees, especially in Turkey, *as early as* 1914–1915 turned to Venizelism, the only political camp which promised them salvation, and became viscerally hostile to Antivenizelism, the camp which seemed to passively accept their destruction. The initial impressive successes of Venizelist policy, above all as embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), and their ultimate ruin at the hands of the successor Antivenizelist regime only served to confirm and reinforce this previous alignment—with the force of a holocaust.

The ultimate merits of the Greek military involvement in Asia Minor are largely irrelevant in this respect. Even if one holds that it was only by accident, so to speak, that Antivenizelism was in power at the time of the Disaster, and that it would have happened anyway, this historical accident was more than sufficient to shape refugee attitudes. It would be idle to hypothesize what might have happened in this respect if Venizelos had been in power. Nevertheless, it may be safely assumed that the management of the crisis would have been significantly different, especially concerning the fate of the Greek population, about which Antivenizelist inaction could hardly be equaled.

Refugee Rehabilitation

Neither the native Greek society nor its state was ready to welcome and accept the incoming refugees, as seen previously. As early as 1914–1915, the first Asia Minor refugees were faced with the callous indifference, if not outright hostility, of public servants (typically Old Greeks) who harassed them with all sorts of petty bureaucratic and police measures.⁵⁵ Harassment was followed by the November 1916 pogrom, which was openly sponsored by the state authorities in Athens.

From the very beginning, therefore, Venizelism became practically the only effective vehicle of refugee incorporation and rehabilitation in Greek society, as well as their sole protector against native hostility—a role which Venizelism eagerly assumed, and sought to monopolize thereafter. Immediately following the Disaster, the 1922 Revolution took a series of drastic and bold measures for the relief and settlement of the refugees.⁵⁶

55. For several such incidents, see VA Files 99 and 101.

56. The protection of the refugees was specifically included in the notorious 1924 decree for the safeguard of the Republic (*Katochyrotikon*). See Chapter 2 above and the debate in the Fourth Constituent Assembly, 25 May 1924, *Praktika*, pp. 81 and 86 in particular. The decree was rarely, if ever, applied and therefore offered no effective legal protection to the refugees against native discrimination. It should rather be seen as a symbolic measure.

Such policies were more or less energetically continued by successive Venizelist governments and by Venizelist-dominated government services until 1933. One should add the manifold refugee relief activities channeled through Venizelist political and even private agencies, such as philanthropic groups of Venizelist ladies or Venizelos and his wife personally.

One can hardly overemphasize the role of Venizelism as agent for the *integration* of the refugees into the Greek political system. Both on the local and on the national level, they were immediately recognized as an integral and even privileged part of the Venizelist camp, and of the L.P. in particular, entitled to representation on party tickets and in both local and national government.⁵⁷ Refugee associations became an integral part of the web of Venizelist partisan organizations. Initially excluded from native patron-client networks, the refugees rapidly developed their own networks or rather political machines, headed by refugee or prorefugee politicians and enjoying access to the top Venizelist leaders, including Venizelos personally. Therefore, the refugees justifiably saw the Venizelist Republic as “their” regime, and the L.P. in particular as “their” party.

Antivenizelist hostility was probably even more decisive in its political consequences than Venizelist acceptance of the refugees. In their eyes, the many inadequacies and ambiguities of the latter naturally tended to evaporate before the open and unambiguous explicitness of the former. From the very beginning, as already noted, Antivenizelism not only appeared indifferent to the plight of the refugees, but actually became the vehicle for native hostility and aggression, and even systematically exploited and manipulated such hostility, using the refugees as a convenient scapegoat. Throughout the first decade of the refugee presence in Greece after 1922, Antivenizelism was not only absent, or excluded, from the great task of refugee relief and settlement, but actually attacked it and often explicitly promised to reverse it, once in power.

This was most apparent in the New Lands, where Antivenizelist politicians, throughout the interwar period, kept alive the hopes of the natives that refugee land would sometime be redistributed to them. In 1934, Gotzamanes, a prominent Antivenizelist leader in Macedonia, reportedly exclaimed:

57. Despite the perennial complaints voiced by the refugees themselves and the naïve, strictly proportional requirements of some observers, refugee interwar representation in both Parliament and the cabinet (almost exclusively as Venizelists) should be considered remarkable, given the structure of Greek politics and their own condition. The only quantitative estimates available are those by Pentzopoulos, pp. 186ff., who calculated the percentage of refugee deputies in 1923–1933 and found the following: 10.8 (1923), 12.5 (1926), 13.6 (1928), 15.2 (1932), and 12.0 (1933). These figures should be compared with the refugee proportion in the male population, i.e., 19.2 percent.

When, at last, Mr. Prime Minister, will the fields be taken away from the refugees, and restored to the natives?⁵⁸

Whatever the veracity of this particular report, it epitomized a permanent theme of Antivenizelist propaganda in the areas involved. Among many analogous incidents, suffice it to mention the striking case of the border village Angistri, in the Serres nome. It was inhabited by 160 native (Slavo-Macedonian) families, and 90 refugee families settled in 1925. Before the 1932 election, P.P. candidates promised the expulsion of the refugees and the distribution of their lands to the natives. During the short-lived first Tsaldares government, the natives proceeded to occupy part of the refugee lands. After its fall, encouraged by P.P. politicians, they attempted to terrorize the refugees into fleeing, eventually murdering two in February 1933.⁵⁹

Such incidents continuously reaffirmed the image of Venizelism as sole protector of even the physical safety of the refugees. A 1935 Royalist pamphlet addressed to them characteristically sought to dispel this image:

The tragic delusion that the sole protector of the refugees is Venizelism, and that Antivenizelism is their enemy, rose to truly tragic heights. Naïve refugees believed the unpatriotic Venizelist slander that, if ever the P.P. came to power, they would slaughter them and burn their settlements.⁶⁰

Such Venizelist propaganda, however, was only effective because it could draw from actual events and from the rabid Antivenizelist press.

On the political level, the initial reaction of Antivenizelism was to demand the exclusion or at least the segregation of the refugees from the political system. In 1923–1924, it first refused to accept their electoral participation, which was then allowed without registration, and then advocated the institution of separate refugee electoral colleges, similar to those created for Moslems and Jews.⁶¹ Although they had no chance of being granted by the militarily victorious Venizelist camp, such demands were nevertheless articulated, with lasting consequences for refugee political loyalties and consciousness. On the other hand, Antivenizelism systematically cultivated *native* consciousness and even defensive organization. In 1931, for example, the Antivenizelist mayor of Thessaloniki emphatically stated that a newly founded association of *natives* should prove “that

58. Quoted by L. Iasonides in the Senate and reported in *Neos Kosmos*, 14 July 1934.

59. The Prefect of Serres to Venizelos, 17 February 1933, VA File 113.

60. Adamantiou, p. 9.

61. See the Antivenizelist demands at the conference called by Venizelos on 19 January 1924, VA File 324.

we are not disinherited (*apopaidia*), but the pure and real children of Thessaloniki.”⁶²

During the 1928 electoral campaign, the authoritative *Kathemerine* of G. Vlachos offered one of the most comprehensive and systematic expressions of Antivenizelism as a defensive reaction of natives against refugees, recapitulating all the essential themes. On the one hand, the refugees are attacked as a captive electorate which, both through its numbers and through fraudulent means (gerrymandering, multiple registration and voting, etc.), has deprived the native majority of its legitimate political power and has made Venizelist usurpation possible. Denouncing the distribution of seats at the expense of Antivenizelist eparchies, the paper concludes:

Thus, 350 thousand native Greeks are deprived of the right of representation in Parliament, while the refugees will send three times as many as those they are entitled to.⁶³

According to the paper, “sixty thousand nonexistent refugees voted in 1926,” and multiple voting by refugees on a massive scale has, and will again deprive the natives of a majority in Athens.⁶⁴ In a transparent provocation, an anonymous refugee urges the natives to abstain, since their vote will be wasted because of the refugees, the captive and “professional” voters of Venizelism.⁶⁵ Eventually abandoning its advocacy of abstention, the paper proclaims that Antivenizelist unity is required to face a united Venizelism with its “refugee herd” and that everywhere

we must present ONE TICKET, THE GREEK ticket, THE TICKET OF THE NATIVES, THE TICKET OF SUCCESS.⁶⁶

Refugees have of course no place on such a ticket:

We were surprised to see, in yesterday’s papers, that the P.P. will include three refugee politicians on its Athens ticket. Why will it include them? On the basis of what morality, and on the basis of what expediency? Is it because all the nationwide refugee organizations demanded that Demetrios Gounares be put to death, or is it because in the last municipal elections even the poll-watchers of Mr. Merkoures voted for Mr. Patses in the refugee

62. See *Eleftheron Vema*, 28 October 1931.

63. “The Cooking,” *Kathemerine*, 14 July 1928.

64. “The Supernumeraries,” and “The Venizelist Infamies to Light: How the Refugees Acquired the Majority at the Expense of the Natives,” *Kathemerine*, 13 and 20 July 1928, respectively.

65. “Again the ‘Leper,’” *Kathemerine*, 14 July 1928.

66. “To Fellow Believers,” *Kathemerine*, 16 July 1928.

wards? But they are Greeks, and of the same blood, and brothers. *Let them be brothers and cousins.* When they acquire a political consciousness and a will of free citizens—which will never happen—then they will be entitled to be considered among *us*, not only as electors, but also as eligible. For the present, the refugees have no place on the tickets of the P.P., the party of Demetrios Gounares, because the party of D. Gounares, presenting itself twice and three times before their settlements, was met with insults and contempt. The refugees have a place on the Venizelist tickets, on which they are voted and for which they vote, doing perfectly.⁶⁷

On the other hand, refugee dominance through a Venizelist victory is vividly depicted as a menace for the natives. In what is probably another provocation, an anonymous group of “indigenous Athenians” focuses on the “secondary schism” between natives and refugees, a consequence of the initial National Schism, and warns fellow natives:

Voting for Venizelos, they necessarily vote for refugees, and voting for refugees, they vote for the plunder and the loss of their property—rural yesterday, real estate today, urban tomorrow. For that, the unfortunate refugees are not to blame. Because they have been ruined and want to live, anyhow, whether at the expense of the one or of the other. Venizelism is also not to blame. Because it knows that, if it displeases the refugees, it will be kicked out of Greece, like on 1 November. But what is the fault of us, natives? Why must we endure this total expropriation of Greece for the benefit of the refugees?

This question, however, requires an answer, and this answer must be practical and easily understood: *The natives, those among them who do not want the likes of Kirkos to snatch even the window shutters of their houses, must cross out two refugee candidates and write-in, whether two of their own party, or even, if there are no such candidates, two opponents. Because the opponents may bring the King, but they will not bring the bailiff, and the auction.*⁶⁸

Drawing the conclusions, Vlachos warns that a Venizelist electoral victory will bring a *double* dictatorship: the *political* dictatorship of the Liberals and the *economic* dictatorship of the refugees, whose “prey” the urban houses and real estate of the natives will soon become.⁶⁹

67. “The P.P. and the Refugees,” *Kathemerine*, 19 July 1928. Emphasis added. Merkoures and Patses were the Antivenizelist and the Venizelist candidate, respectively, for mayor of Athens.

68. “A Division Worthy of Attention,” *Kathemerine*, 20 July 1928. The reference is to the November 1920 election. Kirkos was a refugee minister, held responsible for the expropriation of native real estate in Athens. He later defected to Antivenizelism.

69. “The Other Side,” *Kathemerine*, 21 July 1928. A few days later, on 29 July 1928, the imminent danger was vividly portrayed with a front-page report on the expropriation, for the

Only gradually, and essentially after 1930, would the P.P. and Tsaldares personally come to realize the necessity and the potential of an overture to the refugees, as will be seen.⁷⁰ Despite this major turn, however, Antivenizelism as a whole, and the monarchy in particular, were never able to free themselves from the initial image of embodying native reaction against the refugees.

Charismatic Identification

Although actually inseparable from the two aspects discussed above, charismatic identification may be treated as an analytically distinct dimension, both for its extraordinary significance and for the continuity it provided, as the core element of refugee political loyalties. First as unredeemed Greeks, then as refugees, these people found themselves in a uniquely severe and traumatic crisis, where physical survival itself was repeatedly at stake. Predictably, they were in dire psychological need of a “savior,” whom they found in Venizelos. How he appeared to serve and guarantee their material or otherwise concrete interests has already been discussed. What should be stressed at this point is the powerful emotional and symbolic aspect.

Despite everything, Venizelos remained the living symbol and providential instrument of the stillborn “Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas” created on the paper of the Treaty of Sèvres. After the Disaster, this glorious and benevolent father or rather *grandfather* figure⁷¹ not only was seen as the ultimate guarantor of refugee safety and survival, the ultimate protector against native hostility, but also provided an object of symbolic compensation for misery and discrimination. This is well reflected in a message that a refugee group in Euboea sent him upon his return to power in 1928:

And our life, which was condemned to go on with the honorific, for us, name “dirty refugees,” now finds its sunrise, its resurrection in the person of that great man who, with the dew of his sympathy, with the ideal of pure humanitarianism, with the luminous sun of philanthropy, embraced and adopted the victims of the Asia Minor tragedy.⁷²

benefit of “rich refugees,” of an estate near Athens, whose “unfortunate owner, deprived of everything, went insane”(!).

70. Already in 1928, Tsaldares is reported to have reprimanded Vlachos for his attacks on the refugees, and particularly for his article of 19 July 1928. See the Security Police Bulletin, 20 July 1928, VA File 103.

71. Venizelos was actually nicknamed “the Grandfather” (*ho Pappous*) by his interwar supporters. See Somerites, p. 108.

72. Letter to Venizelos, 21 July 1928, VA File 376.

Pentzopoulos, thirty years later, personally witnessed “the strange spell that Venizelos exerted over the refugees.”⁷³

Venizelos was of course keenly aware of this extraordinary emotional attachment, and repeatedly appealed to it whenever he would not grant refugee demands. The essential message was always that “sacred” and indestructible bonds had been forged between himself and the refugees, bonds which could not be affected by, nor become contingent upon “crass” material interests. Thus, in the aftermath of the 1929 senatorial election, Venizelos stated that the failure of the “miserable” propaganda exhorting the refugees to abstain (if full compensation was not forthcoming) proved their maturity and their assimilation with the natives.

It also proves that the refugee world, which voted continuously and uninterruptedly for the Republican camp from 1923 onward, voted according to a superior ideology, and not to serve merely material interests, as some have sometimes claimed.⁷⁴

Pressing for the ratification of the Ankara Convention in 1930, he again appealed to these bonds, stating that their destruction, rather than the loss of the refugee vote, would be “exceptionally painful” for him. Nevertheless, he was willing to risk such pain because he was convinced that the question of refugee compensations should be terminated once and for all. Otherwise, the country would be pushed to economic bankruptcy and civil war.⁷⁵

Just as refugee Venizelism has been misleadingly attributed to the specific responsibilities of the Disaster as such, it has often been implied that the death of Venizelos “freed” the refugees in one stroke from their previous political loyalty and made them available for Communism. This is however a simplistic view. In particular, it ignores developments which were well under way before the death of Venizelos, and which this death may be more accurately said to have merely *accelerated*. To these we shall now turn.

REFUGEE SEPARATISM

The primacy of historical and emotional bonds over material interests that Venizelos and Venizelism counted upon with respect to the refugees was in fact a perennially fragile and unstable state of affairs, and could never be

73. Pentzopoulos, p. 177. An Asia Minor refugee priest even told him: “The Lord had sent him to us to unite us all.”

74. Venizelos notes, VA File 280.

75. Chamber, 25 June 1930, *Efemeris*, pp. 1328–1330.

taken entirely for granted. Important dimensions of the refugee condition—above all ethnic consciousness and alienation from Greek society, in conjunction with pressing needs and explosive issues such as debts and compensations—pointed to the potential for what may be called refugee “separatism,” namely, the emancipation of the refugees from all previous political loyalties, and the pursuit of their particularistic interests through independent and opportunistic political action.⁷⁶

More concretely, the ever-present temptation was for the refugees to “sell” their compact and pivotal vote to the highest bidder, that is, the party or politician who, at any given moment, would promise most with respect to their own particular problems and demands—demands which, by their very nature, could never be fully and finally satisfied. Within this perspective, a distinctive brand of refugee politicians and agitators came into being, best known under the infamous name of *prosfygopateres* (literally, “fathers of the refugees”). They sought to gain control of the refugee vote through maximalist demagogy and political machines built around various refugee organizations, in order to eventually trade this vote against prorefugee policies or even more particularistic and self-serving measures. Conversely, the temptation was compelling for nonrefugee political leaders to court the refugee vote and establish themselves as the foremost protectors and purveyors of refugee interests. This was the case of both local politicians and national figures, such as Plasteras and Kondyles in particular. For their part, refugees were extremely susceptible to demagogy and repeatedly proved available for all sorts of political ventures. As a prominent Marxist aptly put it, the refugees were highly “flammable material,” with an “adventurous disposition” created by their situation.⁷⁷

The ever-present potential for refugee separatism, which repeatedly threatened to subvert and overwhelm refugee Venizelism, may be better understood and illustrated through a rapid survey of relevant interwar developments. From the very beginning, Venizelists realized and feared the possibility that the dissatisfied refugees might massively turn against them. “If the refugee multitudes turn against us (since the present Government can’t possibly satisfy them) what happens?”⁷⁸ This ominous prospect

76. Refugee particularism was exacerbated by the fragmentation of the refugees themselves along ethnic lines—by country, area, or even locality of origin. Ethnicity, the essential constitutive element of the group, also provided the principle of its differentiation into compact communal subgroups. Ethnic cleavages among the refugees had an important impact on the degree to which they remained attached to Venizelism, and continually threatened to destroy the overall unity of the refugee communal bloc as a Venizelist stronghold.

77. See Maximos, p. 42.

78. N. Apostolopoulos to A. Michalopoulos (then private secretary of Venizelos), 2 February 1923, VA File 356. See also N. Apostolopoulos to Kokos Melas, 24 November

seemed imminent after Venizelos concluded, in Lausanne, first the Convention for the exchange of populations, then the peace treaty itself: both were anathema for the refugees, who still refused to accept the inevitable consequences of the Disaster.⁷⁹

This prospect was then averted by the increasing polarization over the regime issue. The refugees threw their massive support behind Plastiras, the Revolution, and the cause of the Republic. In October 1923, they actually fought for them against the Antivenizelist Counterrevolution, which incidentally also destroyed any chance that Metaxas might lure the refugee vote. The impact of this vote was then heavily felt, for the first time, in the election of the Fourth Constituent Assembly (December 1923)⁸⁰ and in the plebiscite of April 1924.

During the tumultuous life of the Assembly, refugee separatism was manifested on a number of occasions by its 43 refugee members. In 1924, 23 deputies (of whom 20 were refugees) founded the National Republican Party "for the systematic support of local and refugee issues" and offered its leadership to Kondyles.⁸¹ Soon thereafter, local party organizations in Eastern Macedonia (especially Drama and Kavalla), which were armed and heavily composed of refugees, were used by Kondyles as minister of interior to break strikes and terrorize workers, in what was a characteristically fascist or protofascist experiment.⁸²

Kondyles appeared again as *deus ex machina* on the eve of the 1926 election, in which refugee demands became a central issue for the first time: they concerned the immediate payment of the long-delayed compensations to the refugees. Organizations speaking mostly for the urban refugees threatened abstention unless payments started immediately, even if

1922, VA File 317, where it is reported that the refugees have "horrible complaints" and that Metaxas is infiltrating them.

79. See Kafandares to Venizelos, 20 June 1923, VA File 321, also published in Veremis, p. 335, where Venizelos is warned of the political dangers of refugee dissatisfaction. See VA File 320 for the many refugee protests against the Lausanne Convention, and especially the letter of Venizelos to N. G. Kyriakides, 26 January 1923, where he noted: "I know that the refugee world will anathematize me for what I am doing." His correspondent, however, assured him: "The refugee world and the unredeemed nation will never anathematize its redeemer."

80. See A. Michalakopoulos to Venizelos, 2 December 1923, VA File 323, where the irresistible tide of Republicanism is attributed to the refugees. "The Revolution, through the refugees, awards its strength to its favored tickets of Republicans."

81. See Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 97.

82. Fourth Constituent, 19–22 November 1924, *Praktika*, pp. 339–340 and 354 in particular. It may be noted that refugees continued to be distinctly available for fascist ventures. The most important fascist, or protofascist, and rabidly anti-Semitic organization in Northern Greece ("National Union 'Greece'," commonly known as EEE or as 3 E's from its initials) is reported to have been heavily composed of refugees. See the letter of Captain Skardakes (one of the founders and leaders) to Pavlos (Gypares?), 8 August 1931, VA File 387.

this required that the election be postponed. Other refugee groups threatened to present separate refugee tickets and parties, offering the nominal leadership to the dissatisfied Liberal Sofoules. On the Antivenizelist side, Metaxas, in addition to his declared republicanism, openly promised immediate refugee compensation, while the P.P., through *Kathemerine*, was content with separate refugee tickets, which it hypocritically recommended for the more effective promotion of refugee interests. The reaction of mainstream Venizelism, then represented by the "Union of Liberals" and *Eleftheron Vema*, can only be described as true panic. Refugees were warned that

abstaining, they will risk receiving nothing. When the house of the Greek Republic will have perhaps collapsed, its ruins will surely not be used for refugee compensation . . . many other and rapacious mouths have been waiting for a long time.⁸³

The two other refugee options, voting for Antivenizelism or for separate refugee tickets, were depicted as equally catastrophic: the first would also lead to the fall of the Republic, whereas the latter would squander refugee political strength and would exacerbate native hostility.⁸⁴

Despite the frantic Venizelist propaganda and organizational efforts, the situation seems to have been saved only when the National Bank, under heavy pressure by the Kondyles government and the Liberals, finally consented to begin payments, four days before the election. Interested refugee organizations then called for a massive vote in favor of the "Union of Liberals," while most separate refugee tickets were withdrawn. The 1926 Venizelist nightmare was thus over. Yet, several conservative Liberals, drawing the lessons of the election, expressed concern over the dominant weight acquired within the party by the "forever moving refugee bank (*banquise*)," whose demands were unpredictable.⁸⁵

The triumphant return and electoral landslide of Venizelos in 1928 left no room for particularistic refugee agitation. Such agitation resumed, however, on the eve of the 1929 senatorial election, threatening, once again, refugee abstention if "full compensation" was not promised beforehand. As mentioned earlier, Venizelos then sternly resisted such pressure, and subsequently concluded that he had suffered no losses in consequence.

A major turning point was reached in June 1930, when Venizelos presented the Ankara Convention to the Chamber for immediate

83. "The Refugee Dilemma," *Eleftheron Vema*, 13 October 1926.

84. "Again Concerning the Refugees," *Eleftheron Vema*, 15 October 1926.

85. See N. Broumes to Venizelos, 12 November 1926, VA File 327; and K. Spyrides to Venizelos, 9 January 1927, VA File 328.

ratification. The long parliamentary debate, on 17, 23, 24, and 25 June 1930, which was mostly limited to refugee deputies and the party leaders, proved extremely significant.

Although the bulk of refugee deputies reluctantly submitted to L.P. discipline under obvious moral pressure, a smaller group of *prosfygopateres*, both inside and outside Parliament, permanently severed their ties with the Liberals and vociferously denounced the Convention as a sellout of refugee rights. Venizelos not only defended the Convention, but also emphatically declared that the vision of "full compensation" had to be irrevocably replaced by the vision of "full rehabilitation," that is, adequate settlement for all refugees. He violently attacked dissenting *prosfygopateres* as a "threat to national unity," opening a new cleavage between refugees and natives, and pushing the country to the brink of civil war. But he also seemed to dismiss the future political dangers of such agitation. Appealing to the historical bonds linking him to the refugee world, he referred at great length to the responsibility of his opponents for the Disaster and the refugee tragedy.

Among Venizelist leaders, however, both Kafandares and Kondyles rejected the Convention, thus announcing their intention to court refugee support in the future. On the Left, the A.P., represented by Anthrakopoulos, also rejected the Convention. So did the C.P., which was not represented in the Chamber.⁸⁶ For his part, Tsaldares inaugurated a historical turn in Antivenizelist strategy by attacking the Convention and defending those refugees opposed to it. In a masterful balancing act, he denounced the settlement with Turkey *both* because it would increase the financial burden born by the natives *and* because it deprived the refugees of their right to full compensation. Completing his obvious overture to the latter, he also referred to the responsibilities for the Disaster, seeking to dispel "the poison with which these refugees had been imbued, that a part of the natives with its political world had willed their destruction."⁸⁷

The debate on the Ankara Convention thus announced future realignments of critical importance.⁸⁸ Party leaders soon began outbidding each other for refugee support. Kafandares, for example, sought to make an issue out of the inequalities in price and size between refugee lots in various regions.⁸⁹ It was Kondyles, however, who proved most aggressive

86. See KKE, Vol. 3, pp. 199–200.

87. Chamber, 25 June 1930, *Efemeris*, p. 1339.

88. Its importance is also indicated by the fact that the speech by Venizelos was printed and distributed through the Athens Liberal Club in almost 200,000 copies: 100,000 for Macedonia, 50,000 for Thrace, and 34,000 for the Athens area. See the list in VA File 423.

89. L. Iasonides and A. Papadatos to Venizelos, 7 July 1931, VA File 358.

in this field. Having systematically cultivated refugee support ever since 1924 and confirmed it during a tour of Northern Greece in 1928,⁹⁰ he proceeded to create a new issue on the eve of the 1932 election by promising to pay the 25 percent hitherto withheld by the National Bank from all refugee compensations. This promise then passed almost unnoticed amidst the polarization over the regime issue which dominated that election. But it returned with a vengeance in March 1933.

By then, it was the "United Opposition" as a whole which promised the 25 percent. Its generous platform, addressed to the "Brother Refugees," was drafted by two of the notorious *prosfygopateres* who had broken with Venizelism in 1930, and bore the signatures of Tsaldares, Metaxas, Chatzkyriakos, and Kondyles. The last, in particular, not only vouched for the republicanism of the coalition, but also contributed his personal credibility as a protector of the refugees, patiently built ever since 1924 and especially in 1926 and 1930. At the end of various promises, among which the 25 percent was the only concrete commitment, the tract judiciously reminded the refugees that the L. P. had officially declared that "no refugee is entitled any more to any sum whatsoever."⁹¹

Venizelism and Venizelos personally then seem to have underestimated the threat, which proved a fatal mistake. Refusing to play the game, they denounced the financial irresponsibility of the opponents, who promised to pay an enormous sum at a time of crippling economic crisis—and this "without a substantial burden for the budget," as Tsaldares cryptically claimed. Attempting once again to move the debate from material to "ideological" issues, they denounced Antivenizelist propaganda as an insult to the refugees: it implied that their vote could be bought with material benefits, whereas their loyalties were due to "who was responsible for their uprooting." More than an insult, it was blackmail: the refugees were faced with the dilemma either to vote for Antivenizelism and cash the 25 percent or confront an explosion of native anger.⁹²

Venizelist refusal to draw the lessons of past experience, especially that of 1926, had disastrous consequences. Enough refugees were moved by the bait of the 25 percent to *secure* electoral victory for Antivenizelism. Suffice it to note that 20 out of the critical 21 Athens seats were lost to

90. See Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 181–182.

91. For the text, which was also printed in Turkish, see VA File 359; and *Eleftheron Vema*, 4 March 1933, which denounced the Turkish version as an insult to the Greekness of the refugees. It may be added that refugee defectors to Antivenizelism were characteristically denigrated as *donmedes*, from *doenmeh*, a Turkish term which had originally designated the Jews ostensibly converted to the Moslem faith in Thessaloniki.

92. See the speech of Venizelos in *Eleftheron Vema*, 3 March 1933; and *Eleftheron Vema*, 2 March 1933.

Venizelism by less than 2,000 votes, almost certainly less than refugee defections.⁹³

A large part of such defections proved extremely short-lived, however, even though the consequences were irreparable. The 25 percent was of course never paid, after Antivenizelism came to power. This breach of promise, together with renewed polarization after the abortive Plasteras coup and the attempted assassination of Venizelos, rapidly drew much of the "floating" refugee vote back to the Venizelist fold. This was apparent during the critical Thessaloniki by-election in July 1933. It is specifically reported that refugee support for Kondyles had by then almost disappeared.⁹⁴ The P.P., however, patiently continued its penetration of the refugee community and preserved a sizable part of refugee defectors. Important refugee organizations threatened to pass under P.P. control, while the party at last proceeded to create its own refugee "Center."⁹⁵

Nevertheless, political developments after 1933 left little room for further refugee particularistic agitation and practically precluded any further refugee defections to Antivenizelism. Despite the P.P.'s low visibility efforts, the original antirefugee spirit of Antivenizelism, now in power, resumed on several levels.⁹⁶ It reached the proportions of hysteria after the disastrous Venizelist coup of March 1935, during which the refugees in Macedonia had massively volunteered and fought on the rebel side. Refugees were therefore a prime target of the savage repression that followed, both under Tsaldares and, especially, under Kondyles, their former champion. Within this context, ludicrously belated efforts to "sell" royal cha-

93. If the nationwide estimate in Table 38 is assumed to be valid for Athens as well, refugee defections to Antivenizelism must have exceeded 3,000. It is significant, however, that Tsigdemoglou, one of the most notorious refugee defectors, was the *only* unsuccessful Antivenizelist candidate in the Athens district, which probably reflects native reluctance to vote for a refugee.

94. See "George" to G. Sartzetakes (a Venizelist Gendarmerie officer), 6 June 1933, VA File 429. The author of this letter, most probably a Gendarmerie officer in Thessaloniki, reports that the refugees, despite their "fluid consciousness" affected by the promise that both urban and rural debts would be canceled, were not going to be fooled again after the disappointment of the 25 percent. Moreover, Kondyles was losing 50–100 percent of his previous support, depending on the area.

95. See A. Giannopoulos to Venizelos, 6 November 1933, VA File 399. In this "absolutely confidential" letter, an official of the Joint Commission of Unredeemed and Refugees (*Koine Alytroton kai Prosfygon Epitropeia*) warned Venizelos that the organization, claiming 184 local branches, was in danger of being taken over by P.P. supporters because of the lack of funds "after 16 years of Liberal action." See also the address of Tsaldares to the council of the "newly created" Center of P.P. Refugees, 4 January 1935, VA File 405.

96. A characteristic measure was the creation of separate peripheral municipalities in order to remove the refugee vote from municipal elections in Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Volos, etc. See also Chapter 7.

risma to the refugees could have no noticeable impact.⁹⁷ While the path to Antivenizelism seemed forever closed, the door to radicalism opened wider.

This was precisely what a perceptive conservative newspaper feared in early 1936, when it reviewed the position of the refugees in Greek politics. It claimed that their overall assimilation had proceeded rapidly, except in politics, where the cleavage between refugees and natives was becoming more exacerbated every year.

After every election, politicians and newspapers of the Antivenizelist camp attacked the entire refugee population, they insulted it and offended it in its most sacred feelings. And in the moments of civil convulsion all the wrath of the prevailing Antivenizelists turned against the refugees: "Let's burn the settlements" was the usual slogan. And the police forces were always willing to implement this slogan, using violence in the worst possible manner—as happened last March—against harmless and innocent refugees.

[Now, after the election, the preaching of hatred by politicians and newspapers of the Antivenizelist camp is more intense and odious than ever, endangering national unity.]

We may, perhaps, not approve of the attachment of the refugee world to the slogans and idols of the one camp, even though—knowing that after all that has happened it can no longer turn to Antivenizelism—we prefer the Venizelist fanaticism of the refugees to their switching to communism.⁹⁸

REFUGEE RADICALISM

From the very beginning, what was most widely feared was not that the refugees might switch to Antivenizelism, but rather that they would swell the ranks of Communist subversion. In his 1924 interpellation against the decree for the safeguard of the Republic (*Katochyrotikon*), the conservative Zavitzianos characteristically claimed that the republican regime

is only endangered by the movement which is observed in an as yet small class of workers *and refugees*, and which the Government must face seriously before it expands and brings the decomposition and the chaos that it brought elsewhere.⁹⁹

97. This situation was implicitly recognized by Kondyles himself, when, attacking the Republican leaders in his Athens speech of 27 October 1935, he wondered why they should concern themselves over the fate of "the imprisoned, the cashiered officers, the refugees, all those who were misled into rebelling against the legitimate State." Quoted in Merkoures, p. 231. On Royalist propaganda addressed to the refugees, see in particular the pamphlet by Adamantou.

98. "Hoi Prosfyges kai he Hellas" [The Refugees and Greece], *Hestia*, 5 February 1936.

99. Fourth Constituent, 25 May 1924, *Praktika*, Vol. 2, p. 81. Emphasis added. At the same time, armed refugees were used by Kondyles to break strikes and terrorize the workers, as seen previously. The contradiction illustrates the erratic availability of the refugees.

Such fears can best be understood when placed in the specific historical context at the time of the refugee influx. The 1917 Revolution in Russia and the consolidation of the Bolshevik regime had shocked and terrified the bourgeoisie all over Europe—in Greece probably more than elsewhere, given the novelty of the socialist movement there. Developments in Russia appeared directly linked to the dramatic rise of domestic subversion, with the creation of the Socialist Labor Party in 1918, its rapid conversion to Bolshevism, and its vociferous agitation. The miserable and rootless refugee masses, “flammable material” as Maximos put it, seemed supremely vulnerable to revolutionary propaganda. Those among them who came from southern Russia and the Caucasus were actually suspected of bringing Bolshevik ideas with them.¹⁰⁰

The satisfactory settlement of the refugees, and in particular their accession to *real property*, whether rural or urban, was thus conceived as the most effective strategy for making them immune to leftist agitation. Full ownership of one’s house or agricultural land was supposed to firmly establish a fundamentally “bourgeois” identity, taken in its broadest sense.¹⁰¹ Placed in this perspective, the settlement of the refugees and their establishment as property owners have been commonly hailed, then and later, as an achievement which left *no* ground for the C.P.¹⁰²

It should be obvious from the earlier discussion, however, how the actual *incompleteness* of this achievement undermined its political efficacy: not only was refugee ownership typically less than full, but it was also never attained by a large proportion of the urban refugees. Venizelos himself seemed to eventually realize the implications, when in 1933 he rejected the 25 percent payments and gave top priority to

the completion of the housing of those still homeless, whose situation disgraces our civilization, and is a permanent danger against the social order.¹⁰³

As he never had a chance to correct this past omission, the indictment is justified, on his previous record, that he actually

did not discern that the wretchedness of the refugees constituted the principal threat against the social order.¹⁰⁴

100. See Diomidis-Petsalis, pp. 241–242.

101. Among many examples, see the report of A. Michalakopoulos “On the Needs of Macedonia and Thrace,” VA File 106, where, after a tour of inspection in 1929, this most articulate conservative strongly recommends the housing of homeless refugees and workers *in full ownership*, which will “check the communist current, and infuse a conservative spirit.”

102. See, e.g., Protonotarios, p. 164; and Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 95.

103. *Eleftheron Vema*, 3 March 1933.

104. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 97.

Regardless of the manifold shortcomings of refugee settlement, however, the underlying notion that such ownership by itself would constitute a promotion into the conservative “bourgeoisie” is of course inadequate, even though it was then a central tenet of Greek political thinking. Beyond and often despite the question of property itself, refugee radicalism grew out of deeper and more complex factors in the refugee condition, which fall under two broad headings: *ethnicity* and *class*. Ethnic groups subjected to discrimination and alienated from the larger society in which they live are generally known to be inclined towards the Left.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, as peasants or as workers, refugees were likely to turn to the Left (i.e., the A.P. or the C.P.) in accordance with their class situation.¹⁰⁶

The overall dimensions of refugee radicalism have already been estimated (see Tables 36–38 above). The separate contributions of ethnicity and class now remain to be ascertained, within the limits imposed by the

Table 41 THE A.P., AGRICULTURE, AND THE REFUGEES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Native	+.04	+.11	+.04	+.03	+.05
Agriculture	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)
	.054	.002	.123	.001	.002
% Refugee	–.05	+.25	+.03	–.02	+.05
Agriculture	(.06)	(.10)	(.07)	(.03)	(.05)
	.453	.016	.676	.429	.313
% Refugees	+.06	+.00	+.01	+.06	+.03
	(.05)	(.08)	(.06)	(.02)	(.04)
	.180	.996	.808	.003	.380
<i>a</i>	–.49	.38	–.17	–1.18	–.36
	(1.14)	(1.86)	(1.38)	(.49)	(.95)
	.668	.838	.901	.018	.702
<i>r</i>	.15	.40	.15	.35	.32
<i>s</i>	5.13	8.43	6.22	2.23	4.30

105. See Lipset et al., “The Psychology of Voting,” p. 1140.

106. Downward social mobility was probably an obstacle to the growth of refugee radicalism, since downward mobile persons are likely to retain values and patterns of behavior of their previous class position and hence be more conservative than would otherwise be expected in their current situation. See Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility*, pp. 69–71. With respect to the refugees, this argument may be found in Tsoucalas, *Greek Tragedy*, pp. 39–40; and Elefantas, pp. 305 and 315–317.

Table 42 THE C.P., MANUFACTURING, AND THE REFUGEES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Native	+.07	+.10	+.07	+.21	+.12
Manufacturing	(.04) .067	(.06) .098	(.06) .239	(.07) .001	(.05) .024
% Refugee	+.40	+1.07	+1.23	+.77	+.85
Manufacturing	(.09) .000	(.16) .000	(.16) .000	(.17) .000	(.14) .000
% Refugees	+.00 (.02) .979	+.00 (.03) .975	+.00 (.03) .886	+.06 (.03) .051	+.01 (.02) .604
a	-.02 (.53) .969	.75 (.92) .419	.78 (.91) .393	.01 (.97) .994	.60 (.78) .442
r	.48	.61	.66	.59	.62
s	3.24	5.64	5.52	5.93	4.78

data available. As seen in Chapter 3, the peasants (new smallholders) constituted the class basis of the A.P., and the workers in manufacturing that of the C.P. It may therefore be asked (1) whether support for these two parties was *greater* among refugee than among native peasants and workers, respectively, and (2) whether refugee support for the two parties of the Left extended *beyond* their class basis. According to Tables 41 and 42, the answer to the first question is unambiguously affirmative for the A.P. in 1932 at least, and for the C.P. in every election. On the second question, the answer appears to be affirmative for both parties only in 1936, indicating that they drew little, if any, refugee support earlier among nonpeasants and nonworkers, respectively.¹⁰⁷ One may therefore conclude that ethnicity made a contribution to refugee radicalism over and above that of class per se. Initially confined mostly to the particular class audience of the two leftist parties, this contribution seems to have extended beyond it only towards the end of the interwar period.¹⁰⁸ Given

107. Given that *only* the distribution of post-Disaster refugees by occupational sector is available, sectors, rather than classes, had to be used. Native agriculture and manufacturing (as a percentage of the total active male population) were obtained by subtracting the refugee percentages from the overall percentage of each sector. Alternative models yield essentially the same results.

108. Pentzopoulos, p. 190, is therefore correct in stating that “on a percentage basis, the Communist Party was able to recruit a larger number of refugees than natives.”

that substantial refugee support for the A.P. was short-lived, it is the growth of refugee communism that needs to be examined in greater detail.

The C.P. and the Refugees: Initial Obstacles

The C.P. expressed its concern over the fate of Asia Minor Greeks in the immediate wake of the 1922 Disaster. It thereafter began addressing itself specifically to the refugees, listing them alongside the workers and peasants with increasing regularity until its Third Extraordinary Congress in late 1924, which definitively adopted the formula of a "United Front of Workers, Peasants, and Refugees."¹⁰⁹ The Third International, through the Balkan Communist Federation, had previously instructed the Greek party to give particular attention to the refugees, infiltrate them, and tear them away from bourgeois influence. Within the process of the so-called "Bolshevization" of the party, special emphasis was placed on the creation of *refugee cells* and on the recruitment of refugee membership.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized, as it has seldom been done, that the C.P.'s overture to the refugees was seriously hampered, at least initially, by a number of obstacles, most of which have this in common: that the C.P. often embodied and voiced *native* defensive reaction, very much like Antivenizelism.

1. In the past, the C.P. had opposed Venizelist irredentist (or rather "imperialist") policies, together with Antivenizelism, but much more consistently and vociferously, even waging continuous antiwar propaganda among the Greek troops in Asia Minor up until the Disaster. This was clearly inconsistent with its belated concern for the local Greek populations—and future refugees.

2. On several occasions, the C.P. indicated that the role of the refugees was inimical to the interests of native workers. Moreover, C.P. statements often sounded practically identical to those of Antivenizelism, as expressions of politically motivated native hostility. Denouncing the Fourth Constituent Assembly as "400 conspirators," the C.P. characteristically added:

Although the workers, the peasants, the breadwinners, the veterans and the victims of war did not vote for them, they were *elected*.

They were elected by the refugees, the women of the refugees, the children

109. KKE, Vol. 1, pp. 250 and 528.

110. See the resolution on Greece of the Seventh Balkan Communist Conference, published in *Rizospastes*, 30 September 1924, and reprinted in *Saranda Chronia*, p. 139. On refugee cells and recruitment, see KKE, Vol. 1, pp. 537–538, and Vol. 2, pp. 60–63.

of the refugees, the informers, the sinecure appointees. With these votes, and against the will of the working people of Greece, they will govern the country once again. . . .¹¹¹

3. While such statements may be considered only occasional and careless, if instructive, lapses, the C.P.'s official and lasting (1924–1935) policy on the so-called “national question” (for an “independent Macedonia and Thrace”) was explicitly directed *against* the massive settlement of refugees in these regions. Just like Antivenizelism, it was moreover specifically opposed to the concomitant land distribution program at the expense of the natives. Refugee settlement and land acquisition were denounced as part of a sinister plan of the Greek bourgeoisie for the forcible alteration of the ethnic composition of these regions.¹¹²

The fact that both the position on the “national question” and the “United Front of Workers, Peasants, and Refugees” were adopted in their definitive form simultaneously and appeared in the *same* party manifesto is only a telling example of the contradictory policies pursued by the C.P. throughout the interwar period. The party later seemed to recognize the inconsistency and the frontal collision of its “national” policy with basic refugee interests, but characteristically hoped to get away with it through “appropriate slogans so that the bourgeoisie cannot oppose them [the refugees] to our policy on the national question.”¹¹³ How “appropriate” such slogans could be is shown by the December 1924 manifesto, which advocated that land distribution among the refugees be undertaken by “national councils of refugees and peasants within independent and free Macedonia.”¹¹⁴ The participation of native peasants and the context of an independent Macedonia could of course hardly appeal to the Greek refugees. A similarly transparent and unconvincing subterfuge can be found five years later, in the party's program for the 1929 local elections:

The independence of Macedonia and Thrace doesn't at all mean a new uprooting and expulsion of the refugees. Macedonia and Thrace, within the context of the Federation of worker-peasant soviet republics of the Balkans, will have enough space for their populations.¹¹⁵

111. KKE, Vol. 1, p. 382. The reference to refugee women and children obviously alludes to multiple voting. See also *ibid.*, p. 485.

112. See especially the Resolution on the National Question of the Third Extraordinary Congress, and the contemporary Manifesto to the Working People, *ibid.*, pp. 513–518, and 526–531.

113. Resolution on the Economic and Political Situation of the Third Congress, *Rizospastes*, 7 April 1927, reprinted in KKE, Vol. 2, p. 211.

114. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 529.

115. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 91.

Such assurances must have seemed ludicrous to those who were facing the everyday hostility and violence of the native peasants, especially those belonging to the national minority for which C.P. policy was primarily designed—the Slavo-Macedonians.

4. Last, but not least, the C.P.'s limited "cognitive map," its compulsive fixation to a rigid system of standard and largely arbitrary class categories, left little room for the refugees *as such* in its official propaganda. Although action among the refugees was repeatedly listed among the party's "immediate duties," particular refugee demands were very rarely mentioned specifically and independently of other groups. The violent attack on the Ankara Convention in 1930 was both unusual and exceptional. It seems to have been only an ad hoc opportunistic move to exploit refugee dissatisfaction, as indicated by its content, which demanded the *ultimate* in terms of demagoguery: *both* full compensation *and* total cancellation of all refugee debts, as well as total abolition of refugee rents!¹¹⁶

The C.P.'s little actual interest in the refugees as such between 1925 and 1935, despite the "immediate duties" ritually proclaimed, is also indicated by the following facts. (1) There is *no* mention of refugee cells nor of refugees after 1925 in the recurrent discussions of party organization and recruitment. (2) The formula of a "United Front of Workers, Peasants, and Refugees" served as the official C.P. electoral label in 1926 and 1928, but the refugees were dropped subsequently, leaving a "United Front of Workers and Peasants" in 1929, 1932, and 1933, which was to be replaced by a "Popular Front" in 1935–1936. (3) The refugees were similarly dropped from the emphatic headings of party declarations and manifestoes after 1928, appearing only erratically thereafter and actually less often than other groups, beside the indispensable "workers and peasants."

In the absence of an explicit party explanation for such changes and omissions (at least in the collected documents), the reasons may be inferred from the overall class-oriented outlook of the party, and the few directly relevant passages in its literature. In May 1925, it was thus declared:

The struggle between the different social strata of the refugee population . . . makes it imperative for our Party to determine its position *not* on the refugee question as a whole, but *separately* on each of the social categories to which the refugees belong.¹¹⁷

Refugees were differentiated accordingly and viewed essentially as peasants, or as workers. Recruitment instructions in April 1925, the last to

116. *Rizospastes*, 18 June 1930, reprinted in *KKE*, Vol. 3, pp. 199–200.

117. *KKE*, Vol. 2, p. 77. Emphasis added.

mention the refugees, specifically required that refugee recruits be peasants or workers.¹¹⁸ The propaganda popularization of the "United Front of Workers, Peasants, and Refugees" also emphasized in 1927 that *in addition* to his particular problems "each refugee as worker or as peasant suffers the consequences of the general exploitation of these two classes."¹¹⁹

Yet, the refugees and their specific problems were explicitly subsumed *only* under the peasantry, *never* under the working class, despite the greater importance of refugee workers for the C.P. The party probably wanted to avoid conjuring a division of its working-class support along ethnic lines, between refugees and natives. One may therefore draw the conclusion that the C.P., on the level of its official pronouncements, showed a lasting and systematic reluctance to appeal to the refugees as a whole or, equivalently, as an *ethnic* group. Instead, it preferred to approach them along *class* lines, subsuming them explicitly or implicitly under the class to which they belonged.

The C.P. and the Refugees: Obstacles Removed

In light of the preceding discussion, one may understand why the growth of refugee support for the C.P., especially among nonworkers, was a distinctly slow process. On the other hand, one may also understand how this apparently irresistible process after 1928 coincided with, and may be largely explained by the gradual *removal* of such obstacles, together with other favorable developments.¹²⁰

Among these, one should emphasize the growing significance of the C.P. as an outlet for what was essentially a *protest* vote, especially for the refugees. In their case, dissatisfaction with Venizelism could be much more readily translated into a swing to the Left, which was after all Republican, than to Antivenizelism. This seems to have been a recurrent phenomenon in by-elections and in local (municipal and communal) elections—contests where control of the national government, and the Republic's survival were not directly at stake. To the extent that C.P. candidates were refugees

118. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

120. Elefantas, p. 307, claims that the growth of the C.P. after 1928 was due only to the realignment of the refugees themselves, which "simply" coincided with the changes in the party brought about by the intervention of the Third International (December 1931). Yet, the two developments (among the refugees and within the party) should not be seen in isolation but rather in interaction. Elefantas himself later argues that the political and structural inadequacies of the C.P. prevented the maximization of its refugee support. See *ibid.*, p. 318.

themselves, one may also speak of a distinctly *ethnic* vote.¹²¹ Another and probably *decisive* development which favored the shift of refugee support to the C.P. was the disintegration of the A.P., which had seemed to hold better chances of drawing them to the Left, particularly in the countryside, and to which the refugees had actually turned on a massive scale in 1932.

It was however after 1934 that the process accelerated, as obstacles were removed one by one. The adoption of a new strategy of a "Popular Front" against fascism not only signified the gradual abandonment of sectarian isolation, but also the end of the fixation with rigid class categories. The C.P. was thus better prepared to seize the historical opportunity offered by the disastrous Venizelist coup of March 1935, which was a *critical* turning point in its relation to the refugees, as it was quick to realize:

The bankruptcy of Venizelism gives us serious possibilities for serious breaches in its influence among its masses, and the refugee masses in particular, to our benefit.¹²²

As a first step, the disastrous policy for "independent Macedonia and Thrace" was simultaneously dropped at last, and replaced by "full national and political equality for all national minorities."

While the common Republican struggle and, above all, the indiscriminate and savage repression of all Republicans created an unprecedented common consciousness and active solidarity on the mass level (especially under Kondyles who declared war on "Venizelocommunists"), the C.P. carefully reevaluated its refugee strategy and sought to "overcome the weaknesses of its work."¹²³ The party was disappointed by the results of the January 1936 election, which it termed a "serious success" of Venizelism, and was quick to draw the lesson:

Our Party must . . . revise its work among the refugees towards the definition of a concrete refugee policy and towards the development of its work for the conquest of the refugee masses around the Communist refugee policy.¹²⁴

The urgency of the matter is reflected in the resolution of the Politbureau "On the Refugee Question," dated 12 April 1936, where such a Commu-

121. Ibid., pp. 129–133. Elefantos characteristically wonders whether the refugees voted "for a *red* mayor, i.e., the Communist with the total revolutionary vision, or for *their own* mayor, i.e., the refugee, the compatriot, the fellow countryman from the lost country."

122. Resolution of the Central Committee, 23 March 1935, reprinted in *KKE*, Vol. 4, p. 168.

123. *Rizospastes*, 13 June 1935, reprinted in *KKE*, Vol. 4, p. 188.

124. Resolution of the Central Committee, 28 January 1936, reprinted in *KKE*, Vol. 4, pp. 335–340.

nist refugee policy was formulated at long last. For the *first* time after more than a decade, the party unreservedly and unambiguously addressed itself to the refugees *as such* and *as a whole*, without concern for their internal differentiation or class distribution, which was not even mentioned. It was moreover an impressively global assessment of the evolution of the refugee question, which covered all its main aspects, and adopted *all* refugee demands, resurrecting even the issue of the 25 percent payments which had dominated the 1933 election.¹²⁵ This major turn in C.P. policy was obviously precipitated by the death of Venizelos in March, which, in the words of a leading Communist:

has caused much ferment in the Liberal Party and among the masses who follow it. For us there can be no doubt that this Party will be split up and that big masses of its supporters, especially refugees, will go Leftwards.¹²⁶

The consequences of these developments would only be seen after the forced interval of the Metaxas dictatorship.¹²⁷

One may conclude that the refugees' *ethnic* route to Communism reached important dimensions and gained real momentum only towards the *very end* of the interwar period. An additional key to this development is provided by the composition of the party's ruling elite, which was consolidated until 1935 around the nucleus of the "New Leadership" appointed by the Third International in 1931: about half of the Central Committee and most of the Politbureau members were refugees, including the party secretary and "Leader" N. Zachariades.¹²⁸

It is a common error to project such late developments *backwards* onto the entire interwar period. Statements such as the following two are grossly misleading:

125. Ibid., pp. 352–354.

126. Quoted in Birtles, p. 279. From an interview with Sklavainas, C.P. parliamentary spokesman, in May 1936.

127. By 1945, Zachariades characteristically affirmed: "The refugee world in its decisive majority is with EAM. The settlements all over Greece are strongholds of popular democracy. Even our opponents do not dispute this." See *To 7o Synedrio tou KKE* [The 7th KKE Congress], Vol. 3 (Athens, 1945), p. 13. EAM was the resistance organization controlled by the C.P.

128. Elefantes, pp. 121–133, who argues that party leadership did not reflect Greek society and its popular classes as a whole, but overwhelmingly the refugees—a marginal and nonintegrated element in that society. Consequently, instead of speaking the *universalistic* language of communism, party leadership actually translated it into a *particularistic* refugee idiom. According to his data, on p. 386, the distribution of refugees (including a Cypriot) was more precisely the following: in what he defines as the ruling elite as a whole, 11 out of 27; in the Central Committee, 9 out of 16 in 1934, and 10 out of 22 in 1935; and in the Politbureau, 5 out of 7 in 1931, 6 out of 8 in 1934, and again 5 out of 7 in 1935. Burks, p. 58, notes that 6 out of 13 "leading Greek communists" were refugees.

There is widespread agreement in Greece that refugee elements, whether urban or rural, proletarian, peasant, or middle class, constitute the core of the Communist vote.¹²⁹

Finally, the peasant refugees of Greece constitute the most important part, both of the electoral and of the organizational strength of the KKE.¹³⁰

Both assertions are manifestly untrue for the interwar period, during which the C.P. certainly attracted *urban* rather than rural refugee support (see Tables 43 and 44) and refugee *workers* rather than peasants (see Table

Table 43 THE C.P. AND THE REFUGEES
(urban areas, n = 56)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Refugees	+.10 (.04) .009	+.28 (.07) .000	+.31 (.07) .000	+.24 (.07) .001	+.22 (.06) .000
<i>a</i>	1.40 (.92) .133	2.77 (1.77) .124	2.42 (1.83) .193	4.83 (1.87) .012	3.29 (1.52) .035
<i>r</i>	.35	.49	.51	.42	.46
<i>s</i>	4.51	8.72	9.02	9.18	7.46

Table 44 THE C.P. AND THE REFUGEES
(rural areas, n = 140)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Refugees	+.02 (.01) .209	+.04 (.02) .043	+.06 (.02) .002	+.07 (.02) .000	+.04 (.02) .012
<i>a</i>	.88 (.29) .003	2.39 (.47) .000	2.10 (.46) .000	2.60 (.48) .000	2.26 (.40) .000
<i>r</i>	.11	.17	.25	.29	.21
<i>s</i>	2.89	4.73	4.57	4.76	4.01

129. Ibid., pp. 57–58. The ecological analysis which purports to confirm this “popular notion” is a classic example of the ecological fallacy: it consists only of the simple correlation

42). Communist support among the latter remained negligible until 1936 and even then clearly did *not* constitute “the most important part” of party strength.

Nevertheless, a telling *shift* is discernible in 1936, according to several regression estimates. Against the apparent stability of overall refugee support for the C.P. (see Table 37), a drop in urban and worker support seems to have been compensated by mostly rural gains (see Tables 42–44). This displacement of party strength among the refugees indicates the growing contribution of ethnicity. It also confirms and explains what was noted in the previous chapter: towards the end of the interwar period, Communist support was growing *outside* the working class, where it stagnated or even regressed.

coefficient (r) between the C.P. vote and refugees as a whole. The coefficients reported are .62 in 1926, .57 in 1933, and .67 in 1936 (with $n = 34$).

130. Elefantes, p. 309. This statement rests on impressions of the geographic distribution of the C.P. vote and on the totally invalid affirmation that refugee peasants were *more* inclined towards the C.P. than refugee workers and urban refugees in general. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

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ORTHODOX GREEKS VERSUS MINORITIES: NATIONALITY, ETHNICITY, AND RELIGION

Our borders are guarded by partly enemy populations.

*The Prefect of Florina (P. Kalligas) to Venizelos, Report No. 3394,
26 February 1930, VA File 107*

THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL HOMOGENEITY

The most widely and immediately recognized effect of population exchange and refugee settlement was its ethnic impact, which turned Greece into probably the most homogeneous national state of the Balkans. In this respect, the most crucial change was the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia in particular. Macedonia as a whole had previously seemed an inextricable mosaic of nationalities (thus lending an exotic name to various mixed salads) and had thereby been the object of a protracted and bitter struggle, primarily between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. In the part won by Greece during the Balkan Wars, and after the departure of probably more than half a million Turks and Bulgarians and the settlement of 638,253 refugees, Greeks increased dramatically from 43 percent of the total population in 1912 to 89 percent in 1926.¹ Nevertheless, this achievement, like refugee settlement itself, remained *incomplete*. By 1928, there remained in Greece a residual mosaic of national, ethnic, and religious minorities, which were to play an important role in interwar politics (see Table 45).

1. Pentzopoulos, pp. 125–140.

Table 45 NATIONAL, ETHNIC, AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, 1928

<i>Minority</i>	<i>Language</i>	<i>Religion</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
1. Turks	Turkish	Moslem	86,506	1.39
2. Slavo-Macedonians	Slavo-Macedonian	Orthodox	81,844	1.32
3. Chams	Albanian	Moslem	18,598	0.30
4. Sephardic Jews	Ladino	Jewish	63,000	1.02
5. Armenians	Armenian	Orthodox	31,038	0.50
6. Koutsovlachs	Koutsovlach	Orthodox	19,679	0.32
7. Pomaks	Bulgarian	Moslem	16,755	0.27
8. Greek Catholics	Greek	Catholic	27,747	0.45
9. Greek Jews	Greek	Jewish	9,090	0.15
10. Other ^a	Miscellaneous		30,685	0.49
TOTAL MINORITIES			<u>384,942</u>	<u>6.20</u>
Orthodox Greeks ^b			5,819,742	93.80
TOTAL POPULATION			<u>6,204,684</u>	<u>100.00</u>

SOURCE: Census of 1928.

^aIncludes all other groups defined by some combination of religion and language, none of which exceeded 4,000.

^bIncludes 103,642 Turkish-speaking refugees.

The historical background and international aspects of the minority question in Greece, and above all of the Macedonian question, clearly fall outside the scope of this study. They will be discussed only to the extent that they are directly relevant to an understanding of the role of these minorities in interwar *domestic* politics. A most vexing preliminary question concerns the character itself of these minorities. It is a question heavily infused with emotion and largely obscured by the diametrically opposed claims and interests of competing nationalisms, for which it was of course the key issue. The distinction which needs to be made is between *national* and *ethnic* minorities. As these terms are used in the present discussion, a national minority is an ethnic group which, over and above the distinctive culture, language, and possibly religion which define the latter's identity, *also* identifies with a nation other than the one within which it exists, and aspires either to be incorporated into another national state or to secede and create a national state of its own. Despite many ambiguities and inconsistencies, the official position of Greek nationalism and of the Greek state in particular, especially after 1922, has been to deny the existence of

national minorities and to acknowledge them only as ethnic groups. Apart from a marginal category of foreign agents, such groups were portrayed as Greek citizens distinguished only by religion or language—as Moslems rather than Turks and as Slavophones rather than Slavs in the two most numerous cases. In the latter case, the additional element of Greek national consciousness, despite the language, would also be occasionally advanced, more or less plausibly.²

As official Greek euphemisms indicate, the choice itself of a name for the designation of such groups has by no means been a neutral or innocuous issue. Beside the Greek state, it also involved internal divisions within the group in question, as well as other state interests, in the two most important and numerous cases at least. In the first case, whether they would be called Moslems or Turks was directly linked to the continuing struggle between Old and Young Turks in their midst, and to their relationship with the Turkish Republic. In the second case, there were as many as *four* alternatives in interwar years: Slavophone Greeks (according to Greek authorities), Bulgarians (according to Bulgaria and its friends), Serbs (according to Serbia), and Macedonians, that is, a distinct nation (according to the Federalist wing of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization or IMRO, as well as the Third International).

Although this study can certainly not compete with the existing prolific literature and include a detailed treatment of such matters, it seemed justified, for its purposes, to categorize the following five groups as interwar national minorities: Turks, Slavo-Macedonians, Chams, Sephardic Jews, and Armenians. The first three qualify by virtue of their actual or potential identification with a neighboring nation-state: Turkey, Bulgaria, and Albania, respectively. In the second case, given that identification with Bulgaria, although prevalent, competed with separate national identity and aspired statehood, it seemed preferable to adopt a name which essentially leaves the question open.³ Sephardic Jews qualify not only by virtue of their Zionist majority, but also because of their persistent reluctance to accept Greek sovereignty and assimilate into Greek society. Finally, Armenians clearly identified with a distinct national entity and eventually emigrated to what was the closest substitute of their own nation-state—Soviet Armenia.

2. The 1928 Census characteristically recognizes only groups by language and religion. Nevertheless, it also finds it necessary to add that the majority of those speaking Slavo-Macedonian and Koutsovlach are Greeks in national consciousness, which “in Greece does not always coincide with the language spoken.” See Vol. 4, p. xxviii. Yet, although officially designated as “Slavophones,” the Slavo-Macedonians were commonly called “Bulgarians” in interwar Greece.

3. The alternative “Macedonian Slavs” does not convey the specificity and distinctiveness of the group.

Koutsovlachs are a borderline case. Despite the active Rumanian interest for them, those actually identifying with that distant state seem to have been so few in number that it is more appropriate to categorize Koutsovlachs as (only) an ethnic group, together with the Pomaks and others. Finally, Greek Catholics and Greek Jews, together with the heretofore unmentioned Old Calendar Church, should be classified as religious minorities.

The main purpose of this summary classification is to allow an introductory general framework for the understanding of the significance and role of these minorities in interwar politics. Three essential aspects must be emphasized.

1. Although numerically small, most minorities were so heavily concentrated in certain areas that they could determine the electoral outcome of several constituencies through a compact vote. Depending on the number of seats at stake and on the overall balance of political forces, they could thus occasionally have a significant impact on the national level as well.
2. Depending on the degree and form of their distinctiveness and on their particular economic conditions, most, if not all, minorities suffered some form of discrimination, both by the Orthodox Greek majority and by the Greek state, ranging from the curtailment of privileges to severe harassment and persecution.
3. The internal politics of most minorities and their own leadership largely determined their "external" behavior in Greek politics, which was predicated on their particular interests and specifically on the expected effect that control of the Greek state by one or the other political party would have for them.

In the case of *national* minorities (except Armenians), these three aspects acquire several crucial modifications. Over and above their weight in local politics, the presence of such minorities in sensitive and especially border areas constituted a permanent threat to the territorial integrity of the Greek state, which viewed them as actual or potential Trojan horses of foreign territorial claims. In the particular case of the Thessaloniki Sephardic Jews, the threat was certainly less specific, but they were perceived as at least distinctly inimical to the definitive Greek possession of that most coveted city. Consequently, the Greek state more or less consistently and forcibly sought to assimilate these minorities or otherwise neutralize the threat they represented. Conversely, their own political alignments were largely determined by foreign governments or other organizations outside Greece, which claimed their loyalty and which were of course intent on thwarting the policies of the Greek state.

GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MINORITIES

If we now turn to the attitude of the principal political forces towards the minorities in general, and especially towards the national minorities, several critical differences emerge.

Venizelism

In this as in other respects, Venizelism was the principal, most dynamic, and most consistent agent of Greek irredentism and nationalism, *and* was so perceived by the minorities involved. It had first been the agent of the annexation and incorporation of the territories where they lived by the Greek state. It subsequently embodied, if not exclusively, at least most forcefully the will of the Greek state to consolidate its possession of these new territories. Venizelism was in particular responsible for the exchange of populations, which almost eradicated the two largest national minorities, and for the massive settlement of refugees in Northern Greece and especially in sensitive and border areas, which was deliberately and systematically aimed at changing the composition of the population, and adversely affected the minorities in a variety of ways. In power throughout most of the interwar period, Venizelism also formulated and implemented state policies aimed at the assimilation or otherwise the neutralization of minorities (national minorities in particular), even though the excesses of some agencies, such as the Gendarmerie, often went beyond the intent and method of official policy.

This general interpretation is not invalidated but only qualified by what might appear to constitute contradictory evidence. Venizelists, for example, sometimes did seek local electoral alliances with minority groups, but this was seldom, if ever, in open conflict with state interests and policy. In general, Venizelism actually guaranteed and respected minority rights to a significant extent, and drew considerable minority support. But this should be understood in the context of modern liberal conceptions and paramount diplomatic considerations, to which Venizelist leaders, and Venizelos personally, were supremely sensitive, as well as state policies more subtle than forcible assimilation.⁴ Relations with the Turkish minority offer the most important illustration in this respect, as will be seen.

4. Venizelos had already manifested this sensitivity in autonomous Crete, where he systematically promoted cooperation between Christians and Moslems. See, e.g., his 25 November 1906 address to the Second Cretan Constituent Assembly, quoted in Stefanou, Vol. 1, pp. 288–290.

Despite such qualifications, however, minorities were on the whole not mistaken in their early perception of Venizelism as the principal threat to their interests and survival, a perception which largely persisted throughout the interwar years. A natural consequence was that they mostly turned to Antivenizelism, which was ready and eager to receive them.

Antivenizelism

The critical difference between the two political blocs is not to be found on the most general level of ideology and official pronouncements. On that level, Antivenizelism ostensibly shared the same nationalist perspective and could never openly question the obvious interest of the Greek state in the safeguard and consolidation of its new territorial possessions. On a much more practical and consequential level, however, it showed at an early stage (1915–1916) *both* that it was actually less prepared than its opponents to formulate and pursue an effective policy in this respect *and* that it was quite prepared to seek minority electoral support by all means, regardless of the implications for state interests and policies.

This convergence between Antivenizelism and national minorities reached its most emphatic and massive expression in 1920, as will be seen, and largely resumed after 1922. Throughout the interwar period, it was typically Antivenizelist politicians who served as the protectors of national and other minorities against the actions or exactions of the Greek state. A key aspect is that the overall cleavage between refugees and natives assumed, in parts of the New Lands, the specific form of a bitter conflict between *Greek refugees* and *non-Greek natives*. It was a conflict over land between rural refugees and Slavo-Macedonians. It was a conflict over the control of economic life in Thessaloniki between urban refugees and Jews. In this confrontation, which now involved vital interests of the Greek state and was heavily loaded with nationalist fervor, Antivenizelism essentially became the vehicle of native defensive reaction, as elsewhere. The long-standing Antivenizelist connection with national minorities carried of course an indelible stigma in Venizelist eyes. Implicitly acknowledging a common, ethnic frame of reference, Venizelists would thus wonder in 1933 how the P.P. could legitimately threaten the refugees with native anger, since it “formerly relied, and in part today as well, in the whole of Northern Greece, on the vote of the Turks, the Bulgarians, and the Jews.”⁵

5. *Eleftheron Vema*, 2 March 1933. Nevertheless, rabid Antivenizelists could go as far as stating that the (Sephardic) Jews were “more Greek” than the refugees. See Chamber, 24 January 1934, *Efemeris*, p. 990.

Communism

What Antivenizelism did on an ad hoc basis, largely through patron-client networks, and for distinctly electoral purposes, the C.P. proceeded to do on a programmatic and doctrinal level, turning minority rights into a central, if not *the* central, tenet of its policy throughout most of the inter-war period. Although Communist policy on the so-called "national question" has been the object of much controversy and of a correspondingly prolific (and mostly polemical) literature, only a brief outline of its emergence and development can be offered here.⁶ Two important points should be noted at the outset: (1) this policy was reluctantly adopted by the C.P. of Greece after much resistance and under heavy pressure by the Third International; (2) consequently, it became the critical *test* of the party's loyalty to the International and through it to the Soviet party.⁷

Between 1920 and 1924, as the party became increasingly dependent on the Third International, it was subjected to growing pressure for the adoption of the International's evolving policy on the Balkans, which was mostly voiced through the Balkan Communist Federation or BCF (founded in 1920) and was inspired by the C.P. of Bulgaria. Beginning in 1922, the Bulgarian Communists pressed for a policy of independence for "united" Macedonia and Thrace, against the resistance of their Yugoslav and Greek comrades. Thanks to Soviet support, the Bulgarian views prevailed and were definitively adopted by the Fifth Congress of the International in the summer of 1924.⁸

The position of the Greek Communist leaders, who had until then systematically resorted to evasive and dilatory tactics, thus became untenable. At the end of 1924, the Third Extraordinary Congress of the C.P., together with the party's definitive integration into the Third International, solemnly adopted what was to be its policy on the so-called "national question" for a decade, which faithfully reproduced the recent resolution by the International. Based on the construction that there existed a "Macedonian people" and a "Thracian people," it promised them a "united and independent Macedonia" and a similarly "united and independent Thrace." It condemned the "dismemberment" of these two lands, between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria in the first case, and between Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria in the second. It also denounced the annexationist designs of Bulgaria for the other parts of Macedonia, as well as the

6. The most detailed study seems to be that by Kofos. Kousoulas, pp. 54–72, provides a shorter exposition. On the parallel and closely related developments in Yugoslavia, see Palmer and King.

7. Elefantos, pp. 38–39.

8. Palmer and King, pp. 27–41; and Kofos, pp. 68–78.

"colonization" of these parts by Yugoslavia and Greece, whose massive settlement of refugees was explicitly blasted.⁹ This particular aspect was again emphasized in the party's 1925 agrarian program, which was candidly said to have been "authorized" by the BCF:

In Greece, as in many other countries, the agrarian question crosses the national. Under the pretext of the national defense of the Greeks, the land is taken away from the minorities to be given to the Greek refugees, and a systematic colonial and Hellenization policy is generally pursued. The C.P. is against this policy, which divides the peasants into Greeks and non-Greeks, into refugees and natives, whereas the interests of the former as of the latter require their common action against the bourgeoisie and the landowners.¹⁰

In light of its far-reaching and lasting consequences, this was a major turning point in the history of the young party. Its advocacy of the detachment of Macedonia and Thrace from the Greek state emphatically confirmed existing suspicions about its antinational character and provided the most virulent foundation for anticomunism in Greece. It immediately provoked a wave of persecutions, which were to continue thereafter and which could now be based on the concept of treason.¹¹

Although the damage was largely irreparable and although there was ostensibly no change until 1935, the 1924 policy on the "national question" actually followed a tortuous and tortured course until 1931. In 1930, for instance, the Central Committee was emphatically restating the same policy *despite* its surprising recognition that:

The national question (Macedonia-Thrace), being mainly an inter-Balkan question, does not play a serious role in Greece, because of the relatively small percentage of the oppressed nationalities.¹²

Eventually, in 1931, the International openly voiced its dissatisfaction with the party's performance. In its so-called "Appeal," which accompanied its direct intervention and appointment of the "New Leadership," it also stressed:

The KKE has remained far from the revolutionary national liberation struggle of the peoples which are oppressed by the Greeks. . . . The Party must,

9. KKE, Vol. 1, pp. 513–518 and 528.

10. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 92.

11. Eventually, propaganda for the detachment of "part from the whole of the State" became one of the two forms of Communist activity that Law 4229 of 1929 turned into a "special crime" (*idionymon*).

12. KKE, Vol. 3, p. 171.

without delay, wage the struggle for the right of free self-determination of the nations, including secession. . . .¹³

As one should expect, the appointed "New Leadership" immediately inaugurated in December 1931 what was clearly the most extremist and virulent phase of the party's "national" policy:

Greece is an imperialist state, which conquered by force entire regions inhabited by other nationalities (Macedonia and Thrace), which oppresses them and subjects them to a colonial exploitation, which persecutes and exterminates the national minorities (Jews).¹⁴

The C.P. of Greece was therefore going to struggle for self-determination, including secession, for independent Macedonia and Thrace, and against the oppression and persecution of the Jewish population. Any underestimation of these priorities within the party was to be considered a "symptom of the chauvinistic influence of the dominant nation."¹⁵

It was only the evolving policy of the Third International against fascism and for a "United" or "Popular Front" that eventually allowed a drastic change in party policy. Immediately upon the defeat of the disastrous Venizelist coup in March 1935, the Central Committee hastily formulated a new policy of "complete national and political equality for all the national minorities which live in Greece."¹⁶ This new formulation was to replace thereafter any mention of self-determination, secession, and the like. Following the Seventh Congress of the International, the party's Sixth Congress (December 1935) explicitly acknowledged the substitution of the 1924 slogan "united and independent Macedonia and Thrace" by the new slogan "complete equality for the minorities" and proceeded to provide an explanation. Far from constituting a denial of the Marxist-Leninist principle of self-determination for national minorities, the change was said to be imposed by the changed ethnic composition of Macedonia, after the massive refugee settlement, "in close connection" with the changed political conditions, in which the antifascist and antiwar struggle received top priority.¹⁷

There were, however, clear indications that the change was far less

13. Ibid., p. 304.

14. Ibid., p. 326.

15. Ibid., p. 327.

16. Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 166. This was significantly an *addendum* to the original resolution of 23 March 1935. See *ibid.*, p. 157.

17. Ibid., pp. 280 and 296–297. Kousoulas, p. 71, convincingly argues that this new priority was the real explanation.

radical than it seemed, and did *not* constitute a total break with past policy. The same resolution concluded:

The Party does not stop proclaiming that, finally and definitively, the Macedonian question will be solved fraternally after the victory of Soviet power in the Balkans, which will tear up the dishonest treaties for the exchange of populations and will take all practical measures to wipe out their imperialist injustices. Only then will the Macedonian People find its complete national rehabilitation.¹⁸

Even more eloquently, the “theory” that “Macedonia has become Greek” was strongly condemned as a “rightist opportunistic distortion of the party line” in the aftermath of the January 1936 election.¹⁹ In retrospect, these were signs that the party was to be plagued again by the “national question” in coming years.

At the conclusion of this rapid review of C.P. interwar policy, its implications for mass support should be examined, which are more relevant to the present study than its other controversial aspects. On the one hand, these implications directly involve those minorities on behalf of which Communist policy was ostensibly designed. Whereas nothing which might be construed as a distinct “Thracian people” actually existed, only the Slavo-Macedonians could be expected to identify with the “Macedonian people,” and this was in fact what was intended. Among other minorities, only Jews and Armenians consistently drew the party’s attention, whereas Chams and Turks were only occasionally mentioned. It may therefore be seen that C.P. policy directly concerned a minute proportion of the total population. And it will be seen subsequently that the party did not even manage to win the majority of this minute audience.

The indirect implications involving the Greek majority thus become by far more important. It seems fairly obvious that the policy on the “national question” had a crippling effect on the growth of party support during most of the interwar period.²⁰ Given its distinctly treasonous overtones by accepted standards, it naturally alienated the Greek masses, especially in those regions whose detachment from Greece was advocated, and above all the refugees, whose settlement and rural property were directly threatened. Together with other factors, the removal or rather *withdrawal* of this obstacle certainly contributed to the growth of party support towards the very end of the interwar period, although the last election in 1936 probably intervened too soon for this effect to be fully appreciated. It

18. KKE, Vol. 4, p. 297.

19. Ibid., p. 340.

20. See, e.g., Stavrianos, p. 670.

is nevertheless significant that the party's electoral propaganda obviously exaggerated the change in policy, as the postelectoral attack on "rightist opportunism" clearly indicates.

THE ALIEN AS ARBITER

Communist policy offers only the most extreme illustration of the implications that alien national minorities could have for party politics, implications which were inextricably connected with vital state interests. On a much more practical, local, and everyday level, the defense of minority groups and individuals against the Greeks and the Greek state, which was typical of Antivenizelist politicians, is widely said to have seriously interfered with the implementation of state policy, albeit by overzealous agencies. In 1931, the exasperated prefect of Florina, the most sensitive border district because of its large Slavo-Macedonian population, characteristically wrote to Venizelos:

I submit to you the opinion that we must restrict any interference, reaction, persecution, and defamation of the administration by the local politicians for partisan reasons, whenever it takes decisions against persons dangerous to the security of the State. To this end, it is necessary that all parties agree, by common understanding, that we appear here only as Greeks implementing national policy, and not for collecting votes, which, without benefiting greatly the parties themselves, causes incalculable national damage.²¹

Nevertheless, this situation continued and seems to have reached a peak in 1935, during the campaign for the one-sided June election, when Gotzamanes, defecting from the P.P., sought to mobilize *native* Macedonian support behind his Macedonian Union and threatened to carry the election in Macedonia. He was then accused of addressing Slavo-Macedonians in their own language, and Kondyles denounced his platform as "pure national treason," and as simply reproducing the slogan of the "Bulgarian Committee" (i.e., the IMRO)—"Macedonia for the Macedonians."²²

This seems to have been the only time when Antivenizelism experienced itself what was for Venizelism the most salient and irritating domes-

21. The Prefect of Florina (V. Balkos) to Venizelos, Confidential Report No. 33, 30 January 1931, VA File 108, p. 25.

22. See Linardatos, pp. 62–63; and Gregoriades, *4e Avgoustou*, pp. 18–22, who dismisses the accusations about the use of Slavo-Macedonian. It should perhaps be explained that only Venizelist abstention, in the wake of military defeat, created the possibility that Gotzamanes and his Macedonian Union might carry the election in Macedonia against the P.P.

tic aspect of the minority question throughout the interwar years. This was the traumatic memory of 1915 and, especially, 1920, and the fear that something similar might happen again, namely, that alien minorities, hostile to Greek nationalism and the Greek state, might be in a position to influence or even determine the outcome of Greek elections.

One need hardly explain Venizelist reactions to what was, in 1915 and again in 1920, a rather absurd situation. At stake in those elections was the country's entry into or continuation of war, which involved its most vital national interests: territorial integrity and expansion, as well as the physical survival and eventual incorporation of unredeemed Greeks. Yet, compact alien populations were entitled to vote, guided by their loyalty to foreign nations (Bulgaria and Turkey), which were precisely the foremost enemies against whom war would be or was actually waged. In the case of the Sephardic Jews, hostility to Greece would also lead them to vote in a way which would be most unfavorable to Greek interests. Not surprisingly, all these minorities in fact massively voted against war and against Venizelism—its advocate, but also the most dynamic and effective agent of Greek nationalism and irredentism.

The impact of this vote was mostly concentrated in Macedonia, where it can be estimated that Turks, Slavo-Macedonians, and Jews, taken together, either constituted a majority or could at least secure electoral success for the party with the smaller fraction of the Greek vote in *every* electoral district (*nome*). This was exactly what happened in May 1915, which was the first Greek election to be held in Macedonia and, in many respects, the most critical to be held in Greece theretofore. Having sought and secured the support of Turks, Slavo-Macedonians, and Jews, Antivenizelism prevailed over the Venizelist Greek majority and carried 69 out of the 74 Macedonia seats. Among the Antivenizelists elected, there were significantly 16 Turks, 4 Jews, and at least 1 Slavo-Macedonian. Venizelism won only 1 seat in Thessaloniki and 4 in Serres, the districts with the smallest proportions of alien minorities, obviously thanks to split-ticket voting.²³

In December 1915, Venizelism boycotted the election, and Antivenizelism carried all the seats in Macedonia, as elsewhere. Among those elected, there were 17 Turks, 3 Jews, and at least 1 Slavo-Macedonian. It is indicative of the massive rate of (mostly Venizelist) abstention and of the thereby increased weight of the minorities that in the city of Thessaloniki,

23. The data on the elections of 1915 and 1920 were supplied by Nikos Oikonomou. The nationality of those elected was derived from their names. On the May 1915 election in Macedonia and the Antivenizelist promises to the minorities, see Kordatos, *Neotere Hellada*, Vol. 5, p. 432; Venteres, Vol. 1, p. 335; and Leon, *Socialist Movement*, pp. 25–26.

out of 38,263 registered voters, only 250 Greeks and 3,812 Turks and Jews are reported to have voted.²⁴ Similarly, in the nome of Preveza (Epirus), which had been entirely carried by Venizelism in May, 2 out of the 3 seats were filled by Chams in December.

These events, in which alien populations made their electoral weight massively felt against Greek nationalism and Greek sovereignty, provoked the wrath of Venizelists and greatly exacerbated the National Schism. For them, Turkish and Bulgarian support for the Antivenizelist regime “blatantly prove that the policy followed, satisfying the hereditary foes, runs counter to the Nation’s interests.”²⁵ Nevertheless, the overwhelming Venizelist majority elsewhere in May and Venizelist abstention in December did not allow alien minorities to decide the outcome of the 1915 elections in Greece as a whole, as they did in Macedonia.

It was in 1920 that the situation changed. Antivenizelism again carried 69 out of the 74 Macedonia seats, but this time those seats would have given a small nationwide majority to Venizelism (187 out of 369) if it had taken them all. And this would have happened almost certainly if the minorities had not voted for Antivenizelism, or even if they had not voted at all. Among the 69 Antivenizelists elected in Macedonia, there were 14 Turks and 3 Jews. Only in Drama Venizelism managed to split the Turkish vote and elect its only 5 deputies in Macedonia, including 2 Turks. On the contrary, in Thrace (both Western and Eastern), which had recently come under Greek occupation, conditions did not allow Antivenizelism to field any candidates, and Venizelism ran unopposed, collecting all the seats. Among those elected as Venizelists in Thrace, there were 20 Turks, 1 Jew, and 1 Armenian. All elected Turks, however, left the Liberals soon thereafter and joined the Turks of other parties to form a separate group in the Assembly, where they largely supported the Gounares government.²⁶

The shock of electoral defeat in 1920 and its disastrous consequences—savage repression at home and eventual disaster in Asia Minor—greatly exacerbated reactions to the minority vote and exaggerated perceptions of its actual impact. It was thus erroneously asserted, thirty years later:

24. *Hestia*, 19 December 1915.

25. G. Papandreou, “Hoi Dyo Politikoi Kosmoi” [The Two Political Worlds], reprinted in Papandreou, p.81. This article first appeared in May 1916.

26. On the Turkish vote in 1920, see especially Gregoriades, *Dichasmos*, Vol. 1, pp. 375–378, 382, 400, and 404. He reports that information gathered by his father, Colonel N. Gregoriades, in Istanbul indicated that both the Sultan and Kemal had instructed the Turks in Greece to vote against Venizelos. In Thrace, however, the local military commander, General Emm. Zymvrakakes, warned Turkish notables that no Turk was to run against Venizelos. Since the Greeks were Venizelists practically to a man, Antivenizelism abstained in Thrace.

Thanks to the Thessaloniki Jews, we lost Eastern Thrace, and the Asia Minor Disaster occurred, which was terrible for our nation.²⁷

Not surprisingly, Venizelists, in this as in other respects, reacted to the traumatic experience of 1920 by a strong determination that it should never be allowed to happen again. Yet, on the very eve of the Disaster, it was still apparent that a Liberal majority among the Greeks in Macedonia would again be offset by the continuing hostility of the Turks there.²⁸

Consequently, one of the very *first* acts of the 1922 Revolution was to announce that the Moslems of Macedonia and Thrace would henceforth vote in separate electoral colleges and that they would be entitled to 19 seats in all. A year later (October 1923) and after the population exchange had been agreed and largely completed, it was decreed that both the remaining Moslems (in Western Thrace) and the Jews (in Thessaloniki) would vote in separate electoral colleges.²⁹ This measure could be construed to be in fulfillment of the treaty between Greece and the Allies signed at Sèvres, on 10 August 1920, for the protection of national minorities. Article 7 of that treaty provided that Greece would adopt, in the New Lands only, an electoral system taking into account the rights of national minorities. On the eve of the 1920 election, the Venizelist Chamber had thus actually approved a project of constitutional revision, which would permit the creation of separate electoral colleges for Moslems and Jews.³⁰ Nevertheless, their eventual creation in 1922–1923 was primarily due to domestic political considerations. Antivenizelists immediately recognized the expected effect of the measure. A political friend from Drama thus wrote to Metaxas:

We had however the Turks with us and therefore won in all elections heretofore, except for four seats in the last one. . . . In coming elections, however, if we separate the Turks as the Revolution has proposed, the Venizelists will surely win.³¹

Such calculations soon became obsolete, when the Turkish minority vanished from Macedonia as a result of the population exchange. Commenting on the groundless optimism of Antivenizelists with respect to the expected outcome of the 1924 plebiscite, the official biography of

27. Vogazles, p. 15. However, the 25 Thessaloniki seats, won by virtue of "5,000 Jewish votes," did not by themselves give a majority to the P.P., as he implies.

28. N. Apostolopoulos to Venizelos, 22 July 1922, VA File 317. Only in Serres was there a chance of electoral success, the nome with the smallest minority strength.

29. See Pepones, Vol. 1, pp. 264 and 405.

30. See Nikos Oikonomou in *Historia tou Hellenikou Ethnous*, Vol. 15, p. 145.

31. Quoted in Giannopoulos-Epeirotas, p. 93.

Tsaldares candidly observes that they had overlooked the radical alteration of the electoral body after the arrival of the refugees *and* the departure of the Moslems.³² Nevertheless, Venizelism did not abandon the idea of separate electoral colleges, which were first in force during the December 1923 election, and became a perennial and explosive issue for the rest of the interwar period.

There were no separate minority colleges in 1926 and no mention thereof in the Republic's 1927 constitution—an omission which was to have major consequences six years hence.³³ It was Venizelos who reinstated the separate colleges upon his return to power. They remained in force for both Chamber and Senate elections in 1928, 1929, 1932, and 1933, despite the continuous protests of both Antivenizelism and the Jewish community.³⁴ Although the official justification continued to claim that electoral segregation was for the protection of the minorities affected, Venizelos frankly conceded to a friendly Jewish audience in Thessaloniki, on the eve of the 1933 election, that the separate colleges were a product of 1920 and served partisan purposes. He then promised to reconsider the issue, but this became impossible after the storm that followed.³⁵

In the wake of the Antivenizelist electoral triumph and rise to power in March 1933, the special court controlling elections ruled that the electoral segregation of Thessaloniki Jews was unconstitutional, and therefore nullified the March results of both the separate college and the Thessaloniki district as a whole. The Tsaldares government hastened to merge the two by decree and fix the by-election for July 2. In March, Venizelism had carried all 18 Thessaloniki seats by less than 5,000 votes, whereas the P.P. had won both seats of the Jewish college, with 5,754 and 4,878 votes respectively, against 1,403 for the single Liberal candidate. The government could therefore reasonably hope to win all 20 seats in July thanks to the addition of the Jewish vote.

Rather than simply increasing the already substantial Antivenizelist majority in the Chamber, those seats acquired a much greater significance. They were enough to secure an Antivenizelist majority in the *joint* sessions of Chamber and Senate, thereby neutralizing the continuing Venizelist domination of the latter, which constituted for Venizelists their last parliamentary line of defense and, in several critical respects, their last institutional guarantee. This would at last give Antivenizelism a free hand in

32. Vouros, pp. 73–75.

33. The issue had been hotly debated by the Assembly, but no decision had been reached. See Fourth Constituent, 27 March and 3 April 1925, *Praktika*, pp. 647–655 and 755.

34. See, e.g., *Kathemerine*, 18 July 1928.

35. *Eleftheron Vema*, 28 February 1933.

legislation, in constitutional revision, and in the next presidential election. For the first time after more than a decade, an alien minority, and of all minorities the Jews, had thus become the arbiter of Greek politics once again. For Venizelists, it was 1920 all over again.

The consequences were explosive. An exacerbated and unprecedented racial cleavage between Greeks and Jews was added on top of the mounting nationwide polarization due to the abortive Plasteras coup and to the attempted assassination of Venizelos. The "Jewish danger" became one of the major themes of the Thessaloniki electoral campaign, and Venizelos himself emphatically reminded his audience of the 1920 contribution of "Jews, Slavs, and Moslems in Northern Greece" to the victory of the Royalists, with its disastrous consequences. Separate colleges had been instituted to prevent a repetition, but the Jews had always demanded their abolition and had at last succeeded.

They have thus sought, with a population of sixty thousand, to exert a decisive influence, given the approximately equal strength of the two great parties, over a state of six and a half million.³⁶

Although the local campaign and the explosion of Venizelist anti-Semitism will be examined in greater detail below, it must be emphasized here that its consequences exceeded the local level and persisted on a nationwide scale long after the by-election was over (with a Venizelist triumph, despite the Jewish vote). The reinstatement of separate minority colleges and the corresponding theme of "the alien as arbiter" (with pronounced anti-Semitic overtones) seem to have been so effective as propaganda that they became a *major* battle cry of Venizelism thereafter, in its attacks on the Tsaldares government and in the mobilization of its forces for the coming confrontation.

The government's electoral bill, which became an explosive issue in 1934, was thus specifically blasted for the abolition of separate colleges that it confirmed. The Senate committee listed as one of the three main reasons for the bill's rejection that, with the merger of Jews (and the detachment of the newly created nome of Kilkis), it would suppress the opinion of Thessaloniki's "Christian majority."³⁷ Before the whole Senate, it was emphatically repeated that Thessaloniki was being "surrendered to the Jews," while in Rhodope (Western Thrace) the plurality system threatened either to produce representation entirely by Turks or to deprive the Turks of representation. Tsaldares characteristically retorted that both

36. *Eleftheron Vema*, 30 June 1933. See also VA File 295.

37. *Neos Kosmos*, 10 July 1934.

Moslems and Jews "have the same rights as other Greeks" and that the Jews in particular "have proved their assimilation to our national interests and Greek sentiment for decades."³⁸

Two months later, Venizelos himself, addressing the militant Republican mass organizations, explained that his efforts aimed at bringing the country back to normal political life and at securing new elections. It was to that end that he demanded the abandonment of the electoral bill, which "butchered" the districts of Athens and Thessaloniki, and also abolished separate minority colleges, seeking to

turn into *arbiters of the fortunes of Greece* populations of another race, which must be confined to the election of representatives corresponding to their numerical strength. Besides, this is what the Turks of Thrace demand in their petition to the Senate.³⁹

It was only after the disastrous coup of March 1935 that the highly emotional issue of "the alien as arbiter" seems to have been eventually abandoned by Venizelism. It was ironically taken over by Antivenizelism when Gotzamanes threatened to turn the Slavo-Macedonians into arbiters of the June 1935 election in Macedonia, as seen previously.

It may have become apparent from the previous discussion that separate minority colleges as a major and bitter political issue in the inter-war period mostly concerned the Jews, and only incidentally the Turks, even though they were also affected. The reasons for this profound difference should become clear when each minority is examined in turn.

NATIONAL MINORITIES

Turks

The compact Turkish population which had inhabited Western Thrace for several centuries was exempted from the population exchange of 1923 in

38. *Neos Kosmos*, 13, 14, and 15 July 1934. Despite its elevated tone, the assimilation of Turks and Jews by Tsaldares to "other Greeks" was so unrealistic, or else so much in conflict with current perceptions, that it must have sounded ludicrous, if not outright provocative. A similar debate was provoked by the creation of a separate Kilkis nome, which was obviously aimed at removing a large number of Venizelist refugees from the Thessaloniki electoral district. To the Venizelist charges that the government rejected the refugees while it embraced the Jews, Tsaldares again retorted that Greek citizens should not be accused "only because they have a different religion." See Chamber, 24 January 1934, *Efemeris*, pp. 979–993 passim. See also n. 5 above.

39. Venizelos to An. Papoulas, President of Panhellenic Republican Defense, 20 September 1934, VA File 350. Emphasis added. With almost identical content, Venizelos to the local

return for the exemption of the Greek community in Constantinople, and especially for the continuing presence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate there. In a very real sense, Greece and Turkey then essentially agreed to mutually hold hostages, whose treatment in each of the two countries would thereafter guarantee a similar treatment of their counterparts in the other.

Over and above treaty provisions for the protection of religious minorities, which codified such expected treatment, it was this real situation of reciprocity which radically changed and redefined the position of the Turks in Greek politics. The Venizelist Republic was understandably intent on catering to their particular needs, thereby also securing their political support domestically. For their part, they had every reason to cooperate and cultivate good relations with the Greek authorities, avoiding any revival of the 1915–1922 situation, which would be meaningless in the context of the irreversible postwar settlement anyway.

This situation was, however, seriously complicated by intense factionalism within the Turkish community itself, and above all by the continuing bitter struggle between Old Turks, or Old Moslems, as they typically defined themselves, and Young Turks. The latter, backed by republican Turkey and in close cooperation with its diplomatic representatives, aggressively sought to impose Kemalist reforms in Western Thrace as well. This struggle for the control of religious, educational, and cultural activities and organizations directly or indirectly involved the entire web of privileges extended to the Turkish minority by the Greek state and unavoidably drew it into the dispute.

Venizelism generally kept a certain distance from the Turkish minority and, although it actively sought its electoral support, never considered it an integral part of Greek politics.⁴⁰ Venizelism also ostensibly adopted a posture of neutrality with respect to the dispute between Old Moslems and Young Turks, but actually seems to have favored the former and to have mostly relied on their electoral support. It was in the obvious interest of the Greek state both to keep the Turkish minority divided and to treat it solely as a *religious* Moslem minority (which was after all what the Treaty of Lausanne provided), thereby strengthening the faction most inimical to

sections of Republican Defense and Panhellenic Republican Defense, 19 September 1934, VA File 307. On the position of the Turkish minority, see the petition of the four Turkish deputies and the one senator, all Venizelists, in *Neos Kosmos*, 25 July 1934.

40. See, e.g., the reply of Venizelos to the president of the newly founded Association of Liberal Moslems of Xanthe, 1 June 1929, VA File 276, where he characteristically speaks of this group as a *communal* organization, carefully avoiding any reference to its obviously intended relationship with the L.P.

modern Turkish nationalism and the contemporary Turkish state, namely, the Old Moslems. In line with this overall approach, the separate electoral college included all Moslems of Western Thrace, that is, both the Turks and the Pomaks, who were strongly traditionalist. Nevertheless, the Young Turks seem to have gradually gained ground, especially after the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in 1930, which in many ways favored them and demoralized their opponents.⁴¹ It was however after Antivenizelism came to power in 1933 that things radically changed. Seeking to win over the electoral support of the Turkish minority, it appears to have systematically favored the Young Turks at the expense of the Old Moslems, thereby essentially resuming the tactics of 1915–1922—those of securing minority votes by any means.⁴²

It is against this background that the interwar political alignments of the Moslems of Western Thrace may be interpreted (see Table 46).⁴³ Although establishing the exact political identity of such tickets as the “Agrarians” in 1928 or the “Independent Moslems” in 1933 (classified as “Other” in Table 46) as well as identifying personal factions and patron-client networks would require further research, the overall picture emerges with sufficient clarity. Among the two principal blocs, Venizelism practically monopolized the electoral support of the Turks for most of the interwar period, until 1935. It also monopolized their parliamentary representation: all Moslem deputies elected during that time, as well as the sole senator elected in 1929, ran as Venizelists. During these same years, Antivenizelism did not even field an official ticket; 1928 is no exception, given that the ticket here listed as Antivenizelist was one of Independents who identified themselves as P.P. supporters.

It was only after its rise to power in March 1933 that Antivenizelism officially and aggressively made its appearance among the Turkish electorate, first in the local elections of 1934⁴⁴ and then in the uncontested elec-

41. See the perceptive reports of K. Stylianopoulos to Venizelos, 15 January 1930, VA File 107, and 1 July 1931, VA File 251. Stylianopoulos served as director for minorities in the prime minister's office during 1928–1932. On the support given to Old Moslems, which was protested by Turkey in 1928, see also Ladas, pp. 494–495.

42. See the protest of Komotine committees (Old Moslems) to Venizelos and the other leaders of the National Coalition, 17 March 1934, VA File 402.

43. As noted, the separate electoral college included all Moslems, i.e., both Turks and Pomaks. Nevertheless, given the small number of the latter, the table mostly reflects the behavior of the former. A similar picture is obtained through regression analysis if the Turks are merged with the rest of the population.

44. In the aftermath of those municipal and communal elections, the Liberal Club of Komotine reported to Venizelos that government intervention had produced few defections among Greek Venizelists, but many among the Turks. See report dated 10 March 1934, VA, unclassified.

Table 46 THE MOSLEM VOTE IN WESTERN THRACE, 1926–1936
(in percentage of valid ballots)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Anti-venizelism</i>	<i>Venizelism</i>	<i>Agrarianism</i>	<i>Communism</i>	<i>Other</i>
1926	—	93.14	0.57	5.89	0.40
1928	26.37 ^a	37.18	35.69 ^b	—	0.76
1929	—	100.00 ^c	—	—	—
1932	—	86.33	6.64	3.61	3.42 ^d
1933	—	71.89 ^e	—	2.92	25.19 ^f
1936	36.28	49.38	4.85	9.49	—

NOTE: For the elections of 1928–33, the results of the separate college are taken from the official publications. On the method of estimating party strength in 1928 and 1933, see Appendix 2. For 1926 and 1936, when there was no separate Moslem constituency, the following method was used. The preference votes of the strongest Moslem candidate on each ticket in the districts of Rhodope and Evros were assumed to represent the *total* number of Moslems voting for that ticket. The sum of these represents the total Moslem vote, on the basis of which percentages were computed. This is certainly an underestimate when compared to other elections, which indicates that an unknown number of Moslems did not vote for the strongest but for other Moslem candidates on the ticket. Moslems most probably did not vote for Greek candidates, and Greeks most probably did not vote for Moslem candidates, except in the case of the C.P., whose Moslem vote is thereby certainly inflated in 1926 and 1936.

^aIndependent ticket of self-proclaimed P.P. supporters.

^bIndependent ticket of self-proclaimed Agrarians.

^cAll candidates to the Senate ran as Venizelists.

^dIndependent ticket led by a leader of the Young Turks and subsequent P.P. deputy.

^eIncludes the official National Coalition ticket and a ticket of Independent Liberals.

^f"Independent Moslems of Thrace."

tion of June 1935 (which is not included in Table 46). Eventually, in 1936, the Turkish vote seems to have been almost equally shared between the two blocs, even though Venizelism remained stronger. Of the two Turks elected in that year, one was a Venizelist and a permanent interwar deputy of the Farmer-Labor Party, the other an Antivenizelist and a leader of the Young Turks in Western Thrace. Finally, support for Agrarianism was small, except in 1928 when, however, the Agrarian label may not have meant much. Similarly, support for the C.P. remained limited (and in 1926 and 1936 was certainly less than appears in Table 46, due to the computational method used).

In conclusion, for most of the interwar period, the Turks of Western Thrace sided with the republican regime and with the bloc in power, that is, Venizelism, which explains why they resisted the abolition of their

separate electoral college and why their electoral influence never became a real issue, unlike that of other minorities. The shift to Antivenizelism towards the very end of the period may in fact largely be explained by the same need to remain on good terms with the Greek state—which was also in accordance with Turkey's policy at the time.

Slavo-Macedonians

Unlike the Turks of Western Thrace, Slavo-Macedonians did not remain in interwar Greece (mostly in Western Macedonia) on the basis of a diplomatic deal with the interested country—in this case Bulgaria. The 1919 Convention between Greece and Bulgaria provided for the “reciprocal emigration” of their minorities on a *voluntary* basis, and, although various forms of pressure were in fact exerted, this remained a critical difference with the subsequent compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. Most importantly, it allowed a sizable and compact Slavo-Macedonian population to stay in Greece, largely upon instructions from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), whereas Greeks left Bulgaria practically to a man, thereby removing any potential basis for reciprocity in the future treatment of minorities.⁴⁵ Moreover, Bulgaria, unlike Turkey, was the foremost revisionist state in the Balkans during the interwar period, refusing to accept the territorial settlement imposed upon it after World War I and perennially using the Slavo-Macedonian population in Greece and Yugoslavia as the basis and spearhead of its expansionist aspirations. This combination of factors, compounded by their location right on the border, defined the extremely sensitive and explosive position of Slavo-Macedonians in interwar Greek politics, in contrast to the settled situation of the Turkish minority.

The convoluted history and political evolution of the Slavo-Macedonian minority and especially the endless disputes surrounding it cannot be summarized meaningfully here.⁴⁶ Suffice it to note the most general and relevant aspects. The least disputable and most visible distinctive mark of Slavo-Macedonians was their language, a Slavic idiom considered akin to Bulgarian. Although religion as such no longer provided a means of separate identity in the interwar period (they were Christian Orthodox), memories were still strong of the last decades of Ottoman rule, when choosing the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate against that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was equivalent to choosing Bulgaria against Greece. A reli-

45. See Pentzopoulos, pp. 60–61; and Ladas, pp. 104–123.

46. See, e.g., Palmer and King, pp. 3–57; Kofos, pp. 9–94; Burks, pp. 91–96; and Christidès, *passim*.

gious issue which did not concern only Slavo-Macedonians but to which they were particularly sensitive (and thereby susceptible to both IMRO and Antivenizelist propaganda) in the interwar years was that of the Old Calendar.⁴⁷ Otherwise, an often neglected but essential aspect is that the bulk of the Slavo-Macedonian population consisted of a solid traditional peasantry, much attached to the land, and drawing its strength from its distinctive forms of social organization centered around the *zadruga* (a type of extended family).⁴⁸

On the most sensitive issue of national identity, the standard Greek argument that distinctive speech and culture did not automatically preclude Greek national consciousness seems plausible, but offers no certain method of estimating the numbers involved. In any event, those of the 1928 Census for the Slavo-Macedonian-speaking population as a whole clearly do not reflect its actual strength, as a result of either official policy, or reluctance on the part of those concerned, or both. Contemporary Greek reports estimate as many as 200,000 "Bulgarian"-speaking inhabitants in Macedonia, of whom no more than 80,000–90,000 are considered to be lacking a Greek national consciousness—a number equivalent to that of the census, perhaps not accidentally.⁴⁹ In Western Macedonia, where the bulk of the Slavo-Macedonian minority was concentrated, the census reports 38,562 (31 percent of the total population) in the nome of Florina and 19,537 (20 percent) in the nome of Pella (Edessa). According to the prefect of Florina in 1930, however, there were 76,370 (61 percent), of whom as many as 61,950 (49 percent of the population), including the most prosperous and influential, were lacking a Greek national consciousness.⁵⁰

Among those lacking a Greek consciousness, there can be little doubt that the overwhelming majority continued to identify with Bulgaria during the interwar period. This was largely due to the continuing hold of the IMRO, which was itself dominated by its "Supremist" wing (i.e., that favoring annexation to Bulgaria), was based in Sofia, and closely cooper-

47. See the reports of K. Stylianopoulos, 16 December 1931, VA File 251; and of the Prefect of Florina (V. Balkos), 10 March 1932, VA File 110.

48. On this, see Karavidas, pp. 298–318 *passim*. Most perceptively, Karavidas emphasizes that it was their peasant culture and family organization which constituted the most formidable obstacle to the assimilation of the Slavo-Macedonians by the Greek state.

49. See the reports of P. Demetriades to the Association for the Dissemination of Greek Letters, 13 August 1927 and 23 December 1927, VA File 373. Given the confidential nature and policy orientation of these reports, they should be rated as more reliable than public statements. On the actual number of Slavo-Macedonians, see also Christidès, pp. 64–65.

50. The Prefect of Florina (P. Kalligas) to Venizelos, Report No. 3394, 26 February 1930, VA File 107. His alarmist successor estimates those speaking "Bulgarian" as 75–80 percent of the nome's population. See the Prefect of Florina (V. Balkos) to Venizelos, 10 March 1932, VA File 110.

ated with the Bulgarian state throughout most of the period (until 1934). Although interwar developments in this area are extremely kaleidoscopic, political control by the mainstream, pro-Bulgarian IMRO seems to have at no point been seriously eroded, whether by dissident elements of the Organization (such as the Federalists, who favored autonomy) or by the IMRO (United) set up in Vienna by the Third International in 1926 after the failure of Communist efforts to create a united front with IMRO itself in 1924.

As long as Bulgaria refused to accept irrevocably and unequivocally the borders created by World War I, Greece could not afford to recognize the existence of any group that might be construed as a Bulgarian minority right on its frontier,⁵¹ nor would Yugoslavia tolerate the creation of such an explosive precedent for the status of its own much more numerous Slavo-Macedonian population. Greece thus eventually refused to ratify the 1924 Kalfov-Politis Protocol (which promised Slavo-Macedonians in Greece international protection as a Bulgarian minority) after it had created an uproar both in Athens and in Belgrade.⁵² Again in 1929, Greek willingness to provide the minority with education in its own language remained without effect due to the bitter dispute between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the former demanding Bulgarian, the latter Serbo-Croatian.⁵³

Slavo-Macedonians in Greece, unlike other major minorities, were therefore never officially recognized as one nor granted any minority rights. Quite on the contrary, they suffered various forms of harassment from Greek authorities, whose perpetual concern was to repel IMRO raids, eradicate active supporters of Bulgaria, and assimilate the rest. The most important interwar incident, which attracted international attention and strongly influenced the signing of the Kalfov-Politis Protocol, occurred in July 1924 at the village of Terlitz or Tarlis (later Vathytopon), in the nome of Drama, when a Greek detachment in pursuit of an IMRO band proceeded to execute several Slavo-Macedonian natives.⁵⁴ Tension on the Greco-Bulgarian border, constantly fed by IMRO incursions, even-

51. See Venizelos to Michalakopoulos (then minister of foreign affairs), 23 November 1930, VA File 283. In his report (see previous note) the prefect of Florina, P. Kalligas, emphatically warned in 1930 that the actual recognition of a national minority would be equivalent to the detachment of the area from Greece.

52. See the heated debate, Fourth Constituent, 28–29 January and 2 February 1925, *Praktika*, Vol. 4, pp. 47–64, 67–88, and 106–148. It may be noted that the stillborn 1926 agreements between Greece and Yugoslavia contracted by the dictator Pangalos included a recognition of the Slavo-Macedonians as a Yugoslav minority and provisions for its protection. See Pipineles, p. 30.

53. See Kofos, pp. 48–49.

54. The officer responsible, a Captain Doxiakes, was court-martialed and heavily sentenced. See Fourth Constituent, 28 January 1925, *Praktika*, Vol. 4, pp. 57 and 62; and Markezines, Vol. 3, p. 40 n. 51.

tually led to the Greek invasion of Bulgaria in October 1925, which created a major international incident and provoked the intervention of the League of Nations. A peculiar but quite characteristic situation was also created around the issue of emigration to the United States. Many Slavo-Macedonians, encouraged by IMRO, would first go to Sofia and then enter the United States with Bulgarian passports. Upon their return to Greece, they would face expulsion.⁵⁵

The most explosive and perennial issue, however, was that of the land in conjunction with refugee settlement. Slavo-Macedonian natives reacted strongly and often violently to the massive settlement of Greek refugees and to their occupation of fields they had themselves coveted or even cultivated in the past. The 1924 Kalfov-Politis Protocol actually coincided with the initial phase of the refugee settlement crisis, with grave consequences for the Greek state, as Slavo-Macedonian peasants would massively declare themselves Bulgarians, or even Serbs, in the futile hope that their villages and lands would thus be spared the refugee invasion.⁵⁶ As noted earlier, this conflict over land between Slavo-Macedonian natives and Greek refugees continued throughout the interwar period, with recurrent violent explosions and major political implications.

In view of the overall condition of the Slavo-Macedonians, it is hardly surprising that they should massively oppose, within the context of Greek politics, that political bloc which primarily embodied definitive Greek sovereignty over their native lands and systematically sought to buttress such sovereignty by all means, including refugee settlement, namely, Venizelism. This, however, does not mean that Slavo-Macedonians mostly supported Communism, as a widespread myth maintains.⁵⁷

There was of course never any question of establishing a separate electoral college for Slavo-Macedonians, which would naturally invite Bulgarian territorial claims. Their voting patterns can therefore only be inferred from ecological analysis and other information. While it confirms their strong opposition to Venizelism, ecological regression indicates that the majority of Slavo-Macedonians consistently voted for Antivenizelism during the interwar period, as they had done in 1915–1920 (see Table 47).⁵⁸

55. See police reports dated 13 February 1931, VA File 108.

56. See the speech of A. Papanastasiou during the debate on the Protocol, Fourth Constituent, 2 February 1925, *Praktika*, Vol. 4, p. 115; and Karavidas, pp. 352–356, who reports that incoming Greek refugees often attacked the natives as “Bulgarians.”

57. See, e.g., Burks.

58. The deflated census figures had to be used, in the absence of other ecological data. According to the census, Slavo-Macedonians exceeded 2 percent of the total population in only 15 units of analysis.

Table 47 ANTIVENIZELISM AND SLAVO-MACEDONIANS
(New Lands only, n = 99)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Slavo-Macedonians	+ .83 (.20) .000	+ .65 (.20) .001	+ .77 (.21) .000	+ .55 (.19) .006	+ .70 (.18) .000
<i>a</i>	17.03 (1.48) .000	20.93 (1.49) .000	29.80 (1.57) .000	31.72 (1.47) .000	24.87 (1.36) .000
<i>r</i>	.39	.32	.36	.28	.37
<i>s</i>	13.91	14.00	14.69	13.77	12.75

That they should have aligned themselves with Antivenizelism rather than with the C.P. may be understood in light of several factors, some of which have already been discussed. Local Antivenizelist politicians, often belonging to long-established notable families, offered the only practical and day-to-day protection available to Slavo-Macedonians variously harassed by the Greek authorities. Moreover, they systematically exploited the same issues that IMRO agitated about, such as the Old Calendar and the land question, often encouraging Slavo-Macedonians to take violent action.⁵⁹ Given that Antivenizelism had a good chance of eventually coming to power, it generally held the concrete and often explicit promise that it would then reverse Venizelist policies adversely affecting the minority, above all by removing the refugees settled in their midst. Furthermore, the majority of Slavo-Macedonians consisted of conservative and tradition-bound peasants, including several fairly prosperous ones, who were precisely the staunchest supporters of Bulgarian irredentism. Any association with Communism not only would go against their deeply ingrained attitudes and Bulgarian nationalist ideas, but would also make them even more vulnerable to police persecution. Finally, the mainstream IMRO

59. The case of Angistri has already been reported in Chapter 4 above. Another typical example occurred during the 1926 electoral campaign when "Royalist Bulgarian natives" belonging to the Party of Free Opinion (Metaxas) reportedly assaulted Liberal candidates and refugees near Voemitsa, because of the massive settlement of refugees in the area. See *Eleftheron Vema*, 31 October 1926. On the attitude of Antivenizelist politicians, see, e.g., the 1925 and 1927 statements by Filippus S. Dragoumes, reprinted in his *Ekloge*, 1922–1925, pp. 75–78, and *Ekloge*, 1925–1928, pp. 34–36. Scion of an old political family of Florina, Dragoumes takes the defense of "Slavophones" against the Greek state, and especially against refugee settlement, and claims that "almost all" have a Greek national consciousness.

seems to have directed the Slavo-Macedonian vote to Antivenizelism and certainly not to Communism, no doubt for the same reasons. In the aftermath of the 1932 election, the prefect of Florina characteristically reported that the Slavo-Macedonians had massively voted for the P.P. upon instructions from IMRO in Sofia, and after Antivenizelist promises to recognize minority rights in education, church affairs, etc., *despite* a proclamation urging them to vote for the C.P., which was issued by “the left wing of the Bulgarian Committee” in Vienna—presumably IMRO (United).⁶⁰

Although no association is to be found through ecological analysis, it seems fairly certain that a minority fraction of the Slavo-Macedonian population *did* vote for the C.P., in some elections at least. This had already happened in 1920,⁶¹ but only began to attract attention in 1926, when it could be associated with the vociferous Communist propaganda for an “independent Macedonia.” In that election, the “Bulgarians” of Florina were reported to have voted for the C.P. upon instructions from Vienna, because of its program for Macedonian “autonomy.”⁶² However, only a fairly small minority of the Slavo-Macedonian vote actually went to the Communist ticket.⁶³ Although this remained true in subsequent elections to an extent which cannot be exactly estimated, the connection between Slavo-Macedonian “autonomists” and Communism created a grossly inflated image, which persisted throughout the interwar years and even to the present. Among the reasons for this widespread misperception, two deserve particular emphasis. On the one hand, Communist propaganda for an “independent and united Macedonia” seemed to represent the most extreme threat to Greek territorial integrity in the context of contemporary alarmist views regarding both the growth of Communism and the Slavo-Macedonian minority. On the other hand, the connection between Slavo-Macedonians, Communists, and the threatened loss of Greek Macedonia was most effective—not only for propaganda, but also for the police repression of both Communist and Slavo-Macedonian agitation.⁶⁴

60. The Prefect of Florina (V. Balkos) to Venizelos, Confidential Report No. 316, 13 October 1932, VA File 112.

61. See Stavrides, pp. 38–39.

62. *Eleftheron Vema*, 16 November 1926, and 29 November 1926. See also Karavidas, pp. 305–306; and the Prefect of Florina (V. Balkos) to Venizelos, 10 March 1932, VA File 110.

63. Stavrides, pp. 389 and 393, claims that about 2,500 Slavo-Macedonians in Western Macedonia voted for the C.P., which should be considered an upper limit. With regard to the Florina district, he states that Slavo-Macedonians voted for the C.P. “to some extent” and “to the big surprise” of local Antivenizelist politicians.

64. Already a decree of 2 June 1926 instituted measures of deportation or even expulsion for suspects of acts or ideas of “secession.” See Alivizatos, pp. 266–268.

Not surprisingly, mainstream Antivenizelism gradually adopted the same perspective after its rise to power. As noted earlier, the Slavo-Macedonian vote became a bitter issue during the one-sided 1935 electoral campaign. And after 1936, it was ironically the same Metaxas, for whose party Slavo-Macedonians had massively voted a decade earlier, that sponsored the most systematic repression of the minority to date, including even a prohibition on the use of its language.⁶⁵ This policy would soon bear its fruits, during the 1941–1944 Occupation, when Slavo-Macedonians turned against Greece—first siding with Bulgarian chauvinism, then with Yugoslav communism.⁶⁶

Chams

Located on the border with Albania, which regarded them as unredeemed brothers, the Albanian-speaking Moslems, or Chams, as they called themselves, represented an ever-present threat to Greek territorial integrity, second only to that posed by the Slavo-Macedonians. They were concentrated in the northwestern part of Greek Epirus (thereby also known as the Chamouria) and mostly in three eparchies: Margariti (31.56 percent of the total population), Filiates (30.96 percent), and Paramythia (8.71 percent).

Although they should have been exchanged as Moslems in the context of the 1923 population exchange, they were eventually exempted as Albanians and allowed to stay, under diplomatic pressure from Albania. Despite the strong protests raised by this concession,⁶⁷ the Greek government undoubtedly had to consider the survival of the large Greek population in Southern Albania (or Northern Epirus in Greek terminology), which created a situation of “mutual hostages” analogous to that with Turkey, even though it was never formalized. This situation did not prevent the expropriation of the large estates (*chiftliks*) owned by the Chamouria beys, in the context of land reform, thereby exacerbating a long-standing local conflict between Greeks and Chams over the land, which had largely belonged to the latter or rather their upper class (the beys)

65. Nevertheless, the foremost exponent of the peculiar Macedonian brand of Antivenizelism seems to have remained true to his past record. In his 20 July 1940 memorandum to Metaxas, S. Gotzamanes characteristically denied that Slavo-Macedonians constituted an alien minority, and strongly advised against police measures. See Gotzamanes, *Hypomnemata*, pp. 81–91.

66. See Burks, pp. 96–99.

67. In 1925, a prominent Epirus Liberal attacked the Michalakopoulos government on that account and urgently demanded that Chams leave that most sensitive border area. See Fourth Constituent, 11 February 1925, *Praktika*, Vol. 3, pp. 256–261.

during the Ottoman period.⁶⁸ Exploiting this and other issues, Albanian propaganda among the Chams continued throughout the interwar years and would eventually culminate in a serious challenge to the Greek possession of the area during World War II and the Axis Occupation.⁶⁹

Like Turks, Slavo-Macedonians, and Jews in Macedonia, and no doubt for similar reasons, the Chams seem to have opposed Venizelism in 1915–1920. This is also suggested by the fact that only in December 1915 were two Chams elected to the Chamber, obviously as Antivenizelists. Their interwar alignments apparently did not attract public attention, and can only be inferred from local electoral patterns. In 1926, encouraged by proportional representation and undoubtedly also by the recent Albanian diplomatic success on their behalf, Chams seem to have mostly supported their own “Party of the Chamouria” under Ali Dino Bey, who received a total of 1,539 votes in the districts of Ioannina and Preveza. In subsequent elections, however, they apparently followed the overall trend in their areas and mostly voted for Venizelism—overwhelmingly in 1928–1933, but with a visible drop in 1936. The reasons can only be conjectured without further research, but probably involve the efforts of local Venizelist politicians, in cooperation with state authorities, to attract the Cham vote, mostly through clientelism, and thereby defuse the danger of electoral separatism. In effect, the separatist show of 1926 was never repeated, and in 1932 Ali Dino Bey, significantly running on the Farmer-Labor ticket, received the ludicrous total of 67 preference votes in the districts of Ioannina and Preveza.⁷⁰

To conclude, the case of the Chams may be compared to that of the Turks in Western Thrace. In light of paramount diplomatic considerations involving a Greek minority in a neighboring country, Venizelism and the Venizelist Republic sought to accommodate and control an alien minority, thereby neutralizing the threat it might otherwise pose.

Sephardic Jews

Unlike the Turks, Slavo-Macedonians, and Chams, Sephardic Jews (86 percent of whom were concentrated in the city of Thessaloniki) were not claimed by any foreign state. Yet, they were also considered, and for the most part considered themselves, an alien national minority in interwar

68. On the early phase of this conflict, see the Governor-General of Epirus, Report No. 1866, 4 September 1914, VA File 100.

69. See the report of the Governor-General of Epirus, 21 January 1929, VA File 104. On the Occupation years, see Lagios.

70. See also the earlier reports of the Prefect of Preveza (Bristoyannes), 20 March 1932 and 31 March 1932, VA File 110.

Greece. It is actually the *lack* of such a recognized foreign protector that may largely explain why their conflict with the Greek majority and with the Greek state was allowed to develop quite openly and reach dimensions that would be unthinkable in the case of other national minorities.

The compact Jewish presence in Northern Greece, and Thessaloniki in particular, dates back to the beginning of the 16th century when massive arrivals from the Western Mediterranean, and especially Spain, increased tremendously what had been a small religious community since Roman times.⁷¹ At the turn of this century, Thessaloniki was a city with a Jewish majority relative to any other national group and probably in absolute terms as well. It was also a city where the Jewish community encompassed the *entire* spectrum of a fairly industrialized urban class structure, from bourgeois to proletarian and lumpenproletarian. Jewish bankers, industrialists, and merchants largely controlled the city's economic life, while the majority of the workers was also Jewish.

In 1912, the Greek occupation of Thessaloniki (which was accompanied by a brief wave of anti-Semitism) marked the beginning of the community's decline, as the city's central economic role in the Balkans was reduced by the new national borders, while Jewish control was itself challenged. Both the beginning and the subsequent phases of this decline were marked by successive waves of emigration, reducing the Jewish population of Thessaloniki to about 50,000, or one-fifth of the city's total, by 1940.

A major turning point was the Great Fire of August 1917, which practically destroyed the central part of the city and dealt a death blow to its predominantly Jewish character. Reconstruction and the new city plan allowed Greek authorities to prevent a massive resettlement of the Jews in the central, commercial, and port areas.⁷² The poorest and mostly working-class part of the Jewish community, more than a third of the total, thus moved to certain suburbs under miserable housing conditions.⁷³ These ghetto-like peripheral settlements became both the strongholds of the Jewish Left and the target of local Greek anti-Semitism.

In 1924, the imposition of the Sunday holiday again adversely af-

71. For a concise history of the Jews in Thessaloniki, see the entry "Salonika (Thessaloniki)" in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*. More details on the interwar period are to be found in the first chapters of Molho; and in Nehama, pp. 757–807.

72. For a highly cosmetic Greek version, see Vacalopoulos, pp. 132–133. Nehama, pp. 767–769, claims that several thousand (7,000 on one page, and 4,101 on another) Jewish property owners were expropriated by virtue of the new city plan. On the highly symbolic and emotionally charged issue of the Jewish cemetery, see Molho, Vol. 1, pp. 56–57, and especially Vol. 3, pp. 13–14. Kastrinos, pp. 276–279, claims, nonetheless, that the original city plan was reduced in scope because of the Jewish reaction. Papanastasiou was the responsible minister of public works at the time.

73. Molho, Vol. 1, p. 2. He reports that there were on average 3.4 persons to a room.

fected the Thessaloniki Jews.⁷⁴ Furthermore, after the massive refugee influx, tensions mounted between Greeks and Jews in the city and in Northern Greece generally, as a result of exacerbated competition for the control of local economic life. The roots of growing anti-Semitism were thus largely economic, even though they were typically overlaid with political issues. In 1926, for example, a "National Macedonian Organization," which appeared after the November election and decreed a commercial boycott against the Jews ostensibly because of their Communist vote, consisted mostly of small Greek merchants.⁷⁵ Among such groups, the most important was the fascist or protofascist "National Union Greece" (*Ethnike Henosis Hellas*), commonly known as the EEE or as the Three E's, founded in 1927, and reportedly having a membership of 7,000 in 1931 (3,000 in Thessaloniki), mostly refugees.⁷⁶ In close collaboration with the Thessaloniki newspaper *Makedonia*, the EEE launched a rabidly anti-Semitic campaign, culminating after several incidents in an actual pogrom in June 1931, when the Jewish suburb of Campbell was largely burned down. After the Campbell riots, anti-Semitism erupted again on the occasion of the July 1933 Thessaloniki by-election, to which we shall return. It was only in 1936 that the Metaxas dictatorship reportedly "brought a change for the better in the lives of the Jews of Salonika"⁷⁷ and offered them the last years of peace and security before the Nazi holocaust, which was to destroy them almost completely.

Because of its far more developed, differentiated, and institutionalized social organization, the internal politics of the Jewish community involve greater complexity and visibility, if not transparency, than those of other minorities. The profound class cleavage between the Jewish bourgeoisie and the Jewish proletariat was reflected in the extreme polarization between a conservative, bourgeois, religious, and Zionist Right, and a distinctly working-class socialist and communist Left, which had its strongholds in the Jewish suburbs. Between the two, a smaller party of Moderates was also distinctly bourgeois. The composition of the last communal assembly, elected in 1932 by proportional representation, indicates the distribution of forces, which seems to have been fairly stable throughout the interwar years. Zionists of all shades had a majority, and maintained their control of all executive agencies, with 26 seats (52 percent).

74. See Fourth Constituent, 23 and 27 May 1924, and 11 July 1924, *Praktika*, Vol. 2, pp. 54, 109–110, and 696–700.

75. *Eleftheron Vema*, 24 November 1926.

76. See Captain Skardakes to Pavlos (Gypares?), 8 August 1931, VA File 387.

77. "Salonika (Thessaloniki)," p. 703; and Molho, Vol. 3, p. 14. Among other measures, the EEE was banned and dissolved, and anti-Semitism in the press was curtailed.

Next came the Left with 14 seats (28 percent), while the Moderates only held 10 seats (20 percent).⁷⁸

What is most relevant for the present study is how these Jewish political forces stood in relation to the Greek state and to the Greek political parties. Zionism, which significantly grew after the Greek occupation in 1912, essentially represented a refusal to accept Greek sovereignty as irreversible, or at least a refusal to assimilate, and consistently sought to preserve and defend the integrity and autonomy of the Jewish community against encroachments by the Greek state. Although on different grounds and with different objectives, the Left took a practically parallel position against Greek bourgeois nationalism. In contrast, the Moderates stood for assimilation and for smooth, cooperative relations with other Greek citizens and with the Greek state. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Zionism aligned itself with Antivenizelism, the Left with the C.P., and the Moderates with Venizelism.⁷⁹

As with other national minorities in Northern Greece, the compact Jewish vote for Antivenizelism in 1915 and 1920 was essentially a vote against Greek domination and sovereignty, embodied by Venizelism. Subsequently, Antivenizelism, for electoral rather than ideological reasons, offered itself as the only effective defender of the Jewish community and its particular interests. In this case, Metaxas seems to have remained true to his camp's tradition.

On the other hand, Jewish relations with communism were strong and organic rather than incidental, as with Antivenizelism. Out of the predominantly Jewish early proletariat of Thessaloniki emerged the *Federacion Socialista Laboradera* in 1909, which was to play an important role in the Balkan and Greek socialist movement and which, despite the participation of other nationalities, retained its distinctly Jewish character.⁸⁰ Opposed to Greek annexation, the war, and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the *Federacion* supported the Antivenizelist ticket in May 1915, on which it got two socialist candidates elected—one Jew and one Greek.⁸¹ In 1918, it was one of the principal founding groups of what was to become the C.P. of Greece. Although its influence on party affairs

78. Molho, Vol. 1, p. 4. For Zionism as a whole, I have added the 22 "sionistes généraux" and the 4 "mizrahistes." For the Left, I have added the 12 "partisans du bloc populaire" and the 2 "faubourguistes."

79. Ibid., pp. 17–20. For a similar but rather disingenuous account, see also Nehama, pp. 771–772.

80. On the *Federacion*, see especially the reminiscences of its founder, Benaroyas. See also Leon, *Socialist Movement*, especially pp. 103–107; and Kordatos, *Ergatiko*, pp. 236–266, 300–301, and 315–316.

81. Ibid., pp. 274–276; Benaroyas, pp. 89–90; Elefantos, p. 25; and Stavrides, p. 15.

declined in subsequent years, the Jewish Left continued to contribute the most compact bloc of Communist votes in Thessaloniki.⁸² For its part, and in addition to its overall policy on minorities and on Macedonia (which was quite appropriate for the Jews as well), the C.P. showed a particular interest in the Jewish minority and vociferously, if ineffectually, denounced all manifestations of anti-Semitism.⁸³ It should be emphasized that these early and lasting bonds between the Jewish minority and the C.P., grossly exaggerated and distorted in contemporary perceptions, heavily contributed to both anti-Semitism and anticommunism in interwar Greece.

It is however the relationship between the Jews and Venizelism which proved most complex, convoluted, and ultimately determining for their interwar political alignments. From the very beginning, Venizelism perceived the Thessaloniki Jews as a most intractable and inimical alien element, both to itself and to the Greek state.⁸⁴ Their vote in 1915 and, especially, in 1920 confirmed these early perceptions and was never forgotten, nor forgiven. In response, the separate electoral college was instituted in 1923, which the Jews strongly resented as a political ghetto. They boycotted that first election in protest and continued agitating for the abolition of the separate college throughout the subsequent decade.

Moreover, from the very beginning, Venizelism adopted a policy of assimilation, entailing the curtailment of Jewish privileges and particularisms, within the context of its overall conception of Greek national interest. This assimilationist policy was both resented and resisted by the Jewish majority, whereas only a small, if influential, group (the Moderates) was ready to espouse it. In 1919–1920, Jewish complaints and demands for autonomy actually threatened Greek national interests on the international level.⁸⁵ During the interwar years, one of the thorniest remaining issues was the participation of Jews who maintained foreign citizenship in communal elections. Such participation was eventually prohibited.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, during the first interwar years, communal leadership was apparently intent on pursuing a careful conciliatory policy and on preventing any repetition of the 1915–1920 provocations. In the 1926

82. Ibid., pp. 391–393, claims that the Jewish votes in 1926 elected two Jews on the Communist ticket *against* the party line and provoked the anger of Greek Communists.

83. See, e.g., KKE, Vol. 3, pp. 327, 331, 501, and 547.

84. See Raktivan, pp. 48–52. Vogazles, p. 6, portrays them as *the* most hostile minority.

85. See Leon, *Socialist Movement*, pp. 94–95; and especially Kitsikis, pp. 423–436, on the efforts of the Venizelos government to counter such Zionist propaganda at the time of the Peace Conference.

86. See K. Stylianopoulos to Venizelos, 2 December 1929, VA File 105; and *Eleftheron Vema*, 24 April 1930, which characteristically states that foreign subjects “should take the nationality of the State whose bread they eat.”

election, although the separate college was not in force, electoral self-segregation was in fact adopted by all Jewish bourgeois forces, who ran as a "Jewish Political Union." No Jew appeared on the list of any Greek party, except those of the C.P. and a minor leftist group. In 1928, no doubt in view of the expected Venizelist landslide, community leadership chose to support a ticket of Independents (but self-proclaimed Liberals) who polled a majority in the separate college (54.71 percent) and were both elected, whereas the official Liberal ticket made a very poor showing (6.69 percent). In 1929, the Jewish community advanced one step further towards accommodation with Venizelism when it requested that the official L.P. *chrism* be given to its own senatorial candidate—a prominent Zionist who was then reportedly "willing to promote the idea of assimilation."⁸⁷ The request was granted, and the candidate polled 63.47 percent of the separate college, while the only other candidate to receive any votes also declared himself a Liberal.⁸⁸ This spectacular and solemn rapprochement between Venizelism and the Jews proved short-lived, however, as the promise of accommodation turned sour due to the explosive rise of anti-Semitism.

Neither official Venizelism nor Venizelos personally was ever identified with truly anti-Semitic attitudes. In fact, they had always reacted strongly against manifestations of anti-Semitism. A contemporary example was offered in October 1929, when the indignant minister of interior informed Venizelos that an anti-Semitic circular of the "Panhellenic Bourgeois Union" linking the Jews to the C.P. had been widely circulated by the Army and Navy General Staffs, as well as by the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church. Venizelos immediately condemned the action as "absolutely irregular."⁸⁹

Nevertheless, grass-roots anti-Semitism (typically confounded with anticommunism) seems to have been not only a distinctly refugee, but also a predominantly Venizelist mass movement in Northern Greece.⁹⁰ Furthermore, the foremost exponent of anti-Semitism was *Makedonia*, the major Venizelist newspaper of Thessaloniki, whose publisher (P. Levantes) was one of the region's most influential L.P. political figures and a deputy. Also, local Greek authorities seem to have typically tolerated, if not actu-

87. As a Thessaloniki Liberal put it, the community requested the party *chrism* "in order to rehabilitate themselves vis-à-vis the L.P. by voting this time for the party candidate." See X? to Venizelos, 7 February 1929, VA File 379.

88. This self-proclaimed Liberal seems to have been supported by the C.P. as well. See KKE, Vol. 3, pp. 71–72.

89. See P. Argyropoulos (minister of interior) to Venizelos, 31 October 1929, VA File 335, and Venizelos to the ministers of the army, navy, and ecclesiastical affairs, 31 October 1929, VA File 279.

90. Captain Skardakes in his previously cited letter to Pavlos (Gypares?), 8 August 1931, VA File 387, claimed that EEE membership was 90 percent Venizelist.

ally cooperated with, the EEE, mostly in the context of anticommunist action.⁹¹

After several lesser incidents, tensions eventually erupted in the Campbell pogrom of June 1931. The agonizing Jewish leadership characteristically cabled Venizelos that his personal presence was required "for the restoration of the state of law in Thessaloniki."⁹² Neither his condemnation of the events and of anti-Semitism in general, however, nor the compensations offered for the destruction could repair the political damage and mend the fences. A major turning point in interwar politics, the Campbell pogrom irrevocably convinced the Jewish community that it could expect no effective protection from the Venizelist Republic against aggression by its own supporters.

After more than a decade, Thessaloniki Jews therefore openly and massively rallied behind Antivenizelism and the P.P., "which truly protected them."⁹³ In both Chamber and Senate elections of 1932 and again in March 1933, the Jewish community and its leadership impressively threw their support behind the official Antivenizelist (P.P.) ticket, thereby also revealing the weakness of the real Jewish Liberals. Then, in May 1933, the community finally succeeded in securing the abolition of the separate college, thus provoking the critical Thessaloniki by-election of July when, for the first and only time in the interwar period, the Jews appeared as a possible arbiter of Greek politics. Since the by-election has been discussed earlier in this chapter, what remains to be seen is how it brought to the open and further embittered the relationship between the Jews and Venizelism.

The campaign opened in Thessaloniki on a distinctly anti-Semitic tone when P. Levantes, publisher of *Makedonia* and heading the Venizelist ticket, declared:

Given that the election was nullified because of the Jews, and given that the bloc in power places its hopes for victory and for the further perturbation of Greek life on the votes of the Jews, the National Coalition shall neither include a Jewish candidate on its ticket nor ask for Jewish votes. It shall address itself through a purely Greek ticket to the Greeks of our district.⁹⁴

91. The C.P. has always denounced Gonatas, then governor-general of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, as a promoter of "fascist," i.e., anticommunist and anti-Semitic organizations, such as the EEE. See, e.g., Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 263.

92. Cable dated 30 June 1931, VA File 295. See also Chamber, 23 and 25 June 1931, *Efemeris*, pp. 658–659 and 727–730.

93. Chamoudopoulos, p. 44. This is significantly a Venizelist source.

94. *Makedonia*, 26 May 1933. The text has "United Opposition," an obvious error.

Although no electoral gains were to be expected, Venizelos and the other leaders of the National Coalition initially rejected these views and insisted on the inclusion of a Jewish candidate. The Thessaloniki Liberals, however, refused to comply and eventually prevailed, claiming that the Levantes position had aroused great enthusiasm.⁹⁵ Anti-Semitic Venizelist fervor could no longer be suppressed and actually appeared to be endorsed by Venizelos himself, with his insistence on the theme of “the alien as arbiter” and on the reinstatement of electoral segregation.

The electoral outcome (see Table 9) spectacularly confirmed the calculations and expectations of the Thessaloniki Venizelists. The mobilization of Greek voters against the “Jewish threat” certainly contributed to the electoral triumph of the National Coalition and to its dramatic increase in support since March, whereas the Jews voted for Antivenizelism practically to a man, except those remaining faithful to the C.P. A most convincing indication is that Aaron Sakkes, the best known Venizelist politician in the Jewish community, who ran as an Independent Liberal after his exclusion from the official ticket and should be expected, under the circumstances, to rally all Venizelist Jews, received the pathetic number of only 126 votes—against his 1,403 in the separate college in March.

This emphatic affirmation of Jewish hostility exasperated Venizelists and Venizelos personally. Receiving a Jewish delegation after the election, he exclaimed:

The attitude of the Jewish element, which voted for the government ticket as a group, and by order of its communal leadership and of the rabbinate, constitutes an act of hostility against half of Greece. . . . It is a deliberate rising, decided beforehand, by a minority as a whole against the Opposition as a whole. This has fatally created an intolerable situation, which forces the Opposition to consider the matter more radically, in time. The Jews should have been grateful until now to the old republican parties, which, although they governed the country continuously, forgot even the votes of the Jews of 1 November 1920, which, however, contributed to the overthrow of the Liberals and to the destruction of Great Greece.⁹⁶

This transparently threatening tone, never adopted by Venizelos before, inaugurated a new period of tension with the Jewish minority. As noted earlier, the theme of “the alien as arbiter,” specifically directed against the Jews, and the demand for their renewed electoral segregation, proved so effective in mobilizing mass support that they became an essential ingredient of opposition attacks against the Tsaldares government for almost two

95. See the correspondence in VA Files 296 and 396.

96. *Eleftheron Vema*, 5 July 1933. Venizelos is reported to have shown the delegation articles of “unimaginable violence and insolence” against the Liberals from the Jewish press, including a caricature.

years. Although not exactly anti-Semitic in inspiration nor in their authoritative formulation (since they could apply to any minority in a similar role), such statements nevertheless kept alive and appeared to endorse rampant anti-Semitism in the Venizelist press and public. It is even reported that, during the disastrous Venizelist coup of March 1935, anti-Semitism served as an additional motive for the massive enlistment of Venizelist volunteers in Northern Greece, in view of the projected march on Thessaloniki, where the "abominable Antivenizelist Jews" with their legendary treasures were to be found.⁹⁷

In the meantime, the Jewish Moderates persevered in their efforts to mend the fences between Venizelism and the minority, despite the unabated anti-Semitism of *Makedonia* and Venizelos's own stubborn insistence on the reinstatement of the separate college. These efforts were supported by a fraction of the Jewish commercial bourgeoisie and led to the reconstitution of the Jewish Section of the Liberal Club of Thessaloniki in January 1934.⁹⁸ It was only after the March 1935 coup that these efforts seem to have achieved a measure of success. In the 1936 election, two Jews (Aaron Sakkes and Edwin Saltiel) ran on the official L.P. ticket, whose Jewish vote appears to have increased notably, whereas that for the C.P. dropped. More significantly, however, the official P.P. ticket in that year included no other than the president of the Zionist Federation of Greece.

The interwar political alignments of the Thessaloniki Jews are summarized in Table 48. In light of the preceding discussion, and apart from the problem of estimating the Jewish vote whenever there was no separate college, it should be obvious that party labels, or the absence thereof, are often deceptive and mask initiatives taken by the community's religious and secular leadership. This is why Table 49 attempts to reconstruct the distribution of Jewish political forces in terms of their own internal division into Zionists, Moderates, and Leftists, whose basic orientation towards Antivenizelism, Venizelism, and Communism, respectively, is known. A very different picture thus emerges for the period 1926–1932, which shows that the overwhelming majority of the Jewish community remained fundamentally hostile to Venizelism *throughout* the interwar years, and that Venizelist perceptions were accurate in this respect.

In conclusion, it may be said that this conflict between Venizelism and the Thessaloniki Jews became the *most* significant and explosive interwar cleavage involving a national minority. Although the potential for a confrontation was to be found in the minority's basic rejection of Venizel-

97. Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 430.

98. See Aaron Sakkes to Venizelos, 28 November 1933, VA File 399, and 2 January 1934, VA File 401. See also Venizelos to Edwin Saltiel, Secretary of the Jewish Section of the Liberal Club of Thessaloniki, 8 and 14 February 1934, VA File 306.

Table 48 THE JEWISH VOTE IN THESSALONIKI, 1926–1936
(in percentages of valid ballots)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Antivenizelism</i>	<i>Venizelism</i>	<i>Communism</i>	<i>Other</i>
1926	—	—	39.07	60.93 ^a
1928	22.87	61.40 ^b	15.73	—
1929	0.00	100.00 ^c	—	—
1932 (Chamber)	36.89	15.92 ^d	21.85	25.34
1932 (Senate)	60.96	—	—	39.04
1933 (March)	71.08	9.38	15.34	4.19
1933 (July, est.) ^e	84.04	1.58	14.38	—
1936	70.09	17.75	12.16	—

NOTE: For the elections of 1928–33 (March), the results of the separate college are taken from the official publications. On the method of estimating party strength in 1928 and 1933, see Appendix 2. For 1926 and 1936, when there was no separate Jewish constituency, the following method was used, as in Table 46. The preference votes of the strongest Jewish candidate on each ticket in the district of Thessaloniki were assumed to represent the *total* number of Jews voting for that ticket. The sum of these represents the total Jewish vote, on the basis of which percentages were computed. The assumption that Jews did not vote for Greeks and vice versa seems even more plausible than in the parallel Moslem case, except again in the case of the C.P., whose Jewish vote is thereby probably inflated in 1926 and perhaps deflated in 1936. Finally, in 1926, things are simplified by the presence of the “Jewish Political Union,” which can safely be assumed to represent the entire Jewish vote, except the Left.

^aThe “Jewish Political Union” received 60.26%.

^bThe ticket of “Independents,” also designating themselves as Liberals, received 54.71, and the official Liberal ticket 6.69.

^cBoth candidates to the Senate who received any votes ran as Liberals.

^dAaron Sakkes ran as an Independent but was a known Liberal.

^eBased on the estimate that 8,000 Jews voted, 126 for Aaron Sakkes, 1,150 for the C.P. (the same as in March), the remainder going to Antivenizelism.

ism, as an agent of Greek nationalism and assimilation, tensions escalated because of grass-roots and local pressures, which national leadership proved unable to control.

Armenians

Unlike any other interwar national minority, Armenians never posed a threat to Greek territorial integrity, however indirectly, nor were they suspected of hostile intentions toward Greeks and Greece. Although a few had lived in Greece before, the overwhelming majority of interwar Armenians came after 1922 as refugees from Turkey and were actually accorded

Table 49 ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH POLITICAL FORCES
IN THESSALONIKI, 1926–1936
(in percentages of the total)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Zionists</i>	<i>Moderates</i>	<i>Leftists</i>	<i>Not Ascertained</i>
1926	46.00 ^a	15.00 ^a	39.00	—
1928	77.58 ^b	6.69	15.73	—
1929	63.47 ^c	—	—	36.53
1932 (Chamber)	55.13 ^d	15.92	21.85	7.10
1932 (Senate)	78.01 ^c	—	—	21.99
1933 (March)	71.08	9.38	15.34	4.19
1933 (July, est.)	84.04	1.58	14.38	—
1936	70.09	17.75	12.16	—

NOTE: Table established on the basis of both the ostensible party labels and the known political orientation of the candidates within the Jewish community. Those whose political orientation could not be ascertained are Haim Cohen in the 1929 and 1932 Senate elections and Jesua Algava in the 1932 and 1933 Chamber elections. Cohen seems to have been supported by the Left (at least in 1929) though probably not only by the Left.

^aBased on the distribution of preference votes within the “Jewish Political Union” between, on the one hand, Isaac Sciaky and Abraham Recanati (Zionists), and Aaron Sakkes (Moderate), on the other.

^bIncludes the P.P. ticket and the Independent ticket of self-proclaimed Liberals.

^cAscher Mallah, the official Liberal candidate.

^dIncludes the P.P. ticket and Mentech Bessantchi, Independent.

^eIncludes the official P.P. candidate and Ascher Mallah, Independent.

the treatment and relief programs extended to Greek refugees.⁹⁹ While Greece welcomed them in a political show of sympathy and solidarity, their stay was considered temporary and transitional from the very beginning, and emigration abroad (initially to Soviet Georgia) was officially encouraged. By 1928, the census found only about 30,000 remaining Armenians, one-half in Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki, the others dispersed among various towns, in only seven of which they constituted between 2 and 6 percent of the population. In 1931–1933, those “sympathizing with communism” are reported to have emigrated to Soviet Armenia (a total of 6,589) by virtue of an agreement between Greece and the U.S.S.R. The process resumed in 1946 and eventually involved most of the remaining Armenians.¹⁰⁰

Armenians in Greece are known to have leaned towards the C.P.,

99. Pentzopoulos, pp. 76 and 132, speaks of over 50,000 Armenian refugees.

100. See Pallis, p. 79; Christidès, p. 62; and Vogazles, p. 7.

which repeatedly manifested a particular interest in them. They certainly suffered from alienation, misery, and discrimination at least as much as, and probably more than the Greek refugees. In addition, their Communist sympathies may largely be explained by the attraction of Soviet Armenia, sole realization of an Armenian national home, however imperfect. Their voluntary and massive emigration to that country, in successive waves, seems to support this interpretation.

ETHNIC MINORITIES

Koutsovlachs

Even though their distinctive language appeared akin to Rumanian, and even though they had access to corresponding educational privileges by virtue of a 1913 understanding between Greece and Rumania (which persistently offered itself as their mother nation), it seems that only a negligible proportion of the Koutsovlachs actually identified with Rumania during the interwar period. In fact, this may account for the unrealistically small number reported by the 1928 Census, given that Koutsovlachs with a Greek national consciousness were reportedly unwilling to declare their particular idiom as their mother tongue.¹⁰¹ According to that census, Koutsovlachs exceeded 3 percent of the total population in only four eparchies, and 10 percent only in that of Metsovo (33.38 percent).

Not qualifying as a national but only as an ethnic minority, the Koutsovlachs do not seem to have been affected by any major issues in that capacity. It was rather as nomadic or seminomadic shepherds that they faced the interwar generalized crisis of this traditional form of pastoral economy. Returns from Koutsovlach villages, and in particular Metsovo, indicate that Koutsovlachs mostly voted for Venizelism in 1928–1929, but subsequently shifted to Antivenizelism, which their majority apparently supported in 1936. This was probably in response to the crisis of nomadic pastoralism, as well as local factors and particular candidates.

Pomaks

On the other hand, the Pomaks of Western Thrace, despite their distinctly Bulgarian idiom, were unquestionably hostile to Bulgaria and primarily conceived of themselves as true Moslems rather than as a nation or part

101. On this and the Koutsovlachs in general, see Averof, pp. 19–20. His estimate of the Koutsovlach total is between 150,000 and 200,000.

thereof. Conservative peasants and religious traditionalists, they were mostly concentrated in the countryside of Xanthe (26.51 percent of the total population and 51 percent of the Moslems). As noted earlier, Pomaks were included in the separate Moslem electoral college, and it is hardly possible to disentangle them from the much more numerous Turks. Returns from several villages indicate that the Pomaks of Xanthe apparently voted along local and personalistic lines, for particular candidates, including in 1936 the P.P. deputy and prominent Young Turk, who is reported to have eventually converted them to modern Turkish nationalism.¹⁰²

Others

Several other ethnic groups in interwar Greece were not counted by the 1928 Census, and their political significance does not seem to deserve particular mention here, with one exception: the *Arvanites* of Old Greece and especially Attica. These Albanian-speaking Greek Orthodox villagers, with a long-standing Greek national consciousness, should not be confused or even linked to the Chams. Through tradition and clientelism, they were strongly attached to the Old Parties and the monarchy. In the Attica countryside, they constituted a formidable stronghold of Antivenizelism (but also seem to have supported to some extent Pangalos, on purely ethnic grounds).

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Greek Catholics

For several centuries, the Catholics of Greece had been regarded, and had regarded themselves, as an essentially alien presence in the midst of a perennially and profoundly hostile Orthodox population. Tensions were exacerbated during the War of Independence, when Catholics adamantly refused to recognize themselves as Greeks and join the struggle.¹⁰³ They were subsequently reluctant to become part of the newborn state, which they perceived as an instrument of Orthodox intolerance and oppression.¹⁰⁴

Although their national identity was no longer in question, Catholics in the interwar period continued to be set apart by more than their reli-

102. On the Pomaks, see Christidès, pp. 55–56, 62, and 68; and Foteas.

103. Frazee, pp. 42–43, 50–51, and 61.

104. Ibid., pp. 82–84, 122, 135, 154–155, and 165–166.

gious faith.¹⁰⁵ While most of them were dispersed among several urban centers, more than a third of their total number was concentrated on only two small islands of the Cycladic complex, Syros (24.20 percent of the population) and Tenos (32.76 percent), where they constituted a distinctive and deeply rooted subculture of solid and conservative peasants.¹⁰⁶

It is on Syros that the communal cleavage between Orthodox and Catholic Greeks ran deepest: it reflected the opposition between an Orthodox commercial port (Hermoupolis, almost 94 percent Orthodox) and a compactly Catholic countryside (87 percent Catholic) with extremely unequal populations (21,416 in Hermoupolis and 6,247 in the countryside, according to the 1928 Census). This unique situation had been born less than a century before, when Hermoupolis ("City of Hermes") was founded by Orthodox settlers on the erstwhile exclusively Catholic island, displaced the inland Catholic town, and mushroomed into the most dynamic commercial and maritime center of 19th-century Greece. Things were different on Tenos, where the diminutive town (pop. 2,485 in 1928) was also overwhelmingly Orthodox, but the countryside (pop. 8,775) had an Orthodox majority as well. Rather than simply corresponding to a contrast between town and country, the communal cleavage followed the lines of areal segregation into distinct rural zones, with the Orthodox villages located on both sides (east and west) of the Catholic central part. It should be added that Catholics enjoyed residual privileges, about which they were particularly sensitive. This was especially true of the educational field, where their particular institutions were still under largely foreign (French and Italian) influence, as was their clergy.

It is hardly surprising that the long-standing communal cleavage peculiar to these two islands should be reflected in political alignments, with greater sharpness and intensity in Syros than in Tenos (see Table 50). Declining the official party candidacy offered him in 1933, a Liberal characteristically perceived the Catholics of Syros as "perhaps the only compactly Antivenizelist community in Greece."¹⁰⁷ Their traditional Antivenizelism was obviously not determined nor affected by mere considerations

105. The Catholics of Corfu, however, seem to have been sensitive to interwar Italian propaganda. The prefect complained in 1930 that, "because of partisan passions," national sentiment was asleep, especially in the town of Corfu, where Antivenizelism was dominant. See the Prefect of Corfu, Confidential Reports Nos. 70 and 73, 1 and 7 July 1930, VA File 107.

106. For a perceptive and concise portrait of the Catholic islanders, see Kolodny, Vol. 1, pp. 240–246, and Vol. 3 (Atlas), map F 19. He characteristically reports that Syros used to be called *l'isola del Papa* before the 19th century. On Orthodox and Catholics in Tenos, see Florakes, pp. 6–13 and 232–233.

107. M. Pnevmatikos to Venizelos, 8 February 1933, VA File 394.

Table 50 CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX ANTIVENIZELISM IN
SYROS AND TENOS, 1928–1936
(estimated in percentages of the total)

<i>Election</i>		<i>Orthodox</i>	<i>Catholics</i>
1928	Syros	50.07	58.82
	Tenos	34.11	45.12
	Both	44.53	53.20
1929	Syros	27.36	36.49
	Tenos	28.77	29.39
	Both	27.91	33.60
1932	Syros	53.67	77.75
	Tenos	47.22	57.77
	Both	51.35	69.50
1933	Syros	55.35	84.78
	Tenos	50.60	56.80
	Both	53.56	72.84
1936	Syros	52.55	84.09
	Tenos	52.59	66.72
	Both	52.56	75.58

NOTE: Estimated on the basis of the returns from the presumably Catholic precincts, i.e., for Tenos those of Kome, Kellia, and Stene, and for Syros the entire island, except the municipality of Hermoupolis.

of religious affiliation, as shown in 1928 when they massively voted for the Orthodox P.P. candidate and against his Catholic but Liberal opponent. It was rather the joint effect of their peasant conservatism, their hostility to the Liberal bourgeoisie of Hermoupolis, and the directives of their religious leaders, typically concerned about the preservation of past privileges. It was thus a restrictive law on foreign schools passed by the Venizelos government in 1930 which further exacerbated Catholic hostility. On the other hand, in Tenos, different conditions allowed an Orthodox Liberal (K. Alavanos) to win the confidence of an otherwise similarly Anti-venizelist Catholic electorate, to the point of carrying their majority in 1928 and preserving a substantial following among them thereafter.¹⁰⁸

108. The Prefect of the Cyclades (N. Arones) to Venizelos, 24 March and 30 April 1932, VA File 110. Law 4862 was debated by the Chamber in December 1930. Although they were careful to agree in principle, leading Antivenizelists, such as P. Tsaldares and I. Ralles, objected to the wording of the bill, obviously concerned about Catholic schools in particular. Papanastasiou also found the bill too strict on Greek Catholics. See Chamber, 22 December 1930, *Efemeris*, pp.507–537.

Greek Jews

In sharp contrast to their Sephardic brethren in the New Lands, Greek-speaking Jews of Old Greece typically regarded themselves, and were widely regarded, as assimilated Greeks, distinguished only by their religion—even though rampant anti-Semitism did not make such fine distinctions.¹⁰⁹ Greek Jews as a whole do not seem to have exhibited distinctive partisan loyalties, dispersed as they were among several small communities. An indignant Jewish merchant of Chalkis, protesting against continuing anti-Semitism in the Venizelist press, claimed in 1934 that the majority of Greek Jews supported the L.P., and offered his home town as an example.¹¹⁰ But things were different elsewhere, depending on local conditions and traditions. Corfu Jews, for example, who had mostly spoken Italian ever since Venetian times, are known to have supported the local Theotokes faction, a stronghold of Antivenizelism, ever since the late 19th century because of the pronounced anti-Semitism of its opponent Polyas at that time.¹¹¹ Given that they were clearly less assimilated than those of Chalkis, for example, their case may well reflect the general tendency linking assimilation with Venizelism, nonassimilation with Antivenizelism.

The Old Calendar Church

Leaving the Old Calendar Church to the very end of this discussion of interwar minorities is no reflection on its size or significance. In fact, it was probably larger than any of the minorities discussed so far, and possibly larger than all of them put together. But readily available and precise information does not seem to exist about the actual numbers involved and especially about their areal distribution. It is here called a “Church” although it never achieved recognition of its independence from the official Greek Orthodox Church. It could also be called a “movement” since it was essentially a grass-roots mass movement, one of the most significant but least studied in modern Greek history.

The calendar became a major religious and political issue after January 1923, when the 1922 Revolution, in one of its most radical moves, replaced the Julian with the Gregorian by decree. Initially intended for secular matters only, the reform was soon extended to the religious realm

109. On the assimilation of Greek Jews in Old Greece, see Molho, Vol. 2, p. 55. Venizelos would typically offer them as a model, both to refute charges of anti-Semitism and to demonstrate the obstinate refusal of assimilation characterizing Sephardic Jews.

110. Iakovos Cohen to Venizelos, 24 February 1934, VA File 401.

111. Nikos Oikonomou, personal communication. See also Valetas, pp. xxiv–xxxi.

as well, taking effect only two days before the proclamation of the Republic in March 1924.¹¹² An essentially symbolic issue, the retention of the old calendar was immediately elevated into a matter of true faith and sacred tradition, and became a highly emotional battle cry rallying the most backward, reactionary, and obscurantist forces among the Orthodox clergy and flock. In 1925, they founded in Athens the "Greek Religious Community of Genuine Orthodox Christians" (commonly abbreviated as G.O.Ch.), which grew rapidly: it claimed 245 local branches in 1929–1931 and 800 at the beginning of 1934.¹¹³ In May 1935, three bishops hostile to Chrysostomos (archbishop of Athens since 1923 and responsible for the calendar change) provided the movement with leadership at the episcopal level, proclaimed their separation from the official Church of Greece, and constituted their own synod.¹¹⁴

Throughout the years of Republican rule, Old Calendar supporters (*palaiohemerologites*) were subject to severe harassment and persecution by the official church and by the state, which typically intervened at the request of church authorities and enforced their decisions. This systematic refusal of religious freedom and constitutional protection to Old Calendar supporters was based on a clever, if specious, legal construction: since they only rejected the calendar and not the religious dogmas of the Greek Orthodox Church, they did not constitute a distinct religious faith, entitled to constitutional protection. Regardless of their declarations, they could thus not leave the established church and were therefore bound to its rules and disciplinary procedures. Old Calendar supporters, who considered themselves the guardians of genuine Orthodox dogma rather than innovators, were thus placed in a vulnerable legal position.

Republican repression not only aimed at preserving the integrity of the established Church of Greece. It also aimed at safeguarding the authority of church leaders loyal to the regime (above all Archbishop Chrysostomos) and at suppressing agitation openly hostile to the Republic. The most backward and obscurantist forces among the Orthodox clergy and flock had long been distinctly Royalist and Antivenizelist in orientation. In this sense, the calendar dispute did not create an entirely new political cleavage. But the Old Calendar, as a universally understood symbol of tradition, nicely lent itself to political exploitation and agitation on the mass

112. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 1, p. 64. See also Roussas, who provides a brief historical review of the question.

113. Roussas, p. 22. On the growth of the movement in Eastern Macedonia, see Savvopoulos, pp. 8–14.

114. Roussas, pp. 23–24; and Kavourides, p. 76. One of the three 1935 bishops, Kavourides is referred to in 1952 as "Archbishop of the Church of Genuine Orthodox Christians."

level against the Republic, whose establishment had coincided with the calendar reform. In the particular case of the Slavo-Macedonians, political exploitation of their strong attachment to religious tradition, through the calendar issue, seems to have been a prime component of both Antivenizelist and IMRO propaganda.¹¹⁵ The Old Calendar movement thus emerged from its inception as a rabidly antirepublican and Antivenizelist force.¹¹⁶

The notorious 1924 decree for the safeguard of the republican regime (*Katochyrotikon*) was therefore also aimed at preventing a repetition of what had occurred during the plebiscite campaign on the regime, when the calendar issue had served as a major propaganda weapon against the supposedly sacrilegious Republic.¹¹⁷ The decree, however, does not seem to have been applied in this direction. Old Calendar supporters were persecuted mostly through state-enforced disciplinary decisions of the official church or else through criminal prosecutions for offenses against it. Repression continued intermittently, while Antivenizelists typically sided with the persecuted movement.¹¹⁸ When the issue came before the Chamber in January 1931, Venizelos stated that *palaiohemerologites* could only be granted freedom of religious practice if they left the official church and founded their own. Tsaldares, cautiously and evasively taking their defense, retorted that they were neither schismatic nor heretic and should be left alone. Whereas Papanastasiou denounced the political exploitation of the issue in successive elections, Venizelos underplayed the political aspect in an obvious attempt to prevent Antivenizelist exploitation in the future.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, repression continued and, only a week after the last Venizelos cabinet took office, it was reported that global measures were to be taken against Old Calendar supporters, including the closing of their churches. The competent minister denied that any decision had been

115. K. Stylianopoulos, the Venizelist expert on minorities, strongly and urgently recommended that the holding of mass according to the old calendar be suppressed. See K. Stylianopoulos to Venizelos, 16 December 1931, VA File 251.

116. See Savvopoulos, p. 8, where this Old Calendar priest denounces the "pseudo-Republic" and speaks reverently of the "martyr" King George II. Kavourides, then bishop of Monastir, had significantly clashed with the fervently Venizelist Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1920–1922 and had been forced to retire to Mount Athos, as an Antivenizelist agent. See Kavourides, pp. 52–57. For the views of Archbishop Chrysostomos stressing the political aspect of the question, see Roussas, p. 20.

117. Fourth Constituent, 25 May 1924, *Praktika*, Vol. 2, pp. 81 and 86–87.

118. In 1927, for example, the Antivenizelist deputy D. Vokotopoulos openly attacked Archbishop Chrysostomos for the calendar reform. See Roussas, p. 22. In Drama, the local branch of the Old Calendar organization was founded in 1931 with the help of the politician N. Malindretos. See Savvopoulos, p. 11. Malindretos ran with the Union of Royalists in 1935 and was eventually elected on the P.P. ticket in 1936, no doubt with the support of the movement.

119. Chamber, 22 January 1931, *Efemeris*, pp. 541 ff. Venizelos overlooked the legal difficulties involved, whether intentionally or not.

reached (no doubt because of the approaching election), but local incidents and prosecutions continued.¹²⁰

It was only after Antivenizelism came to power that repression of the Old Calendar movement abated, a fact which is reflected in its rapid growth and eloquently confirms their lasting political ties.¹²¹ And it was in the wake of the Venizelist defeat in March 1935 and in the context of the ensuing Royalist reaction that the three Old Calendar bishops were encouraged and supported in their religious coup by Antivenizelist extremists, in an alliance against both Archbishop Chrysostomos and the Republic.¹²² Briefly exiled by the synod of the established church in June 1935, under the Tsaldares government, the three rebel bishops were liberated by the Kondyles government in October 1935, and remained free to hold services thereafter, despite the continuing hostility of the official church.¹²³ For the Old Calendar movement, the restored monarchy obviously signified an end to republican persecution.

A COMMON PATTERN

The most obvious common pattern emerging from the preceding journey among the mosaic of interwar minorities is that Antivenizelism typically sheltered and expressed the stubborn resistance of a variety of *particularisms* against the modern, liberal, and national state, which aspired to control, assimilate, neutralize, or even suppress them. Young Turks, Sephardic Jews, Slavo-Macedonians, Catholics, and the Old Calendar Church are the most significant cases in this respect. In contrast, Venizelism emerges as the foremost exponent and agent of such state policies, which allowed or even required some form of accommodation only in particular situations (such as the Turks and the Chams).

Finally, Communism could offer itself as the defender of *some* particularisms but not others—national but not religious minorities. It was moreover seriously handicapped by the fact that, unlike Antivenizelism, it

120. *Eleftheron Vema*, 23 and 25 January 1933, and also 14 February 1933, when it is reported that 11 *palaiohemerologites* were sentenced on account of a disturbance they provoked in Menidi, near Athens.

121. See *Neos Kosmos*, 3 July 1934. Papanastasiou had earlier again denounced the association of Antivenizelism with the Old Calendar issue, which he attributed to a spirit of systematic opposition to the L.P., adding that supporters of the movement were to be found entirely in the Antivenizelist camp. On that occasion, denials by the Tsaldares government and party were strong but hardly convincing. See Chamber, 26 January 1934, *Efemeris*, p. 1054.

122. Roussas, p. 24. For the views of Papanastasiou, see *Anexartetos*, 1 June 1935, reprinted in Lefkoparides, Vol. 2, p. 806.

123. See Kavourides, pp. 76–77.

could not provide effective protection, but invited repression instead. And it was actually successful only among Armenians, Sephardic Jews, and, to a lesser extent, Slavo-Macedonians because of factors peculiar to each of these groups: the attraction of Soviet Armenia, the existence of a class-conscious Jewish proletariat, and of a diffuse autonomist orientation, respectively.

Over and beyond their immediate electoral consequences, which were normally local after 1922 and often marginal—with the obvious exception of the Thessaloniki Jews in 1933—these patterns acquire their greatest significance in the way they affected, and largely shaped, both the self-image and the image projected by each political force in interwar Greece.

· 6 ·

OLD GREECE VERSUS NEW LANDS: REGIONAL AND ACCUMULATED CLEAVAGES

Here are ten years that the majority of New Greece governs. Since the majority of Old Greece prevailed in the election of 5 March, would it be denied the right to govern, against all logic?

From a speech by Kondyles in Thessaloniki, June 1933, VA File 305

REGIONALISM IN INTERWAR GREECE

Interwar Greece was the recent product of a century-long process of territorial expansion around the original diminutive kingdom of 1830. The Ionian Islands were the first to be incorporated, in 1864. Thessaly and Arta followed, in 1881. Macedonia, the rest of Epirus, Crete, and the larger Aegean Islands constituted the territorial gains of the Balkan Wars, at the end of which the country almost doubled. Finally, (Western) Thrace was the only lasting gain of World War I.

Combining geographical, administrative, and historical criteria, the 1928 Census thus recognized ten distinct regions (*diamerismata*): Peloponnesus, Sterea Hellas (including Euboea), Cyclades, Ionian Islands, Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Crete, Aegean Islands, and Thrace (see Map 1, frontispiece). To a greater or lesser extent, each of these major subdivisions was set apart by physical geography, economic and social structure, cultural and political tradition, and particular historical experiences—some quite recent, including the process itself of incorporation into the Greek state. Physical and historical boundaries further divided the country into a multitude of smaller areas, each endowed with its own social and

political life. This was of course particularly true of even the smallest among the numerous islands.

Regionalism and localism, including village patriotism, were therefore powerful forces in interwar politics. They manifested themselves even in the major urban centers, where groups organized by region or locality of origin (e.g., the Cretans in Athens) were essential in mobilizing political support and were thereby often entitled to representation on party tickets, in both local and national elections. Over and above this maze of regional and local particularisms, however, loomed the overriding territorial division which dominated interwar politics: the cleavage between *Old Greece* and the *New Lands*—between pre-1912 Greece and the areas incorporated subsequently (see Map 1).¹

Tables 51 and 52 indicate the striking magnitude of this cleavage, operationalized for the purposes of ecological regression by means of dummy variables (with 1 in the areas in question and 0 elsewhere).² The intercept (*a*) here represents the estimated average party vote in the areas *excluded* by the dummy independent variable (i.e., having 0), whereas the sum of the intercept and the regression coefficient represents the estimated average party vote in the areas *covered* by the dummy independent variable (i.e., having 1). The regression coefficient by itself represents of course the difference between these two regional averages.

According to these estimates, the average strength of Antivenizelism in Old Greece was greater by about 25 percent of the votes compared with that in the New Lands, where Antivenizelism remained a permanent minority. (The difference is slightly smaller in 1932 only because of Thessaly.) On the other hand, the regional difference is smaller for Venizelism in 1932 and 1933 only because of the greater strength of the Left in the New Lands. Most significantly, the regional cleavage emerges with greatest intensity in 1936. Taking average party strength over all four elections, it can be seen that Antivenizelist support in Old Greece was almost *double* that in the New Lands, where Venizelist support increased by about *one-half* in com-

1. A more symmetrical distinction would be between Old and New Greece or Old and New Lands. Nevertheless, choosing one term from each pair, i.e., Old Greece and New Lands, apart from stylistic reasons, seems to be more in accordance with common interwar usage. This choice is also more appropriate since the first term, unlike the second, connotes a historically integrated whole, which was the case for Old Greece but not for the New Lands. It should also be noted that the eparchy of Arta in Epirus, and Thessaly as a whole (except the eparchy of Elasson), i.e., the territories incorporated in 1881, are here considered part of Old Greece despite their important similarities with the continental New Lands, especially in terms of agrarian structure. Treating them as a third, intermediate category would unnecessarily complicate the analysis of the principal territorial cleavage.

2. On dummy variables as "qualitative regressors," see Arthur S. Goldberger, *Econometric Theory* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 224–227.

Table 51 ANTIVENIZELISM AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
Old Greece	+24.98 (2.03) .000	+22.29 (2.08) .000	+24.26 (2.11) .000	+27.18 (1.87) .000	+24.68 (1.77) .000
<i>a</i> (New Lands)	19.15 (1.43) .000	22.61 (1.47) .000	31.78 (1.49) .000	33.12 (1.32) .000	26.66 (1.25) .000
<i>r</i>	.66	.61	.64	.72	.71
<i>s</i>	14.23	14.59	14.78	13.09	12.41

Table 52 VENIZELISM AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
New Lands	+24.65 (2.08) .000	+16.24 (2.13) .000	+22.04 (2.15) .000	+24.98 (2.07) .000	+21.98 (1.82) .000
<i>a</i> (Old Greece)	52.51 (1.48) .000	46.31 (1.51) .000	38.61 (1.53) .000	33.40 (1.47) .000	42.71 (1.30) .000
<i>r</i>	.65	.48	.59	.66	.65
<i>s</i>	14.53	14.90	15.06	14.46	12.77

parison with Old Greece. Additional analyses show that the regional cleavage was manifested in both urban and rural areas—somewhat more sharply in the latter, as one would expect.

The regional cleavage was *also* related to the growth of radicalism, which was significantly stronger in the New Lands: the A.P. in 1932 and 1936, and the C.P. in every election (Tables 53 and 54). In the case of the A.P., the cleavage was a distinctly rural phenomenon. For the C.P., however, it was manifested in both urban and rural areas, although most sharply in the former. Finally, the regional cleavage, as reflected in the last interwar election, is vividly illustrated in Maps 2–4.³

3. It is immaterial for the present discussion that these maps were drawn according to postwar district boundaries.

Table 53 THE A.P. AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
New Lands	-.24 (.74) .741	+3.25 (1.29) .012	-.50 (.89) .580	+.72 (.34) .033	+.81 (.64) .210
a (Old Greece)	1.84 (.52) .001	4.82 (.91) .000	2.07 (.63) .001	.39 (.24) .107	2.28 (.46) .000
r	-.02	.18	-.04	.15	.09
s	5.16	9.01	6.25	2.35	4.50


Table 54 THE C.P. AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
New Lands	+1.34 (.51) .010	+2.09 (1.00) .038	+3.20 (1.02) .002	+2.87 (1.03) .006	+2.18 (.85) .011
a (Old Greece)	1.03 (.37) .005	3.38 (.71) .000	2.86 (.72) .000	3.81 (.73) .000	3.09 (.60) .000
r	.18	.15	.22	.20	.18
s	3.60	6.99	7.12	7.19	5.94

The Case of Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki

Maps 2-4 also show that the three cities of Greece sharply deviated from the corresponding regional averages, even though their inclusion in the ecological analysis would *not* have significantly affected the overall regression results. (On the maps, Athens-Piraeus and Thessaloniki appear in the two larger boxes of the lower left corner, together with the diminutive insular eparchies of Aegina, Hydra, Spetsae, and Cythera, which were part of the Piraeus electoral district.)


In percentages of the valid votes, the exact electoral returns were the following in 1936 (without the Agrarians, who did not run in Athens-Piraeus and polled only 18 votes in Thessaloniki):



Map 2. ANTIVENIZELISM IN 1936.

Source: Elias Nicolacopoulos, *Atlas ton Hellenikon Vouleftikon Eklogon kai Demopsefismaton, 1936-1977* [Atlas of the Greek Parliamentary Elections and Plebiscites, 1936-1977] (Athens: National Social Research Center, forthcoming).

- a. Athens-Piraeus.
- b. Thessaloniki.



Map 3. VENIZELISM IN 1936.

Source: Elias Nicolacopoulos, *Atlas ton Hellenikon Vouleftikon Eklogon kai Demopsefismaton, 1936-1977* [Atlas of the Greek Parliamentary Elections and Plebiscites, 1936-1977] (Athens: National Social Research Center, forthcoming).

- a. Athens-Piraeus.
- b. Thessaloniki.



Map 4. COMMUNISM IN 1936.

Source: Elias Nicolacopoulos, *Atlas ton Hellenikon Vouleftikon Eklogon kai Demopsefismaton, 1936-1977* [Atlas of the Greek Parliamentary Elections and Plebiscites, 1936-1977] (Athens: National Social Research Center, forthcoming).

- a. Athens-Piraeus.
- b. Thessaloniki.

City	Antivenizelism	Venizelism	Communism
Athens	43.63	45.70	6.71
Piraeus	35.37	54.01	7.47
Thessaloniki	41.87	43.95	12.76

In Athens and Thessaloniki, the two major blocs were thus almost evenly matched, whereas Piraeus remained a Venizelist “acropolis” (fortress).

If these returns are compared with the regional averages in Tables 51 and 52, Thessaloniki emerges as an Antivenizelist enclave in the New Lands, whereas Athens and especially Piraeus clearly constitute Venizelist enclaves in Old Greece. In Thessaloniki, the difference with the regional average is entirely due to the Jewish vote, which represents about one-third of the Antivenizelist total. Conversely, in Athens and Piraeus, the striking difference between Venizelist strength and its average in Old Greece is almost entirely due to the compact vote of the refugee periphery (and partly to the concentration of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and its petty bourgeois and labor allies, especially in Piraeus). With respect to the two major blocs, these peculiarities sharply distinguish the three cities from the overall territorial pattern during the interwar period.

In contrast, Communist strength, *both* in Athens-Piraeus *and* in Thessaloniki, was by 1936 about double the corresponding regional average in Old Greece and in the New Lands, respectively (see Table 54). This difference between the major urban centers and the corresponding regional average was primarily or even entirely due to the high concentration of workers, and particularly refugee workers, in all three cities.

A PROTRACTED CRISIS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

The origins of the cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands are to be found in the rapid territorial expansion resulting from the Greek successes in the two Balkan Wars (1912–1913). The Greek state was then suddenly faced with the formidable task of integrating new areas and populations almost equal to its own. Apart from the sheer proportions involved, which were unprecedented, the task was enormously complicated by the profound differences separating the New Lands from pre-1912 Greece and from each other. In addition to differences in economic structure, legal and administrative systems, etc., the most serious problem was posed by the presence of compact alien populations in Macedonia, Epirus, and Crete, which contrasted sharply with the practically complete

national homogeneity of Old Greece. Finally, what would have been a formidable task even under normal and peaceful conditions was further aggravated by the ensuing storm of World War I, which engulfed most of the areas in question and above all Greek Macedonia. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the combined effect of these conditions created a unique and protracted crisis of national integration, which was to plague Greece for decades.

From the very beginning, the Venizelos government of 1912–1915 had recognized that the legislation and administration of Old Greece could not be simply extended to the New Lands in one stroke. Integration required instead a gradual process of adaptation. A maze of special legislative and administrative provisions thus evolved for the New Lands, which was to distinguish them from Old Greece for more than three decades. It was crowned by the institution of governors-general, superprefects for entire regions (Epirus, Macedonia, Crete, Aegean, and later Thrace), which survived until after World War II.

Yet, the most intractable and politically sensitive problem proved to be the domination of government administration by Old Greece and especially by its core region, the Peloponnesus. Enjoying an entrenched privileged position from the inception of the Greek state in terms of both education and clientelism, the Peloponnesus has been overrepresented in the civil service down to the present.⁴

As elsewhere (e.g., in Italy, although the direction is here reversed, from South to North), civil servants from Old Greece were not content with bringing their unimaginative bureaucratic routine to the administration of the New Lands. Typically regarding their assignment as a temporary exile, they also treated the natives and their problems with supreme arrogance and contempt, as a quasi-colonial people. These attitudes were characteristically condensed in the same ethnic slurs that were later addressed against refugees, such as *tourkosporoi* ("Turkish seed") and *tourkogennemenoi* ("Turkish-born").⁵

Resentment among the native Greeks was widespread and lasting. It was reflected not only in their Venizelist and radical sympathies, but also in the particular brand of Antivenizelism peculiar to the New Lands and

4. See Tsoucalas, *Exartese*, pp. 420–422, who emphasizes the link to the structure of peasant property. On this point, see also the discussion of peasant culture in Chapter 3. A recent study found that the proportion of civil servants from the Peloponnesus was *double* the region's share of the country's population. At the other extreme, the most underrepresented regions were *still* Macedonia and Thrace with only about one-third of their share. See Demetrios Argyriades, "The Ecology of Greek Administration: Some Factors Affecting the Development of the Greek Civil Service," in Peristiany, pp. 347–348. On the same situation during the interwar period, see Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 177–178.

5. See K. P. Spanoudes to Venizelos, 6 June and 17 July 1916, VA File 313.

especially to Macedonia. Already in May 1915, S. Gotzamanes had campaigned with his first Macedonian party against the invasion of patronage appointees from Old Greece.⁶ For the next twenty years, Macedonian Antivenizelists such as himself, G. Bousios, and F. Dragoumes continued to speak for the region's particular interests and especially for those of its native population, including the Slavo-Macedonians. After Antivenizelism came to power in 1933, a bitter internal conflict developed between Macedonians and Old Greeks. It first led to the resignation of F. Dragoumes as regional governor-general, and eventually culminated in the Gotzamanes regionalist challenge during the one-sided electoral campaign of 1935, which was denounced as treason by mainstream Antivenizelism. The regional cleavage was thus reflected *within* Antivenizelism itself.⁷

Nevertheless, politicians such as Gotzamanes and F. Dragoumes never represented more than a regional variant of Antivenizelism. They were never able to seriously challenge the overwhelming attachment of the New Lands to Venizelism and Venizelos personally. Outside his native Crete, and apart from the fact that he was himself originally an unredeemed Greek struggling for his island's union with Greece, this attachment originated in Venizelos's masterful political conduct of the Balkan Wars. At their conclusion, the Greeks in the New Lands rightly hailed him as their liberator, whereas the competing purely military glory of Constantine was more effective in Old Greece. Subsequently, a heroic generation of Liberal political administrators presided over the process of bringing the New Lands under effective Greek rule. They were typically, and often sharply, distinguished from their Old Greek career subordinates by their pragmatic nationalist zeal and their more modern and imaginative ideas. From the very beginning, therefore, Venizelism emerged as the foremost agent of national integration with respect to the New Lands. This historical role, however, was only secure as long as Venizelism retained its comfortable majority in Old Greece. As soon as this majority was challenged and eroded, national integration became, as in a head of Janus, the other face of civil war.

THE NATIONAL SCHISM

If Old Greece, and especially the original kingdom, had assumed the role of a Greek Piedmont for almost a century, it suddenly proved to be, in 1915–1916, a distinctly *reluctant Piedmont*. This was the most divisive and traumatic aspect of the National Schism (*Ethnikos Dichasmos*) which

6. See Gotzamanes, *Koinonikai Taxeis*, pp. 148–149.

7. On the views of F. Dragoumes, see his *Ekloge*, 1922–1925, and *Ekloge*, 1925–1928. On his 1934 resignation as governor-general of Macedonia, see *Neos Kosmos*, 4 and 5 July

grew out of the conflict over Greek participation in World War I. As noted earlier, the conflict initially involved the fate of as yet unredeemed Greeks, primarily in Turkey. After the war came to Greek Macedonia, however, it became increasingly obvious that the fate of the New Lands was also at stake.

Without attempting to summarize here the convoluted diplomatic developments of the crisis, which have been the object of numerous studies,⁸ suffice it to note that the most immediate threat came from Bulgaria, allied to the Central Powers. But the Entente Powers as well were not expected to safeguard the territorial integrity of Greece if it remained neutral, and in fact increasingly disregarded its sovereignty in Greek Macedonia and elsewhere.

Under these conditions, it was apparent that the Venizelist position in favor of siding with the Entente represented the only realistic policy to save not just unredeemed Greek communities, but even the gains of the Balkan Wars themselves. In contrast, Greek neutrality, which was the policy of the king and Antivenizelism (and actually benefited the Central Powers), would in any case leave the country's territorial integrity at the mercy of the eventual victor, while it allowed its sovereignty to be violated by all sides as long as the war lasted. That this was the crux of the matter was most readily understood by the Greeks in the New Lands and especially in Macedonia, where they faced the specter of immediate extinction. The question was whether Old Greece was willing to fight, once again, on their behalf.

In the May 1915 election, Venizelism won a sweeping victory both in Old Greece and in the New Lands, except Macedonia where the compact vote of Turks, Slavo-Macedonians, and Jews ominously swamped a large Venizelist majority among Greeks. The outcome of the December 1915 election, however, is less easily interpretable, because of both Venizelist abstention and general mobilization. Approximately 280,000 voted in December against 730,000 in May. The Venizelist boycott seems to have been especially successful in the urban centers and, quite significantly, in Macedonia, Crete, and the Aegean Islands. Nevertheless, about half the difference in turnout represented those mobilized, who were unable to vote. As Venteres notes: "The will of the peasant world was not manifested clearly because *it* was mainly mobilized. But, as was revealed later, the peasants were being dragged little by little to the Old Parties."⁹

1934. On the 1935 Gotzamanes campaign in Macedonia, see Gregoriades, *4e Avgoustou*, pp. 20–21; Linardatos, pp. 62–63; and Chapter 5 above.

8. Venteres is still the most powerful and influential (Venizelist) source. Among recent studies, see especially Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers*.

9. Venteres, Vol. 2, p. 85. On the estimated numbers of December voters (280,000) and mobilized conscripts (230,000), Nikos Oikonomou, personal communication.

This was specifically true of the yeomen of Old Greece, who had recently born the brunt of the Balkan Wars and were now subjected to the manifold hardships of a protracted and pointless mobilization lasting almost ten months. They were, moreover, subjected to the authority and to the astute propaganda of the Royalist officers and General Staff, who fully exploited their war-weariness and their loyalty to the king in order to turn them against Venizelos, portrayed as a warmonger and an instrument of foreign powers. Beginning with and *through* that mobilization, the Liberals lost most of the popular support among the peasants and petty bourgeois of Old Greece which they had enjoyed previously. In one of his most penetrating observations, Venteres concludes: "Only thus can the Greek Crisis be explained organically, in its social depth and not on its political surface."¹⁰ Conversely, mobilization provided Constantine's authoritarian regime with a (literally) regimented popular base and above all with the shock troops it used for the increasing repression of its Liberal opponents—first as soldiers, later as Reservists.

It was in the course of 1916 that the Schism, as a developing conflict between Old Greece and the New Lands, escalated and crystallized. During the first months of that year, the Liberals won sweeping victories in four by-elections, all in the New Lands, and were preparing for a general election which was, however, never to take place.¹¹ Tension mounted in May 1916, when the Antivenizelist regime surrendered Greek border forts to the Germans and Bulgarians. In August, the whole of Eastern Macedonia was abandoned to the Bulgarians without resistance from a Greek army corps, which eventually went into ignominious internment in Germany for the rest of the war. A little earlier, prompted by a threatened Serbian political foothold in Thessaloniki, a small group of Venizelist officers and civilians in that city had initiated the revolutionary movement of "National Defense" (*Ethnike Amyna*).¹²

For Venizelos, who had until then resisted the pressure of his supporters and the frantic appeals from the New Lands, the die was finally cast when the Bulgarians occupied Eastern Macedonia. In September 1916, breaking with what was left of constitutional legality, he assumed the leadership of National Defense and formed a rebel Provisional Government, which established itself in Thessaloniki and entered the war against the Central Powers. Crete, the Aegean Islands, and most of Greek Macedonia immediately joined the revolt and furnished the bulk of its fighting forces. Greece was thus split into the "State of Athens" and the

10. Venteres, Vol. 2, pp. 55–56.

11. X? to Venizelos, 2 May 1916, VA File 367. The by-elections were held in Kavalla, Drama, Chios, and Lesbos.

12. Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers*, pp. 386–387.

"State of Thessaloniki," broadly corresponding to Old Greece and the New Lands, respectively.¹³

The split became irreconcilable and escalated into actual civil war with the November Days in Athens. Following an illusory military victory against the attempted landing of Entente troops, the Antivenizelist regime then sponsored a savage pogrom against Liberals in an unprecedented explosion of mob violence, which was never forgotten nor forgiven by the other side.¹⁴ In the following months, both sides massively persecuted opponents in the areas under their control. For Old Greece, the Entente blockade (December 1916–June 1917) also was a historical experience of lasting consequences. It produced a severe winter famine and extreme hardship on a massive scale, exacerbating popular hatred against the Entente and against Venizelos personally, who was again portrayed as the principal culprit.¹⁵

Finally, in June 1917, the Entente forced Constantine to leave the country, and established the Venizelos government in Athens and in control of a reunified Greek state. Recalling the Chamber elected in May 1915 to life, the Venizelist regime energetically pursued the war effort. Antivenizelist opposition, concentrated in Old Greece and aimed primarily at sabotaging this effort through mutinies in the armed forces, was mercilessly repressed.¹⁶

After three years, Greek irredentist aspirations appeared to be definitely realized with the occupation of Thrace and the Smyrna area and with the Treaty of Sèvres, which created a Greater Greece, "Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas." On this spectacular record, Venizelos underestimated domestic reaction to his repressive rule and proceeded with the fateful election of November 1920. He was then disastrously defeated by the massive opposition of Old Greece, which overwhelmed, together with the alien minorities of Macedonia, his large and fanatically loyal majority among the Greeks in the New Lands. For the next two years, Old Greece savored its revenge at home through the renewed persecution of Liberals, while it reluctantly pursued the unwanted war in Asia Minor to its cata-

13. Epirus and probably Thessaly would have also joined the National Defense revolt if they could. In contrast, the adhesion of several Cycladic and Ionian islands was largely imposed by force. With these qualifications, the correspondence between the two rival governments and the territorial cleavage (Old Greece vs. New Lands) is almost perfect.

14. For a striking account, see Venteres, Vol. 2, pp. 242–275. See also the monograph by Chourmouzos. On Royalist terror against Venizelists in Epirus, Kozane, Katerine, and elsewhere in Southern Macedonia, see Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers*, pp. 430–431.

15. Ibid., pp. 440, 456, and 488. See also Venteres, Vol. 2, pp. 291 and 307, who emphasizes that the blockade decisively broadened the popular base of Antivenizelism, with lasting effects.

16. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 369 n. 1, for a list of the principal mutinies.

strophic conclusion. The election of November 1920 thus emphatically confirmed that the National Schism had become, and would remain, in its most concrete manifestation, a bitter conflict between Old Greece and the New Lands.

Irrevocably losing its original majority in Old Greece between 1916 and 1920, Venizelism increasingly came to represent the Greeks of the New Lands, together with unredeemed Greeks everywhere. This had little to do with regional particularism (except, perhaps, in the case of Crete). Greeks in the New Lands overwhelmingly identified with Venizelism as the uncompromising exponent and effective agent of a nationalist program conceived in terms of the *entire* nation, including its newly liberated and its unredeemed parts. It was in light of this global conception that national interest was defined—hence treason also. It was in light of the same conception that the war involved national survival as such, including the defense of the New Lands and the liberation of other territories inhabited by Greeks. Normal parliamentary rule and civil liberties could not, therefore, be allowed to interfere with the war effort. Nor was opposition tolerable, which took the form of incitement to mutiny and desertion, as was the case with Antivenizelism in 1917–1920.

Voicing the views of many Liberals, Venteres characteristically argues in retrospect that a Venizelist dictatorship was required in 1917 which would dispense with the 1920 election,

because the majority of the people of Old Greece, systematically deluded, was fundamentally out of touch with reality. If left master of its decisions, it would ruin the entire Greek Nation. At most two million persons of the old state decided the fate of six million Greeks of the New Lands and of the unredeemed Nation.¹⁷

The implications for the previously discussed role of Venizelism as agent of national integration for the New Lands are obvious: integration would be *forced* upon a recalcitrant Old Greece, if necessary.

Although ostensibly subscribing to a similar, if more grandiloquent, conception of Greek nationalism, Antivenizelism actually came to represent the *introverted patriotism* and reactive parochialism of Old Greece. To the Venizelist vision of “Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas,” it stubbornly opposed the nostalgic concept of a “*small but honorable Greece*,” that is, essentially one confined to its pre-1912 borders. During the 1920 electoral campaign, an Antivenizelist candidate would thus symbolically tear up a map depicting Greater Greece according to the Treaty of Sèvres.¹⁸

17. Ibid., p. 362.

18. See Apostolopoulos, p. 105. The incident occurred in Messenia (Peloponnesus).

A spontaneous and genuine attachment to peace was undoubtedly at the root of popular opposition to the war in Old Greece—and was, ironically, exploited by a militarist monarchical regime. Yet, Old Greece proved willing to suffer the hardships of war and actually to fight (against the Entente) to defend itself and its king—but not to defend Greek Macedonia, even less Greek Thrace or Asia Minor. Similarly, the concept of treason did not extend beyond the borders of 1912. The National Defense volunteers fighting against the Bulgarians for Greek Macedonia were thus “traitors to King and Country” for Old Greece. Subsequently, in 1917–1920, obstruction of the war effort, including mutiny and desertion to the enemy, was seen as part of the popular struggle for the lost constitutional freedoms and against the Venizelist tyranny.

Once again, G. Vlachos is the most articulate exponent of Antivenizelist ideology as a romantic and traumatized reaction of Old Greece. Upon the return of the former Queen Olga (widow of George I) in October 1920, he welcomed “the Queen of our good days” and warned her that Greece was no longer as she knew it when she first came in 1868:

It is now “Greece of 1920.” . . . Men came from all over, *the foreigners as Greeks, the Greeks as foreigners*, and *they* became ardent defenders of the Fatherland, and *we* traitors, and *we* were named adventurers, and *they* creators of the country, and the years of bitterness, and the years of labors, and the generations of Your old acquaintances were forgotten, and their memory was slandered, and the older were called without a country, and thieves, and silly by the younger. . . .

You must have sometime felt the blasphemous wish “of *the small but honorable Greece*”; You have perhaps longed, like ourselves, for the good days, when our borders were narrow, but the love of the Greeks for Greece boundless, when we did not extend to the Bosphorus, but we were not murdered in the streets of the capital, *when Greece was small, but the country of the Greeks, and not great, but a foreign fief*.¹⁹

Seeking to revive Antivenizelist partisan loyalties in the 1926 election, Vlachos characteristically turned again to the traditionalist nostalgia for pre-1909 Greece, which had been shattered by “the man with eyeglasses” (Venizelos):

The fist, which unsuspecting Greece had applauded, turned into a catapult. Right, left, everywhere its victims were heaped in masses. Church, Throne, Barracks, Parliament, all fell. Continuity, Tradition, Calm fell. The offices fell, and Greece fell. And then, in the dark holes left here and there by the pyramids of the ruins, the Greeks devoted themselves to their own persecu-

19. “He Vasilissa” [The Queen], *Kathemerine*, 12 October 1920, reprinted in Vlachos, pp. 9–10. Emphasis added.

tion and destruction like reptiles of death cellars. The Greeks, the happy climbers of the summits.

The Greece, poor and small, which gave ten decades worship to the dream of the Great Fatherland, now calls today's Greeks to turn their glance to the past, from the depth of their ruins. There, with the help of their conscience, without passion, they will face salvation. There, in the past which had not been touched by the curse of the catapult, which had not known the new men, a happy, united Greece will be found as a memory. *That Greece we* had created. *That Greece* Eleftherios Venizelos destroyed.²⁰

The idyllic state that Vlachos chose to glorify, as his party's essential political myth, was of course dear to the hearts of Old Greece: it *was* Old Greece itself. The other Greece, the one dear to the New Lands and the refugees, was obviously no concern of his. Their own bitter nostalgia, however, turned to the short-lived "Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas." In their eyes, *that* Greece Venizelos had created. *That* Greece Antivenizelism destroyed.

THE SCARS OF CIVIL STRIFE

It was primarily as a profound cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands that the National Schism was inherited by interwar mass politics. The permanent Venizelist majority among Greek natives in the New Lands was further reinforced and consolidated by the concentration of refugee settlement in Macedonia and Thrace. It was moreover no longer challenged by a compact alien vote.²¹

Bitter memories of civil strife were essential for the persistence of the historical cleavage, once the actual issues had been tragically buried by the 1922 Disaster. Between 1915 and 1925, the pendulum of repression had swung no less than four times. In 1915–1917, the Liberals were persecuted in Constantine's Greece. Between 1916 and 1920, it was the turn of the Antivenizelists, first in the areas controlled by the Provisional Government, then mostly in Old Greece. In 1920–1922, the Liberals were again subjected to Royalist violence, both official and unofficial. The tables were finally turned by the Revolution of 1922, which executed the Six, suppressed Antivenizelist opposition, and eventually crushed the Counterrevolution of 1923 (which was essentially an armed rising of the Royalist Peloponnesus).

20. "Parelthon" [Past], *Kathemerine*, 5 November 1926, reprinted in Vlachos, pp. 28–31.

21. Nonetheless, the persisting links between Antivenizelism and alien minorities (especially the Slavo-Macedonians and the Sephardic Jews) kept alive the memories of 1915–1920

The absence of readily available and reliable quantitative data makes it impossible to conclusively compare the violence suffered by each side, or to use the areal distribution of civil violence in ecological analysis. Yet, the years of Venizelist repression in 1916–1920 seem to have left the most enduring scars, especially on the regional and local level. In any event, Antivenizelism was certainly more inclined than its opponents to turn such memories into a *central* element of partisanship. During its long years out of power, its continuing existence and cohesion seemed to depend largely, if not decisively, upon the uncompromising loyalty to the dead and other martyrs of Venizelist tyranny, whose memory was constantly kept alive—most passionately by Vlachs.

On the national level, the execution of the Six cast its shadow on the entire interwar period, together with Constantine's remains, which lay symbolically unburied in exile. On the local level, traumatic memories centered on the many obscure victims of Venizelist repression between 1916 and 1920, which had typically been occasioned by popular resistance to National Defense, the war effort, and mobilization.²²

In Old Greece, such memories accounted for local Antivenizelist majorities far exceeding those in the surrounding area and region. Apeiranthos, a village on the island of Naxos in the Cyclades, is an exemplary and well-known case, which may serve to illustrate this point. In January 1917, it had been the site of one of the bloodiest encounters in the ongoing civil war, when it refused to join the rebel Provisional Government. The ensuing assault by National Defense troops left about 30 dead and 45 wounded among the villagers.²³ Table 55 shows the lasting consequences of the massacre on village loyalties over the next two decades.

In the New Lands, similar memories accounted for the existence of distinctly Antivenizelist enclaves in the midst of otherwise strongly Venizelist regions. The case in point is Chalkidike, in Macedonia, which in September 1916 refused to join National Defense and submit to its decreed mobilization. Armed resistance by the area's Reservists was then brutally suppressed by National Defense troops under Kondyles. A second local revolt was later launched by homecoming deserters and was again crushed

and continually reinforced Venizelist loyalties among the Greeks in the New Lands (Macedonia in particular).

22. See the book by Gerakares, which is a very detailed and passionate Antivenizelist chronicle of Venizelist repression all over Greece. Only the first volume seems to have been published, which unfortunately ends in 1917.

23. Gerakares, Vol. 1, pp. 264–269. For a Venizelist account, see Kypraios, pp. 84–90. The figures of casualties differ slightly, perhaps because four of the wounded may have died subsequently. Gerakares thus lists 32 dead and 44 wounded, Kypraios 28 and 48, respectively. It should be added that the massacre greatly shocked and distressed the Venizelos Provisional Government in Thessaloniki.

Table 55 ANTIVENIZELISM IN APEIRANTHOS, 1928–1936
(percentage Antivenizelism of valid votes)

	<i>Apeiranthos</i>	<i>Rest of Naxos</i>
1928	63.27	37.82
1932	73.46	46.35
1933	75.60	53.76
1936	80.89	66.45

by the Provisional Government.²⁴ Also in Macedonia, native Antivenizelism in the Florina district was partly attributed to the extreme hardships suffered under Entente occupation during the war.²⁵ Nevertheless, such cases remained isolated and atypical in the context of the New Lands, whereas Apeiranthos was a symbol for Old Greece as a whole. In large measure, the overall territorial cleavage was kept alive by such local experiences.

Once Antivenizelism had recognized the Republic and had risen to power in 1933, it seemed briefly possible and even probable that the cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands would be bridged at last, especially with respect to Macedonia, the most important region. It is telling that Macedonian Liberals apparently feared this prospect and systematically exploited regional dissatisfaction to avert the erosion of their traditional stronghold.²⁶ This prospect was precisely what was at stake in the conflict between Old Greek and Macedonian Antivenizelists within the Tsaldares government, which ended with the defeat of the latter, as noted earlier. Soon thereafter, the Venizelist coup of March 1935 emphatically confirmed the limits of national integration and drastically renewed the conflict between Old Greece and the New Lands.

In the opening sentences of *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, Marx pointedly remarks that historical events occur twice, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. Without underestimating its far-reaching and tragic consequences, it may be said that the March 1935 coup was precisely such a repetition of the National Defense revolutionary movement of 1916. The 1935 coup did not aim at directly overthrowing the Tsaldares government in Athens. If successful, it would have established a rival Venizelist regime

24. Gerakares, Vol. 1, pp. 209–219; and, on the Venizelist side, Venteres, Vol. 2, pp. 319–321. See also the Prefect of Chalkidike to Venizelos, 24 August 1929, VA File 379, where the area's Royalist tradition is attributed to the vicinity of Mount Athos and to the conflict with National Defense.

25. The Prefect of Florina (V. Balkos) to Venizelos, 10 March 1932, VA File 110.

26. See, e.g., the article by M. I. Mavrogordatos, in *Eleftheron Vema*, 30 May 1934.

in Thessaloniki, and in control of the New Lands. In other words, it would have almost exactly recreated the territorial split of 1916.

The disastrous mistakes committed, the inaction or opposition of most Venizelist military and civilian leaders, and finally the swift collapse of the coup should *not* mask its significance as a relapse of the civil war between Old Greece and the New Lands. The rebellion immediately prevailed, amidst great popular enthusiasm, in Crete, Eastern Macedonia, Thrace, and the Aegean Islands—areas where both conscripts and civilian population were overwhelmingly Venizelist. A telling expression of popular support in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace was the massive response to the appeal for volunteers. Similar support was assured in most of Central and Western Macedonia where, however, local Venizelist conspirators failed to move. In contrast, the Tsaldares government relied decisively for the suppression of the revolt on conscripts and volunteers from Old Greece, where popular reaction was massive and fanatical. The brief campaign against the rebel forces in Eastern Macedonia was in a very real sense a military expedition of Old Greece for the subjugation of the New Lands.²⁷

This interpretation was widely held at the time, on both sides, and was unmistakably confirmed by the spirit of the ensuing widespread repression. It essentially represented an explosion of the visceral vindictiveness that Old Greece had contained for more than a decade. The election of 1936 would show that the gap between Old Greece and the New Lands had actually *widened*, as a result of the coup and its sequel (see especially Table 51).

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

An important territorial cleavage, which closely parallels but does not entirely coincide with that between Old Greece and the New Lands, is the division between relatively privileged and underprivileged areas. With the data available, relative deprivation can be measured by means of two variables: the extent of male illiteracy and the number of doctors in each area.²⁸

Tables 56 through 59 conclusively show that Venizelism was

27. See Benekos, pp. 139–146, 172–173, and 189–197; and Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 307–308, 336, and 342. On the ensuing repression, see especially Linardatos, pp. 15–133 *passim*; and Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 451 and 474.

28. The huge difference between male and female illiteracy is primarily due to the traditional position of women. Male illiteracy is therefore the most appropriate and discriminating indicator of educational deprivation as such.

Table 56 ANTIVENIZELISM AND ILLITERACY
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Illiterate (of males aged 8 or older)	-.62 (.13) .000	-.74 (.12) .000	-.82 (.13) .000	-.58 (.13) .000	-.69 (.12) .000
<i>a</i>	46.82 (3.52) .000	51.99 (3.31) .000	64.16 (3.41) .000	61.08 (3.53) .000	56.01 (3.17) .000
<i>r</i>	.32	.39	.42	.30	.38
<i>s</i>	17.99	16.92	17.40	18.03	16.19

Table 57 VENIZELISM AND ILLITERACY
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Illiterate (of males aged 8 or older)	+.55 (.13) .000	+.61 (.12) .000	+.73 (.13) .000	+.63 (.13) .000	+.63 (.12) .000
<i>a</i>	51.42 (3.59) .000	39.35 (3.11) .000	31.59 (3.38) .000	30.26 (3.55) .000	38.15 (3.08) .000
<i>r</i>	.28	.35	.38	.32	.37
<i>s</i>	18.33	15.91	17.27	18.11	15.72

stronger in relatively deprived areas, that is, areas with higher illiteracy and lesser availability of medical services, whereas the reverse was true of Antivenizelism. The two measures are strongly correlated with each other ($r = -.55$) and seem to actually reflect a single dimension of deprivation, which is primarily represented by illiteracy, as multiple regression using both suggests.

The key role of education has been previously discussed (in Chapter 3) with reference to the two peasant strata. Yet, the differences found here between Antivenizelism and Venizelism are by no means confined to the rural areas and therefore have wider implications. As noted earlier, the Greek educational system had been characterized by a congenital imbalance since the 19th century. On the one hand, the uneven development

Table 58 ANTIVENIZELISM AND MEDICAL SERVICES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
Doctors per 10,000 pop.	+.85 (.24) .000	+.87 (.23) .000	+.77 (.24) .002	+.52 (.24) .030	+.75 (.22) .001
<i>a</i>	24.95 (2.25) .000	26.91 (2.18) .000	37.83 (2.29) .000	42.51 (2.29) .000	33.05 (2.09) .000
<i>r</i>	.25	.26	.22	.15	.24
<i>s</i>	18.38	17.75	18.68	18.69	17.03

Table 59 VENIZELISM AND MEDICAL SERVICES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
Doctors per 10,000 pop.	-.77 (.24) .002	-.56 (.22) .009	-.76 (.23) .001	-.65 (.24) .008	-.68 (.21) .001
<i>a</i>	70.88 (2.28) .000	58.88 (2.05) .000	55.64 (2.23) .000	51.01 (2.31) .000	59.10 (2.02) .000
<i>r</i>	.22	.19	.23	.19	.23
<i>s</i>	18.61	16.70	18.20	18.81	16.45

and actual neglect of elementary education was responsible for the persistence of mass illiteracy, which in 1928 amounted to a staggering 50 percent (36 percent among males and 64 percent among females) and placed Greece near the bottom of European comparisons.²⁹ On the other hand, the disproportionate growth of secondary and university education offered an avenue of upward mobility into government employment and the professions, and supported a corresponding set of dominant cultural values and popular aspirations. In accordance with this role, the educa-

29. For the population aged eight or older, which is a more meaningful basis, the rate was 41 percent in 1928 (23 percent among males and 58 percent among females). For the population aged fifteen or older, i.e., past schooling age, the rate was 45 percent (26 percent among males and 63 percent among females).

tional system as a whole was imbued with an exclusively classical orientation; its keystone was the artificially archaic *katharevousa*, language of the state and of the educated, which sharply and invidiously separated *both* from the rest of the population. The living, natural, popular, or *demotic* language (*demotike*) was banned from Greek education.

Antivenizelism clearly represented the areas (and strata) which had historically benefited most from this educational system and were hence most imbued with its values. In contrast, Venizelism came to represent the educational aspirations of the most deprived areas (and strata).³⁰ This cleavage on the mass level adds a *new* dimension to the protracted and virulent conflict over educational policy and the language question, whose convoluted history cannot be presented here.

For the purposes of this analysis, Liberal policy can best be described as a global effort to redress the traditional imbalance, in favor of universal elementary education and in accordance with the requirements of both national integration and bourgeois modernization.³¹ Placed in this perspective, the adoption of the *demotic* in elementary education, which came to represent the most radical and controversial tenet of Venizelist policy, aimed at removing a critical barrier to mass literacy and to the integration of new territories and populations, including the refugees in particular.

It was coupled with the constitutionally required six years of compulsory universal education. This had been a major Liberal reform during the 1911 constitutional revision, but was in fact implemented only in 1929 with the institution of a uniform six-grade school by the Venizelos government. The most spectacular and lasting achievement of that government was in fact the construction of 3,167 school buildings during its four years in power (almost all for elementary schools), compared with a mere 1,474 for the entire previous century (1830–1928). These combined policies represented the biggest effort hitherto undertaken against illiteracy in Greece, and effectively inaugurated universal compulsory elementary education.³²

In sharp contrast, classical secondary education was strongly discouraged. Intent on reducing the excessive number of jobhunters (*the-*

30. The discussion is here primarily about *areas*. With respect to social strata, the earlier discussion of the peasantry covers the most important aspects. On the Antivenizelism of the “educated” or “literate” (*grammatismenoi*) among the urban petty bourgeoisie, see A. Kallivas to Venizelos, 11 November 1922, VA File 319.

31. For a concise analysis of educational developments, see the contribution by A. Demaras in *Historia tou Hellenikou Ethnous*, Vol. 15, pp. 489–494; and Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 96–98.

32. See *To Ergon tes Kyverneseos Venizelou*, pp. 180–190.

sitheres) with high-school diplomas, the Venizelos government actually closed down a number of schools and drastically reduced enrollments. Classical secondary education was to be reserved for the best pupils, with provisions for equal opportunities, while vocational and technical education was encouraged, to meet the requirements of economic development.³³

In light of this summary review, it may be seen that Venizelist educational policy, particularly in 1928–1932, not only concretely served the urgent educational needs of the most deprived areas and groups. It *also* sharply antagonized and even attempted to *block* the traditional aspirations and values most strongly (but not exclusively) held by the relatively privileged areas and strata.

Finally, one might expect the Left to be stronger in the most deprived areas. This is generally true of the A.P. (see Table 60), but in its case the relationship with relative deprivation is mostly confined to the rural areas. Conversely, the predominantly urban base of the C.P. masks a rather weak relationship with the second measure of deprivation (doctors per 10,000 population), which only emerges in a *separate* analysis of urban and rural areas. Practically no relationship is to be found with illiteracy, at least through ecological analysis.

Table 60 THE A.P. AND ILLITERACY
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928–36
% Illiterate (of males aged 8 or older)	+.10 (.04) .009	+.15 (.07) .026	+.03 (.05) .579	+.06 (.02) .000	+.08 (.03) .011
<i>a</i>	–.71 (.99) .476	2.77 (1.77) .119	1.19 (1.22) .333	–.82 (.45) .069	.61 (.87) .486
<i>r</i>	.19	.16	.04	.26	.18
<i>s</i>	5.07	9.04	6.25	2.29	4.45

33. Ibid., and various documents in the Venizelos Archive. Between 1928 and 1932, secondary school enrollment was cut almost by half. In the face of enormous resistance, this part of the 1928–1932 program seems to have been even more short-lived than the rest, which was thoroughly dismantled by Antivenizelism after its coming to power in 1933.

SUPERIMPOSED CLEAVAGES AND THEIR
TERRITORIAL DIMENSION

Relative deprivation is not the only instance where one dimension of cleavage parallels another. In the preceding discussions, it has often become apparent that cleavages which have hitherto been treated separately, for conceptual and analytical reasons, actually *coincided* to a considerable extent. In other words, the distinct characteristics associated with support for a particular party were largely to be found in the *same areas* or even in the *same individuals*.

This was true of the four numerically most consequential dimensions defining the social base of the two major blocs:

ANTIVENIZELISM	VENIZELISM
old smallholders	new smallholders
natives	refugees
privileged areas	deprived areas
Old Greece	New Lands

Old smallholders were of course natives in their entirety, whereas about half of the new smallholders were refugees. Compared with the old smallholders and the natives in general, new smallholders and refugees in general suffered from greater deprivation: the ecological correlation with male illiteracy (among those aged eight or older) is $-.02$ for old smallholders, but $+.50$ for new smallholders and $+.33$ for refugees.³⁴ Moreover, according to the census, male illiteracy averaged 22 percent among natives, but 29 percent among refugees.

Finally, every other dimension of cleavage largely coincided in reality with the overriding territorial division between Old Greece and the New Lands:

1. Over 75 percent of the new smallholders were to be found in the New Lands, where they constituted the overwhelming majority of peasant proprietors as a whole (around 90 percent in Macedonia, Thrace, and Epirus).
2. Almost 70 percent of the refugees were also to be found in the New Lands, where they constituted 31 percent of the population. Outside Athens and Piraeus, the corresponding proportions in Old Greece were 12 percent and 5 percent. If the refugees settled in Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki are excluded (as they are excluded from the ecological analysis), as many as 83 percent of the rest lived in the New Lands.

34. See also Chapter 3, n. 183.

3. Relative deprivation as well was disproportionately concentrated in the New Lands, where male illiteracy averaged 29 percent (30 percent if Thessaloniki is excluded) against 19 percent in Old Greece (21 percent if Athens and Piraeus are excluded).

It is in light of this actual coincidence among several overlapping dimensions of political conflict that the results of ecological analysis should be interpreted, if the corresponding independent variables are all brought into the same multiple regression. The existence of superimposed cleavages implies multicollinearity among the respective ecological variables, which should result in larger standard errors. Furthermore, to the extent that cleavages actually coincide, the corresponding regression coefficients should change from those found in the separate treatment of each dimension: their size may be reduced, more or less sharply, and even their sign may be reversed. Finally, the multiple correlation coefficient should be considerably smaller than the sum of the respective simple correlation coefficients.

Table 61 ANTIVENIZELISM AND MASS CLEAVAGES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Petty Bourgeois Manufacturing, Transports, Personal Services, and Professions	+ .61 (.23) .010	+ .65 (.22) .004	+ .37 (.23) .118	+ .43 (.23) .062	+ .51 (.21) .014
% Yeomen (old smallholders)	+ .67 (.13) .000	+ .60 (.13) .000	+ .57 (.13) .000	+ .54 (.13) .000	+ .59 (.12) .000
% Refugees	- .21 (.06) .001	- .21 (.06) .001	- .16 (.06) .015	- .31 (.06) .000	- .22 (.06) .000
% Illiterate	- .28 (.14) .056	- .39 (.13) .004	- .59 (.14) .000	- .23 (.14) .101	- .37 (.13) .004
a	24.40 (6.60) .000	29.89 (6.22) .000	48.00 (6.60) .000	43.86 (6.53) .000	36.54 (5.87) .000
r	.53	.56	.54	.54	.58
s	16.27	15.32	16.26	16.08	14.46

Table 62 VENIZELISM AND MASS CLEAVAGES
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Petty Bourgeois Trade and Finance	+ .99 (.42) .021	+ .90 (.38) .019	+ 1.26 (.41) .002	+ 1.41 (.42) .001	+ 1.14 (.37) .002
% Peasants (new smallholders)	+ .25 (.11) .021	+ .17 (.10) .081	+ .31 (.10) .003	+ .37 (.10) .000	+ .27 (.09) .003
% Refugees	+ .20 (.07) .005	+ .06 (.06) .377	+ .02 (.07) .727	+ .12 (.07) .084	+ .10 (.06) .103
% Illiterate	+ .37 (.16) .020	+ .59 (.14) .000	+ .67 (.15) .000	+ .48 (.15) .002	+ .53 (.14) .000
<i>a</i>	39.28 (6.32) .000	28.30 (5.65) .000	15.74 (6.06) .010	12.54 (6.21) .045	23.96 (5.45) .000
<i>r</i>	.41	.40	.45	.45	.46
<i>s</i>	17.57	15.69	16.84	17.25	15.13

This is precisely what can first be seen in Tables 61 and 62, which bring together the most essential relationships between each of the major blocs and three nationwide dimensions of cleavage: class, refugees, and deprivation.³⁵ Table 61 should be compared with Tables 14, 22, 34, and 56, where each dimension was analyzed separately. Similarly, Table 62 should be compared with Tables 15, 23, 35, and 57.

Among resulting changes, the most striking occurs in the relationship between Venizelism and the refugees as such, which practically vanishes for 1932 and 1933. This is of course *not* to be interpreted as showing that no refugees supported Venizelism in those two elections. It shows instead that refugee support almost entirely coincided or else was indistinguishable from that of the new smallholders, the most deprived areas, and the commercial petty bourgeoisie.

35. The more localized cleavages involving the various national, ethnic, and religious minorities can be incorporated in a regression model only in part. It therefore seemed preferable to leave them out of this discussion altogether rather than include only a few. That these cleavages partly coincided with the overall division between natives and refugees has already been pointed out in Chapter 5.

Table 63 ANTIVENIZELISM, MASS CLEAVAGES, AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Petty Bourgeois Manufacturing, Transports, Personal Services, and Professions	+.37 (.20) .065	+.47 (.20) .021	+.15 (.21) .480	+.17 (.19) .374	+.29 (.17) .098
% Yeomen (old smallholders)	+.42 (.12) .000	+.41 (.12) .001	+.34 (.12) .005	+.26 (.11) .018	+.36 (.10) .000
% Refugees	-.02 (.06) .690	-.07 (.06) .263	+.02 (.06) .729	-.10 (.05) .080	-.04 (.05) .416
% Illiterate	-.05 (.12) .702	-.22 (.13) .086	-.38 (.13) .003	+.02 (.12) .844	-.16 (.11) .150
Old Greece	+21.04 (2.46) .000	+16.02 (2.46) .000	+19.57 (2.52) .000	+23.70 (2.28) .000	+20.08 (2.12) .000
<i>a</i>	11.97 (5.81) .041	20.43 (5.83) .001	36.43 (5.95) .000	29.85 (5.40) .000	24.67 (5.01) .000
<i>r</i>	.69	.66	.68	.74	.74
<i>s</i>	13.85	13.90	14.20	12.88	11.94

If the territorial cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands is also introduced as a fourth dimension by means of the corresponding dummy variables, the resulting changes are even more spectacular (see Tables 63 and 64). Although the territorial coefficients found previously are somewhat reduced (cf. Tables 51 and 52), all other coefficients drop sharply, vanish, or are even reversed in one case (Venizelism and refugees). The degree to which other coefficients are affected by the introduction of the territorial dimension indicates the extent to which each of the corresponding cleavages *coincided* with the territorial division between Old Greece and the New Lands. It can thus be seen that the overriding regional cleavage largely reflected and subsumed *other* interwar cleavages, with the *additional* intensity and salience of a clear-cut geographical division.

If we now turn to the Left (Tables 65 and 66), some overlap may again be detected among cleavages, but with a critical difference from the

Table 64 VENIZELISM, MASS CLEAVAGES, AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Petty Bourgeois Trade and Finance	+ .62 (.35) .080	+ .68 (.35) .057	+ .93 (.35) .008	+ 1.04 (.34) .003	+ .82 (.30) .007
% Peasants (new smallholders)	+ .13 (.09) .144	+ .10 (.09) .277	+ .21 (.09) .020	+ .25 (.09) .004	+ .17 (.08) .025
% Refugees	- .03 (.06) .671	- .08 (.06) .219	- .17 (.06) .006	- .11 (.06) .083	- .10 (.05) .076
% Illiterate	+ .07 (.13) .581	+ .42 (.13) .002	+ .41 (.13) .003	+ .18 (.13) .167	+ .27 (.11) .020
New Lands	+ 23.75 (2.53) .000	+ 14.09 (2.53) .000	+ 20.92 (2.51) .000	+ 23.88 (2.45) .000	+ 20.66 (2.17) .000
<i>a</i>	43.69 (5.26) .000	30.92 (5.27) .000	19.63 (5.22) .000	16.97 (5.11) .001	27.80 (4.51) .000
<i>r</i>	.66	.53	.64	.68	.68
<i>s</i>	14.55	14.59	14.45	14.12	12.47

two major blocs. As one would expect, the *class* dimension seems to have been of paramount importance for the Left, and to have largely subsumed all other cleavages, including the territorial.

This is particularly obvious in the case of the A.P. A comparison of Table 65 with Tables 29, 36, 60, and 53, where each dimension was treated separately, shows the changes that the inclusion of all four dimensions (class, refugees, deprivation, and region) in the same regression produces. The coefficients previously estimated for deprivation and region vanish or in some cases become negative. Those for the refugees also drop slightly, whereas those for new smallholders remain practically unchanged. One may conclude that support for the A.P. in deprived areas, in the New Lands, and, to a considerable extent, among refugees practically coincided or else was indistinguishable from that of its distinctive class base—the new smallholders.

Finally, in the case of the C.P., Table 66 should be similarly compared with Tables 18, 37, and 54. Whereas all coefficients are somewhat reduced

Table 65 THE A.P., MASS CLEAVAGES, AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Peasants (new smallholders)	+ .04 (.02) .044	+ .22 (.04) .000	+ .08 (.03) .005	+ .03 (.01) .005	+ .09 (.02) .000
% Refugees	+ .01 (.02) .570	+ .06 (.03) .088	+ .02 (.03) .423	+ .03 (.01) .005	+ .03 (.02) .093
% Illiterate	+ .08 (.05) .086	- .12 (.07) .108	- .03 (.06) .548	+ .02 (.02) .224	- .01 (.04) .739
New Lands	- 1.57 (.87) .072	+ .64 (1.42) .650	- 1.47 (1.06) .167	- .29 (.38) .450	- .67 (.72) .353
<i>a</i>	- .85 (.99) .390	2.12 (1.61) .191	.95 (1.21) .433	- .87 (.44) .048	.34 (.82) .683
<i>r</i>	.26	.46	.22	.38	.40
<i>s</i>	5.03	8.21	6.15	2.22	4.18

in size, the drop is sharpest with respect to the refugees and the regional cleavage, indicating that support for the C.P. among the refugees and in the New Lands mostly coincided with that of the working class—even though a shift in party support in 1936 is once again discernible.

At the conclusion of this brief discussion of superimposed cleavages, it should perhaps be stressed that the emphasis here has been quite *different* from that of a strictly “causal” interpretation, which would seek to “explain” the vote by selecting the most “powerful” variable(s) in terms of variance “explained.” Although not central nor essential to the argument, a causal interpretation is nevertheless readily allowed by the regression results as presented. Moreover, the series of tables which have been previously compared may also be seen as essentially equivalent to stepwise regression.³⁶

36. Although different, the interpretation presented here is nonetheless compatible with one couched in causal terms. To take only the most extreme example, the negative “net” effect of refugees on Venizelism, once class, deprivation, and region have been controlled, represents what is, in real terms, a small residual fraction of the refugee group not contained in the other variables. It may be added that a strictly causal analysis would require the estimation of both direct and indirect effects, hence an assumed causal sequence among

Table 66 THE C.P., MASS CLEAVAGES, AND REGION
(n = 196)

	1928	1932	1933	1936	1928-36
% Workers in Manufacturing	+.23 (.03) .000	+.51 (.06) .000	+.56 (.06) .000	+.54 (.07) .000	+.46 (.05) .000
Ratio of Workers to Employers in Manufacturing	+.15 (.06) .011	+.20 (.11) .070	+.18 (.11) .096	+.10 (.11) .381	+.16 (.09) .088
% Refugees	-.00 (.01) .942	+.05 (.02) .055	+.05 (.02) .026	+.06 (.03) .016	+.04 (.02) .072
New Lands	+1.15 (.51) .026	+.83 (.94) .375	+1.82 (.92) .049	+1.43 (.97) .141	+1.18 (.78) .132
<i>a</i>	-1.36 (.45) .003	-1.37 (.83) .100	-2.14 (.82) .009	-.64 (.86) .457	-1.03 (.69) .138
<i>r</i>	.55	.61	.66	.62	.63
<i>s</i>	3.09	5.65	5.55	5.82	4.71

Of primary concern for this study is rather the considerable extent to which interwar mass cleavages actually coincided or overlapped. The specifically territorial dimension of this phenomenon, with respect to the two major blocs, constitutes the single most important aspect and a *key* to an understanding of interwar political developments. Superimposed cleavages are generally expected to reinforce one another. If, in addition, they are accumulated along geographic lines and coincide with a clear-cut territorial division, the implications for political conflict can be extreme. Such was precisely the case in interwar Greece where the overriding regional cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands represented an ever-present potential for civil war.

correlated independent variables. In most cases, however, such an assumption would be problematic if not untenable.

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SOCIAL COALITIONS AND PARTY STRATEGIES

This will turn, by noon of election day, the electoral ballots into war bullets.

Venizelos to A. Zaïmes, President of the Republic, 5 May 1934, VA File 307

The fact that interwar political forces drew the core of their mass support from distinctive coalitions of particular strata, groups, and areas should be expected to constitute an indispensable and central precondition of their respective strategies. On the other hand, precisely *to the extent* that mass support followed the lines of (largely overlapping) social cleavages, the role of charisma and clientelism in their “pure” form was considerably limited and modified. Nonetheless, in the formulation and implementation of party strategies, charismatic appeals and clientelist networks were particularly important—especially as functional substitutes of or else as supplements to otherwise weak organizational capabilities for mass mobilization.

The existence of cleavages on the mass level is by no means a sufficient condition for the development of appropriate and effective structures of mass organization. In fact, the structure of interwar parties, except the C.P., remained incomplete and fragmented in this respect, as seen earlier. The implementation of party strategies, and hence their formulation itself, depended therefore to a large extent on the resort to charisma or clientelism as readily available alternative techniques of mass mobilization.

The essential historical facts about interwar party strategies have already been outlined in the first chapter of this study. Party strategies have further been discussed with reference to particular cleavages. Without undue repetition, it remains to bring the various threads together on the most general level, and ultimately to focus on the downfall of the Republic and eventually of parliamentary politics altogether.

The implications of a spatial model of party competition provide a central thread throughout this chapter and should be briefly sketched at the outset. It has been argued (in Chapter 2) that the space itself of party competition would be radically altered, depending on the relative salience of the two principal ideological dimensions, which invoked drastically different distributions of mass support and hence diametrically opposed dynamics: centrifugal on the political regime, centripetal on the social order. Several critical turning points in interwar party strategy may be interpreted in this perspective. As long as it clung to unconditional Royalism and thus confined itself to the regime dimension, Antivenizelism preserved its cohesion, but also suffered an insuperable handicap in vote maximization, in the face of a solid Republican majority. As soon as the regime was ostensibly removed from party competition, following its solemn recognition by Tsaldares in 1932, Venizelism was at once deprived of its decisive comparative advantage. The election of 1933 became a contest between two bourgeois blocs over economic issues, in which Venizelism was handicapped to the advantage of its opponent. Moving back to the regime dimension in the wake of electoral defeat, Venizelism recaptured its momentum, but sacrificed its distinctiveness as a bourgeois force by finding itself eventually defending the Republic together with the Communists, after its disastrous coup of March 1935. Antivenizelism could then *compress* the two hitherto distinct dimensions into one and claim that the monarchy was also the only bulwark of the existing social order. For its part, the C.P. could begin to break out of its past isolation and lay claim to Republican loyalties, especially after Venizelism appeared to abandon the Republican banner to the Left.

THE ELECTORAL AND THE MILITARY ARENA

Mass cleavages and electoral politics in general may appear irrelevant if the interwar years are regarded as a mere succession of military coups and counter coups—an image of the period which is commonly encountered. To understand interwar politics, however, and party strategies in particular, electoral competition and military intervention should rather be regarded as *alternative* sites or arenas in the struggle for political power. For

interwar party strategies, the two sites were inextricably connected and, ultimately, even interchangeable.

At the root of this situation was the fact that the officer corps itself had been split by the National Schism into Venizelists and Antivenizelists. On the elite level, each of the two political camps thus consisted of a civil-military bloc (*syngrotema* in contemporary usage) held together by historical bonds and above all by the continuing mutual dependence between civilian and military leadership. In a nutshell, as Kondyles once put it, the politicians could not hold power without the officers, while the latter could not preserve and promote their own interests unless they attached themselves to a party.¹

Ultimately, solidarity between civilian and military leadership within each bloc was *required* if it was to preserve its chances in a final confrontation, in which *both* its survival *and* that of the participants themselves would be at stake. As long as the resumption of civil war remained a distinct possibility, neither camp could dispense with its military arm, however troublesome and demanding.

It seems hardly possible, in retrospect, to fathom the mutual suspicion, fear, and paranoia that the most savage phases of civil strife had bequeathed to the participants, both major and minor. A telling example is offered by an anonymous Venizelist officer of the Gendarmerie, who warned a Liberal superior in 1932 that the Antivenizelists had been “angels” in 1921–1922 compared with their mood at the time, in anticipation of electoral victory:

The disposition of the Royalists, if they prevail, is most ferocious; immediately they will begin a general extermination this time—not half-measures, but a radical purge. This must attract the undivided attention of the center, which must organize an effective defense beforehand, bearing in mind that every Liberal citizen will be denied the right to live under the sun of Greece.²

Ever since the November Days of 1916, it had been obvious to all concerned that there were no limits to civil violence and that the only ultimate guarantee was armed force itself. It is only against this background that endemic military intervention can be explained. Civilian dependence on the military opened Pandora’s box of uncontrolled praetorianism.

1. Speech by Kondyles in Thessaloniki, on 6 October 1935, quoted in Merkoures, pp. 210–211. The most detailed study on the military during the interwar period is the book by Veremis.

2. Letter of a Gendarmerie officer in Thessaloniki to his friend and colleague Major G. Sartzetakes, quoted in the latter’s report to Venizelos, 1 June 1932, VA File 358. The “center” refers to L. P. leadership and Venizelos personally.

The potential choice itself between an electoral and a military strategy implied a division of roles within each bloc between civilian party leaders and military men. The latter would automatically secure a predominant position within the bloc whenever a military strategy was required or adopted. An obscure Liberal put it in a nutshell in 1933 by voicing a commonly understood assumption: that Venizelos would be the undisputed leader if, and as long as, events took a "normal" course, whereas Plasteras would (or should) automatically replace him in the eventuality of "abnormal" (i.e., violent) developments.³

Furthermore, the overall solidarity of each bloc did not prevent and actually encouraged the fragmentation of its military arm into rival cliques, which would often take initiatives of their own. Relative impunity was assured with respect to the bloc in question as a whole, since it could ill afford to waste its military resources on internal disputes. Ultimately, the military arm of each bloc, and particular cliques within it, would consider and often achieve emancipation from civilian party leadership altogether.

This highly condensed discussion is primarily applicable to Venizelism, which remained in control of the Greek armed forces throughout most of the interwar period. Although its roots go back to the Revolution of 1909, the Venizelist military faction was actually born out of the National Defense rebellion of 1916, when a separate army was created under the Provisional Government of Thessaloniki. The officers who joined it, or were commissioned by it, acquired through war service manifold professional advantages which were thereafter guaranteed only by a Venizelist regime—and eventually by the Republic.

These National Defense officers (*Amynites*) constituted the original hard core of the interwar Venizelist military faction. It had ruled the reunified and greatly expanded Greek armed forces in 1917–1920, but suffered reprisals and petty persecutions under Antivenizelism in 1920–1922, which left indelible scars. The 1922 Revolution, however, turned the tables once again. Despite its initially broad appeal, it was quickly appropriated by the Venizelist military faction, which eventually remained in undisputed control of the armed forces—after it had crushed the Counterrevolution of 1923 and purged over a thousand officers in its wake. The Republic, which they imposed in 1924, thus had a very concrete and specific meaning for the Venizelist military: it implied the consolidation and preservation of the status quo in the armed forces, hence of their own

3. N. Nikolettatos during the meeting held on 12 October 1933 for the fusion of Panhellenic Republican Defense and Republican Defense, two rival Venizelist mass organizations led by ex-officers. See the minutes of the meeting in VA File 430.

professional interests, and, in many prominent cases, of personal safety itself, against reprisals for the execution of the Six in particular.

Between 1923 and 1933, control of the armed forces by the Venizelist or Republican military faction was in fact preserved. It was briefly threatened when Pangalos, one of the faction's feuding leaders, proceeded to establish a personal regime and supersede preexisting loyalties. It again appeared threatened in 1927, when the Ecumenical Cabinet partly granted Antivenizelist demands and reinstated some of the officers cashiered in 1923. It was only in 1933, however, that the electoral victory of Antivenizelism, the defection of Kondyles, and the abortive Plasteras coup combined to create conditions for the erosion of Republican control in the armed forces. The Plasteras coup, which was neither resisted nor adopted by the bulk of the Republican military, presented the Tsaldares government with an unexpected golden opportunity for the first purge of Republican officers. In its wake, Kondyles, a recognized expert in this respect, proceeded, as minister of war, to further weaken the hitherto total control by the Venizelist military faction, thereby greatly alarming the Venizelist camp.

This threat was eventually turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy by the disastrous Venizelist coup of March 1935, which was supposed to prevent it. Instead, the unsuccessful coup triggered developments which closely paralleled those of 1923–1924. Over a thousand Venizelist officers were cashiered, leaving the Antivenizelist military faction in total control. Intent on preserving its newly won political power and professional gains at all costs, this faction first pushed the unreliable Tsaldares aside, and imposed a Kondyles dictatorship and the Restoration. Demonstrating that the Antivenizelist bloc also could ill afford to waste its military resources, Tsaldares confined himself to merely verbal protests, and eventually walked out of the Constituent Assembly with his majority rather than challenging the Kondyles cabinet in a vote. Subsequently, the Antivenizelist military adamantly opposed the reinstatement of Venizelist officers. They would therefore tolerate neither a Liberal victory at the polls, in January 1936, nor the formation of a Liberal cabinet with Communist support, and effectively also blocked the emergence of a government coalition between the L.P. and the Antivenizelist parties. When such a coalition at last appeared assured, in the summer of 1936, the Antivenizelist military faction was ready to lend its support to the dictatorship established by Metaxas and the king in August 1936.⁴

4. On all these developments, see especially Linardatos, pp. 112–200 *passim*.

To conclude, military interventions after 1922 may be classified into two broad categories. The first includes the 1923 Counterrevolution and the March 1935 Venizelist coup. *Regardless* of the background and intentions of the actual protagonists, these two events evolved into general military confrontations between the two blocs, in a relapse of the civil war between them. They both resulted in the destruction of the military base of the losing side—and consequently of the regime it supported. On both occasions, the collective solidarity and political responsibility of each bloc came into play. On both occasions, mass cleavages were *directly* relevant: each side critically relied on the areas and groups which constituted its electoral base.⁵

All other interwar coups were essentially *internal* to the bloc that was in unchallenged control of the military at the time—Venizelism between October 1923 and March 1935, and Antivenizelism thereafter. Such coups were ultimately predicated on the instrumental solidarity of the bloc in question, which was unwilling to risk the destruction of its military base and thus leave itself open to a vengeful comeback of the opposite bloc.⁶

For each of the two military factions (i.e., the military arms of the two civil-military blocs), corporate solidarity rested on tangible professional and personal interests and on the memories of common struggles and sufferings. This was the most concrete, if not the only, basis of their Republican or Royalist loyalties. Under parliamentary rule, they were dependent on their civilian counterparts—but only as long as the latter appeared to effectively safeguard military interests that could in a very real sense be identified with the survival of the bloc as a whole. Conversely, civilian party leaders were keenly aware after 1916 that civilian rule depended on the partisan control of the armed forces *and* that victory or survival in civil war depended on the availability and strength of a loyal military force. This fundamentally instrumental solidarity provides the *key* to interwar civil-military relations.

It is perhaps necessary to emphasize, against a common cynical misperception, that civilian party leaders on *both* sides were generally and genuinely committed to parliamentary politics—if only because parliamentary politics guaranteed their own supremacy within their bloc. A telling but often neglected example is the public condemnation by Venize-

5. On this aspect, see Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 38–46, 365, and 430–431; Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 1, pp. 115–141 *passim*, and Vol. 2, pp. 307, 335–336, and 359; and Chapter 6 above on the 1935 coup. A particularly pertinent fact is the recruitment of volunteers both in 1923 and in 1935; on the Venizelist side, they were primarily refugees.

6. The overthrow of the Pangalos dictatorship in 1926 is the exception that confirms the rule. Pangalos became expendable or rather a liability for Venizelism only after he had himself severed his ties with his original bloc and turned against it.

los of the dictatorial views of Plasteras in May 1934. Writing in the same Republican newspaper, Venizelos blasted the naïve advocacy of a dictatorship as the perfect solution and insisted that, although the Republic did not necessarily imply a parliamentary system, nevertheless its very foundation was that "government emanates from popular election." Venizelos proceeded to elaborately justify the electorate for having disavowed him in 1920, 1932, and 1933—instances that Plasteras had used as prime examples of the disastrous results of universal suffrage. Venizelos further assured his Republican audience that they could get rid of the Tsaldares government "without bloodshed, through the means made available by the free form of government which is being slandered so much." And he concluded that, although parliamentarism was "sick," the solution was not to kill it, but rather to cure it through constitutional reform.⁷ Given that less than a year later Venizelos was to join forces with Plasteras in the March 1935 coup, some tend to discount such earlier statements despite their emphatic and public character. The key to the apparent inconsistency, however, lies in the allusion to other "available means": as will be seen, such means were or at least appeared to be exhausted by January 1935.

To end their dependence on the military and permanently shut Pandora's box of praetorian emancipation, the civilian leaders of the two blocs were obviously required to eradicate the latent threat of a relapse into civil war and to achieve a political settlement (without precipitating a military coup). As long as this perennial mirage of so-called "reconciliation" (*symfiliosis*) failed to materialize, the preservation of civilian rule was ultimately contingent upon the success or the prospects of electoral strategies. In this crucial sense, mass cleavages were indirectly related to military intervention *in general*.

CONTENTIOUS INSTITUTIONS

The regime issue (republic vs. monarchy) was the *central node* between military and electoral strategies. The Republic was originally established, essentially, as an institutional device guaranteeing permanent Venizelist control of the armed forces. Its legitimation and consolidation, however, rested on the emergence and preservation of a *stable* Republican majority in the electorate *and* in the legislature. Two key institutions were of critical importance in this respect: the electoral system and the Senate. In a negative way, the presidency of the Republic was a third. Each of these institutions will be discussed in turn.

7. *Demokratikos Agon*, 19 May 1934. See also *Eleftheron Vema*, 1 May 1934.

Electoral Engineering: "Narrow-Wide" and "Baklava" Patterns

Manipulation of the electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies involved three broad aspects: (1) the electoral formula itself, whether proportional representation or plurality; (2) the choice of electoral district; and (3) gerrymandering *stricto sensu*, that is, ad hoc changes of district boundaries.⁸ All three aspects were directly and obviously related to mass cleavages and in particular to those with a concrete geographic dimension—the territorial cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands, and the cleavages involving refugees and minorities which were heavily concentrated in certain areas.

Electoral Formula Proportional representation in principle had few consistent supporters in interwar Greece outside Papanastasiou's Farmer-Labor Party and the Left, that is, precisely those political forces which would most benefit from it. Otherwise, its significance for the strategy of the major blocs (and parties) was limited by short-term ad hoc calculations. In the first place, the choice of proportional representation was designed to prevent a landslide victory by the adversary bloc whenever such an outcome was anticipated or probable under the plurality system. Furthermore, proportional representation was the obvious instrument for a strategy of accommodation: it was generally expected to defuse tension, prevent the polarization of the electorate, and hence promote a rapprochement between the two blocs, possibly leading to a government coalition. For the major blocs and parties, however, the price of proportional representation was high, if not prohibitive: it undermined the cohesion of the two blocs *both* as party coalitions dominated by a major party *and* as heterogeneous alliances of particular strata, groups, and areas, by encouraging the emergence or emancipation of minor parties and ultimately the fragmentation of mass support. Above all else, proportional representation threatened to produce an irresistible and irreversible growth of the class parties on the Left.

Conversely, the plurality system was the obvious choice whenever it promised a sweeping electoral victory and a strong parliamentary majority. Moreover, it forced bloc and party cohesion by requiring maximum mobilization and concentration of forces in a compact electoral coalition led by the dominant party of each bloc. Given that it polarized the electorate, the plurality system artificially exacerbated political tension and was therefore suited only to a strategy of confrontation. An additional source

8. A description of the electoral systems actually used during the interwar period is to be found in Appendix 1 and will therefore not be repeated here.

of tension was the fact that the system invited fraud and, especially, pressure, since a few votes could decisively change the overall outcome. As Venizelos characteristically argued in 1934, two or three thousand Liberal voters prevented from casting their ballots in Attica and Thessaloniki would be enough to secure an Antivenizelist victory. In that case, Venizelism would counter force by force, which “will turn, by noon of election day, the electoral ballots [*sfairidia*] into war bullets [*sfaires*].”⁹

Between 1922 and 1933, Venizelism was essentially in a position to impose the electoral system of its choice in *every* election. Seeking total domination in 1923, 1928, and 1933, it adopted the plurality system. Conversely, to prevent a feared Antivenizelist victory and promote the formation of a coalition government, proportional representation was adopted in 1926 and 1932 over the perennial protests of Antivenizelism.

After 1933, Antivenizelism was for the first time in a position to dictate its own rules of the game. It had always strongly preferred the plurality system, which was not only traditional, but had also given Antivenizelism its two historic electoral triumphs, in 1920 and in 1933. After the last one, the plurality system, suitably tailored, contained the tempting promise of perpetual domination. In 1936, however, proportional representation was acceptable, to forestall a potential electoral comeback of Venizelism, which by then appeared to have recovered from its military defeat.

With reference to the electoral formula, the combination of contradictory coalition and campaign strategies with proportional representation in 1932 and then with plurality in 1933 proved a fatal blunder on the part of Venizelos, as will be further explained below.

Electoral Districts Under the plurality system, the *critical* and most controversial issue naturally revolved around the choice of electoral districts. A uniform system of single-member districts does not seem to have ever been seriously considered during the interwar period. It can be surmised that it would have favored Antivenizelism—if only by creating optimal conditions for the operation of clientelism. (It should be recognized, however, that the drawing of boundaries for single-member constituencies would have posed an intractable and explosive problem.) Similarly, a uniform system of “narrow” districts, corresponding to eparchies, was seldom, if ever, discussed. The partisan disputes and conflicts actually centered on *two* principal alternatives: a uniform “wide” system based on existing nomes, which was the choice of Antivenizelism, and the

9. Venizelos to A. Zaïmes (President of the Republic), 5 May 1934, VA File 307.

(in)famous “narrow-wide” (*stenoevreia*) hybrid system concocted by Venizelism in 1923. Beyond these nationwide district formulas, a *key* issue involved the potential exceptions to the general rule: Athens-Piraeus, the minority colleges, and the secondary problem of the historic privileged districts of Hydra, Spetsae, and Psara.

As explained previously, the disastrous electoral defeat of 1920 remained forever present in Venizelist memory. Its traumatic magnitude (given that the votes received by each bloc were estimated to be almost evenly matched) was attributed to the overall operation of the plurality system with “wide” districts (*nomes*), in conjunction with the alien vote which had swamped a Liberal majority among Greeks in Macedonia. A historic response to the bitter lesson of 1920 was the “narrow-wide” formula invented in 1923, which was explicitly predicated on the territorial cleavage between Old Greece and the New Lands. “Narrow” districts in Old Greece promised to salvage the scattered enclaves of Venizelist strength there. Conversely, “wide” districts in the New Lands maximized the large Venizelist majority there by submerging most of the few Antivenizelist enclaves. In addition, the major deviations from the overall territorial pattern, namely, the three cities, were also taken care of. Athens and Piraeus were separated from rural Attica and were thus expected to remain safely in Venizelist hands thanks to their compact refugee periphery. Refugee settlement in Thessaloniki *and* the surrounding countryside similarly promised a permanent Venizelist majority there, especially after the city’s hostile Jewish vote had been subtracted from the electoral district (which comprised both city and countryside) and relegated to the ghetto of a separate minority college.¹⁰ Altogether, Athens, Piraeus, and the Thessaloniki district represented a large bloc of seats (one-fifth of the national total in 1928 and 1933), which was expected to be *pivotal* in any election held under a plurality system. Finally, the three privileged districts offered a welcome supplement to Venizelist overall strength in seats until 1933.

The “narrow-wide” formula and its integral appendages—this masterpiece of Venizelist electoral engineering (or “cooking” in contemporary polemics)—was of course anathema to Antivenizelism, whose calculations were exactly reverse. Its own ideal system was plurality with “wide” districts (*nomes*) everywhere. The most immediate effect of this system would be to swamp any residual Venizelist enclaves in Old Greece. Furthermore, Athens and Piraeus, or at least their pivotal refugee periphery,

10. On the partisan calculations behind the “narrow-wide” system, whose invention is generally attributed to G. Papandreou, see Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 22–23; and Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 1, pp. 111–112. On the territorial cleavage and the three cities as deviant cases, see Chapter 6 above.

could be swamped in a single district of Attica-Boeotia. The Thessaloniki district itself, with or without its refugees, might be swayed by the Jewish vote, once minority colleges were abolished. Even the three privileged districts, although a minor nuisance, were viewed unfavorably and were in fact abolished in the wake of Venizelist military defeat in March 1935—despite their supremely traditional character. Finally, with respect to the refugees in particular, Antivenizelism was prepared in 1922–1923 to deny them electoral participation in the absence of regular registration—a process which would take several years, as experience subsequently proved. Otherwise, Antivenizelism had then demanded their segregation into a separate electoral ghetto, similar to the one created by Venizelism for Jews and Moslems.

Although partisan disputes about these issues had continued intermittently ever since 1923, they reached the breaking point only after 1933: Antivenizelism was at last able to dictate its own terms, and the election itself had demonstrated the political arithmetic at stake with dramatic and unprecedented clarity. Its results, reported in Table 67 for each category of electoral district, represented a dismal collapse of Venizelist electoral engineering and of the particular expectations that Venizelos had complacently publicized during the electoral campaign. He had then assured his audience that out of *all* the seats at stake in Athens, Piraeus, and the New Lands (including Thessaloniki) Antivenizelism could “seriously contest” only *two* (in Chalkidike). In the rest of Greece, that is, Old Greece, he had claimed that the two blocs were “approximately equal,” except for the Ionian Islands, only region where he conceded that the opponents indubitably prevailed.¹¹

Table 67 shows the staggering extent to which he had been wrong in his calculations. Perhaps the most striking fact is that Antivenizelism won no less than 91 percent of the 107 seats in the “narrow” constituencies of Old Greece, whereas Venizelism kept 84 percent of the 79 seats in the “wide” constituencies of the New Lands (not counting Thessaloniki). The critical role of the three largest districts thus emerges with particular clarity. Given that among these Venizelism retained its hold on the 28 seats of Piraeus and Thessaloniki, it becomes obvious that the outcome of the election as a whole was decided *in Athens* where Antivenizelism won 20 pivotal seats by some 2,000 votes. As seen earlier, refugee defections from Venizelism almost certainly exceeded this number. Even in the absence of these defections in Athens, however, Antivenizelism might still have car-

11. See his last campaign speech in Athens, 2 March 1933, VA File 295. For the detailed calculations he had made earlier, see an undated memorandum in his own hand, VA File 300.

Table 67
AREAL DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTORAL GAINS
5 MARCH 1933

<i>Category of District</i>	<i>Seats at Stake</i>	<i>Seats won by:</i>		<i>A.P.</i>
		<i>Antivenizelism</i>	<i>Venizelism</i>	
"Narrow" (Old Greece)	107	97	8	2
"Wide" (New Lands)	79	13	66	—
Athens	21	20	1	—
Piraeus	10	—	10	—
Thessaloniki	18	—	18	—
Jews	2	2	—	—
Moslems	4	—	4	—
Privileged Districts	7	4	3	—
TOTAL	248	136	110	2

ried the election thanks to an equal bloc of 20 Thessaloniki seats *if* the separate college had not neutralized some 5,000 Antivenizelist Jewish votes. In sum, a crucial election, which *changed the course* of contemporary Greek history, was decided by some 2,000 refugee votes; otherwise, it might still have been decided by some 5,000 Jewish votes. Finally, if the "wide" electoral system of 1920 had been in force in 1933 (and assuming that the votes would have been the same), it can be estimated that Antivenizelism would have won *more than two-thirds* of the seats: 175 to 73 for Venizelism.¹²

Antivenizelism was quick to draw the obvious lessons and take the initiative. The first test came with the abolition of the Jewish college and the ensuing Thessaloniki by-election of July 1933. Despite its outcome, which was a triumph for Venizelism (and anti-Semitism), Antivenizelism was far from discouraged and simply proceeded to redo its calculations. In 1934, the Tsaldares government produced its own masterpiece of electoral engineering in the form of a bill which instituted the "wide" district (nome) throughout the country. Its key feature, however, which pushed Greece to the brink of civil war, was a blatant exercise in gerrymandering—which

12. See Nikos Oikonomou in *Historia tou Hellenikou Ethnous*, Vol. 15, pp. 321–326.

earned a native label comparable to the American in infamy and inspiration.

Gerrymandering Some gerrymandering had been common in Greek electoral engineering, especially under Venizelism after 1922. Refugee settlement itself, especially on the periphery of Athens-Piraeus, is commonly said to have been guided by electoral considerations—although no economically viable alternative has ever been suggested.¹³ The electoral separation of Athens-Piraeus and of the minority colleges was of course also equivalent to gerrymandering. The same was true of the choice of court districts, rather than nomes, as “wide” electoral constituencies in the New Lands under the plurality system invented in 1923. Gerrymandering *stricto sensu*, however, involved ad hoc deviations from existing administrative boundaries which were supposed to coincide with those of electoral districts. Such deviations are evident both in the plurality system as applied in 1923, 1928, and 1933 and *even* in the proportional system of 1926 and 1932 but need not be described in any detail here.¹⁴

Yet, it was the Antivenizelist project of 1934 that overshadowed all previous gerrymandering by its very thoroughness and global ambition: it involved in one stroke the three largest districts (i.e., the cities) and almost 50 seats. Two preliminary measures had carefully paved the way for the electoral bill itself. One was the creation of a separate nome of Kilkis, detached from the nome of Thessaloniki. Another was the creation of separate refugee peripheral municipalities, detached from the municipalities of Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, and other urban centers. New municipal boundaries were drawn in a ruthlessly arbitrary pattern, which was readily compared to baklava layers. Like Governor Gerry’s salamander in the earlier American case, baklava thus entered Greek political discourse. The electoral segregation of the refugees, a perennial Antivenizelist dream, was first put to the test in the municipal elections of February 1934 with

13. See, e.g., Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 97; and Pentzopoulos, pp. 265–268. Neither author, however, nor anyone else has come forward with an alternative to refugee settlement around the major urban centers. Rural settlement, as seen in Chapter 4, practically exhausted or even overstepped the limits (physical, economic, and political) of available agricultural land. In the cities, apart from the prospect of productive employment, however vague and unfavorable, miscellaneous public buildings offered readily available emergency housing for the refugees, especially in the first years after their arrival. It should also be noted in this connection that a substantial number of refugees who had been settled on land abandoned their villages and fields and moved to the cities on their own.

14. See, e.g., *Kathemerine*, 18 July 1928, for a scathing attack on the electoral detachment of twenty Venizelist villages from the nome of Chalkidike (where their vote would be wasted amidst a traditionally Antivenizelist native majority).

extremely rewarding results: Antivenizelism won in *all* three cities (Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki).¹⁵

The implications of this first successful experiment for the national level became apparent soon thereafter with the electoral bill which went down in infamy as the “*baklava-making*” bill (*baklavadopoiesis*). Since the nome was imposed as standard electoral district throughout the country, the new nome of Kilgis was subtracted from the electoral district of Thessaloniki, while the new refugee municipalities were similarly subtracted from the electoral districts of Athens and Piraeus and merged with the nome of Attica-Boeotia. The electoral arithmetic behind these changes was blatant. In July 1933, Venizelism had won the Thessaloniki by-election by less than 5,000 votes, which roughly corresponded to its mostly refugee majority in the then eparchy of Kilgis alone. The detachment of Kilgis, therefore, promised to make sure at last that the Jewish vote would decide any future contest in the nome of Thessaloniki and secure all the seats for Antivenizelism. Similarly, the detachment of the refugee periphery was designed to secure Antivenizelist control of Athens, if not Piraeus. The refugee vote itself would be swamped in the enormous Antivenizelist majority of rural Attica. In 1933, these changes would have meant a *two-thirds* Antivenizelist majority in seats, even though the two blocs were practically equal in votes.¹⁶

Coupled with the combination of patronage and heavy-handed government pressure that Antivenizelism had brought to bear on the Thessaloniki and subsequent by-elections (especially Chios in late 1933) and with the Kondyles machinations in the armed forces, the “*baklava-making*” bill manifested a ruthless determination on the part of Antivenizelism to remain in power by all means. Alarmed and outraged, Venizelism was up in arms—first metaphorically and in the end literally. It is precisely at this critical juncture that the Republic’s Senate was supposed to play the role for which it had been originally intended.

The Senate: Last Parliamentary Ditch

For Venizelism, the Senate represented the last parliamentary defense of the Republic in case the electoral system failed to prevent an Antivenizelist

15. See the results in Markezines, Vol. 4, p. 117.

16. On the overwhelming Antivenizelist majority in rural Attica, see, e.g., the colorful reports of a tour by D. Vratsanos in *Kathemerine*, 23 and 24 July 1928. Calling them fortresses (“acropolises”) of Antivenizelism, Vratsanos attributes their rabid Royalism and opposition to Venizelos mostly to the war and mobilization crisis of 1915–1917. On the “*baklava-making*” bill, see Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 261; Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, pp. 359–361; and Nikos Oikonomou in *Historia tou Hellenikou Ethnous*, Vol. 15, pp. 321–326.

majority in the Chamber. As Papanastasiou candidly and succinctly explained in 1924, the most concrete task of the new second legislative body would be to prevent a “weak” majority in the Chamber from overthrowing the Republic *by changing the electoral law, and/or the composition of the armed forces*.¹⁷ “Weak” obviously referred to a Chamber majority which would still constitute a *minority* in the *joint* sessions of Chamber and Senate. Such sessions were eventually required in four instances: (a) the election of 10 out of the 120 senators (once the other 110 had been elected); (b) the resolution of conflicts over legislation, at the request of the Senate (only); (c) the election of the president of the Republic; and (d) constitutional revision (in which case the joint session was called the National Assembly).¹⁸

The Senate was therefore required to have a large and lasting Republican (i.e., Venizelist) majority. Both its peculiar electoral system and the timing of the first election in fact produced such an overwhelming majority (85 percent of the seats) in 1929 (see Table 5), which could only be eroded gradually over the next nine years. One-third of the Senate faced reelection in 1932, at which time Antivenizelism made substantial gains (see Table 7). Nonetheless, another third of the seats would be renewed only in 1935 and the remainder only in 1938.

The Senate’s intended role was actualized only after the 1933 election, which in fact produced a “weak” Antivenizelist majority in the Chamber—one which could not prevail over the continuing Venizelist majority of the Senate in joint session. This balance of parliamentary forces was briefly threatened by the Thessaloniki by-election in July, whose 20 seats were enough to tip the balance in favor of Antivenizelism. Once this eventuality had been averted, and given that the role of the opposition was increasingly stifled in the intolerant Antivenizelist Chamber, the Senate became for Venizelism a safe haven and the center and last stronghold of parliamentary defense against initiatives by the adversary.

As one should expect and exactly as Papanastasiou had predicted ten years earlier, the key issues concerned the composition of the armed forces and the electoral system (for Chamber elections). In the summer of 1934, and after the Venizelist opposition had walked out, the Chamber passed the two controversial government bills aimed at the consolidation of Antivenizelist rule: the “baklava-making” bill and a bill altering the army list at the expense of the dominant Venizelist military faction. The Senate di-

17. Fourth Constituent, 4 December 1924, *Praktika*, Vol. 3, pp. 507–508.

18. As explained earlier, only the confidence of the Chamber was required for the cabinet according to the Republic’s constitution (Art. 89). The Senate by itself, or in joint session with the Chamber, was thus not empowered to overthrow the government.

rectly rejected the first and rendered the second innocuous, requesting a joint session to resolve the conflict. Arguing against the constitution that such a session was only optional, that is, rested on the consent of the Chamber, the Tsaldares government flatly refused, threatened to abolish the Senate, and proceeded to promulgate the two bills into law in the fall—after compromise negotiations had been aborted by the intransigence of Kondyles.

Threatening to erupt into civil war, the constitutional crisis was eventually not resolved but rather bypassed when the Tsaldares government rescinded the “baklava” provisions (only)—thus reintegrating the refugee periphery into the electoral districts of Athens and Piraeus—in exchange for the reelection of Zaïmes as president of the Republic.

Even though its treasured legislative veto thus remained in a constitutional quandary, the Senate was still a critical parliamentary pawn, as the presidential election itself reaffirmed. The senatorial election scheduled for April 1935, however, threatened to irreparably neutralize the Senate as a Venizelist stronghold by producing what the Thessaloniki by-election had failed to produce: an Antivenizelist majority in the joint sessions. This imminent danger certainly affected the timing of the March 1935 coup and was a catalyst which precipitated its eruption.¹⁹ In its wake, one of the very first acts of the Tsaldares government was to abolish the hated Venizelist institution by decree.

The Shadow Presidency and the Quest for a Strong Executive

In the course of 1934, when the legislative veto of the Senate was denied by the Tsaldares government, Venizelists had vainly appealed to the president of the Republic, urging him to refuse the promulgation of laws passed in obvious violation of the constitution. In this case, however, both the institution and the person (A. Zaïmes) had been a poor choice for such an eventuality.

Largely in reaction to earlier royal encroachments, and given the guardian role assigned to the Senate, the republican constitution had provided for an almost decorative head of state (similar to the contemporary French model)—side by side with the strongest and purest parliamentary regime in Greek constitutional history. The president was, in particular,

19. See Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 387; and Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 307. The linkage with the timing of the coup is obvious, irrespective of whether Venizelos's expressed concern about the consequences of the senatorial election was justified and sincere or not. On this concern, see his famous letters to Navy Commander Zangas, 10 February 1935, and to General A. Othonaios, 19 February 1935, in *ibid.*, pp. 286 and 291, respectively.

deprived of a veto in legislation, while a dissolution of the Chamber before its term was subject to approval by the Senate (which itself could not be dissolved). Nevertheless, the presidency retained enough discretionary powers to play an influential and potentially critical role.

The first president, Admiral Pavlos Koundouriotes, a war hero and a prominent figure in the Thessaloniki Provisional Government of 1916, had been for Venizelism an obvious and fortunate choice. Upon his resignation in 1929, however, Venizelos and his immediate entourage committed a fatal blunder, which must be placed at the doorstep of charisma. At the time, G. Kafandares as next president had the support of most party leaders (including, apparently, Tsaldares himself). In addition, his unquestioned Republican convictions and his personality guaranteed a watchful and vigorous exercise of the limited presidential powers to the benefit of the young republican regime. Such independence and self-assertion is precisely what seems to have ultimately dissuaded Venizelos, who eventually opted for Alexandros Zaïmes, an aging, colorless, and spineless scion of the *tzakia* and hence of moderate Antivenizelist background—a man, in sum, who was neither committed to the Republic nor fit to defend it, if need be. This disastrous mistake can best be explained in the framework of charisma and its congenital intolerance for dissent. In this particular case, the past and especially the probable future insubordination of an old “disciple” (Kafandares) seem to have been the determining factor.²⁰

By 1934, Venizelos openly recognized that Zaïmes was a “shadow” of a president and a liability for the republican regime. Yet, it was ironically the refusal of Zaïmes to stop the unconstitutional electoral and army list laws that ensured his reelection in December 1934, as an Antivenizelist favorite this time.²¹ In exchange for the partial repeal of the electoral law, the Venizelist majority refrained from electing Venizelos himself to the presidency, as it had threatened, and did not block the reelection of Zaïmes. This compromise was the result of an initiative by the senators of “professional organizations” (interest groups), which, in the absence of Venizelos (in Crete at the time), had been engineered by his lieutenants in the L.P. committee (Sofoules and Gonatas). Presented with the accomplished fact of L.P. commitment to this compromise, Venizelos, although outraged, apparently did not wish to openly disavow his own chosen deputies—again a decision which may be interpreted in the framework of charisma.

In any event, the compromise was yet another fatal blunder, which irretrievably wasted the remaining parliamentary resources of the Venize-

20. See the excellent analysis in *ibid.*, pp. 20–28.

21. On the reelection of Zaïmes, see *ibid.*, pp. 267–274.

list bloc. One can only surmise what might have happened if Venizelos (or even another strong Republican leader) had been elected to the presidency in December 1934. It is most probable, however, that the openly announced Antivenizelist resistance would have been eventually overcome or even crushed thanks to the continuing predominantly Republican control of the armed forces. The Republic would thus have survived, although most probably transformed in a presidential direction.²²

In 1929, Venizelos had flatly refused to become president of the Republic on the compelling argument that, given the limited presidential powers, either *he* would “burst” or the constitution.²³ At the time, he obviously preferred the position of prime minister in an orthodox parliamentary setting. In the course of his last four years in office, however, and in the face of mounting opposition attacks and social unrest amidst the storm of the Depression, he apparently became obsessed with the vision of a “strong executive,” which would be freed from such obstruction.²⁴ Upon his tactical resignation in May 1932, he categorically demanded that emergency presidential powers, modeled on Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, be written into the Republic’s own constitution; only under this condition, he exclaimed, would he accept to form a government again or even to become president. Two weeks later, his new cabinet in fact submitted such a project of constitutional revision (which had no sequel).²⁵

It is in light of this vision of a “strong executive” that *both* his previously quoted arguments against the dictatorial plans of Plasteras *and* his subsequent willingness to become president of the Republic can be interpreted. Once this last parliamentary opportunity had been wasted, the March 1935 coup represented the only readily available avenue in the *same* direction: after a forced interval of military dictatorship, a constitutional regime endowed with a strong executive could at last be established, in the particular form of a presidency elected by universal suffrage.²⁶

In connection with the March 1935 coup, the presidency was involved in yet another way. Whether candidly or not, Venizelos repeatedly expressed the fear that, if Antivenizelists mustered a majority in the joint sessions of Chamber and Senate as a result of the imminent senatorial

22. The Republic would have survived but not the L.P., which Venizelos reportedly intended to dissolve upon his election to the presidency. See Gregoriades, *Hellenike Demokratia*, p. 370, who attributes the “treason” of Sofoules and Gonatas to their fear that they would be relegated to political insignificance as individuals if the L.P. was disbanded.

23. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 21.

24. See especially his long conversations with K. D. Polychroniades, as reported in the latter’s later book.

25. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 136 and 143.

26. See the program for the military government to be established, which Venizelos outlined in his letter to Plasteras, 27 February 1935, in *ibid.*, p. 350n.

election, they would force Zaïmes to resign and would elect as president a member of the deposed dynasty, thus paving the way for restoration.²⁷

The Limits of Institutional Engineering

Three principal conclusions may be drawn from this highly condensed overview of institutional engineering during the interwar period. First, at practically every step, it has demonstrated the inextricable interdependence of military and electoral strategies. Suffice it to emphasize that *both* major military confrontations, in 1923 and in 1935, were directly related to the introduction of electoral systems which, in conjunction with prevailing political conditions, were expected to ruin the electoral chances of the side that eventually resorted to armed struggle.

With reference to the most fateful decision in this respect, which was undoubtedly the March 1935 Venizelist coup, it is commonly thought that it was not really needed at the time for the preservation of the Republic and therefore should be entirely explained in terms of purely personal and self-serving motives on the part of Venizelos and other key participants. Granted such motives, however, it may still be argued that, by January 1935, the institutional and structural safeguards with which Venizelists had sought to ensure the permanency of the regime *and* their own political (and even physical) security were being dismantled or else had been shown to be inadequate. At the very least, it can be seen that Venizelos could convince himself and others of this.

The new electoral system, despite the removal of the particular "baklava" provision, still gave a probably decisive advantage to Antivenizelism in Thessaloniki and elsewhere outside Athens-Piraeus. In addition, Antivenizelism had demonstrated in a series of by-elections an inflexible determination to win any electoral contest by all means, from patronage to force. Even some of the normally safest Venizelist strongholds had fallen or had been narrowly saved from this storm strategy. Under these conditions, *only* proportional representation, which Venizelism vainly demanded, could avert the specter of perpetual Antivenizelist domination through electoral manipulation.²⁸ The role of the Senate in legislation had also been placed in jeopardy. If Antivenizelism secured a majority in the joint sessions of Chamber and Senate through the coming senatorial elec-

27. See his previously mentioned letters to Navy Commander Zangas, 10 February 1935, and General A. Othonaios, 19 February 1935, in *ibid.*, pp. 286 and 291, respectively.

28. See, e.g., the Senate committee report on the "baklava-making" bill, in *Neos Kosmos*, 10 July 1934. This authoritative Venizelist report proposes proportional representation as a means of containing conflict and facilitating accommodation—even though both the L.P. and the P.P. are opposed to that electoral system "in principle."

tion, the issue of the Senate's legislative veto would even become obsolete. Furthermore, under such new conditions, the shadow presidency, which Venizelism had failed to turn into a Republican bastion, might itself become a formidable weapon in Antivenizelist hands. Against this overall background, the armed forces, ultimate guardian of the regime, were themselves not safe. The gradual erosion of Venizelist control had already proceeded to a considerable extent, as demonstrated by the secure military control of the Tsaldares government over Athens and Old Greece in general during the coup itself. Such erosion could be expected to continue inexorably in the future.

Although the actual coup was probably premature, and otherwise disastrously ill-conceived, military intervention therefore represented a valid, if not the only, strategic option for Venizelism. If not that one, then another coup would probably be required sooner or later, given that parliamentary and electoral strategies had been wasted, exhausted, or else did not promise success. Under these circumstances, Venizelos apparently felt that he could no longer contain the impatience of Plasteras and others, which threatened to produce an uncoordinated and partial initiative, analogous to the Plasteras coup of 1933—but this time fatal.²⁹

A second conclusion is that the "rules of the game" themselves remained in contention throughout the interwar period. There were *no* secure and institutionalized mutual guarantees, offering safety to both sides, to prevent the struggle for power between Antivenizelism and Venizelism from degenerating or escalating into civil war. The Republic as such was actually only an abstraction in this respect. Hence, its solemn verbal recognition by Tsaldares in 1932 was no guarantee for Venizelism, especially in light of his personality and his insecure position. The earlier experience with Metaxas, whose ostensible Republican loyalism had ebbed with his declining political prospects, had been an object lesson, if one was needed: Republican security in every sense (i.e., both of the regime and of its supporters) could not rest on intangible assurances alone. Concretely, and especially in Venizelist eyes, the Republic was embodied *not* in its constitution but rather in two *key*, if less dignified, documents: the army list and the electoral law, symbolizing the interdependence of military and parliamentary strategies. As long as these twin documents constituted the main bone of contention between the two adversary blocs, nei-

29. In his famous letter to Navy Commander Zangas, 10 February 1935, which seems to be the most comprehensive document on the March coup, Venizelos explicitly stated that, after the "unfortunate" action leading to the disastrous compromise on the reelection of Zaïmes, Plasteras was "certainly" entitled to proceed with the coup. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 285.

ther the Republic nor equivalently Venizelism could be and, especially, *feel* secure.

Third and consequently, both the army list and the electoral system became the stumbling blocks of *every* effort at a political settlement throughout the interwar period. Apart from the inherent difficulties of a mutually satisfactory compromise on such supremely zero-sum issues, the concessions that in fact *could* be made ultimately depended on the structure of each bloc in relation to its mass base.

THE IRRESISTIBLE ASCENSION OF ANTIVENIZELISM

The manifold institutional precautions and safeguards devised by the Venizelists against the eventuality of an Antivenizelist victory at the polls are understandable in light of what seems to have been an irresistible electoral dynamism on the part of Antivenizelism. The remarkable electoral effectiveness of this bloc should be linked to the first two among its key characteristics, which its opponents never ceased to blast—precisely because of their impressive results:

1. From its inception, Antivenizelism had been an essentially negative and reactive, if not reactionary, force.
2. It therefore needed no program (in any concrete and positive sense) nor an effective party organization other than the traditional structures of clientelism, which were well adapted to its character and strategy.
3. On the other hand, however, a third key characteristic should be emphasized: although born out of a charismatic conflict and saddled with its legacy, Antivenizelism lacked a charismatic leader during the interwar period.

If the analyses in the preceding chapters could be condensed in a single phrase, this would be that Antivenizelism represented a *universal* vehicle for the defense of *particularisms*, whether on the collective or on the individual level. In every respect and along every dimension examined, the stable core of its social base was constituted by class fractions and strata, groups, and areas adversely affected or otherwise threatened by historical change. In a class perspective, this was true of the principal fractions and strata characteristic of the 19th-century “historical bloc,” faced with the menace of capitalist development and rationalization. In an ethnic perspective, it was true of the natives faced with the refugee invasion and of miscellaneous national, ethnic, and religious minorities engaged in a struggle for survival against the modern, liberal, and national state. The

same was true, from a regional perspective, of the traditionally privileged areas and of Old Greece as a whole, for which the past represented, in a variety of ways, a lost Golden Age. In every case, Venizelism was the actual agent or else the symbolic representative of the forces of change, whereas Antivenizelism embodied both a romantic reaction and, in tangible terms, a promise to staunchly defend particular interests of practically any kind—including those of individual clients.

The force of this otherwise heterogeneous alliance was that it required no common program, except a lowest common denominator: the defense of traditional and entrenched interests on every level of society—from the landowner to the artisan and the yeoman. *This* is the true meaning of the P.P.'s definition as party of "all the people." The force of Antivenizelism was also that its mass support was essentially traditionalist and conservative at heart, despite its recurrent anarchic outbursts exemplified by the mob rule of the Reservists.³⁰ Antivenizelism was therefore not seriously threatened by the class parties of the Left, nor was it crippled by its manifest incapacity to play a hegemonic role. On the contrary, although incapable of hegemony, it was electorally formidable as a *coalition for patronage* and as a vehicle for universal dissatisfaction. This strategy, in turn, was well served by the traditional clientelist structures on both the national and the local level. Such structures permeated or else were not threatened by the partisan organizations developed for the purposes of political warfare, such as the Reservists and later the People's Associations.³¹

This overall organizational structure, however, coupled with the lack of a concrete program, created an acute problem of bloc cohesion, especially during the long lean years out of power when the sources of patronage were limited, if not inaccessible. In the absence of a living charismatic leader, a minimum of cohesion was provided by the legacy of charismatic conflict and civil strife, inextricably linked to the Royalist tradition. This was conclusively demonstrated in the crisis of succession to the leadership of Antivenizelism as a whole that the execution of Gounares opened in 1922.

Metaxas was the first to announce his candidacy, but wasted his

30. In the pointed words of Dafnes: "The Antivenizelist mass, although it comprised a multitude of totally impoverished elements, was attached for sentimental reasons to a leadership which did not aim at the implementation of a radical social and economic program." *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 248.

31. Insofar as Antivenizelism fits the description of an "internally-mobilized" party, it conforms to Shefter's expectation that such parties are more likely to pursue a strategy of patronage. A victorious "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy" did not precede universal suffrage in Greece. Cf. the Introduction; and Shefter, pp. 17–29.

chances of leading an electoral Antivenizelist comeback by becoming involved in the Counterrevolution of 1923. In April 1924, he hastened to recognize the Republic, even though Tsaldares refused to do so. As his official biographer explains, Tsaldares sensed that the popular base of Antivenizelism "did not want to consider definitively terminated the crisis continuing since 1915." The P.P. therefore should not alienate this force, which, although negative, would in time become a positive factor for the restoration of political equilibrium "to the benefit of the country and of the party."³² In 1926, both Metaxas and Tsaldares, sharing between them Antivenizelist electoral support, participated in the Ecumenical Cabinet. The political future of Metaxas was sealed, however, when Tsaldares conclusively proved that it was possible to win a share of government power and patronage, however briefly, *without* paying the price that his rival had hastened to offer, that is, the recognition of the Republic. Having in addition achieved the reinstatement of loyal Antivenizelists in the armed forces, Tsaldares cautiously avoided the bitter cup of economic stabilization, which Metaxas drank to the end—while the bulk of his supporters deserted him for the P.P. Soon thereafter, the election of 1928 permanently relegated Metaxas and his party to minor status within the Antivenizelist bloc.

Thanks to his intransigence and tactical skill, Tsaldares had thus achieved by 1930 the reconstitution of Antivenizelism as a cohesive political bloc around the P.P. and under his leadership. Yet, although intransigence and loyalty to the bloc's legacy had ensured the remarkable survival or even revival of Antivenizelism, they *also* placed narrow limits on the growth of its electoral appeal and a critical obstacle to its rise to power. In the electoral arena, the refugees were the pivotal voting bloc, whereas in the military arena the Venizelist armed forces would not allow a majority openly hostile to the Republic to reap the fruits of victory at the polls.

In both arenas, recognition of the Republic was thus the key to power: it would neutralize the Damocles sword of the Venizelist military, and it would also remove the principal barrier between Antivenizelism and the refugees, who could then be swayed by an appeal to their particular and material interests. They were, after all, the *only* major particularism that Antivenizelism had hitherto refused to represent.

His obvious overture to the refugees in 1930 suggests that Tsaldares was by that time ready to embark on this new course. In 1932, his recogni-

32. Vouros, pp. 74–75. It is striking that all Antivenizelist sources glorify this perennial limitation of Tsaldares to calculations of narrow party interest. Cf. Svolopoulos, p. 52, on the decision to participate in the 1924 plebiscite: "Panages Tsaldares, on this occasion also, did not hesitate to take the decision that the interest of the Party dictated."

tion of the Republic at last opened the door to power. Finally, in 1933, the refugee bloc was itself breached by the promise of the 25 percent payments, providing the few critical votes that resulted in a resounding electoral victory—which was also the personal triumph of Tsaldares.

Until then, and especially in the few months separating his recognition of the Republic from the electoral triumph in March 1933, the first taste of government power and the prospect of complete domination which appeared within reach had contained the contradictions between this new course and the legacy of Antivenizelism. Once the bloc was securely in power, however, these contradictions could no longer be contained and threatened to develop into a split, which, under the circumstances, might be the end of Antivenizelism.

As a broad coalition for patronage and for the defense of particular interests, Antivenizelism could afford to be *agnostic* on the regime issue. Given that the majority of the electorate was solidly Republican, republicanism actually offered Antivenizelism the opportunity to broaden its base even further, consolidate its power, and look forward to lasting political domination through electoral means. Apart from the case of Kondyles himself, the recruitment of refugee leaders and voters and the attitude of many among the Venizelist military indicated that both the electoral and the military base of Venizelism could be eroded, coopted, or otherwise accommodated through traditional methods of patronage. This vision of an Antivenizelist Republic seems to have increasingly won the preference of Tsaldares and of the moderate wing of his party. It represented, however, a radical break with the Royalist legacy of Antivenizelism and threatened to destroy its cohesion, exposing it to both electoral and eventually also military defeat. As Dafnes epigrammatically observes: "The effort to preserve the unity of the P.P. and to contain the intransigent elements will inspire the whole policy of Tsaldares until 10 October 1935."³³

As a historical coalition of particular strata, groups, and areas, which had been forged under the auspices of the monarchy and in opposition to Venizelism and all it represented (including its distinctive social base), Antivenizelism could not sever the umbilical cord to its past with impunity, especially in light of its loose clientelist structure.³⁴ The diehard Royalists in the P.P. primarily drew their strength from solidly entrenched local factions. But they could also draw upon the vast reserve of the traditionally Royalist yeomen and petty bourgeois of Old Greece—the

33. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 144.

34. Dertiles pertinently observes that Royalism was "the cornerstone of the traditional alliance between the majority of the peasant smallholders and the conservative fractions of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie" ever since the 19th century. See Dertiles, pp. 120–121.

backbone of Antivenizelist mass support. The partisan associations themselves, heirs to the Reservists, were centers of Royalist loyalism and agitation, and a powerful pressure on the P.P. rather than an instrument in the hands of party leadership. In sum, with the broadening of its electoral appeal and its patronage, the conflict between republic and monarchy was transposed *inside* the P.P. and Antivenizelism. Similarly, mass cleavages which had hitherto served as demarcation line *between* the two major blocs threatened to erupt *within* the Antivenizelist bloc. This was true of the conflict between Old Greeks and Macedonians in particular, as seen previously, and above all of the conflict between natives and refugees. As their massive and indiscriminate persecution in the wake of the March 1935 coup would dramatically demonstrate, the integration of refugees into the Antivenizelist coalition had been an impossible or at least a reversible and fragile process.³⁵

Under these conditions, a split of Antivenizelism over the issue of restoration could *not* be contained on the elite level alone. It would inevitably break apart its mass base as well, roughly into two halves, as had happened in 1926 and was to happen again eventually in January 1936. It is hardly necessary to insist that the consequences of such a split in 1933–1935 would be fatal, especially under the preferred plurality system.

Until March 1935, the tension between the prospect of an Antivenizelist Republic and the project of monarchical restoration was largely contained by the common threat of a Venizelist comeback. As soon as this threat was crushed militarily, the tension erupted into the open. Metaxas rushed to raise the banner of Restoration in a new bid for bloc leadership. Once he had been neutralized through government pressure and fraud in the June 1935 election, Kondyles seized his long-awaited opportunity and headed the coalition of Antivenizelist officers and P.P. defectors which was to impose the Restoration by force and fraud. Caught in the web of evasive tactical maneuvers that had served him so well in the past, Tsaldares was initially dragged along until he was finally pushed aside, without offering any resistance. It may be conjectured that he preferred the preservation of the Republic, but was more concerned about the unity of his party and his bloc, both as a political force and as a civil-military coalition. And yet he dismally failed on both counts. Antivenizelism was politically split down the middle, as the election of January 1936 eventually showed,³⁶ while its military arm had emancipated itself from civilian leadership, making it

35. To the extent that it is not an overestimate, the 11 percent of refugees supporting Antivenizelism in 1936, according to Table 38, may actually be the product of intimidation more than anything else.

36. The C.P. analysis of the electoral outcome pertinently concluded that Kondyles and Theotokes with their General People's Radical Union had become "the most authoritative

possible for Metaxas to stage a spectacular comeback as dictator and take his *revanche* on parliamentary politics (and twenty years of personal trauma, minutely recorded in his diary).

When all is said, however, it seems improbable that Antivenizelism would have split without the conditions created by the abortive Venizelist coup in March 1935. Or else, if it had, its electoral debacle would have been certain. In either case, it can be surmised that the Republic would have survived. Until the end of the interwar period, during most of which it had been in power, the initiatives of Venizelism thus proved *more* critical for political developments than those of its adversary.

THE UNCERTAIN SURVIVAL OF VENIZELISM

With reference to three key characteristics, Venizelism may be seen as the exact reverse of its principal adversary:

1. From its inception, it had been a rising coalition for drastic, and even radical change, seeking to establish and consolidate a *new* hegemony—that of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.
2. An appropriate program was therefore essential, and so was an effective organization for its implementation.³⁷
3. On the other hand, unlike its rival, Venizelism also remained a charismatic movement around a restless charismatic leader, from whom it failed to emancipate itself in his lifetime.

In the particular case of Venizelism, therefore, the role of an individual personality was decisive. A psychohistory of Venizelos is crucial for an understanding of the tumultuous course of his party and bloc. Here, however, the emphasis is on structural and strategic factors rather than personal motivations.

From the very beginning, a fundamental and permanent contradiction was built into the heart of the Venizelist coalition for change—threatening to tear it apart. It was the ultimately irreconcilable conflict of class interests between the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie heading the coalition and its popular mass base. Between 1915 and 1922, this contradiction almost destroyed Venizelism and eventually buried its original vision in the sands of Asia Minor.

representatives of the Antivenizelist hatred of large popular masses, mainly in Old Greece”—at the expense of Tsaldares. See *KKE*, Vol. 4, pp. 334–338. Ecological regression clearly confirms the accuracy of this analysis.

37. In Shefter's terms, Venizelism emerged as an “externally-mobilized” party and was therefore apt to pursue a strategy of program. Cf. the Introduction; and Shefter, pp. 17–29.

Despite the earlier loss of working-class support, however, interwar Venizelism *continued* to draw the bulk of its popular support from a combination of the most deprived strata, groups, and areas, which *also* represented the numerically largest potential base for radical and revolutionary social movements. From a class perspective, this was true of the new smallholders, the most numerous social stratum available for radical agitation. In an ethnic perspective, this was of course true of the refugees, arbiters of interwar elections. The same was also true, from a regional perspective, of the most deprived areas and of the New Lands, or at least of their largest part: Macedonia and Thrace.

Although both major blocs were interclass alliances under bourgeois leadership, it was thus Venizelism which was primarily and directly threatened by the challenge of the Left. The potential loss of its popular base to the Left, which at times appeared imminent, would not only spell the end of Venizelism as an interclass alliance and as a viable electoral and governing coalition; it would also subvert the bourgeois order as a whole. This was a crucial difference with Antivenizelism, whose social base appeared securely traditionalist and conservative. It is also the key to the overall strategy of Venizelism—and that of Venizelos personally. In a certain sense, Venizelism was condemned to be perpetually on the move, making great leaps forward (in what may be appropriately called a *fuite en avant*)—to postpone the ineluctable eventuality of its breakup between Left and Right. A mass of evidence suggests that Venizelos was acutely aware of this necessity; hence the perennial “restlessness” that amused detractors and unsettled supporters.

The alliance of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie with a potentially radical popular base was the historical product of the 1909 Revolution and eventually of the National Schism. The alliance had then been forged around a program combining pragmatic irredentism with social reform—primarily land reform. The Asia Minor Disaster in 1922, however, by dealing a death blow to Greek irredentism, had irremediably amputated this initial program. Worse, it had destroyed its ideological cement and the keystone of bourgeois hegemony—even though the victims flocking to Greece made possible the electoral survival of Venizelism after its military comeback through the Revolution of 1922. What remained of the initial program essentially consisted of land reform, which was extended in the form of rural refugee settlement. The rapid completion of this task, however, although a major political achievement, soon threatened to exhaust the historical content of the alliance. Although in power, Venizelism therefore urgently required a new program, and the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie a new hegemonic project. Equivalently, it may be said that Republicanism, to become more than a curtain drawn on the tragic end of the 1915–1922

crisis, required a content which could *extend* the original alliance into the future.

It is precisely this new program that Venizelos undertook to provide by returning to politics in 1928, at which time he characteristically declared that he could not allow the L.P. to disintegrate (as a political party, but presumably also as an interclass alliance, that is, a “national” party).³⁸ As seen in previous chapters, several key features of his ambitious endeavor to make Greece “unrecognizable” at short notice constituted a “New Deal” addressed specifically to the popular base of the Venizelist bloc.

It is also at this point that the need for effective party organization was most acutely felt in order to mobilize mass support behind the government’s program and combat leftist and especially Agrarian agitation against it. Such organization largely did not exist, as the Liberals discovered with increasing alarm.³⁹ The failure to create one has already been discussed (in Chapter 2). It may also be linked to the permanent contradiction at the heart of the Venizelist interclass alliance—between an increasingly conservative entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and a popular base in the process of radicalization. The idea briefly adopted in 1910, which would have linked the party directly to economic interest groups, and especially to the Merchant Associations, was rapidly abandoned. Such a model of party organization not only would have destroyed the autonomy of interest groups, but would have also brought economic and class conflicts into the open inside the party, subverting its cohesion, the role of leadership, and the party’s image and broad electoral appeal. By 1930, a democratic mass party would be a potentially disastrous experiment, particularly in the absence of an integrated and firmly rooted party ideology. Here again, the exceptionally favorable conditions for party organization created by the irredentist fervor of 1915–1922 no longer existed.

Eventually, the charisma of Venizelos proved a poor substitute for party ideology and organization. In the past, it had been founded primarily upon spectacular successes in foreign policy and war: “Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas” had been the ultimate “proof.” When confined, in 1928–1932, to the realm of domestic and especially economic policy, it rapidly reached its limits and eventually collapsed in dismal failure. Conservative Liberals characteristically attributed mounting social unrest to the unrealistic expectations produced by the return of Venizelos and by his hyperbolic promises to all classes. In their eyes, he had failed to recognize that “acute social fermentation” had intervened and that consequently:

38. See especially an undated note in his own hand, VA File 276.

39. See, e.g., L. Iasonides to Venizelos, 31 December 1929, VA File 336.

it would no longer be easy for a political leader, as in the past, to be with both capital and the workers, with both the burghers and the peasants, with both the producers and the consumers, a father and protector to all together, and to none in any higher particular degree.⁴⁰

What was *decisive*, however, was that “proof” of Venizelos’s charisma manifestly and disastrously failed to materialize when, after successive bad crops, the Depression swept the country and left his ambitious program in ruins.

Whether the “Great Leap Forward” inaugurated by Venizelos in 1928 might have succeeded under more stable economic conditions, or even with more farsighted and cautious planning, can only be conjectured. The fact is that its dismal collapse destroyed his new program for the Venizelist coalition, exacerbated the existing internal contradictions, and ushered a generalized crisis of hegemony. In such a crisis

the social groups detach themselves from their traditional parties. In other words, the traditional parties in that given organizational form, with those particular men who constitute, represent, and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or fraction of a class) as its expression. When such crises occur, the immediate situation becomes delicate and perilous because the field is open to the violent solutions, to the activities of obscure forces represented by the providential or charismatic men.⁴¹

The disintegration of the Venizelist interclass coalition thus appeared imminent. The entrepreneurial bourgeoisie seems to have largely turned to Antivenizelism for security and stability. On the other hand, the new smallholders became massively available for Agrarian radicalism. Caught between the two, the commercial petty bourgeoisie seems to have born the brunt of the crisis and probably also swayed towards Antivenizelism.

To hold the Venizelist bloc and especially the L.P. together, what remained was Republicanism—*not* any more as a program for the future, but as a settling of accounts with the *past*. The vital importance of this conception of Republicanism for the electoral survival of Venizelism was demonstrated twice, in rapid succession and in the most dramatic manner. In 1932, the last-minute call for the salvation of the Republic, combined with a revival of National Schism memories, decisively contained the major electoral losses that the L.P. might otherwise have suffered, especially

40. Gerasimos Lychnos, “Ho Salos ton Hypervolikon Apaiteseon” [The Turmoil of Exaggerated Demands], *Peitharchia*, 8 December 1929.

41. Gramsci, Vol. 3, pp. 1602–1603. Translation partly taken from Hoare and Smith, p. 210.

among the refugee masses. Two nights before the election, the word went from mouth to mouth: "Vote for the Grandfather one last time!"⁴²

In March 1933, however, the Republic and the past were no longer at issue. Venizelos himself emphatically assured his audience that *both* the ideological conflict over the regime *and* the conflict over the execution of the Six in 1922, which symbolized the legacy of civil strife, had been terminated. The major problems at hand were the foreign public debt, a balanced budget, and industrial production; it was with reference to these issues that voters had to choose between the two blocs, merely on the basis of economic competence.⁴³ This electoral strategy proved fatal. It had not only placed the emphasis on economic policy, in which Venizelos and his charisma had been manifestly defeated. By removing the regime and the past from the campaign, it had *also* freed the forces of refugee particularism, which decided the electoral outcome.⁴⁴

The failure of Venizelos to recognize the critical importance of these forces is underscored by his stubborn refusal to grant any further refugee demands for compensations. This failure may be interpreted in the context of his overall program in 1928–1932. The refugees *as such* had practically *no* place in this program; it was rather primarily as new smallholders (but also as industrial workers) that refugees were to have a vital role in economic development and industrialization.⁴⁵ Apart from the requirements of economic development and industrialization (the brunt of which was born by the urban refugees as cheap labor force) and apart from the concomitant need to place a final ceiling on the insatiable refugee demands, there were also narrow *political* limits within which Venizelism could identify with refugee particularism. Both Venizelism as a bloc and the L.P. as its major component could ill afford to become a *refugee party*, thereby losing native support, at the risk of being relegated to the status of a permanent minority. This prospect seems to have been mostly feared in the New Lands, where Greek natives had always been overwhelmingly Liberal.⁴⁶ It was only thanks to the inherently unstable refugee vote that

42. Somerites, p. 108.

43. See especially his last-minute address on the radio, 4 March 1933, VA File 295.

44. See, e.g., I. Kalogeras to Venizelos, 14 March 1933, VA File 348, where the electoral disaster (in Athens) is also attributed to the shift from the regime issue to the economic record of the "Four Years."

45. Cf. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 96–97, where Venizelos is harshly criticized for his shortsighted failure to make the completion of (urban) refugee settlement an "absolute priority." Dafnes even claims that Venizelos's policy showed that he was *more* concerned about the natives than about the refugees. This apparent paradox may be interpreted by the discussion that follows.

46. See, e.g., X? (from Thessaloniki) to Venizelos, 7 February 1929, VA File 379, where Venizelos is warned that, without an official party ticket (i.e., without a *chrism*), both Kavalla seats may be won by refugees in the coming senatorial election. This "would affront

Venizelism could govern through electoral means during the interwar period—but only as long as refugee particularism was not allowed to drive remaining native supporters away.⁴⁷ On the ethnic level, therefore, this constituted a permanent contradiction within the Venizelist bloc, which parallels the one previously noted within a class perspective.

It may thus be seen that, after the costly lesson of the March 1933 election, renewed polarization over the regime issue and over the revived legacy of the National Schism appeared to offer the *only* way out of the Venizelist predicament. Polarization along these lines would not only stem the hemorrhage of refugee defections (both to Antivenizelism and to the Left), but would also contain the other risks of refugee particularism by reaffirming the *original* bonds between refugee and native supporters. Moreover, a return to the L.P.'s heroic past was also a return to the period when the charisma of Venizelos bathed in miraculous success. The tension produced by the postelectoral Plasteras coup in 1933 and then especially by the attempted assassination of Venizelos served well this strategic imperative. In the Thessaloniki by-election of July 1933, this new strategy of confrontation, coupled with an anti-Semitic crusade, produced its first spectacular results, announcing an electoral recovery of Venizelism.

Eventually, and after the last attempt at "national reconciliation" had failed, this *escape into the past* and the effort to recreate the *original charismatic mission* would lead to the March 1935 coup, which in many essential ways sought to repeat the heroic days of 1916, as noted earlier. The dream of bourgeois hegemony had not been abandoned, however, but only postponed. In the wake of a transitional military dictatorship, it appears that the presidential regime envisaged by Venizelos would essentially resume and continue the effort undertaken in 1928—or even in 1910. Only, as Dafnes caustically remarks, the bourgeoisie did not know that.⁴⁸ In this sense, the March 1935 coup did not merely represent a romantic reaction, this time on the part of Venizelism.

the elementary pride of the natives of Kavalla, ancient and glorious acropolis of Liberalism in Macedonia," at the risk of their abstaining. Five years later, another typical example comes from neighboring Serres. Venizelos is informed that the ethnic slogan "the refugees for the refugee [candidate]" (in the recent municipal election) has completely divided the Liberals into refugees and natives, at the risk of the latter defecting to the exclusively native P.P. See Patsopoulos to Venizelos, 12 March 1934, VA File 306. See also Chapter 4, n. 48 above, on the same problem in Athens, in 1926.

47. A similar predicament was faced by the KKE, as noted in Chapter 4, n. 128, with reference to Elefantes. There was, however, a critical and obvious difference between the L.P. and the C.P. in this respect. To become a refugee particularistic movement would constitute a fatal contraction of the former and the end of its electoral prospects. For the C.P., on the contrary, the same ethnic perspective promised a staggering expansion of its previous mass support, even though at the expense of Marxist-Leninist universalism.

48. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 353.

THE ABORTIVE AND THE ACTUAL THIRD FORCE

The Quest for a Bourgeois "Third Force"

Ever since 1922, it was widely felt that the Asia Minor Disaster had turned the final page on the National Schism and had thus condemned the division between Antivenizelism and Venizelism to historical obsolescence. The quest for a "third force" (*trite katastasis*) that would supersede or displace the two blocs thus became a perennial theme in interwar politics. The recipe was always the same and involved (1) creating a party out of politicians drawn from both sides and (2) appealing to the mass support of both blocs in the name of a new national unity.

Several such projects were sponsored by the Revolution of 1922, but never materialized. Three years later, the dictator Pangalos adopted a similar plan for his own benefit. As soon as he received a vote of confidence in the Constituent Assembly, he bluntly declared:

We are a [new] state [of affairs]. For us, Venizelism and Constantinism do not exist, because the persons representing these two parties no longer exist. Venizelos has died a political death, and Constantine a natural one.⁴⁹

After he had thus provoked an unprecedented alliance of all the parties against him, Pangalos failed—or else was overthrown before he could succeed. Later attempts by himself and his associates to make an electoral comeback do not deserve serious consideration.

Upon his break with Venizelos and the Liberals in 1928, Kafandares launched what seems to have been the most nearly successful project of a "third force." In 1932, despite the last-minute polarization, his Progressive Party polled almost 10 percent, which was largely drawn from Antivenizelism and mostly from the personal clienteles of hitherto Antivenizelist politicians who had joined the party. Nonetheless, the momentum of this attempt at a "third force" seems to have been broken, and Kafandares returned to the Venizelist fold. By 1933, although the absence of the regime issue from the campaign offered a *unique* opportunity for a "third force," any such attempt was ruled out by the formation of two all-inclusive electoral coalitions, in conjunction with the plurality system.

A last attempt at a "third force" was launched in 1935 by minor politicians and academics of mixed but mostly Antivenizelist background around P. Kanellopoulos. This "National Unity Party" (*Ethnikon Henoti-*

49. Quoted in *ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 291. In Greek, the opening sentence is *Eimetha katastasis*, whose categorical certainty is impossible to convey.

kon Komma), which was firmly Republican, ran in only a few districts in 1936 and received an insignificant number of votes (1 percent).

Apart from and beyond the conjunctural changes in political climate and the maneuvers of the two blocs intent on preserving their cohesion, the failure of all "third force" projects should be ultimately sought in the utter inadequacy of the recipe. There was no concrete and novel program, except a negative and vacuous one: national unity and the rejection of historical quarrels. Under these conditions, a "third force" could only consist of an inherently unstable alliance of politicians with their personal followings or clienteles. It is no accident that *all* such attempts seem to have mostly relied on political resources of Antivenizelist background and extraction. With respect to Venizelism, the major stumbling block was that no such "third force" could cut across existing mass cleavages and especially into the compact refugee vote. The only opportunity in this respect was offered in 1933—and was seized by Antivenizelism.

Against this perennial quest for an elusive bourgeois "third force," it became increasingly apparent that a viable alternative to the existing major blocs was only developing behind a radical social program, and along class lines. The *actual* third force was the Left.

The Challenge of the Left

It was under the Venizelos government of 1928–1932 that the Left emerged as a concrete and imminent challenge to the existing dominant division between the two bourgeois blocs. The exuberant expectations and the renewed polarization that Venizelos's return had produced in 1928 arrested the developments under way since 1922 only temporarily: they soon resumed and were actually accelerated as expectations were not met and as he increasingly appeared unable to effectively promote his new blueprint for bourgeois hegemony.⁵⁰ A turning point was reached around 1930, ushering a period of unprecedented popular availability and political fluidity.⁵¹ The emerging crisis of hegemony, however, primarily threatened Venizelism as an interclass alliance and as a governing coalition.

From the very beginning, the development of the Left had been linked to the limitations of Venizelist policy and to the contraction of its mass support. The C.P. was thus born out of the early defection of radical

50. On the negative initial impact of Venizelos's return on Communist support, see the resolution of the C.P.'s Fourth Congress (1928), which explicitly acknowledged "the fluidity of our influence among the masses which were carried away by the current of Venizelism." *KKE*, Vol. 2, p. 569.

51. Cf. Elefantas, pp. 311–315 and 160–161.

labor, whereas the A.P. grew out of a revolution of rising expectations among the beneficiaries of Liberal land reform and rural refugee settlement—the new smallholders. By 1930, the heavy brunt of industrialization under Liberal auspices and the limited immediate benefits of Liberal agricultural policy offered a vastly expanded field for radical agitation and for further inroads into Venizelist popular support, especially among the refugees, whether urban or rural. In 1931, two by-elections dramatically underscored the urgency of the leftist threat: in Thessaloniki, the C.P. doubled its 1928 strength to 6.6 percent, while the A.P., which had not run in 1928, polled 15 percent; a little later, in Lesbos, the C.P. *tripled* its 1928 votes to 21.7 percent. In both cases, the Left was gaining almost exclusively at the expense of Venizelism.⁵²

Venizelos had earlier adopted and imposed on a distinctly reluctant Liberal majority the anticommunist legislation (*Idionymon*) prepared by his then arch-conservative minister of interior (Zavitzianos). The erection of anticommunism into an official or even *the* official state ideology has been pointedly linked to the panic of Greek bourgeois leadership following the collapse of the Great Idea in 1922 and the loss of the ideological control that it had hitherto provided.⁵³ Yet, against the overall setting of the endangered bourgeois order, it was primarily and specifically Venizelism which needed the *Idionymon* law—and this on a very practical and concrete level, including purely electoral considerations. As party organization and ideology and even the appeal of charisma proved increasingly inadequate to defend the government's program and rally mass support behind it, police repression in the name of anticommunism offered a readily available, if crude, substitute. The *Idionymon* law was thus massively and indiscriminately used in 1929–1932 for largely partisan purposes, namely, to contain the erosion of Venizelist and particularly L.P. mass support, against radical agitation of any kind.⁵⁴ This is also why the perennial debate on whether there was a “real” Communist danger (i.e., a chance of a Communist takeover) is ultimately beside the point. The actual and present danger was rather that radical (and not just Communist) agitation might irreparably cripple Venizelism as a project for bourgeois hegemony, as an interclass alliance, and, in the last analysis, as a governing coalition.

52. See Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 45–46.

53. See Elefantes, p. 49; and especially Katefores, pp. 69–76.

54. For a striking example, see D. Metoses to Venizelos, 26 July 1931, VA File 424. In this letter, the Liberal president of the Agricultural Credit Cooperative in Giannitsa (Central Macedonia) requests that the persecution of two schoolteachers as “Communists” be stopped, for the good reason that they are . . . Liberals (“ours”). Instead, two other schoolteachers, belonging to the Farmer-Labor Party of Papanastasiou, should be prosecuted as . . . “Communists.”

Police repression by itself, however, did not defuse the radical time bomb at the popular base of the Venizelist bloc. It may have in fact greatly strengthened the C.P. in the long run—with police arbitrariness and the conditions of deportation or imprisonment acting as its prime recruiters. On the other hand, police repression probably had a greater impact on the growth of the young A.P., which lacked the ideological and organizational resources of the Communists. At this point, one should note the Left's own weaknesses.

In 1930–1932, it was clearly the A.P. that constituted the gravest threat for the bourgeois order, and for Venizelism in particular, given its specific appeal to the enormous mass of rural refugees and other new smallholders. Yet, it failed to develop an effective party organization and ideology, let alone a hegemonic project. Whether or not Marx's "sack of potatoes" aphorism settles the question, it is clear that the A.P. essentially remained an amorphous and diffuse protest movement. The last-minute polarization in 1932 broke its momentum, as it was intended to do. Subsequently, the party itself succumbed to the polarization between the two bourgeois blocs when a segment joined each of the two 1933 electoral coalitions, while the remaining rump under Sofianopoulos also entered into a close and lasting alliance with Venizelism.

For its part, the C.P. had a ready-made, if imported, hegemonic project, but until 1934–1935 chose the splendid isolation of airtight sectarianism. As seen in previous chapters, its influence, outside a solid working-class stronghold or ghetto (including refugee and Jewish workers), remained negligible or else extremely diffuse and unstable. Until 1932–1933, it waged a relentless war against "Agrarian fascism," that is, the A.P., but was slow in picking up the latter's legacy. It was only in 1935–1936 that the new "Popular Front" strategy allowed the C.P. to seize the historical opportunity offered by the failure of bourgeois reconciliation.⁵⁵

THE PRICE OF RECONCILIATION AND REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY

Short of their dissolution and fusion into a "third force," the two major blocs were required to settle their past disputes and conclude a lasting compromise. Only thus could the ever-present specter of renewed civil war be permanently averted, ending civilian dependence on the military and thereby also defusing the time bomb of praetorian emancipation. Eventu-

55. On interwar party strategy, see Elefantes, pp. 221–245; and especially the book by Sarles, which represents the latest semiofficial party assessment. On the failure of the C.P. to grow, *despite* the favorable objective conditions, see also Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 93, whose arguments are mostly inspired by and hence applicable to the pre-1935 period.

ally, a common bourgeois front was *also* needed to defend the existing social order amidst a mounting crisis of hegemony. In immediate response to the ominous 1931 by-elections of Thessaloniki and Lesbos, Venizelos urgently invited Tsaldares to recognize the Republic in order to provide a smooth bourgeois succession in case of a Liberal defeat at the polls.⁵⁶ The fact that the latter ignored the suggestion at the time indicates that commonly recognized civilian and bourgeois priorities remained hopelessly entangled in partisan calculations. Worse, these priorities had *different* implications for each side.

The Obstacles to Conflict Regulation

Among the six conflict-regulating practices listed by Nordlinger,⁵⁷ the first three were in fact acceptable to Venizelism, but not to its opponents: (1) a stable governing coalition, in the form of an Ecumenical Cabinet on the 1926 model, was repeatedly proposed by Venizelos in 1932–1933; (2) proportionality in the electoral system was similarly a central Venizelist demand in 1933–1934; (3) finally, a mutual veto was readily provided by Venizelist control of the Senate and of the armed forces—which was intolerable to the Antivenizelist government. That leaves three alternative practices: “purposive depoliticization,” compromise, and concessions by the stronger party, which, after 1933, was Antivenizelism.⁵⁸

As noted earlier, the perennial stumbling blocks on the agenda of reconciliation were the army list and the electoral law—the twin *keys* to success in the military and in the electoral arena, respectively. With reference to the armed forces, it may be seen that control is a supremely zero-sum issue. Proportionality or a mutual veto would be meaningless in this respect or else inherently unstable, in which case they would precipitate preemptive military intervention. In a certain sense, both the Counterrevolution of 1923 and the March 1935 coup dramatically illustrate this point, since initially neither side had a decisive military advantage. Clearly the most appropriate and workable formula in the military field would be “purposive depoliticization”—which necessarily implied the definitive recognition of the Republic by all sides. In 1926–1927, the Venizelists had attempted to do the first without securing the latter. After the Republic’s recognition by Tsaldares in 1932, however, a process of “depoliticization” seems to have actually been under way in the armed forces, as indicated by

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.

57. Nordlinger, p. 21.

58. Before 1933, Venizelist concessions had repeatedly failed to secure a final settlement, because of Antivenizelist intransigence, as seen previously.

the manifest reluctance of many if not most Republican military leaders to join first the Plasteras coup of March 1933 and then the final March 1935 military adventure, which they considered premature and hence illegitimate. With reference to the electoral system, on the other hand, Venizelists failed until 1933 to institutionalize proportional representation on a permanent basis; once the ultimate choice had passed to Antivenizelism, it was too late. Given the areal distribution of electoral support, plurality cum gerrymandering offered the prospect of perpetual and undivided electoral domination, whereas proportionality would almost certainly impose government by grand coalition on a lasting basis. Finally, the Senate as a mutual veto in the electoral arena was in turn unacceptable to Antivenizelism as long as the army list and the electoral system remained in dispute.

A government coalition with its rivals was particularly undesirable to Antivenizelism, given certain key structural characteristics. As a coalition for patronage, which had been out of power for more than a decade, the bloc urgently required undivided control of government resources. In the perspective of the "ins" and the "outs," it might take years to redress the balance. As *Eleftheron Vema* sarcastically warned the refugees already in 1926, "many other and rapacious mouths have been waiting for a long time."⁵⁹ Furthermore, as a coalition without a program, Antivenizelism ran the risk of being dominated by its programmatic rival and of sharing the responsibility for policies which were historically inimical to the Antivenizelist social base. This risk had become apparent already in 1926–1927, when S. Maximos pointedly observed that the Antivenizelist masses could not be contained integrally within the party framework for the implementation of a program which crushed them *and* which they had previously known as a *Venizelist* program.⁶⁰ In 1927, Tsaldares had adroitly avoided the bitter cup of economic stabilization by bolting the Ecumenical Cabinet as soon as his limited objectives had been achieved. By 1932, he had no reason to become tainted with responsibility for a Venizelist program which had ended in manifest disaster. Quite the contrary, he could cash in on popular dissatisfaction and offer the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie itself the tranquilizing prospect of economic and political security under conservative, if unimaginative, rule—a welcome change after the Venizelos adventure.

In the realm of compromise and of concessions by the stronger (Antivenizelist) side, the *structural* political insecurity of Tsaldares, coupled with an evasive personality formed in the hothouse of traditional clientel-

59. *Eleftheron Vema*, 13 October 1926.

60. Maximos, pp. 138–142. Tsaldares, as minister of interior, had thus been compelled to use armed force against the tradesmen, "most of whom were his supporters."

ism, was probably the decisive obstacle.⁶¹ Whereas Antivenizelist contemporary supporters and later historiographers have glorified their leader's acumen in the service of narrow party interest, it was precisely the same characteristics that perennially fed the mistrust, suspicion, and even anxiety of the Venizelists whenever their fears took a more concrete form. Their otherwise hostile perceptions of Tsaldares were essentially accurate and plagued the successive attempts at a compromise from the very beginning, in the summer of 1933:

The arch-sly Tsaldares visibly undergoes froglike transformations, while he is actually fooling everybody, and deep inside is among the most intransigent. Yet, no direction, no program, no central idea is to be found in this man—everything retreats before, and becomes subordinate to crass party interest.⁶²

Venizelos personally was convinced of the bad faith of his counterpart. In the first abortive round of negotiations, he explained to Kafandares:

This answer [to the Tsaldares proposals] was given as a matter of duty, so that I can be certain that all the means for the prevention of a new civil convulsion have been exhausted. Nonetheless, I expect nothing from an understanding with Mr. Tsaldares, who is held captive by the intransigents, on the days when he is not an arch-intransigent himself.⁶³

When a final breakthrough in negotiations eventually emerged in September 1934, Tsaldares proved once again incapable of adhering to his commitments when he withdrew from the agreement reached—under the threat that Kondyles would desert him, depriving the government of a parliamentary majority. At that point, Venizelos immediately offered to dissolve his National Coalition, making it possible for minor Venizelist parties to join the P.P. in a coalition government. Tsaldares was thus confronted with the dilemma of either remaining a captive of Kondyles and of the intransigents within his own party or becoming a captive of the Venizelists in a government coalition—a prospect which was particularly undesirable, as explained earlier. This is probably why he opted for the first alternative. Eventually, he would fall victim to his image of congenital

61. Hence at least one of the two *essential* prerequisites identified by Nordlinger for acting-out “conflict-regulating motives” was missing: political security of top leaders from potential challengers. See Nordlinger, p. 54. The other prerequisite (i.e., conciliatory attitudes) may be surmised in the case of Tsaldares, but would of course be insufficient by itself.

62. A. Zannas to Venizelos, 17 August 1933, VA File 349.

63. Venizelos to Kafandares, 31 August 1933, VA File 296. See also Venizelos to V. Delegiannes, 29 August 1933, in the same file.

unreliability, when he failed to keep the trust of the partisans of restoration during the critical summer of 1935.⁶⁴

The remaining item on Nordlinger's list, "purposive depoliticization," appears in retrospect to have been the most promising if not the *only* workable avenue of conflict regulation. In the interwar setting, this formula necessarily implied an end to the revival of the National Schism *and* an end to the "Republic for the Republicans," as a sequel to the Schism. As seen previously, the Republic constituted the *central node* between the electoral and the military arenas. The process of "depoliticization" inaugurated by Tsaldares's solemn recognition of the regime in 1932 would therefore have critical consequences in both arenas. In the military arena, the effects were immediately visible with the dissolution of the Military League. In the long run, the prospect of nonpartisan armed forces, which would intervene *only* to avert an actual and present danger of restoration, apparently commanded a decisive majority among the Republican military by 1933 or at least by 1935. In the electoral arena, the effects of "depoliticization" were felt in March 1933—and they were disastrous for Venizelism.

In the long run, Antivenizelism could most probably live with the Republic, despite the rabid Royalism of its extremists. If left in secure and lasting possession of the Treasury, the P.P. could be transformed in a direction in which its essential character as a coalition for patronage would gain the upper hand. This was evidently the historical wager of Tsaldares and his moderate wing, and provides a key to his celebrated image as the apostle of legality and normality.⁶⁵ That the prospects of this strategy appeared promising at the time is amply demonstrated by the anxious impatience *both* of the partisans of restoration *and* of the Venizelists. Unlike its rival, the Venizelist bloc could not survive the "depoliticization" of the Republic and the loss of its historical monopoly of Republican loyalties. It is in light of this strategic constraint that the successive elections of 1932 and 1933 together can be interpreted as a *critical* turning point, at which a unique opportunity for the consolidation of republican legitimacy was lost—or rather wasted.

The Republic's Wasted Chance

As election time approached, in 1932, both Venizelism as a bloc and the L.P. as a major party appeared in grave or even fatal danger. Minor Venize-

64. On the September 1934 negotiations, see Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 270–272.

65. See, e.g., the title of his hagiography by Svolopoulos.

list parties had broken with the Liberals and had joined forces with the P.P. in vociferous opposition to the Venizelos government. On the other hand, radical and especially Agrarian agitation posed an intractable problem. In sum, the Liberals appeared to have irremediably lost their erstwhile allies in the bloc, who threatened to erode their mass support, together with the non-Venizelist Left and, of course, Antivenizelism. On the right of the L.P., the most destabilizing force was probably Kafandares rather than Tsaldares: the Progressive leader appealed to both the Republican middle class and to a sizable Antivenizelist audience. On the left, the menace was even more formidable as compact battalions primarily of rural refugees and other new smallholders seemed ready to follow Papanastasiou and his Farmer-Labor Party or else the A.P.⁶⁶ The L.P. was thus caught simultaneously between the challenge of a bourgeois "third force" (Kafandares) and that of a radical third force along class lines (Papanastasiou and the A.P. rather than the C.P.). The fateful strategy of Venizelos between the spring of 1932 and that of 1933 can only be understood in light of this predicament, as a frantic and conscious effort to meet the challenges on all fronts.

To begin with, proportional representation was adopted (for the 1932 election only) with a double objective: it would rule out both an electoral victory by the P.P. alone, and an electoral alliance which the plurality system might have produced between Tsaldares, Kafandares, and even Papanastasiou. With proportional representation, Liberal losses would be dispersed among minor Republican parties rather than concentrated to the main advantage of Antivenizelism.⁶⁷ Subsequently, the short-lived Papanastasiou cabinet was attacked and overthrown for fear that it might increase its popular support among workers and peasants by sponsoring major social reforms.⁶⁸ During the campaign itself, Venizelos adroitly produced an artificial but effective polarization over the supposedly endangered Republic, thereby minimizing the gains of Kafandares, Papanastasiou, and the Left as Republican masses naturally rallied around the L.P.—the regime's main support. The P.P., which had still not withdrawn its famous "reservations" on the legitimacy of the Republic, made practically no *net* gains, except at the expense of other Antivenizelist groups (compare Tables 4 and 6).

In the aftermath of the election and once Tsaldares had at last recognized the Republic, Venizelos successfully sabotaged the outcome most

66. See, e.g., L. Makkas to Venizelos, 16 July 1932, VA File 346, where it is reported that the appeal of Kafandares is limited to a fraction of the Republican middle class, whereas Papanastasiou is more successful among the "popular mass."

67. See D. N. Filaretos to Venizelos, 2 and 7 March 1932, VA File 345.

68. See Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, pp. 135–142, on the short-lived Papanastasiou experiment, which is pointedly called "the spare part that is not used."

consistent with the popular verdict—a coalition government between Tsaldares, Kafandares, and Papanastasiou.⁶⁹ By February 1933, he had corralled all Venizelists back into the fold, with the sole exception of Kondyles (whose defection seemed insignificant electorally, but proved critical in the long run). The false sense of security and strength produced by this reconstitution of the old bloc and by the addition of new Agrarian allies led to a series of miscalculations. The votes received by each of the participating parties in September 1932 were simply added, whereas it was evident that both Papanastasiou and, especially, Kafandares could not keep the support they had received running *against* Venizelos once they had again placed themselves under his leadership.⁷⁰ On the basis of this unreal arithmetic, the plurality system promised one more landslide, as Venizelos complacently assured his audience during the electoral campaign. Not content with a secure but small parliamentary majority, he thus provoked an election in which the artificial polarization between the two blocs produced by the plurality system could *only* play in favor of Anti-venizelism: the regime and the past had been removed from the partisan agenda, and what remained was essentially widespread dissatisfaction with his unsuccessful economic management and with his failure to keep abreast of specifically refugee demands.

In retrospect, it may be seen that the political developments which Venizelos strenuously *averted* or *diverted* would have greatly and perhaps irrevocably consolidated the Republic and its legitimacy. With or without a solemn recognition by Tsaldares, whose credibility was in any case relative, the 1932 election would have produced not only an overall Republican majority, as it did, but also genuine and solid Republican supports on *both* the right and the left of the Liberals. Kafandares would have drawn and perhaps *kept* moderate Antivenizelist forces into a firmly Republican “third force.” On the left, both Papanastasiou and the A.P. would have strengthened Republicanism with a social dimension which had been stifled under bourgeois rule. It is telling that Venizelos reportedly came to

69. Ibid., pp. 163–164.

70. Already in the immediate aftermath of the September 1932 election, the Prefect of Fthiotis-Fokis (Sterea Hellas) had predicted that Kafandares could not keep many among his voters, who were originally P.P. supporters. See the prefect's report to Venizelos, 29 September 1932, VA File 392. This prediction was dramatically realized in March 1933. In Athens, it was estimated that only about 15 percent of the Kafandares votes in 1932 had been carried over to the reconstituted Venizelist camp (the National Coalition); in the rural eparchy of Doris (Sterea Hellas), the estimate was one-third, probably because of clientelist bonds, which did not operate in the capital. See I. Kalogeras to Venizelos, 14 March 1933, VA File 348; and K. Lidorikes to Venizelos, 19 March 1933, VA File 395, on Athens and Doris, respectively. Kalogeras also reports “many” defections from the Farmer-Labor Party to the C.P.

bitterly regret this strategy after 1933. In private conversations with the Agrarians Sofianopoulos and Pournaras, "he considered it his mistake that he did not allow a purely Agrarian or a Farmer-Labor socialist party to develop, into which all the dissatisfied or leftist elements of the Venizelo-Republican camp would be funneled instead of going eventually to the C.P. or the P.P."⁷¹ Furthermore, even after the election was over, a coalition government where Tsaldares would be flanked by Kafandares and Papanastasiou would have had comparable consequences—to the lasting benefit of republican legitimacy.

In this hypothetical perspective, the Republic would have survived almost certainly—but not Venizelism. The bloc would have succumbed on *every* level: (1) as an electorally viable governing coalition of parties dominated by the L.P.; (2) as an interclass alliance under bourgeois leadership, with its conservative middle class remaining behind a shrunken L.P. or joining Kafandares, if not the P.P., while refugee and other popular mass support would drift to Papanastasiou or the Left; and (3) as a civil-military bloc, since the Venizelist military would eventually transfer their loyalty to a nonpartisan Republic.

Dafnes characteristically remarks that in 1932 and later, until his death, Venizelos was continually concerned about keeping his party in a first role and about imposing solutions which would bear the stamp of his personality.⁷² An interpretation reduced to personal and self-serving motives, however, *including* the fathomless trauma of the assassination attempt, would remain insufficient. In any case, a charismatic leader is not easily reconciled with the loss of his "gift" and "mission," and in this particular case the "mission" involved, by 1932, bourgeois hegemony itself. This was the ultimate justification for the survival of Venizelism, at least in the eyes of its founder. In this perspective, to repair the fatal blunders of 1932–1933, "depoliticization" had to be purposely arrested and even reversed—in both the electoral and the military arena—through a strategy of renewed and virulent polarization over the regime and over the mythological legacy of the National Schism—a strategy that Antivenizelism was unwilling or unable to contain and counteract. In this respect, the attempted assassination of Venizelos (and its disgraceful judicial sequel) constituted the most effective provocation on the part of those who were eager to precipitate a final showdown. On the part of Venizelos and his followers, the obsessive effort to recapture the interrupted "mission" and the founding myths of Republicanism would eventually lead to the last rising of March 1935—a pathetic recreation of the heroic past.

71. Pournaras, *Eleftherios Venizelos*, Vol. 4, p. 95 n. 1.

72. Dafnes, *He Hellas*, Vol. 2, p. 163.

THE REPUBLICAN PANDORA'S BOX: "VENIZELOCOMMUNISM"

The disastrous March 1935 coup destroyed the Republic—but saved Venizelism. It recreated and solidified in a new round of ferocious civil strife the barriers between the two bourgeois blocs, especially on the mass level where the refugees and the New Lands in general bore the brunt of the fighting and of Antivenizelist vindictiveness. In the same stroke, however, the last Venizelist uprising irremediably *breached* the hitherto strenuously maintained (and policed) barriers between Venizelism and the Left, particularly the Communist Left.

The single most important contribution to this historical turning point was probably made, whether deliberately or not, by the wave of Antivenizelist repression which swept the country after the coup and escalated under the Kondyles dictatorship: its declared target was "Venizelocommunism."⁷³ For the first time on such a massive scale, Republicans of all shades experienced the police brutality and arbitrariness which had hitherto been reserved for actual or presumed Communists.

Apart from the spontaneous fraternization of common persecution, however, the unprecedented Republican solidarity on the mass level was also a logical response to the imminent threat of restoration. By September 1935, a united front among the supporters and local cadres of all Republican parties, including the C.P., had become a reality throughout the country. Its most concrete manifestation were local committees of Republican concentration, which often included the representatives of the L.P. itself. As the authoritative *Makedonia* proclaimed in Thessaloniki, for the Liberal masses "there are no enemies on the left."⁷⁴ The response of Tsaldares reflected the spirit of Antivenizelist repression and the *new* thrust of Greek Royalism:

the close cooperation observed nowadays of the Republic's supporters with the leftist elements and even the Communists, *which somehow is considered natural*, clearly demonstrates what dangers the right itself to elect the head of State may have in store for the country. . . .⁷⁵

Less than a month later, the united Republican front officially materialized on the national level as well when *all* Republican parties joined in a coordinating committee—for the first time ever. The committee included the L.P., the minor Venizelist parties (Kafandares, Papanastasiou, Papan-

73. See, e.g., Gregoriades, *4e Avgoustou*, p. 61.

74. Sarles, p. 332. See also Linardatos, p. 106.

75. From his speech on 28 September 1935, quoted in Efstratiou, p. 97. Emphasis added.

dreou), the C.P., the divided Agrarians, and the diminutive Socialists, that is, the entire Republican spectrum, including both Venizelism and the Left.⁷⁶

For the C.P. and its new "Popular Front" strategy, this was a historic breakthrough, after almost two decades of sectarian self-isolation and solitary persecution. The new party line was spectacularly vindicated—and in particular the novel strategy of alliances, which represented the most radical break with the past. The party's Fourth Plenum (September 1935) had specifically stressed the need to cooperate with the L.P. itself ("despite its past") since it opposed the restoration both because of "economicopolitical interests" and "in particular because it is decisively pressured by its Republican antifascist base in the people and in the army."⁷⁷ Political developments in the fall of 1935 proved the accuracy of this analysis.

For Venizelist leadership, however, these developments were cause for alarm and uneasiness. On the one hand, the unholy alliance with the Communists and the accusation of "Venizelocommunism" threatened to drive into the arms of Antivenizelism what was left of bourgeois support. On the other hand, the unobstructed osmosis between Venizelist and Communist masses presaged a drift of the former to the C.P. This had always been a Venizelist nightmare.⁷⁸

The surprise letter of Venizelos dictating a trial recognition of the restored monarchy offered a way out of the dilemma of his lieutenants. The L.P. immediately left the coordinating committee, forcing the minor Venizelist parties to follow suit. Communist alliance strategy appeared in shambles. In the January 1936 election, all other Republican parties eventually refused to join in a Popular Front with the C.P. (except an insignificant splinter group of Agrarians).⁷⁹ Republican voters massively rallied to the L.P., instinctively seeking security and guidance in the strongest party.

Nevertheless, the drift of mass Republicanism to the left was contained only electorally and temporarily.⁸⁰ The trend appears to have con-

76. Sarles, pp. 340–347.

77. KKE, Vol. 4, pp. 246–247.

78. An analogous situation had been created by the alliance forged in 1933 with the A.P. of Sofianopoulos. See, e.g., St. Pistolakes to Venizelos, 21 March 1933, VA File 395, where Venizelos is warned that, if an Agrarian (Sofianopoulos himself) is supported in the coming Serres by-election, many "lively" (*zoeroi*) Liberals, who have until now been held back with great difficulty, will "leak" to the A.P.

79. Sarles, pp. 340–359.

80. Gregoriades, *4e Avgoustou*, pp. 89–90, reports that left-wing Republicans largely voted for the L.P., but openly warned its candidates that they would switch to the Left in the future.

tinued inexorably, and was decisively encouraged by three critical events on the level of political leadership: the recognition of the monarchy by Venizelos and, consequently, by the L.P.; the Sofoules-Sklavainas pact; and the death of Venizelos.

The charisma of Venizelos seems to have worked its last miracle when he suddenly imposed an about-face on the regime issue—and this by messenger from Paris. Birtles characteristically notes:

The *volte face* immediately made . . . by Venizelos's followers was amazing. They turned from Republicanism to Royalty as instantaneously as a column of soldiers ordered to about turn. "But why?" we asked, and the answer (inadequate and irrational though it seemed) was simply this: "Because Venizelos has agreed." This change had not occurred in the attitude of Republicans other than Venizelists. . . .⁸¹

Yet, this striking last performance of charisma was not unambiguous. To begin with, it alienated all Republicans other than "Venizelists," which here should mean Liberals in particular. Furthermore, this radical break with political tradition was presented *and*, more significantly, widely interpreted on the mass level as merely an astute tactical move (primarily to get rid of the hated Kondyles), contingent upon subsequent developments. If the Liberals had swiftly returned to power in the wake of a decisive electoral victory, this tactical move might have turned into one more political triumph for Venizelos and his party. Amidst the protracted stalemate following the January 1936 election, however, and given that the only realistic prospect was a coalition government with Antivenizelism, the dubious gains increasingly appeared not to justify the betrayal of Republicanism. To make matters worse, in the absence of Venizelos, the L.P. was in distinctly unimaginative and uninspiring, if not incompetent, hands.

Poor Sofoules evidently did not realize the implications of what he was doing when he casually signed a pact with the Communist parliamentary leader Sklavainas in February 1936. This (in)famous pact, which was not even supposed to remain secret, contained no less than a government program, in exchange for which the C.P. agreed to support a future Liberal cabinet with its pivotal parliamentary strength.⁸² Regardless of its other aspects, the pact not only dangerously strengthened the specter of "Venizelocommunism" on the right, but also provided the single most emphatic and authoritative seal of approval for the leftward trend of the Venizelist masses—precisely the development that Venizelist leadership was anxious

81. Birtles, p. 60.

82. See the text in *KKE*, Vol. 4, pp. 342–343.

to arrest. An authoritative C.P. source pointedly stresses that the pact, although never implemented, by itself "exerted a beneficial influence on the development of the Communist and of the entire popular antifascist movement," "broke the ice of the Communist bogey," and contributed to the formation of a leftist Liberal current, which favored cooperation with the C.P.⁸³

Finally, by the middle of March, Venizelos himself was dead, and the L.P. was saddled with his last strategic gamble without, however, the magic and the skill to pull it through that only *he* might have provided. Freed from the grip of charisma, the refugee masses in particular could no longer be contained, once the Republican banner had been put aside. In Thessaloniki, during the May popular revolt, the majority of L.P. supporters and local cadres is reported to have joined hands with the Communists, despite the negative attitude of party leadership.⁸⁴ Communist leaders expected that, among Liberal militants, a considerable section with left-wing ideas might eventually become a distinct leftist party. In the words of a party journalist:

What we are concerned about is the Venizelist Party. . . . now the top layers of that Party are likely to go over entirely to the bourgeoisie, to the Right, but the great mass of the Venizelist Party is bound to come further to the Left, *is* coming further to the Left.⁸⁵

The permanent contradiction at the heart of the Venizelist interclass alliance was thus rapidly approaching a final breaking point.

In conclusion, it may be seen that Venizelos, with the strategy of polarization leading to the March 1935 coup, had acted the sorcerer's apprentice once again in his turbulent career. In the wake of the Restoration, which was a direct consequence of the disastrous coup, the previous predicament of the Venizelist bloc was metamorphosed into a *new* and more intractable dilemma: either a common *bourgeois* front with Anti-venizelism around the crown or a common *Republican* front with the Left. In either case, the historical interclass alliance would most probably not survive, and its disintegration would further undermine the bourgeois order. In the first case, which he apparently chose and bequeathed to his successors, a massive defection of Venizelist popular support to the Left could no longer be contained, once the betrayal of Republicanism had irrevocably emptied the alliance of its *last* remaining historical content. In

83. Sarles, pp. 368–369.

84. Ibid., p. 395.

85. Quoted by Birtles, p. 304. See also his earlier conversation with Sklavainas himself, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 279.

the second case, the bourgeoisie as a whole would rally around Antivenizelism and the crown, and Venizelism would be transformed into a radical popular movement sharing an essentially *common* mass audience with the Communists. In *either* case, it was the end of the Liberal project for bourgeois hegemony.

For its part, the C.P. was at last prepared to seize the historical moment. Apart from its dramatic overture to the refugee world as a whole, the party finally gave *concrete* form to the alliance of peasants and workers under the hegemony of the working class—a vision which had perennially eluded the C.P. since its inception. This form was the ostensible dissolution of its rural organizations for the benefit of the “Unified A.P.”—followed by the constitution of an organic “Popular Front” between the two parties. Amidst the mounting crisis of bourgeois hegemony, the wavering hitherto Venizelist masses of refugees and other new smallholders, and betrayed Republicans in general, would furnish the troops and allies that were required to turn this project into a formidable force.

It is only in light of this emerging prospect, rather than of the myth of an imminent Communist insurrection, that the Metaxas dictatorship *and* the impotent protestations of the bourgeois parties may be interpreted. Amidst an increasingly destabilizing organic crisis, Metaxas, who had outlived other potential candidates, provided the closest available ersatz of a charismatic “man of destiny,” backed by the crown and the Antivenizelist military.⁸⁶

The dictatorship, however, did not destroy the seeds planted in 1935–1936. In the wake of this forced interval and during the Axis Occupation, the diffuse and amorphous radicalized Republicanism born out of the March 1935 coup, and the hegemonic project of the C.P. would both combine in a formidable popular movement: the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its army (ELAS).⁸⁷ For their part, the political heirs of Venizelism continued to be plagued by the *same* dilemma of 1935–1936 for almost four decades, while the bogey which was then first dubbed “Venizelocommunism” remained the central myth of the Royalist Right. But all that is another story.

86. For an interpretation of the dictatorship as outcome of an organic crisis along Gramscian lines, see Elefantes, pp. 160–161 and 195–196.

87. Sarles, pp. 368–369, insists that the “beneficial” influence of the 1936 Sofoules-Sklavainas pact did not stop with the dictatorship. “On the contrary, only in the years of World War II did the new political trends fully develop, which had found their first practical expression” in the pact.

APPENDIX

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INTERWAR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Between 1864 and 1922, elections in Greece were held under what was, in the light of subsequent experience, a remarkably stable and simple electoral system. Its main features can be summarized very briefly. Each voter cast as many *lead* ballots as there were candidates, for or against each of them without any restriction. The parliamentary seats of each district (varying according to its population) were then allocated to the candidates receiving the greatest number of affirmative ballots, even if only a plurality.

Although these features did not change over more than a half-century, what became the object of heated partisan disputes and repeated changes was the number and size of electoral districts. The alternatives were two: the so-called “narrow” district (*stene*), and the so-called “wide” district (*evreia*, which remained in force continuously between 1906 and 1922). The first corresponded to the eparchy (*eparchia*), the second originally to the nome (*nomos*), administrative divisions which can be compared to the French *canton* and *département*, respectively. In 1910, there were 69 eparchies and 16 nomes. By 1928, they had grown to 141 and 35. Finally, with respect to electoral districts, a minor peculiarity consisted of the three so-called *privileged* districts of Hydra, Spetsae, and Psara. These three small islands had been permanently granted three, two, and two seats, respectively, since 1844 (regardless of population) in recognition of their special contribution to the War of Independence.

In sharp contrast to the previous stability of the electoral system (especially between 1906 and 1922), the interwar period was an era of constant change and deliberate “electoral engineering,” which was inaugurated by Venizelism in 1923—in reaction to the traumatic electoral defeat of 1920. Interwar elections to the Chamber of Deputies were thus held under either of *two* basic electoral systems, with minor ad hoc modifications each time. To these should be added the

system which was used only in 1935, for the Constituent Assembly of that year, and the system peculiar to Senate elections. An exhaustive and technical description of these four electoral systems falls outside the scope of this study. Only their most essential and relevant features will be outlined here, to provide the background for a discussion of their implications for party strategies, especially in the concluding chapter.

THE "NARROW-WIDE" PLURALITY SYSTEM: 1923, 1928, AND 1933

The plurality system invented in 1923 for the election of the Fourth Constituent Assembly judiciously combined *two* sorts of electoral districts: "narrow" in Old Greece (i.e., eparchies) and "wide" in the New Lands (corresponding to lower court districts). It was thus labeled "narrow-wide" (*stenoevveia*) in Greek political discourse. With minor alterations, the same system was used again in 1928 and 1933.

In addition to the two main sorts of districts, the three traditionally privileged districts were retained, and separate minority electoral colleges were created in 1923, two for the Moslems of Thrace and one for the Thessaloniki Jews. In all, there were 398 seats in 1923 and 98 electoral districts: Athens-Piraeus (in one), 22 court districts, 69 eparchies, the 3 minority colleges, and the 3 privileged districts. In 81 districts (with 259 seats), the traditional lead ballot was used for the last time (except for the privileged districts, where it was used once again in 1926). The paper ballot was used in 17 districts (with 139 seats): in Athens-Piraeus and Macedonia (for the first time) and in Thrace (where it had been introduced already in 1920).

In 1928, the seats were only 250 while the districts remained 98, with one important difference: the two Moslem colleges were combined in one, while the district of Athens-Piraeus was split in two. The paper ballot was universally used. Voters could cast either a "common" ballot bearing any combination of candidates up to the number of district seats, or a "party" ballot (i.e., a party list) in which they could make one or two changes, depending on the size of the district. Seats were filled by the candidates polling the largest number of votes.

In 1933, exactly the same system was used, with minimal alterations in the areal distribution of seats, whose total was reduced to 248.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: 1926, 1932, AND 1936

Proportional representation was first introduced in Greece in 1926 and was in force again in 1932 and in 1936. It was of course combined with "wide" districts, in this case mostly nomes. In 1926, there were 286 seats and 40 electoral districts: Athens, Piraeus, a district combining 2 nomes, 33 nomes, a part detached from the nome of Thessaloniki, and the 3 privileged districts, where the plurality system was retained. There were no separate minority colleges. Voters could only cast party

lists, and no changes were allowed. They could also express their preference (signified by a cross) for one or two candidates on the list, depending on the district's size. Preference votes ("crosses") alone determined who would fill the seats won by each party list (except when there was a tie and except for the seats remaining in the nationwide "third distribution"). Details about the proportional allocation of seats among party lists need not be examined here.

In 1932, there were 250 seats and 43 electoral districts—the same as in 1926 (with minor changes), plus a newly created nome and the 2 separate minority colleges. Among other modifications, only one preference vote ("cross") was allowed.

Finally, in 1936, there were 300 seats and 38 electoral districts: Athens, Piraeus, 35 nomes, and a district combining 2 nomes. Minority colleges and privileged districts had been abolished earlier. Among other changes, there was no restriction on the number of preference votes ("crosses") allowed.

THE "WIDE" PLURALITY SYSTEM OF 1935

For the election of the Constituent Assembly in 1935, a plurality system was adopted, in combination with "wide" districts (i.e., nomes). There were 300 seats and 38 districts: 37 nomes and 1 district (including Piraeus) which was detached from the nome of Attica. Minority colleges and privileged districts were abolished. Seats were supposedly filled by the individual candidates polling the largest number of votes, but voters could only cast party lists in which no change was allowed, except in the districts of Thessaloniki (one change) and Attica (two changes). With these two minor exceptions, it was in fact a plurality system with list voting.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR SENATE ELECTIONS

Finally, for the election of 92 senators by universal suffrage, the electoral district was the nome, plus the 2 separate minority colleges, making a total of 37 districts in 1929. The requirement for election was in general a plurality, but, in the 11 districts with 3 seats or more, provision was also made for the representation of minorities. In effect, it was a plurality system in 26 districts with one or two seats, and what amounted to proportional representation in the remaining 11 districts. Voters could only cast party lists, and only one preference vote ("cross") was allowed. Preference votes alone determined who would fill the seats won by each list. The same system was used in 1932 for the partial renewal of the Senate in 11 districts with a total of 30 seats.

APPENDIX

· 2 ·

THE DATA

UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Any ecological analysis is confronted with the preliminary problem of selecting the most appropriate unit. The choice made here was dictated by the following interrelated criteria:

1. The total number (population) available for analysis should be as large as possible.
2. Units should be ideally comparable in size.
3. Each should also be relatively homogeneous, thereby maximizing heterogeneity among units.
4. Boundaries should be stable over time.
5. Units should also be, as much as possible, “natural” (i.e., with a concrete meaning in social reality) rather than arbitrary and abstract subdivisions.
6. The variety of data available for the units chosen should be sufficient for analysis.
7. Finally, electoral boundaries had to correspond with the administrative boundaries on the basis of which census and other data were collected.

In light of these combined criteria, the most appropriate choice was the eparchy (*eparchia*), a subdivision analogous in scale to an Anglo-Saxon county or a French canton, although normally not endowed with any administrative function. There were 141 eparchies in 1928, 2 of which (Drama and Zyrnovó) were combined to ensure comparability over time, leaving a total of 140.

The data available for eparchies were also reported, by the Census of 1928, for 59 municipalities (*demoi*) or large communes (*koinotetes*), which either had a

population larger than 10,000 or were capitals of nomes (*nomoi*). (Nomes are administrative subdivisions analogous in size and function to French *départements* and headed by a prefect or *nomarches*.) This made it possible to separate these 59 towns from their respective eparchies and to arrive at a total population of 196 units of analysis: 56 municipalities and large communes—those distinguished by the census with three exceptions—and 140 eparchies, from which the 59 municipalities and communes were of course subtracted. With some simplification, the former 56 units are collectively designated as “urban areas,” even though some are quite small, while the remaining 140 are similarly designated as “rural areas,” even though they still contain several small towns.

The three exceptions mentioned above are the country’s three cities: Athens (1928 pop. 459,211), Piraeus (1928 pop. 251,659), and Thessaloniki (1928 pop. 244,680). In light of the second and third criteria, it seemed preferable to exclude these three cities from the regression analysis, because of their incomparably greater size and heterogeneity. Their inclusion, as three more units on a par with the rest, would be of little or else dubious consequence in any case, whether they appeared to conform with the nationwide pattern or to deviate from it. In the latter case, it would be impossible to explain such deviation without an analysis by neighborhood, or parish, for which census data are entirely lacking. The nonvoting religious community of Mount Athos was of course also excluded.

Alternative choices, as units of analysis, included the nomes and the communes. The former, however, were too few in number (35 in 1928). Ecological analysis therefore begins with the 1928 election, since earlier electoral returns are only available by nome. Conversely, very little information is available on the level of the communes (4,990 in 1928), which could not be readily matched with polling stations anyway.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables in this analysis are the votes received by the various political blocs or parties in each area, expressed in percentages of the valid ballots. In the absence of detailed returns from earlier elections, only those of 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1936 were used. In addition to the four corresponding variables for each bloc or party, a fifth was computed, representing its average in each area over these four elections.

Three more elections were held during the same period, for which detailed returns are available: 1929 (Senate), 1932 (Senate), and 1935 (Constituent Assembly). The senatorial election of 1929 was not included, however, because of its peculiarities (low turnout and inflated Venizelist strength) and its otherwise secondary importance. The 1932 senatorial election was only partial. Finally, returns from the one-sided 1935 election are both unreliable and meaningless.

For the four elections covered by the analysis, returns were taken from the official publications cited under Tables 4, 6, 8, and 12. The parties or groups classified as Antivenizelist or as Venizelist in each election are listed in the same tables and need not be repeated here.

Returns from the elections of 1932 and 1936, held under proportional representation, involve no ambiguity, since the votes received by each party list constitute the single available measure of party strength. In 1928 and 1933, however, the plurality (or first-past-the-post) system was responsible for two major sources of ambiguity:

1. Several candidates ran outside official party tickets, but under a self-chosen party label. Given that they obviously appealed to the supporters of the corresponding party, their votes were here counted as part of that party's strength. Official publications adopted the same approach.

2. In multimember districts, voters were free to vote for any candidates, up to the number of district seats, regardless of ticket or party affiliation. To calculate party strength under these circumstances, the following method was adopted: the votes received by all the *candidates* in each area were added, and this sum served as the basis for computing percentages. It is typically smaller than the number theoretically possible (valid participation \times seats to be filled), indicating that some voters did not vote for as many candidates as they could. Party strength is the sum of the votes received by all candidates running under its label, whether official or unofficial. In the particular case of the Communist Party, which fielded incomplete tickets in many districts (i.e., fewer candidates than the seats to be filled), it seemed appropriate to make a small correction, on the fairly safe assumption that its voters did *not* vote for *other* candidates and would normally vote for a complete party ticket. The difference between uncorrected and corrected C.P. totals is in any event negligible. It may be added that the computational methods used in the official publications are roughly analogous to the one adopted here, but far more arbitrary.

Finally, the fact that, unlike the two major blocs, the Agrarian Party and the Communist Party did *not* field candidates in every electoral district was an additional source of perplexity. If only the units in which they actually ran were included in the analysis, the population would differ greatly from election to election. In the case of the A.P., it would consist of only 58 units in 1928, 149 in 1932, 49 in 1933, and 45 in 1936. In the case of the C.P., the respective totals would be 122, 185, 146, and 191 units of analysis. To bypass this difficulty, party strength was assumed to be zero wherever it did not field a candidate—a fairly reasonable assumption. For both parties, the population is therefore 196 units in every election.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Unless otherwise indicated, all independent variables in this analysis were constructed on the basis of data from the Greek Census of 1928, whose results were reported in the bilingual (Greek and French) publication *République Hellénique, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, Résultats statistiques du recensement de la population de la Grèce du 15–16 mai 1928* (Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale). Four volumes appeared: Vol. 1: *Population de fait et de droit-Réfugiés* (1933); Vol. 2: *Age—Etat matrimonial—Instruction*

1935); Vol. 3: *Professions* (in two parts, 1937 and 1932); Vol. 4: *Lieu de naissance—Religion et langue—Sujétion* (1935). The independent variables appearing in the tables will be briefly described by chapter.

Classes (Chapter 3)

Unless otherwise indicated, all class variables are in percentages of the active male population and are derived from Vol. 3, Tables III.d and III.e. The occupational and status categories used have been explained in Chapter 3 with reference to Table 13.

In the discussion of the working class:

1. The number of labor union delegates excluded from the Fourth GSEE Congress, for each urban unit of analysis, was taken from the list published by *Rizospastes*, 14 May 1928. This number was divided by the 1928 number of workers and multiplied by 10,000 to create an indicator of Communist strength in the labor movement.
2. The ratio of workers to employers in manufacturing was constructed by dividing the number of workers by that of employers, as reported by the census, Vol. 3, Tables III.d and III.e. In the absence of other areal data, this is a gross indicator of the average firm size.
3. The variable for the tobacco industry, also in percentage of the active male population, was constructed from census data in Vol. 3, Table I.e., and only for urban areas, where 80 percent of the industry's total was concentrated.

Finally, in the discussion of the peasantry:

1. The proportion of peasant owners refers to heads of agricultural enterprises, that is, the sum of status categories I, II, and III in agriculture (see Table 13). The source is Vol. 3, Tables IV.d and IV.e.
2. The variables on crops are in percentages of the area under cultivation in 1939, as reported in: Hypourgeion Anoikodomeseos, *Agrotikon Eisodema kai Anoikodomesis* [Peasant Income and Reconstruction] (Athens, 1948), Table I. These data are only available by eparchy and were assigned to the 140 rural units of analysis (with one or two missing cases, depending on the variable).

Refugees (Chapter 4)

The basic variable (“% Refugees”) is the percentage of male refugees in the total male population. The numbers of male refugees were taken from Vol. 1, Tables II.d and II.e. Those of the total male population from Vol. 1, Tables 16* and 17*.

The variables for refugees in agriculture and in manufacturing consist of the corresponding percentages of post-Disaster male refugees in the total active male population. Data on the refugees were taken from Vol. 3, Tables II.d and II.e. The

variables for native agriculture and manufacturing, also in percentages of the active male population, were computed by subtracting the refugees from the totals of agriculture and manufacturing.

Minorities (Chapter 5)

The variable for Slavo-Macedonians is their percentage in the total population. Data by language and religion were taken from Vol. 4, Tables 12* and 13*. Those on the total population from Vol. 1, Tables 16* and 17*. (In this particular case, there was no need to discriminate by sex.)

Region and Deprivation (Chapter 6)

The variables for Old Greece (97 units) and the New Lands (99 units) are dummy variables, with 1 in the units belonging to the subdivision in question and 0 in the others.

The principal indicator of relative deprivation, male illiteracy, is measured as a percentage of the male population aged 8 or older. These census data were taken from Vol. 2, Tables 8* and 9*. To construct the other indicator, the number of medical doctors reported in Vol. 3, Tables III.d and III.e, was divided by the total population in Vol. 1, Tables 16* and 17*, and multiplied by 10,000.

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ARCHIVAL MATERIAL

The richest source for this study has been the vast archive of Eleftherios Venizelos, deposited with the Benaki Museum in Athens, and only partly classified in consecutively numbered files. Reference is also made to the Plasteras Archive and the Dangles Archive, also deposited with the Benaki Museum in Athens, and to the Papanastasiou Archive, deposited with the commune of Levidi (in Arcadia).

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Apart from the sources of data, listed in Appendix 2, the principal category of government documents cited consists of parliamentary debates, which were then published in two forms: verbatim in the stenographic *Efemeris ton Syzeteseon* [Gazette of the Debates] and in more or less summary form in the *Praktika ton Syzeteseon* [Minutes of the Debates].

NEWSPAPERS

Most references are made to national dailies published in Athens, including: *Akropolis*, *Eleftheron Vema*, *Hestia*, *Kathemerine*, *Neos Kosmos*, and *Rizospastes*.

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change. The author interprets interwar developments as a protracted crisis of national integration, leading to the demise of the Republic in 1935, and of parliamentary politics altogether less than a year later.

The book also addresses broader theoretical issues in its treatment of charisma, clientelism, and cleavages as complementary and interrelated models for mass politics. It draws on an unusual combination of analytical perspectives, concepts, and instruments—ranging from Gramsci to ecological regression—that are commonly developed and used in splendid isolation. Finally, this work fills an important gap in the comparative politics of Southern Europe.

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